Japan s Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety

Transcription

1 Japan s Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) July 7, 2015

2 1. Promotion of Strategic Development of Technologies and Human Resources 2 <Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan> Decided by the Cabinet in April, Maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources is imperative for smoothly decommissioning aged nuclear power plants, which are expected to increase in the future, as well as TEPCO s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants. 2. Because enhancing the nuclear safety in surrounding countries ensures the safety of Japan, maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources which enable Japan contribute to their safety enhancement is essential. 3. GOJ promotes the development of technologies that contribute to safety improvement of LWRs including countermeasures against severe accidents and enhance their reliability and efficiency in order to reduce risks in case of an accident. 4. Under international cooperation, GOJ also facilitates R&D of nuclear technologies that serves the safety improvement of nuclear use, such as hightemperature gas-cooled reactors which are expected to be utilized in various industries including hydrogen production and which has an inherent safety.

3 1-1. The Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety In response to a request from the Nuclear Power Subcommittee, the Working Group presented issues from the public perspective, while the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) called upon their expertise to work out solutions and the draft of a roadmap. The roadmap for technology and human resources for LWR safety was formulated by bouncing ideas off each other. The objectives of this roadmap are to clarify roles among relevant personnel in academic societies, government agencies, electric utilities, manufacturers, and research institutes, and to serve as a common framework for implementing nationwide activities that will lead to improved safety of LWRs without overlapping efforts. This roadmap targets technologies that contribute to safety enhancements for LWRs, including the smooth and safe decommissioning of NPSs. (Note that technologies related to the disposal of radioactive waste that are the subject of the master plan for basic R&D on geological disposal (the R&D map) and technologies related to the decommissioning of TEPCO s Fukushima Daiichi NPS are to be included in another roadmap that will be transparent to the public, and hence are not covered in this roadmap.) This roadmap will be reviewed at least once a year. <Structure for formulating the roadmap> Requests formulation of the roadmap compatible with scenarios depicted in the Strategic Energy Plan General public/local site community Confirm Share Published on June 16, 2015 Share details of the formulation process in a transparent manner Nuclear Energy Subcommittee Working Group on Voluntary Improvement of Safety, Technology and Human Resource Present issues from public perspective Present solutions and roadmap draft AESJ Researchers and engineers involved in LWR safety participate in planning as individuals 3

4 Method of Evaluating the Priority of Issues based on Their Importance Eight evaluators selected from industry and academia rate each issue using an evaluation axis having two criteria: (A) effectiveness in enhancing LWR safety and (B) importance to the maintenance and development of technology and human resources for contributing to LWR safety enhancements. The evaluators rate each issue according to three levels of importance: (very important), (important), (less important). The evaluation axis is examined as part of the rolling process implemented by the AESJ in order to review evaluation items having overlap, to simplify expressions, and to review the rating method. Draw up the roadmap overview with issues arranged along a time axis based on their resolution timelines. Draw up the issue survey for issues that categorize each activity of technological and human resource development required for resolving issues in the roadmap overview into suitable groups. The issue survey includes a summary of the issues, a list of activities, the basis for adopting the issue, an analysis of the present condition, the anticipated effects, correlations with other issues, the process of implementation, and implementing and funding entities. Each issue is sorted into eight groups suggested by the Working Group in accordance with the anticipated effects of their resolution. (A) Effectiveness in improvement of LWR safety (Identify issues that are predicted to have effective outcomes) (1) Will contribute greatly to resolving issues revealed from the TEPCO s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident (2) Its resolution will be relatively effective in reducing risk (3) Is relatively cost-effective Any issue that has not been adequately defined or for which the stakeholders are not clear is not included in the roadmap. <evaluation axis> Each issue is given a rating of 0 to 6 points based on the two criteria (A) and (B) (with two points being allocated for each of (1) (3)). The priority of an issue is set based on the importance of issues determined from their ratings. (B) Importance to maintenance and development of technology and human resources to improve LWR safety (Identify issues that contribute to mid/long-term nuclear safety and needs of future generations) (1) May serve as a basic infrastructure shared by many nuclear power entities (2) May lead to a worldwide breakthrough in the field of LWR safety (3) May lead to the acquisition and cultivation of young human resources through the discussions on unprecedented challenges Note: (A) and (B) of the evaluation axis rate the importance of each issue from a short-term and a mid/longterm perspective, respectively. Formulate the roadmap with priorities assigned to issues 4

