ESSENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ATMEA TECHNOLOGY: THE ATMEA1 REACTOR
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1 ESSENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ATMEA TECHNOLOGY: THE ATMEA1 REACTOR Antoine VERDIER Business Development Manager BULATOM Varna / June 4 th, 2014 An AREVA and MHI Company
2 Introduction ATMEA Company Company name: ATMEA S.A.S. Office Location: Paris La Defense President & CEO: Andreas Goebel Deputy CEO: Satoshi Utsumi Establishment: November 2007 Scope of activities: Development, Marketing & Sales, Construction & Commissioning of 1100 MWe class Generation III+ ATMEA1 Nuclear Island Capital: 126 Million Euros A JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN 2 WORLD 50% NUCLEAR LEADERS 50% An 2 AREVA and MHI Company 2
3 ATMEA1 = compilation of MHI and AREVA nuclear technology Integrated design based on proven technology APWR Tomari 3 N4 EPR KONVOI An 3 AREVA and MHI Company 3
4 A proven and reliable design encompasses: design, licensing, manufacturing & construction, operation, maintenance and inspection Engineering and nuclear experts: More than 50,000 experienced nuclear professionals world-wide Strong in-house manufacturing capabilities: In-house state-of-the-art manufacturing workshops and technology which assures delivery schedule and high-quality Continuity in own manufacturing for more than 40 years Strong know-how maintained and developed AREVA/MHI Capabilities Reactor Pressure Vessel machining at AREVA Chalon St- Marcel Heavy Components Plant Steam Generators at MHI Kobe An 4 AREVA and MHI Company 4
5 Our Rich Experiences and Strong Support from France & Japan Nuclear Project Japan Government ECAs Utilities Support Typical Project requirements Proven and advanced technology Highest Standard of Safety Economical Efficiencies Fuel Supply and Radwaste Management Localization Human Resource Development Operation and Maintenance Regulatory & Legal framework Finance Support Support France Government ECAs Utilities Coordination ATMEA1 Gen III+ Plant Coordination Design development derived from ~130 PWR experiences Project management High quality in-house manufacturing Well known supply chain An 5 AREVA and MHI Company 5
6 Sinop Project in Turkey Status Government level (Japan and Turkey) On May 3rd, 2013, Inter-Governmental Agreement was concluded between Japan and Turkish Government In October 2013, Host Government Agreement was agreed between Turkish Government and IPP Company, which will become effective after the ratification by Turkish congress Investors level Consortium: MHI, Itochu (Japan), GDF SUEZ (France) and EUAS (Turkey) EPC contractor level EPC consortium MHI leadership Reactor Technology ATMEA1 1st unit commercial operation : 2023 An 6 AREVA and MHI Company 6
7 Outline of ATMEA1 Main Features Reactor Type Electrical output Frequency Core Steam Pressure 3-Loop PWR 1100 MWe class (Net) 50 Hz 157 Fuel Assemblies More than 7 MPa 1 Safety System Built-in diversity Severe Accident Management Airplane crash protection I&C 3-Train reliable active system with passive features + 1 diversified train Shutdown / cooling / I&C / power source for extreme conditions Core catcher / Hydrogen recombiners Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Vessel with a liner Fully Digital 1. Reactor Building Fuel Building 3. Safeguard Building 4. Emergency Power Source Building Nuclear Auxiliary Building 6. Turbine Building An 7 AREVA and MHI Company 7
8 Outline of ATMEA1 The Generation-III+ Reactor One Knows It Works Generation III+ reactor requires by definition improvements in safety and economy Active or passive systems is not the question Most advanced reactor models currently on offer feature both active and passive safety systems, but in variable proportions Active & passive Safety Systems need not be viewed as an either-or issue Active and passive systems are means to an end, not an end by themselves The actual bottom line is found in overall consistency, proven operational performance, reliability and ease of maintenance ATMEA1 provides: World top class safety with: More redundant and built-in diversified systems More layered defence-in-depth against hazards Stand-alone safety more than 7 days autonomy without off-site support Bring no emergency situation to public even in case of severe accidents Optimized life-time economy for 60 years by: Reliable operation by using experienced systems and components World highest plant efficiency and design availability These are ensured by feedback experiences from ~130 PWRs = Proven Design An 8 AREVA and MHI Company 8
