Coordination of International Disaster Relief during Great East Japan Earthquake A Perspective from Government Headquarters. Cabinet Office of Japan

Transcription

1 Coordination of International Disaster Relief during Great East Japan Earthquake A Perspective from Government Headquarters Cabinet Office of Japan

2 1. Institutional Arrangements Basic Disaster Management Plan Chapter 2 Emergency Response 1. When an offer for relief is received from abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should notify Government Disaster Management Headquarters of its type, size, expected arrival date and destination. 2. Government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer. 3. When Government Headquarters accepts the offer, a plan for facilitating relief should be prepared according to pre-defined policy, and be notified to the offering country as well as related ministries and local governments. Inter-Ministerial Agreement Potential Areas of International Relief and Responsible Ministries (partial list) Potential Areas Search and rescue (including handling of rescue dogs) Medical staff Food Water Daily essentials Monetary aid Responsible Ministries National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Agriculture (for quarantine), Ministry of Justice (for immigration) Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ministry of Justice (for immigration) Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Cabinet Office

3 Deputy Director Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Fire and Disaster Management Agency Director of Secretariat for Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters A:Management Team A-1:Situation Management A-2: Meeting/Press Conference A-3:Support of A-1 Executive Secretaries Concerned Ministries and Agencies Local Disaster Response Headquarters Management (Chief) General Affairs Management Dept. D:General Affairs Coordination Section D-1:Coordination of Duties at Cabinet Office D-2:Dealing with National Diet Matter E:Public Relations(PR) Team E-1:PR at Prime Minister s Office E-2:PR at Cabinet Office F:General Affairs Team F-1:Coordination of General Affairs F-2:General Affairs at Crisis Management Center in Prime Minister s Office F-3:General Affairs at Cabinet Office F-4:Dispatch of Staff F-5:General Affairs at Tachikawa Widearea Disaster Management Base F-6:Telecommunications Systems Response Dept. Information Dept. C:Response Section C-1:Coordination of The Section C C-2:Coordination of Corps Dispatch C-3:Coordination of Transportation C-4:Coordination of Supplies C-5:Coordination of Wide-area Medical Service B:Information Collection Section B-1:Coordination of The Section B B-2:Distribution of Materials B-4:Information Collection at Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters B-6:Mapping B-8:Operation of The Devices C-7: Coordination of International Relief CAO, MOFA, MOJ, FDMA B-3:Communication with Cabinet Office B-5: Damage/Response Information Input B-7:Chronology B-9:Support of B-1 I:Contact Persons to The Concerned Ministries and Agencies (Liaison) Management (Coordinator) Management (Liaison) Coordination of Each Function

4 2. Government Disaster Management Headquarters a. Structure of Headquarters Coordination Group (Group C) International Coordination Team (Team C7) b. International Coordination Team Functions: 1) Review offers of international relief 2) Coordination with related Ministries for facilitating relief work, once an offer is accepted Initial Capacity Started activities with 4 members, consisting of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Fire and Disaster Management Agency under supervision of Cabinet Office deputy-director. Gradually expanded Members from National Police Agency, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Land and Infrastructure are added. (8 members maximum)

5 c. Key Activities and Dates Evening, 11 Mar. Notification from MoFA of first international offers (8 offers as of 6pm) Night, 11 Mar. Establishment of team in Emergency Operations Centre (~ 10pm) 12 March Korea (1 st ) and Singapore SAR teams arrived, requested NPA to cooperate 13 March Germany, Switzerland, US, China, UK and NZ teams arrived, requested FDMA to cooperate (SAR teams continued to arrive during March) 14 March Relief goods from China (900 tents, 2,000 blankets and 200 flashlights) arrived (goods continued to arrive during March and April) 17 March Issued an advisory to relevant ministries on facilitation of international relief goods 20 March Launch of Headquarters for Supporting Lives of Disaster Victims 23 March MoFA issued an advisory to its diplomatic missions on needed goods 27 March Medical team from Israel arrived (the only full-fledged medical team) 30 March List of relief goods offered provided to affected municipalities 20 April Free domestic transport services provided by DHL 9 May Team downsized and merged with other teams

6 d. Outline of acceptance Personnel Aid i. Review of team capacities before arrival ii. Matching needs and offers iii. Assigning appropriate cooperating ministries iv. Facilitation of CIQ procedures 1,100 people from 21 countries came. Republic of Korea, Singapore, Germany, Switzerland, United States, China, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, Australia, France, Taiwan, Russia, Mongolia, South Africa, Turkey, India, Israel, Jordan, Philippine Supply Aid The basic policy: Accepting an offer only when offer matched the needs. The following list shows examples of relief supplies that Government Headquarters matched with needs. Canned foods (Indonesia and Kazakhstan), coats (Israel), socks (ROK), underwear and socks (Vietnam), water (ROK, Thailand), pouch food packages (Singapore), corn flakes (Thailand), tea bags (Sri Lanka), coffee beans (Tanzania), masks (Thailand), towels (Viet Nam), blankets (Mongolia, France, Turkey, ROK and Thailand)