5 Conceptual image of the coverage of the roadmap 1 Advancement of utilization of risk information for existing light water reactors, etc. 6Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security 7Development of innovative technologies applicable to light water reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas General public/ local site community Communication with society International society Off site Continuous revising 4 Measures for minimizing off-site damage in the event of an accident ~2020 ~2030 ~2050 Defense in depth On site In plant 3 Measures for preventing on-site damage from expanding in the event of an accident 2Reduction of accident risk of existing light water reactors, etc. 主蒸気安 2 次系減圧弁 大気 補助給水系 蒸気発生器 RWSP 制御棒 非常用冷却ユニット高性能蓄圧タンク RWSP 低圧注入 8 Maintenance and development of human resources required for safe and continuous use of light water reactors ポンプ 5Safe decommissioning of existing reactors To firmly establish independent efforts for enhancing safety based on scientific basis and knowledge and to construct a framework capable of continually maintaining and developing technologies and human resources for LWR safety while incorporating international findings. To establish an international collaborative system based on public confidence in the framework and independent activities for safety enhancements and to make steady investments needed for ensuring safety while reducing residual risk so that nuclear power is used appropriately as an important base-load power source in the energy supply-and-demand structure. To further reduce the demerits and enhance the merits of nuclear power so that nuclear power plays a stable role in the sustainable energy supply and measures against global warming and to provide contributions to the international community in both technology and human resources. 5

6 Human resource development Sharing risk information with society Taking measures based on risk information Software Hardware Grasping various risks Roadmap for 1Advancement of utilization of information on risks of existing light water reactors, etc. Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Considering 1F accident to voluntarily reset safety targets Continuously executing studies to obtain information on risks related to safety targets (S101M101L102_z01, S103M102L101_b01) (S101M101L102_z01 ) 4.71, , , 3.71 Advancing analysis methods and utilizing latest technologies to refine information on risks of earthquakes and tsunami (S106_c04, S106_c05) 4.75, , 4.30 Grasping all risks of natural disasters and accidents other than earthquakes and tsunami and reviewing importance of measures (S106_c03) 4.43, 4.57 Based on latest knowledge and technologies, continuously grasping and refining all risks including those due to large-scale natural disasters (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01) Internationally sharing risk information in which uncertainty is limited and methods of utilization thereof (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01) Preparing methods and data to grasp risk information (S111_d13) 4.86, , , , , 3.71 Introduction and development of equipment utilizing information on risks due to large-scale natural disasters (S110_c10) 3.88,3.25 Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to accelerate risk reduction (S101M101L102_z01, S110M106L103_d02) Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to effectively utilize risk information(s101m101l102_z01,s110m106l103_d02, S103M102L101_b01) Utilizing risk information for management and decision-making (S111_d29, S102M101_a01, S102_a09) Reducing risks by improving management and decision-making based on latest risk information (M103L101_a04, 4.50, , , 2.88 S102M101_a01) 4.25, , 3.43 Having attentive discussions with society about risks of nuclear Having attentive discussions with society about risk reduction facilities (S103M102L101_b01) 3.86,3.71 targets of nuclear facilities (S103M102L101_b01) 3.86,3.71 Utilizing risk information to heighten skills for local and broader area disaster prevention (S104_b04, S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3) 4.13, , , , 2.38 Internationally sharing lessons learned from 1F accident (S110M106L103_d02) Developing human resources that can broadly observe various fields related to risks including frequency of occurrence of natural disasters Within Japan, developing human resources that are good at handling risk information Continuously developing equipment that effectively reduces risks including large-scale natural disasters that very rarely occur, and utilizing the knowledge for designing (S111M107L103_d42) Continuously taking actions to utilize effective risk reduction measures for designing and to design world-standard nuclear plants in which risks are minimized(s111m107l103_d42,s111m107l104_d 10, L103_d16) Introduction and development of equipment utilizing knowledge obtained from 1F accident (S111M107L103_d42) 4.50, , , , , , , , , , 3.71 Arranging management measures to minimize risks and organizations and schemes for them (S101M101L102_z01,M101L101_a02, M103L101_a04) Through attentive discussions, continuously reviewing safety targets so that they can socially be agreed (S101M101L102_z01) 4.71,4.43 Utilizing risk information to continuously heighten skills for local and broader area disaster prevention (S101M101L102_z01, S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3, M102L101L104_b08) 4.71, , , , , 4.13 Internationally sharing latest knowledge on risk information and safety targets to contribute to worldwide nuclear safety 3.50,3.13 (S110M106L103_d02) 3.50,3.13 Continuously accepting overseas trainees to training courses with regard to risk management 4.71, , Continuously developing and maintaining human resources that actively act in the risk management fields within Japan and overseas 6

