The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum

Transcription

1 Eurasan Journal of Busness and Economcs 2011, 4 (7), The Impact of Economc and Poltcal Factors on the 2010 Turksh Referendum Harun YÜKSEL *, Abdulkadr CIVAN **, Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN *** Abstract The referendum held on September 12, 2010 ncluded fundamental changes n Turksh consttuton related wth the socal, judcal and economc aspects. We are of the opnon that the referendum offered a general vew on the reflectons of government polces, snce the ncumbent party, Justce and Development Party (AKP), offcally supported the proposed changes and the man opposton partes, Republcan People s Party (CHP) and Natonalst Acton Party (MHP), were opposed. We tested the effects of poltcal tendences on the referendum results usng provncal data. The results show that the yes votes are hgher n the provnces where AKP has a stronger base, and lower n the provnces where the opposton partes, especally CHP, have stronger bases. Moreover, our analyses mply that referendum votes are hgher where economc condtons are gettng relatvely better n the last year. However, we could not fnd a postve effect of publc spendng on the patterns of votng. Keywords: 2010 Referendum; Turkey; Votng Patterns. JEL Classfcaton Codes: D72 * Correspondng author, Fath Unversty, Department of Economcs, e-mal: hyuksel@fath.edu.tr ** Fath Unversty, Department of Economcs, e-mal: kcvan@fath.edu.tr *** Fath Unversty, Department of Poltcal Scence and Publc Admnstraton, e-mal: egundogan@fath.edu.tr

2 Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadr CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN 1. Introducton A Plebscte, more commonly known as a referendum, s a means of makng decsons wthn the boundares of representatonal democracy, though the frequency of consultng ths vares n each country. Accordng to Türköne (2003) and (Dursun, 1990), referendum, as one of the promnent features of a plebsctary democracy, s the rght of the people to ntroduce ther choce drectly n a specfc ssue and to have a determnng feature. It can be consdered as a form of drect or partcpatory democracy. Andrew Heywood (1999) defned the reasons and areas for the applcaton of a referendum: A plebscte or referendum provdes an opportunty for the electorate to make a decson drectly on a specfc ssue, and t s out of the representatonal democracy, snce t s a dfferent applcaton from empowerng poltcans and allowng them to make decsons on behalf of the electorate. Whle a referendum can be held on every level of every ssue n Swtzerland, t can only be held for consttutonal regulatons n Ireland, and can be held for exclusve and mportant decsons lke EU membershp n England and n many other countres. The referendum held n Turkey on 12 September, 2010 was for the purpose of nvtng the opnon of the publc on a subject whch was not compromsed n the Parlament. Regardless of the concreteness of the subject, referendums n countres lke Turkey frequently set the scene for a showdown between the government and the opposton. It gves necessary space for the dscusson of fundamental problems, and provdes the opposton wth grounds to crtcze all government actvtes. There are some theores, such as the drectonal theory of electoral choce, proxmty model (Westholm, 1997) or the spatal theory (Blazer and Dreer, 1999) whch analyze choces n electons. The theores and models used n analyzng the electons or referendums results are mportant to obtan effectve evaluaton. The results of the September 12 referendum were expected to be affected sgnfcantly by economc condtons, regardless of soco-poltcal stuatons. Thus, whether economc factors have nfluenced the referendum results and whether they had a postve or negatve effect wll be studed n ths artcle. We are of the opnon that the referendum offered a general revew of government polces and the return of government nvestments to the publc wth ther many consequences. Although consderng the referendum result as data for the general electons s not qute accurate, stll t s mportant enough to be consdered. The referendum on September 12 ncluded consttutonal changes wth the clam of reformng the judcary extensvely and constructng a more democratc judcal system. Moreover, t promsed to brng approprate regulatons for EU standards whle extendng and developng fundamental human rghts and freedoms. The followng are the amended or reconsttuted consttuton artcles ncluded n the consttutonal reform package: the artcle on equalty before the law (artcle 10), Page 70 EJBE 2011, 4 (7)