7 e. Roles of Government Headquarters in Facilitating SAR Teams - Government Headquarters requested Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) and National Policy Agency (NPA) to cooperate with SAR teams. - At local level, liaison officers from MoFA coordinated with SAR teams. Executives MoD / SDF Offering Country Offer MoFA Mission Embassy Report MoFA Consultation and reporting Report Request to facilitate CIQ procedures Government HQ (Team C7) CIQ Ministries (MoF, MoJ, MHLW, MAFF) Request to cooperate Transport (as necessary) FDMA and NPA Prefectural DM HQs Coordination Deployment MoFA Liaison Coordination of activities Affected Area Coordination Logistic support Foreign SAR Team

8 f. Roles of Government Headquarters in Facilitating Relief Goods - C7 and MoFA directly contacted municipalities and matched their needs with offered goods. - Majority of goods were transported domestically by offering countries. Offering country Offering country Offer Shipment Order shipping MoFA mission Matching request / reply Embassy Forwarder Shipping fee borne by offering country Detailed info Narita Airport or other airport MoFA Government HQ (Team C7) Government HQs (Teams C3/C4) Matching request / reply Matching request / reply Shipping fee borne by offering country, aid agency or Government HQs Direct matching request / reply Government Local HQs Prefectural HQs Prefectural depot Information flow Needs SDF etc. Municipal HQs Municipal depot SDF etc. Needs Shelters

9 3. Lessons Learned About Personnel Aid a. Facilitation of SAR Teams From Early Stage It was practically impossible at earlier stages to match offered support with actual needs of disaster-affected area. In anticipation of future disasters rules and procedures for rapidly determining acceptance of foreign SAR teams should be developed. Entry of SAR teams into the country was facilitated smoothly by ministries responsible for customs, immigration and quarantine (CIQ).

10 3. Lessons Learned About Personnel Aid b. Domestic Transport of SAR Teams Self Defense Forces (SDF) had to provide transport services to number of SAR teams that did not have their own means of transport. At times of large disasters, as operating agencies will be occupied with their own operations and may lack capacity, it might be realistic to request offering countries to support their own SAR teams. Rationing gasoline for SAR teams along with domestic rescue agencies was difficult because of lack of gasoline throughout Japan.

11 3. Lessons Learned About Personnel Aid c. Coordination with Local Forces Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched its staff as liaison officers that accompanied SAR teams and supported their activities in affected area. It is necessary to formalise work of liaison officers by prescribing them in a manual.

12 3. Lessons Learned About Personnel Aid d. Support from US Forces Japan Initially there were some cases where Government Headquarters coordinated offers of support from USFJ. Majority of cases were handled directly by SDF or relevant ministries. Ministry of Defense later declared to serve as focal point for any kind of request to USFJ. Similar arrangements should be established in advance in preparation for future disasters.

13 3. Lessons Learned About Personnel Aid e. Medical Teams Along with SAR teams, offers of support to dispatch medical teams were made from various countries. Their acceptance was quite limited, however, because of lack of local needs. Affected communities feel reluctant to accept medical teams because of linguistic and cultural barriers. Measures to deal with potential complaints about injuries or damages by international SAR or medical teams should be prepared.

14 3. Lessons Learned About Supply Aid f. Matching offers with needs It was difficult to combine foreign relief goods whose specifications, amounts and arrival dates were unclear as part of supply stock, while it was urgent requirement for Team C4 to transport domesticallyprocured goods in large volume and at once. Team C7 decided to conduct matching based on local information it collected with support from prefectural international offices or through direct phone calls to municipal offices.

15 3. Lessons Learned About Supply Aid f. Matching offers with needs (continued) Matching of foreign goods takes time. Moreover, it takes a longer time to ship goods to Japan. It sometimes happened that needs vanished before goods arrived. For the future, it might be considered to accept foreign relief goods without completing matching. To do so, interim storage and domestic transportation should be resolved.

16 About Supply Aid 3. Lessons Learned g. Domestic transport and interim storage of goods Majority of foreign relief goods were transported domestically by offering countries. Some international organisations and private companies offered domestic transport free of charge. Other companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and management of warehouse for free. It is necessary to consider in advance who will offer domestic transportation and interim storage, and build an agreement with private companies, international organizations and NGOs.

17 For the future The most important learning is to clarify in advance conditions as much as possible and show them to offering countries. The Japanese government is in the process of revising the manual and will share the revised manual with you soon after it is done!