7 Improving work environment Taking measures against degradation over time Preventing operational troubles Always incorporatin g new knowledge into safety measures Roadmap for 2Reduction of accident risk of existing light water reactors, etc. Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42) Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42) 4.50, , 4.00 Advancing plant technologies and operational management to prevent troubles Advancing operational performance (M107_d25) (S111_d29, S111_d30) 4.50, , , 3.88 Drastically improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42) Further clarifying behaviors of reactor cores and cooling water (S111M107_d17-1) 4.00, 4.50 Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown) (S111M107_d18-1&2,) 4.13, 4.00 Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities (S111M107_d24) 3.13, 4.13 Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant facilities (S111M107_d36) 3.50, 5.00 Realizing high operation rate and long-term stable operation (S111M107_d24) 3.13, 4.13 Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown) (S111M107_d18-1&2, M199L199_d20) 4.13, , 4.38 Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities (S111M107_d24, M199L199_d19) 3.13, , 4.38 Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant facilities (S111M107_d36) 3.50, 5.00 Advancing safety against earthquakes (M106_d40-2, M106_d40-1) 3.50, , 3.00 Efficiently using fuel with improved reliability (M199L199_d19, M199L199_d20) Realizing safe operation by very long-life plants (L104_d41) 4.50, , , 4.38 Advancing methods to evaluate material degradation (S111_d37) 3.50, 4.50 Further heighten performances of plant building structures and materials (M107_d38) 3.50, , 5.00 Developing state monitoring technologies for reduction of exposure and reducing loads to environment (S111_d32, S111_d33-1) Optimizing operation management and reducing loads to operators to ensure safe operation (M107_d34) Through technical innovation, reducing risks of exposure and loads of maintenance and operation to ensure safe operation (L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2) 4.38, , , , , 4.50 Human resource development Realizing safe operation Obtaining and maintaining on-site workers Maintaining human resources that can manage plants based on knowledge of phases from designing and construction to decommissioning Developing international human resources that have knowledge and skills necessary for stable and safe plant operation 7

8 Disaster prevention skills (outside of plant) Enhancing disaster prevention skills of society Organizati ons, etc. Improving skills to respond to accidents within power plant Preventing accident from broadening Management Knowledge and technologies Grasping impacts from outside of power plant Grasping impacts of disasters including natural disasters Roadmap for 3Measures for preventing on-site damage from expanding in the event of an accident and 4Measures for minimizing off-site damage in the event of an accident Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Human resource development Arranging technologies and schemes for observation and prevention of natural disasters (S105_a05, S107_c08) 4.50, Grasping impacts of disasters occurring outside of plant including natural disasters and aircraft crashes except earthquakes and tsunami and evaluating risks Reviewing SA measures based on latest international knowledge (S110_c10, S111_d13, S110M106L103_d02) 3.88, , , 3.13 Enhancing local disaster prevention skills against nuclear accidents through improvement of disaster prevention plans (S104M101L102_b02-1, S104M101L102_b02-2, S104_b04) 4.25, , , 3.13 Developing leaders and workers who are good at responding to accidents (S106_c03, S106_c07) 4.43, , 3.38 Establishing technologies for evaluation of impacts of earthquakes including fault displacements and slope failures. Systematizing tsunami-proof engineering (S106_c04, S106_c05) 4.75, , 4.30 Improving analysis codes and evaluation tools used to analyze behaviors during accidents including severe accidents (S112M107_d08) 5.00,4.88 Designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks(s111m107l104_d10) 4.63,5.13 Developing instruments and equipment used to better grasp the plant condition at time of occurrence of an accident (S111_d11-2, S111_d32, S111_d14) 4.75, , , 2.88 Developing, diversifying, and appropriately maintaining facilities and equipment to prepare for accidents (S111_d33-1, S111_d11-1, S111_d14, S104_c02, S111_d13, S111_d30) 4.38, , , ,3.38 〇 4.86, , 2.50 Optimizing management including improvement of management such as improvement of methods of communication with leaders and workers and introduction of new management methods (S105_a05, S102_a12) 4.50, , 3.25 Improving training manuals and training methods to advance training courses for preparation for accidents (S104_c02) 5.00,3.38 Optimizing organizational structure and functionality to enhance risk management skills of organizations (S104_c02, S102_a03) 5.00, ,2.75 Strengthening collaboration between plant and society (S104M101L102_b02-2, S104M101L102_b02-1, S104_b03) 4.50, , , 2.13 Arranging a scheme for introduction and utilization of dosimetry instruments that are available even in case of a broader area disaster in order to exactly grasp condition around plant at time of an accident (S104_b04) 4.13,3.13 Making efforts to increase human resources that can utilize scientific knowledge including that about natural disasters for improvement of nuclear plant safety Continuously optimizing observation schemes for observation based on latest knowledge and technologies Renewing latest knowledge about large-scale disasters including large-scale earthquakes and large tsunami that very rarely occur, improving methods for measurement of their impacts and evaluation of their risks, and continuing studies to reduce uncertainty (M104L103_c06) 4.71,4.29 Continuously improving methods to grasp and evaluate various behaviors including those due to large-scale disasters to reduce uncertainty related to evaluation (S101M101L102_z01, S103M102L101_b01) 4.71, , 3.71 Continuously designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks (S111M107L104_d10) 4.63,5.13 Including accident management to designing to lead to development of innovative technologies(s111_d12,m199l199_d20,m106_d06,s111m107l1 04_d10) 4.63, , , , 5.13 Based on international trends, improving severe accident management including that for large-scale accidents that very rarely occur to continuously reduce risks (M103L101_a04,M106_d07,S110M106L103_d02) 4.25, , , 3.13 Enhancing functions of emergency support organizations including introductions of new technologies and arrangement of schemes (M101L101_a02) 4.00,2.63 Strengthening collaboration between plant and society, improving local nuclear disaster prevention skills, and expanding the skills for broader-area disaster prevention (S104M101L102_b02-3, S104M101L102_b02-1, S104M101L102_b02-2, M103L101_a04) Developing human resources that can show leadership and lead multiple organizations to respond to accidents Developing technologies and schemes for observation and prevention of natural disasters to contribute to improvement worldwide natural disaster prediction Drastically reducing impacts of large-scale disasters that very rarely occur and uncertainty of risks (M104L103_c06) 4.71,4.29 Through utilization of innovative technologies and latest knowledge including those for large-scale disasters, designing world-standard light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks to contribute to worldwide nuclear safety (S111M107L104_d10,M199L199 _d19) 4.63, , 4.38 Utilizing innovative technologies and external emergency support organizations to arrange management that can minimize impacts to outside of power plant even in case of severe accidents including largescale disasters Through international standardization of management, contributing to worldwide nuclear safety (M101L101_a02, M103L101_a04, S110M106L103_d02) 4.00, , , 3.13 Utilizing nuclear disaster prevention skills including use of external emergency support organizations that have been enhanced, in order to enhance various, local and broaderarea disaster prevention skills (M101L101_a02,S104M101L102_b02-1, S104M101L102_b02-2, S104M101L102_b02-3, M103L101_a04) 4.38, , , , , , , , , 3.13 Developing human resources that can internationally act with regard to response to accidents Developing and retaining human resources that continuously study knowledge about large-scale disasters and accidents that rarely occur and can utilize the knowledge for safety improvement 8