3 The Impact of Economc and Poltcal Factors on the 2010 Turksh Referendum the prvacy of specal lfe (artcle 20), freedoms of travel and settlement (artcle 23), the rght to establsh a trade unon (artcle 51), collectve barganng, rght to strke and lockout (artcles 53 and 54), and restructurng the Supreme Councl of Judges and Prosecutors and ncreasng the number of ts members (artcle 159). Smlarly twenty- sx artcles of the Consttuton were changed. The referendum presented a dfferent pcture, snce people wth very dfferent poltcal deologes compromsed n the same drecton. Thus, t can be deduced that poltcal tendences are not the only agent n determnng the drecton of a referendum. Moreover, t s clamed that the opposton dd not support the reform package due to some dsagreements commonly known; they dd not oppose many of the amendments. The voter turnout n the referendum was %, whch s a hgh percentage for a Western democracy. Generally, the percentage of people votng Yes for consttutonal reform for democratzaton s %; whle t s % for no (ysk.gov.tr, 2011). Hence, consttutonal changes are agreed upon and appled. Naturally, many deductons beyond the man reason of holdng the referendum can be nferred on the bass of the referendum result. Even ssues that are not ncluded n the reform package are somehow related and used for poltcal campagns. It s partly because t s accepted as a vote of confdence for the approval of the government polces by both the government and the opposton. Although government partes are not usually content wth such an early vote of confdence, t s understood that Justce and Development Party (AKP) used ths referendum as an opportunty to seek approval by the publc for ts polces. It s clearly ndcated by the fact that both the government party and the opposton held naton-wde meetngs, etc. It was openly demonstrated that almost all the party organzatons as well as the electorate conceved ths as f t was a general electon result. 2. Economc Polces and ther Effects on the Referendum Results We wll focus on economc factors of the referendum results as well as consderng some of the other factors. It s known that socal and economc changes of the knd are thought to sustan the development of nstrumental poltcal competence (Krause and Marcus, 1984). We mght post that ths would affect levels of electoral msconduct n the general level of economc development n a country (Brch, 2007). It s approprate to begn by statng that there are many arguments that can answer the excess of the Yes votes n the referendum. Whle some of the arguments consttute the subject of ths artcle, some other mportant part of the arguments, even f worthy of analyzng, appear to be thematcally napproprate for ths artcle. We choose to restrct the subject of ths study to the explanaton of the correlaton between the electorate behavor and ratonal economc behavor wthn the context of referendum results. EJBE 2011, 4 (7) Page 71

4 Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadr CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN The naton-wde Yes decson as beng that the general electorate probably consders the polces and performance of AKP, who was n favor of the yes votes, are successful. The prevalent postve effects of the government polces create support for the choces and decsons of the government n favor of ts ctzens. Smlar to general electons, referendum s consdered as a poltcal actvty to dsplay that support by the electorate. Thus, a referendum becomes a mechansm to test the polces of a government that promotes a polcy of growng ts economy (Carlsen, 1999). The referendum results wll have a long-lastng nfluence on the Turksh economy whch s closely related to the nterpretaton, comprehenson and executon of the polces of the government and the opposton, and are sgnfcantly ted to these. It can be determned that certan data regardng the economc polces of the government and to what extent natonal and local nvestments contrbute, can be deduced through the referendum result. We wll attempt to examne whether short term (populst) nvestments made before the 12 September 2010 referendum affected the referendum result substantally. In the absence of strong poltcal and deologcal conscousness and especally n the absence of nteractons, voters tend to respond to the myrad of short-term forces that abound n electon campagns (Zuckerman, Valentno, and Zuckerman, 1994). Is there a drect proporton when the current referendum result detals are compared to the percentage of state nvestments per person n a specfc consttuency? Our nqury ndcates that there s not a drect proporton. In other words, the electorate not only makes a choce accordng to the abundance of state facltes that s/he benefts from, but the electorate makes choces under the nfluence of other factors, as well. As commonly accepted, t was predcted to see a hgher percentage of yes votes ndcated more support for the government party n economcally fast growng ctes. However a deep analyss of the referendum results presents a dfferent pcture. 3. Data and Methodology We propose several hypotheses about the poltcal and economcal explanatons of the referendum results and statstcally test them. In the referendum, ncumbent party, AKP, offcally supported the proposed changes and the man opposton partes, Republcan People s Party (CHP) and Natonalst Acton Party (MHP), opposed to those changes. We hypothesze that n the provnces where AKP has a strong base, the Yes votes would be relatvely more than No votes. Smlarly we hypothesze that n the provnces where CHP and MHP have a strong base, no votes would be relatvely more than Yes votes. In order to test these hypotheses, we obtaned the statstcs of the votes cast n favor of AKP, CHP and MHP n the 2009 local electons at the provncal level. It can be argued that snce 2009 local electons mght not represent the true tendences of voters n provnces because many other factors were effectve on the 2009 local electon results, ncludng the Page 72 EJBE 2011, 4 (7)