9 Outline of ATMEA1 Chronology of the Design Development Fukushima accident 2006/ Conceptual Design IAEA Report ASN* Review Positive conclusion Definition of main features Project engineering manual Conceptual safety features CNSC* (Canada) Review Standard Detailed Design Positive conclusion Basic Design *ASN: French Safety Authority *CNSC: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Turkey Sinop NPP with 4 ATMEA1 Functional requirements Safety requirements General arrangement Japan/Turkey HGA Core system & component design Standard Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Japan/Turkey IGA An 9 AREVA and MHI Company 9
10 ATMEA Approach to First Lessons Leaned from Fukushima-Daiichi Accident Fukushima accident happened in the middle of the safety option review by ASN (French Safety Authority) ATMEA1 short-term lessons learned program was to validate the safety options of the design with regards to the particular type of accident of Fukushima Content of the WENRA s proposal for stress-tests Content of the ASN stress-tests towards the French operator Confirmation of design margin and absence of cliff-edge effect ASN review statement: ATMEA1 s safety options ensure an appropriate robustness to Fukushima-type extreme events Diversified Ultimate heat sinks and Power Sources Cooling of both the Reactor and the Spent Fuel Pool by each safety train and with diversified means Seismic classification Volumetric protection against Tsunami and flooding An 10 AREVA and MHI Company 10
11 ATMEA1 Robust Design ATMEA1 robust design with its redundant and diversified safety features ensures best-in class safety External hazards Large commercial airplane crash, Tsunami, Flooding, Earthquakes PROTECT Resistance against external hazards Extreme external hazards beyond plant design Consequence: If highly conservative design margins of PROTECTION are exceeded, partial damage to cooling system could happen COOL Ensure the residual heat cooling function by redundant safety features Very unlikely extreme conditions Consequence: Loss of cooling function could happen CONFINE No/very limited environmental impact even under extreme conditions An 11 AREVA and MHI Company 11
12 Advantage of ATMEA1 design Robust Design PROTECT Earthquake Symmetric layout of safety related buildings to avoid twist deformation of buildings against earthquake Large rectangular basemat to improve seismic stability Thickened outer walls against seismic shear force Japanese experiences against earthquake were fully utilized in ATMEA1 design Basemat An 12 AREVA and MHI Company 12
13 Robust Design PROTECT Tsunami and Flooding As the basis; Ground level is set as high enough to avoid consequences from a Tsunami Additionally; Electrical equipment and I&C equipment are located in upper floors All safety related buildings including Essential Service Water Building are protected with water-tight walls and doors (volumetric protection) Main control room Safety electrical boards Reactor Building Sea water pump Turbine Building Safeguard Building Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pit EL15.0m (standard design) UHS2 AACB UHS1 AACB: Alternative AC power source Building UHS: Ultimate Heat Sink EL: Elevation Level I&C: Instrumentation & Control Important safety equipment (higher than ground level or water tight compartments) Water tight wall, doors An 13 AREVA and MHI Company 13
14 Robust Design PROTECT Airplane Crash A ATMEA1 buildings are protected : By shielding (APC wall) : RB, FB, SAB By segregation : EPS buildings EPS B EPS A EPS X EPS C Ensures that: The reactor core remains cooled, the containment remains intact A APC shield wall Spent fuel cooling and spent fuel pool integrity are maintained No-offsite countermeasures necessary Section A-A An 14 AREVA and MHI Company 14