9 Controlling wastes safely Introducing and developing technologies for safe dismantlement Creating a scheme for efficient decommissioning process Roadmap for 5Safe decommissioning of existing reactors Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Standardizing decommissioning plan (S113_d43) 3.00, 3.50 Considering methods for efficient decommissioning (S113_d43) Considering better reactor designs from decommissioning (M107_d47) 2.88, , 3.50 Considering use of site (M107_d48) 2.25, 2.50 Developing technologies for safe dismantlement (S113_d44) 3.63, 4.13 Using technologies and ideas used in foreign countries and at 1F site (S113_d44) 3.63, 4.13 Standardizing dismantling technologies (M107_d47) 2.88, 3.13 Operating sites while getting consensus (L103_d49) Considering schemes and methods to reduce and reuse wastes (S103_b05) 2.75, 3.00 Obtaining people s understanding of the way of waste disposal (S103_b06) 4.00, 3.00 Operating and managing disposal sites (M107_d46) Developing technologies to construct disposal sites (S113_d45) 3.50, , , 2.38 Human resource development Developing human resources that can predict the ways of use of nuclear power that are consistent with decommissioning plan and the relationship with the energy policy Continuously maintaining human resources that can manage the safe decommissioning process Developing human resources that can contribute to safety of light water reactors by entirely grasping plant life cycle from designing through operation and maintenance to decommissioning 9

10 Contributing to international efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear security (Educating and developing human resources) Improving schemes of plant operation and management from viewpoint of security Improving plant designs from viewpoint of security Roadmap for 6Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Incorporating nuclear security measures into designs to expect a synergistic effect of reduction of accident occurrence risks (S109M104L103_c12, S109M104L103_c11) 3.88, , 3.00 Continuously improving both nuclear security measures and safety measures (S109M104L103_c12, S109M104L103_c11) 3.88, , 3.00 Introducing concept of resistance against nuclear proliferation and considering improvement of safeguard effectiveness by designing and improvement of difficulty of radioactive material diversion (S109M104L103_d26) 2.88, 3.50 Developing technologies and schemes to detect nuclear security threats (S109M104L103_d28) Deriving performance standards for designs with high resistance against nuclear proliferation and demonstrating their effectiveness (S109M104L103_d26) 2.88, 3.50 Establishing technologies and schemes to reduce risks by nuclear security threats as much as possible (S109M104L103_d28) Establishing nuclear plant management systems dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful use (S109M104L103_c12,S109M104L103_d28, S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11, S109M104L103_d26) 3.50, , 3.38 Analyzing computer security threats to continuously advance the Grasping computer security state (S109M104L103_d27) protection measures (S109M104L103_d27) 3.13, , , , , , , 3.50 Through efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear security at facilities within Japan, obtaining reliability from people and international society Arranging a scheme to effectively developing human resources that are responsible for plant operation, etc. based on mutual understanding of safety and security Japan should actively contribute to international problems of nonproliferation and nuclear security Making efforts to educate and develop human resources by qualifying systems with regard to nuclear security education, etc. While the international framework is advanced for measurements for non-proliferation and nuclear security, human resources from Japan should highly contribute to the operation of it Giving enlightenment and education to countries newly introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and supporting establishment of education organizations (centers of education: COE) Supporting independence of education systems in countries newly introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and establishing a network with education organizations (COE) Establishing and developing an unremitting network with education organizations (COE) in countries newly introducing nuclear power plants and other countries 10