5 The Impact of Economc and Poltcal Factors on the 2010 Turksh Referendum personaltes of local canddates. However, many commentators clamed that 2009 electons were rather lke general electons than local electons, t was knd of referendum for the approval of AKP s polces on many ssues. We therefore beleve that usng partes vote shares n the 2009 electons s a vald way to measure poltcal tendences n each provnce 1. However, we used the vote shares of partes n the provncal assembly (İl Genel Mecls) rather than the votes for mayor. We consder that provncal assembly votes are representng party preferences more than nclnaton towards partcular mayor canddates. Next we turn to economc explanatons of referendum votng patterns 2. Our hypothess s that those ndvduals who are happy about the economc performance of the government would vote Yes n referendum. So we argue that ndvduals who are lvng n neghborhoods where the economy s growng relatvely faster, and where nflaton and unemployment rates are relatvely lower, would be satsfed by the economc performance of the ncumbent AKP, and would vote yes n the referendum. In order to measure the economc success of the ncumbent party, we need data about the ncome growth rate, nflaton rate and unemployment rate at the provncal level. Unfortunately, none of those ndcators are avalable at the provncal level for recent years. However, tax revenues can be used as proxes for ncome levels. Normally tax revenues are not deal proxes for ncome levels especally n countres lke Turkey n whch tax evason rates are substantal. However, we are nterested n changes n the ncome levels of each provnce rather than levels. Assumng there s not a substantal varaton n the changes n the tax evason rates between provnces n the relevant perod; we do expect that changes n tax revenues to be a good proxy for the changes n the ncome levels of provnces. An examnaton of the data from the perods ( ) n whch both ncome levels and tax revenues are avalable supports ths conjecture. The correlaton coeffcent between provncal ncome growth rates and provncal tax revenue growth rates s greater than 95%.Therefore; we have used monthly cumulatve general budget tax revenues obtaned from the webste of the General Drectorate of Publc Accounts 3. Socal transfer programs and other government expendtures can also affect the satsfacton of the voters from the ncumbent party polces. Durng the referendum campagn, t has been argued that government nsttutons were spendng extraordnary amount of resources n order to sway consttuents votes. Many concrete examples of socal transfer programs were dscussed n the mass 1 See Köksal, Cvan and Genç (2010) for more dscusson on that. 2 See the Lews and Stegmaer (2000) for a revew of nfluence of economc condtons on voters. Also see Akarca and Tansel (2006,2007), Baslevent et al (2005), Baslevent et al (2009), Carkoglu (1997,2008) and Köksal, Cvan and Genç (2010) for the applcatons of these theores on Turksh Electons. 3 See Köksal, Cvan and Genç (2010) for more on the use of tax revenues as proxy for ncomes. EJBE 2011, 4 (7) Page 73

6 Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadr CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN meda. 4 Consequently, we collected the government spendng data at the provncal level. In the same way that we obtaned the tax revenue data, the government spendng data was obtaned from the webste of the General Drectorate of Publc Accounts. Based on those hypotheses, we estmated the followng regresson: YES Where: = β β AKP CHP MHP β PubSpendng 5 + ε YES : The rato of yes votes to total votes n provnce. AKP2009 : The vote share of AKP n the 2009 electon n provnce. CHP2009 : The vote share of CHP n the 2009 electon n provnce. MHP2009 : The vote share of MHP n the2009 electon n provnce. β β + β Growth Growth : The ncrease n the average ncome level of resdents of provnce between the 2009 electon and the referendum. Pubspendng : The ncrease n publc spendng n provnce between the 2009 electon and the referendum. Below are the expected sgns of the coeffcents of the varables used n the regressons. Varable Expected sgn of the Correlaton Coeffcent between coeffcent Referendum yes votes AKP ,36 CHP ,84 MHP ,35 Growth + 0,12 Pubspendng + 0,10 The correlaton coeffcent between the relevant varable and the rato of Yes votes on the referendum s provded n the thrd column. All of these coeffcents have the expected sgns. We also conducted multvarable regresson technques to test our hypothess more robustly. In the regresson analyss standard Ordnary Least Squares (OLS) technque s used. Standard errors are adjusted for heterocedastcty. It can be argued that referendum votes are left censored snce the Yes votes cannot be negatve; so nstead of OLS technques, Tobt should be used. However mnmum rato of yes votes s n Tuncel (19%). So left censorng does not pose a problem. In any case Tobt estmates gve very smlar results. 4 4 For example, n many provnces government offcals dstrbuted coal, food and durable household tems to the needy. Many clamed these were part of poltcal campagn whle government offcals defended those as part of regular socal transfer programs. Page 74 EJBE 2011, 4 (7)