15 Power supply Robust Design COOL Reliable Cooling Systems Redundant cooling systems (front line systems) Reactor: 3 x 100% safety trains Fuel pool: 2 x 100% safety trains + 1 backup cooling system Redundant and diversified cooling chains (CCWS and ESWS) 3 x 100% safety trains plus one additional safety train (Division X) Each train has sufficient capacity for cooling Reactor core and Spent Fuel Pool Heat sink Division X has diversified cooling equipment and heat sink AAC Cooling chain Consumers Division A Division B Division C Division X UHS1 Sea or River water UHS2 Atmosphere through cell cooler Second Ultimate Heat Sink: more than 7 days autonomy An 15 AREVA and MHI Company 15
16 Robust Design COOL Diversified Water Source 2 diverse Heat Sinks Designed for an autonomy of 30 days Diverse 2 nd Heat Sink to cope with loss of main Heat Sink In very unlikely case of total loss of Heat Sinks.. Diverse access to water sources available on site EFWS, IRWSP in Nuclear Island (NI) Fire Fighting Tank outside NI Fire Fighting Tanks 100% emergency feedwater system EFWS (in safeguard building) EFWS Tanks Main Heat Sink Enough time to deploy off-site countermeasures even under very unlikely total loss of Heat Sinks IRWSP Ex. Fire trucks Diverse Heat Sink (Division X) An 16 AREVA and MHI Company 16
17 In case of Loss of Offsite Power.. Emergency Power Sources (EPS) will provide electricity Robust Design COOL Reliable Electricity Supply Redundant 4 Diesel Generators ensures very low possibility of Station Black Out (SBO) In very unlikely case of SBO. Additional Alternative AC power system (AAC) will provide electricity Diversified Gas Turbine provides the electricity for more than 7 days Power supply Emergency Power Source and Alternate AC: more than 7 days autonomy AAC Heat sink Cooling chain Consumers Enough time to deploy offsite counter-measures even under very unlikely SBO Ex. Power supply vehicle Division A Division B Division C Division X An 17 AREVA and MHI Company 17
18 Robust Design CONFINE Deterministic Approach for Severe Accident Mitigation Containment integrity is kept long term Entry in severe accident conditions Primary side heat-up RPV failure at low pressure Dedicated SA batteries Dedicated depressurization system Core catcher Feed necessary monitoring systems and key valves, ensures MCR habitability Avoid high pressure core melt Spread corium and prevent basemat degradation Release of hydrogen, pressure increase in containment Hydrogen recombiners Pressure resistant containment And annulus for confinement Severe accident heat removal system Prevent hydrogen explosions passively (Auto catalytic recombiners) An AREVA and MHI Company Prevent radiological releases Cool the corium on the long-term 18 18
19 Robust Design ATMEA1 Building up Public Acceptance No/very limited environmental impact even under extreme conditions Accidents not leading to core melt No countermeasures needed outside of the site Accidents with core melt No evacuation, sheltering, long term relocation outside of the site No restriction for the consumption of food outside of the site Confinement function is kept for long term by maintaining containment integrity even after a severe accident An 19 AREVA and MHI Company 19
20 Life Time Economy and Proven Design ATMEA1 also provide optimized Life-time Economy for 60 years Stable energy supply with proven and experienced systems / components + 10% more generation efficiency saving fuel cost and reducing waste generation Short outage duration <16 days with on-power maintenance capability ATMEA1 s safety and economical performances are ensured by feedback experiences from ~130 PWRs = Proven Design High quality in-house manufacturing capability in AREVA / MHI Systems and components used in ATMEA1 are running everyday in the world Design, systems and components are familiar with Operators and Safety Authorities. They know it works An 20 AREVA and MHI Company 20
21 ATMEA1 a reactor well suited to Bulgaria Secure baseload power supply thanks to an advanced Gen 3+ midsize reactor Withstands Fukushima-like accident thanks to highest safety standards Proven technology well known in Europe Access to full support of Japan and France (finance, technology transfer, ) Access to MHI and AREVA s 40 years of experience in design and construction Benefit of Turkish EPC project return of experience An 21 AREVA and MHI Company 21
22 MAIN SAFETY FEATURES OF THE ATMEA1 REACTOR MAIN SAFETY FEATURES OF THE AND ATMEA1 REACTOR ROBUSTNESS TO EXTREME AND SITUATIONS THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION ROBUSTNESS TO EXTREME SITUATIONS ANY QUESTION? An 22 AREVA and MHI Company 22
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