11 Realizing and maintaining safe operation by innovation of designs and technologies Roadmap for 7Development of innovative technologies applicable to light water reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Introducing innovative technologies into plants while continuously improving reliability of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42) 4.50, 4.00 Incorporating accident management into designing to lead to development of innovative technologies (S111_d12, M106_d06, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d20,) 4.63, , , , 4.38 Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown) (S111M107_d18-1, S111M107_d18-2, S111M107_d24, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19) 4.13, , , , , 4.38 Through utilization of latest knowledge including that for large-scale disasters, designing international-standard light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks in order to contribute to international nuclear safety (S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19, M199L199_d20,) 4.63, , , 4.38 Developing state monitoring technologies for reduction of exposure and optimizing operation management to reduce loads to maintenance and operation staff and to ensure safe operation (S111_d32, S111_d33-1, M107_d34) Through technical innovation, reducing exposure risks and loads to maintenance and operation to ensure safe operation (L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2) 4.38, , , , , 4.50 Establishing nuclear plant management systems dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful use ( S109M104L103_c12,S109M104L103_d28,S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11, S109M104L103_d26) 3.88, , , , , 3.50 Human resource development Developing young resources from medium- and long-term viewpoint to retain resources that are responsible for future nuclear safety 11

12 (Ref.) Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) 1 ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet (A) Effectiveness of safety improvement for light water reactors (B) Technological / human resource maintenance / development that contributes to safety improvement for light water reactors Overall assessment of importance (A) (B) S101M101L102_z01 Safety goal setting and risk recognition in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident S102_a03 (During normal operation) Optimization of organizational structure/functional division S102_a09 Sophistication of organizational management toward risk information utilization S102_a12 Framework building and human resource development toward comprehensive decision making based on risk information (including uncertainty) Launching an examination of a structure for utilizing risk information (including related human resource S102M101_a01 development) Establishment of a structure for utilizing risk information (standardization of sophisticated risk S103M102L101_b01 Conduct of communication utilizing risk information S104_b03 Efforts for smooth cooperation between on-site SA countermeasures and off-site emergency preparedness S104_b04 Provision of external event information useful for effective emergency preparedness measures S104_c02 S104M101L102_b02-1 Sophistication of emergency procedures and training for responding personnel (strengthening of response capabilities to accident, etc.) Strengthening of cooperation between nuclear emergency response organizations/structures (including involvement with local emergency preparedness) S104M101L102_b02-2 Efforts for smooth information linkage between on-site and off-site emergency preparedness S104M101L102_b02-3 S105_a05 S106_c03 S106_c04 S106_c05 S106_c07 Preparedness for nuclear emergency response that takes into account wide-area emergency preparedness (promotion of on-site and off-site cooperation) Sophistication of criteria for information sharing and decision making in emergency response (sophistication of environmental impact assessment and event progress prediction) and training on Early identification of risks caused by external events other than earthquakes and tsunamis, and extraction of external events to be examinated continuously Establishment of techniques for assessing safety/securing safety for nuclear plant against tsunamis (systematization of tsunami-protection engineering) Establishment of a technique for earthquake impact assessment used for risk assessment (including assessment of risks such as fault displacement and slope failure) Operation control that takes into account external events (occurrence prediction technique, impact assessment technique, etc.) S107_c08 Establishment of a structure for surveying/monitoring low-frequency external events S110_c10 Achieving a framework for continuous efforts for new findings on external events (natural phenomena, etc.) S110M106L103_d02 Participation in formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident Contribution to formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events S111_d11-1 Diversification and sophistication of the final heat sink S111_d11-2 S111_d12 Diversification and sophistication of SA instrumentations and SA equipment, and equipment design technology Fundamental improvement of accident controllability through efforts for design that comprehensively considers layers 1 to 3 (design) to layer 4 (AM countermeasure) and layer 5 (emergency preparedness) of S111_d13 Improvement of the risk assessment method and its application to SA countermeasures S111_d14 Optimization/sophistication of operation management of SA components S111_d29 Sophistication of maintenance/operation control through risk information utilization