7 The Impact of Economc and Poltcal Factors on the 2010 Turksh Referendum 4. Results and Dscusson Descrptve statstcs of the varables used n the emprcal analyss of our study are reported n Table 1. In the referendum, the percentage of Yes votes was 57.8, however the results of the descrptve statstcs present that the mean of the provnces Yes votes s about 64 percent. The underlyng reason for ths dfference s the demographc structure of the provnces. If we use a populaton weght n the calculaton of mean, we can reach 57.8%, the overall Yes votes n the referendum. Manly ths statstcs shows that, the mean of the Yes votes of the provnces, wth a lower populaton, are hgher than that of the provnces wth a hgher populaton. Ths also shows that the dstrbuton of votes of n the larger provnces s more homogenous than n smaller provnces. Another statstc we can nterpret from the below table s that, whle the AKP share of the votes n the provncal assembly n the 2009 local electons changed from 20% to 55%, there are some provnces where the opposton partes almost have no vote for provncal assembly. For example, the man opposton party, CHP, was unable to have any of ts members elected n the provncal assembly n Hakkar. Table 1: Descrptve Statstcs Varable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mn Max Yes AKP CHP MHP Growth PubSpendng Emprcal results of the study are reported n Table 2 n detal. The followng equatons represent the estmated regressons of our study. As these estmatons present the purpose of the emprcal analyss, we chose to analyze the porton of the varaton n the Yes votes of referendum across the provnces that can be attrbuted to varatons n provncal poltcal and economc changes. In order to examne the poltcal and economc effects of the provnces on the Yes votes at the referendum separately, the followng three regressons were estmated. Equaton 1 represents the poltcal effect only whle the other two equatons nclude the economc effects of the provnces as well as poltcal effects. YES = AKP CHP MHP ε (1) YES = AKP PubSpendng + ε YES = AKP CHP CHP PubSpendng Growth + ε MHP MHP2009 (2) (3) EJBE 2011, 4 (7) Page 75

8 Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadr CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN The results for equaton 1 ndcate that poltcal explanatory varables (vote shares of the poltcal partes n the 2009 local electons) affect the Yes votes n the referendum sgnfcantly. The results further show that there s a postve relatonshp between the vote shares of AKP n local electon at provncal level and the Yes votes n the referendum and t s sgnfcant at 1% level of sgnfcance. Lkewse, the opposton partes vote shares have a negatve effect on the Yes votes as expected, and both coeffcents are sgnfcant at 1% level of sgnfcance. Accordng to the estmaton results, elastctes of coeffcents whch are reported n the margnal effects column ndcate that the percentage change that wll occur n one varable (y) when another varable changes one percent. That s, a one percent change n AKP vote shares ncreases the Yes votes 0.40 percent. On the other hand, a one percent ncrease n the CHP and MHP vote shares decreases the Yes votes 0.32 and 0.18 percent respectvely. The emprcal results also mply that, accordng to the estmated coeffcents of the opposton partes, as the estmated coeffcent of the man opposton party, CHP, s greater than MHP, the proporton of Yes votes s lower than n the provnces where CHP has a strong voter base than n the provnces where MHP has a strong voter base. Ths also ndcates that the proporton of MHP supporters who voted Yes s greater than CHP supporters. As ndcated n the data and methodology above, we took the ncrease n the provnces publc spendng and the average ncome level of resdents to explan the economcal effects on the Yes votes n the referendum. The estmaton results report that there s a negatve relatonshp between publc spendng and the Yes votes n the referendum. Whle the coeffcent s not sgnfcant, the expected sgn s also ncorrect. Ths result mples that ncumbent party polces such as socal transfer programs and other government expendtures do not affect the satsfacton of the voters. Also another explanaton can be made accordng to ths result. Ths s that the ncumbent party s socal transfer programs and other government expendtures are realzed n the provnces, where the rulng party s vote performance s average. The extraordnary spendng was not made n the provnces where AKP and the opposton partes have a votng base. Thus, we cannot explan a sgnfcant effect of PubSpendng on the Yes votes n referendum. 5 The other estmated coeffcents are sgnfcant at 1% level of sgnfcance and affect the Yes votes as expected. The detaled results can be seen n Table 2 from the equaton 2 estmaton results. Accordng to equaton 3, whle the PubSpendng varable s nsgnfcant for all the sgnfcance levels, we ncluded the Growth varable for the regresson to explan the economc effects on the Yes votes n the referendum. As mentoned above, growth mples the economc performance of the ncumbent party (AKP) at the 5 AKP s maxmum vote share was 54.7% at Konya and mnmum at Tuncel wth 19.7% n the 2009 local electons. Publc spendng growth between the 2009 local electon and the referendum for both provnces were below the average provncal publc spendng growth. Page 76 EJBE 2011, 4 (7)