13 (Ref.) Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) 2 ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet (A) Effectiveness of safety improvement for light water reactors (B) Technological / human resource maintenance / development that contributes to safety improvement for light water reactors Overall assessment of importance (A) (B) S111_d30 Establishment of maintenance control of SA components S111_d32 S111_d33-1 Sophistication of state surveillance/monitoring techniques (precursor monitoring/diagnosis, remote monitoring/diagnosis, etc.) Sophistication of exposure reduction technologies (water quality management technology, remote operation/robot technology, radiation protection technology) S111_d37 Increase in reliability of structural material S111M107_d17-1 Sophistication of technique for assessing core/thermal-hydraulic design S111M107_d18-1 Reliability improvement and sophistication of fuels S111M107_d18-2 Reliability improvement of fuels (establishment of fuel standards, etc. and clarification of safety margin assessment method) S111M107_d24 Sophistication of plant operation technology and core design control S111M107_d36 Sophistication of ageing assessment method/countermeasure technique S111M107L103_d42 Reliability improvement and sophistication of systems, structures and components (SSC) S111M107L104_d10 Establishment of global-standard light water reactor design with strengthened resilience S112M107_d08 Sophistication of the safety analysis method M101L101_a02 M102L101L104_b08 Strengthening of the response capabilities of the emergency organization for minimizing the risk of the whole plant (strengthening of external support, etc.) Establishment of an innovative technology and a light water reactor system that will achieve waste and TRU reduction M103L101_a04 Establishment of risk governance for responding to large-scale natural disasters M104L103_c06 Continuous contribution to reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external events Continuation of research on reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external M106_d06 Deepening and implementation of defense in depth according to the safety improvement M106_d07 Development of specific criteria for judging whether or not to restart operation after external events such as earthquakes, and their sophistication M106_d40-1 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (buildings) M106_d40-2 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (components) M107_d25 Sophistication of running performance (event progress suppression, shutdown function, L/F, etc.) M107_d34 Reduction of burdens on maintenance staff/operators through streamlining and labor saving of maintenance/operation control M107_d38 Sophistication of building structures and materials M199L199_d19 Pursuit of life extension of fuels by developing an innovative technology (material development, etc.) and reviewing the fuel concentration M199L199_d20 Development of a fuel/control rod resistance to accidents L103_d16 L104_d35-1 L104_d35-2 L104_d41 Development of a design technology/maintenance control method for minimizing the whole plant risk posed by external events Application of an innovative technology (automation of maintenance/operation, etc.) that increases the effect of maintenance and supports operation Application of an innovative technology (remote operation, robot technology) that minimizes the exposure risk Development of an innovative technology (material development, etc.) for ultra-long life plant operation (operation for over 60 years)

14 (Ref.) Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) 3 ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet (A) Effectiveness of safety improvement for light water reactors (B) Technological / human resource maintenance / development that contributes to safety improvement for light water reactors Overall assessment of importance (A) (B) S103_b05 Achievement of clearance cycle S103_b06 Securing of disposal sites S113_d43 Establishment of a method for establishing a decommissioning plan based on the past record of decommissioning, and its review based on the past record of decommissioning S113_d44 Disassembly of components with high radioactive level S113_d45 Improvement of social acceptance by establishing technique for designing/assessing disposal sites M107_d46 A rational method for managing L3 disposal facilities for decommissioning M107_d47 Reflecting the past record of decommissioning in the plant M107_d48 Reuse of buildings/sites after plant component removal L103_d49 Support for site release after plant component removal S109M104L103_c11 Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (formulation of a crisis management/emergency response plan, etc.) Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (establishment/assessment of a structure ) Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (internationalization) S109M104L103_c12 Assessment of the impact of the strengthening of nuclear security measures on the safety measures Examination of the safety risk posed by man-made hazards Integration of safety and nuclear security in defense in depth S109M104L103_d26 Examination of applicability of the nuclear proliferation resistance concept Derivation and demonstration of the effectiveness of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear proliferation S109M104L103_d27 Application of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear proliferation Computer security - analysis of threat and defense from it Computer security - sophistication of defense Computer security - further sophistication of defense S109M104L103_d28 Development of a method for detecting nuclear security threats Development of a monitoring/detection system using big data Management with nuclear security threat risk reduced to the extent possible

15 Appendix

16 1. Nuclear Energy Policy in the New Strategic Energy Plan of Japan 16 <Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan> Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014 Nuclear power is an important base-load power source as a low carbon and quasidomestic energy source, contributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure, on the major premise of ensuring of its safety, because of the perspectives; i. superiority in stability of energy supply and efficiency, ii. low and stable operational cost and iii. free from GHG emissions during operation.

17 1-1. Dependency on nuclear power generation 17 <Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan> Dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the extent possible by energy saving and introducing renewable energy as well as improving the efficiency of thermal power generation, etc. Under this policy, GOJ will carefully examine a volume of electricity to be secured by nuclear power generation, taking Japan s energy constraints into consideration, from the viewpoint of stable energy supply, cost reduction, global warming and maintaining nuclear technologies and human resources. GOJ has started discussion on the energy mix in the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy and established a new experts Working Group to examine cost of each power source. The draft proposal on the energy mix has just been shown by the Advisory Committee in the end of April 2015 and this proposal will be further discussed toward the final conclusion.

18 Capacity Factor Operation Year (Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency <Projected costs of generating electricity (2014 model plant)> Nuclear Coal LNG Wind 70% 40 years 70% 40 years 70% 40 years 20% 20 years 83% 40 years Operation & management Geothermal Hydropower 45% 40 years Small- & mediumhydraulic 60% 40 years Biomass 87% 40 years Oil 30 10% 40 years Solar (10kW more) 14% 20 years Solar (less than 10kW) 12% 20 years Gas cogeneration 70% 30 years Oil cogener ation 40% 30 years Generation Cost Yen/kWh 10.1~ (8.8~) 12.3 (12.2) 13.7 (13.7) 21.6 (15.6) 16.9 (10.9) 11.0 (10.8) 23.3 (20.4) 29.7 (28.1) 30.6 ~43.4 (30.6 ~43.3) 24.2 (21.0) 29.4 (27.3) 13.8 ~15.0 (13.8 ~15.0) 24.0 ~27.9 (24.0 ~27.8) Yen/kWh Sensitivity analysis Additional safety measures cost doubles Decommissioning cost doubles Decommissioning and compensation cost increases by 1TYen Reprocessing and MOX Fuel fabrication cost doubles The result of the sensitivity analysis of the change in fossil fuel price Nuclear Coal LNG Wind Geothermal Hydropower Small- & Sensitivity analysis of the fossil fuel price change The impact of the 10% change of the fossil fuel price(yen/kwh) Coal ± ~ ~ Biomass Oil Solar (10kW more) 2 Capacity factor in 2011 calculation Coal:80% LNG:80% Oil:50% 10% 3 () : Costs without policy related cost Solar (less than Deduction of heat value (6.3~7.0) ~ ~ Gas Deduction of heat value (7.7~9.3) Oil cogeneration cogeneration Legend Policy related cost Accident risk cost CO2 Fuel Additional safety measures cost medium- Capital hydraulic 10kW) Source Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 7 th Working Group on Verification of Power Generation, Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 18 LNG ±0.9 Oil ±1.5

19 (Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency The nuclear power generation cost is estimated with consideration not only for cost directly related to power generation, but also for future cost such as decommissioning cost, nuclear fuel cycle cost including cost for permanent disposal of radioactive waste, accident risk cost including damage compensation cost and decontamination cost, social cost, namely policy related cost including subsidies for power plant siting and R&D expense for Monju and etc. Social cost Power generation cost Nuclear power generation cost 10.1Yen/kWh~ Accident risk cost 0.3Yen~ Policy related cost 1.3Yen Nuclear fuel cycle cost 1.5Yen Additional safety measures cost 0.6Yen Operating and maintenance cost 3.3Yen Capital cost 3.1Yen Capacity: 1.2GW Operating rate: 70% Discount rate: 3% Operating period of plant: 40 years Accident risk cost (0.3Yen/kWh~) The accident response cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is estimated 12.2TYen which can be corrected to 9.1TYen in consideration of power output of model plant and etc. The lower limit of the estimated value is presented because the damage compensation cost can increase in the future. The accident risk cost will increase 0.04Yen/kWh as decommissioning and compensation cost increases 1TYen. Policy related cost (1.3Yen/kWh) The cost contains 345BYen (2014FY) subsidy for power plant siting (130BYen/year) and R&D cost for Monju (130BYen/year) and etc. Nuclear fuel cycle cost (1.5Yen/kWh) The half of spent fuel is stored for 20 years and reprocessed after that, and the other half is stored for 45 years and reprocessed after that. The cost contains front-end cost (0.9Yen), back-end cost (total: 0.6Yen, reprocessing : 0.5Yen, high-level radioactive waste:0.04yen). Additional safety measures cost (0.6Yen/kWh) Add 60.1BYen which is the estimated cost for additional safety measures for new regulation Operating and maintenance cost (3.3Yen/kWh) Employment cost (2.05BYen/year), repair cost (2.2%), overhead cost (8.44BYen/year) Capital (3.1Yen/kWh) Building cost (0.37MYen/kW(440BYen/plant)), fixed asset tax (1.4%) decommissioning cost (71.6BYen) Source Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8 th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 19

20 (Ref.) Energy Best Mix Outlook of Composition of Electric Power Sources Composition of electrical sources and electricity generation(billion kwh) 2030 Oil % Coal % LNG % Nuclear power 231.7~ ~20% Renewable energy 236.6~ ~24% Total % 2030 LNG 27% (approx.) Coal 26% (approx.) Average in the last 10 years before 3.11 LNG 27% Coal 24% 2030 Solar % Wind % Geothermal 10.2~ ~1.1% Hydropower 93.9~ ~9.2% Biomass 39.4~ ~4.6% Oil 3% (approx.) Renewable energy 22~24% (approx.) Nuclear power 22~20% (approx.) Oil 12% Renewable energy 11% Nuclear power 27% All the numbers are approximate Source Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8 th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 20

21 1-2. Mid-and-Long Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPPs Present Dec Nov Dec to 40 years in the future Efforts to stabilize the NPP Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Cold shutdown achieved Achieve cold shutdown Significantly reduce radiation releases Fuel Removal from Spent Fuel Pools of Unit 1-4 Unit 4 (Removal was completed) Fuel Debris Removal from Unit 1-3 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Period up to the start of the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (within 2 years) 1 2 Period up to the start of the fuel debris removal (within 10 years) 3 Preparing for rubble removal Dose reduction is underway Rubble removal & dose reduction is underway Dose Reduction, Leakage Identification & Stop Leakage, Technology Development for Debris Removal Steps for Spent Fuel Removal ; 1Rubble Removal & Dose Reduction 2Installing Fuel Handling Machine 3Fuel Removal Installation of Fuel Debris Removal Equipment Period up to the completion of decommissioning measures (30 to 40 years in the future) Fuel Debris Removal The current Roadmap was revised in June, The Government of Japan is now in the process of the revision, taking account of the Strategic Plan which NDF has just released on April