9 The Impact of Economc and Poltcal Factors on the 2010 Turksh Referendum provncal level, and thus t s expected that t ncreased the votes for the ncumbent party. The estmated coeffcent of the provnces economc growth s sgnfcantly postve, ndcatng a percent ncrease n the economc growth of provnces ncreasng the Yes votes 0.01 percent. Ths result also mples that the economc success of the ncumbent party (AKP) at the provncal level has postve sgnfcant effect on the Yes votes. The estmated coeffcent sgns suggest that the ncumbent party ( Yes votes) would beneft from hgher economc growth, whereas the opposton partes would be nfluenced negatvely. 6 Table 2: Estmaton Results Dependent Varable: Yes votes Method: Ordnary Least Squares Equaton 1 Equaton 2 Equaton 3 Varables Margnal Margnal Margnal Coeffcents Coeffcents Coeffcents Effects Effects Effects c (8.80) * (11.74) * (11.56) * AKP (4.23) * (4.55) * (4.29) * CHP (-15.52) * (-14.49) * (-14.59) * MHP (-7.82) * (-7.40) * (-7.27) * PubSpendng (-0.44) (-0.51) Growth (1.71) ** R-squared F-statstcs Prob(F-statstcs) Number of Obs Note: Values n parenthess are t-statstcs. ***, ** and * denote sgnfcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectvely. We would lke to also emphasze that the coeffcents of the equatons and margnal effects of the coeffcents do not alter when addng a new varable to the regresson. Ths result mproves the relablty of estmaton results n our emprcal analyss. The R 2 value of the model ndcates that the explanatory varables we use n our analyss are able to explan 84% of the varaton n the Yes votes of the referendum. Almost 16% of the varaton n the Yes votes cannot be explaned by the partes vote shares n local electons and economcal changes at the provncal 6 Bngöl was one of the fastest growng provnce between the 2009 local electons and the referendum, therefore the Yes votes were about 95% n the referendum On the contrary, Hatay had relatvely less growth rate than the other provnces, the No votes were hgher than the Yes votes n Hatay. EJBE 2011, 4 (7) Page 77

10 Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadr CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN level. There must be other dfferences between the 2009 electons and the referendum whch nfluenced the Yes votes. As the R 2 values ndcate, although the explanatory varables are able to explan 83%, 84% and 84% of the varaton n the Yes votes for the three equatons respectvely, the economc explanatons seem to have no remarkable effect on the Yes votes. In the man, ths can be explaned the profle of the country s voters. In our country, poltcal partsanshp has come nto promnence n the present than ratonal economc behavor. In some provnces of our country, voters behavors do not change to corroborate the ncumbent party s success. 5. Concluson The September 12, 2010 referendum made substantal changes to the Turksh Consttuton. The ncumbent party, AKP, supported the proposed changes whle the opposton partes opposed them. At the end of the referendum, 26 artcles of the Consttuton were amended. Relatvely sgnfcant changes were made n the felds of the composton of hgher courts ncludng the Consttutonal Court, fundamental human rghts and labor market condtons. In ths study we have proposed several hypotheses regardng the poltcal and economc explanatons of the referendum results and test them statstcally. Our opnon s that even though the referendum was about on specfc ssues and most of the proposed changes were supported by a wde varety of poltcal and socal groups, the result s a reflecton of government polces. We hypothesze that the ndvduals who are happy about the government polces voted yes n the referendum. Frst we examned at the poltcal explanaton for the results. We analyzed the relatonshp between the referendum results and the votes receved by the man partes (AKP, CHP and MHP) n the prevous electon (2009). We found that n the provnces where AKP had relatvely hgher votes, the referendum yes votes were also hgher. On the other hand, n the provnces where CHP and MHP had relatvely hgher votes, n the referendum no votes were hgher. However ths effect was more pronounced for CHP. That mght mply that CHP was more successful than MHP on convncng ts party sympathzers to follow ts offcal polcy on the referendum. We also studed the effects of economc varables on the referendum results. By usng provncal level data, we tested whether the economc condtons had any nfluence over votng patterns. Indeed, the data supports the asserton that n the provnces where economc condtons were relatvely mproved more n the last year, the referendum votes were hgher. Fnally, we analyzed the mpact of government spendng on the referendum results. It has been argued that populst spendng and transfers by the government nsttutons were amng to ncrease the support for the proposed changes. However, we could not fnd any effect of government spendng on votng patterns. Page 78 EJBE 2011, 4 (7)

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