22 1-2. R&D Activities for Decommissioning Governmental total budget from FY2011 to FY2016 for decommissioning and contaminated water management is BY. 1. Spent Fuel Management 2-1 Decontamination inside R/B 2-3 Investigation and Analysis inside Reactor Robot investigation Muon detection SA code analysis etc. Robot machine etc. 2-2 Water Confinement of PCV Remote grouting etc. 2-4 Retrieval of Fuel Debris Remote retrieval system Criticality control Transfer & Storage etc. NARAHA Remote Technology Development Center (Mock-Up Test Facility) 3. Radioactive Waste Management OKUMA Analysis and Research Center (Radioactive Material Analysis and Research Facility) 22

23 1-3. Existing Light Water Reactors 23 <Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan> On the premise that safety comes before everything else and that every possible effort is made to resolve the people s concerns, judgment as to whether nuclear power plants meet the new regulatory requirements will be left to the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). In case that the NRA confirms the conformity of nuclear power plants with the new regulatory requirements,which are of the most stringent level in the world, GOJ will follow NRA s judgment and will proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants.

24 Tsuruga 28 Kashiwazaki Kariwa Shika 21 9 (Ref.) Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (As of July 1, 2015) Tomari Onagawa Mihama Ohma Higashidori(Tokyo) Higashidori(Tohoku) Ohi Takahama Shimane Genkai Permitted in Feb Sendai Ikata Permitted in Sep Hamaoka BWR PWR 27 Reactor-type Tokai ABWR Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daini Under NRA Review for basic design and concept (Total 25 Units) Capacity Age (Applied Date for NRA Review) Not Start Operation 24

25 **Based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 25 (Ref.) Outline of processes for restart of NPPs Safety Reviews and Inspections process of NRA Review of basic design and concept (for permission of reactor installment license change) Date Reactor Applicant *Not required by the nuclear Sep. 10 reactor Sendai law NPS, 2014 Feb Permitted reactors Unit 1 and 2 Takahama NPS, Unit 3 and 4 Kyusyu Electric Power Kansai Electric Power Review of detailed design (for approval of construction works plan) Assessment of Operation management systems, etc. (for approval of operational safety programs Date Reactor Applicant Date Mar May Approved reactors Sendai NPS, Unit 1 Sendai NPS, Unit 2 Kyusyu Electric Power May Local acceptance process * No legal requirements Local acceptance process Disaster prevention and evacuation plan *Not a legal prerequisites for restart Preparation and enhancement of the disaster prevention and evacuation plan

26 1-4. GOJ s Stance on Spent Fuel Management (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy) <Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan> Promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle policy 1. GOJ will make efforts to reduce the volume and harmfulness of radioactive waste and create a nuclear fuel cycle that contributes to effective utilization of resources while adequately taking the past history into consideration and continuing to seek the understanding of relevant municipalities and the international community and will promote reprocessing and plutonium use in LWRs. 2. Specifically, GOJ will promote plutonium use in LWRs, and proceed with such measures as completion of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, construction of a MOX fuel processing plant, and completion of the Mutsu interim storage facility on the underlying premise of ensuring safety. GOJ remains committed to the policy of not possessing reserves of plutonium without specified purposes. Also GOJ will promote R&D of fast reactors, etc., through international cooperation with the U.S. and France etc. 3. GOJ will position Monju as an international research center for technological development, such as reducing the amount and toxic level of radioactive waste and technologies related to nuclear nonproliferation. GOJ will take necessary measures for issues to be overcome, such as the re-establishment of systems to implement the above mentioned actions on its own responsibility. 26

27 (Ref) Current situation of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new safety standards which were enforced in December JNFL now plans to complete the RRP in March Apr.2001 Water Tests Sep.2004 Nov.2002 Chemical Tests Dec.2005 Dec.2004 Uranium Tests Jan.2006 Completion (Planned) Mar.2006 Active Tests Mar.2016 (Planned) 27

28 (Ref) Current Situation of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant Although JNFL started construction work of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October 2010, construction work was interrupted temporarily by the influence of the earthquake etc. In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new regulations which were enforced in December JNFL now plans to complete the MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October Maximum fabrication capacity 130 ton-hm / year Products MOX fuel assembly for domestic Light Water Reactors(BWR and PWR) Size of main building Location place Construction cost 85 m x 85 m 3 basements, 2 elevated Neighborhood of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 210 billion yen Progress of construction: 8.6% (September 2014) 28

29 (Ref.) Japan-France Cooperation on ASTRID Project - Outline of Cooperation - General arrangement GENERAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATIONBETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT A L ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES ALTERNATIVES, THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY was signed on May 5 th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019). Implementing Arrangement IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT À L ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ÉNERGIES ALTERNATIVES, AREVA NP, JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., AND MITSUBISHI FBR SYSTEMS, INC. was signed on August 8 th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019). Japan and France are cooperating SFR development, including ASTRID program in the area of plant system design and R&Ds (Component and analysis code development, Measures for severe accident, Fuel). General Arrangement Signing Ceremony at Palais de l'élysée (May 5th, 2014) 29