Facts, Lessons Learned and Nuclear Power Policy of Japan after the Accident

Transcription

1 Facts, Lessons Learned and Nuclear Power Policy of Japan after the Accident January 24, 2012 Akira Izumo Deputy Director Nuclear Energy Policy Division Agency for Natural Resources and Energy Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

2 Table of Contents 1. Facts and Figures 2. Lessons Learned from the Accident 3. Nuclear Energy Policy of Japan 1

3 1. Facts and Figures KYODO NEWS 2

4 Earthquake and Tsunami Casualties : over 23,400 Dead : over 15,000 Missing: over 3,500 Injured over 5,900 Tsunami: 14 meters or higher Earthquake: M quake (March 11, 2011) M - 7 class 6 times M - 6 class 96 times M - 5 class 580 times (As of December 1st) (As of January 10 th ) TOKYO Fukushima Dai-ichi 3

5 Earthquake Onagawa NPS Epicenter Tokyo Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, Dai-ni NPS Earthquake Intensity Level 7 Level 6 upper Level 6 lower Level 5 upper Level 5 lower Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 3 JMA (Japan Meteorological Agency) 4

6 Tohoku District - Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake Occurrence Time: 14:46 (JST) on March 11, 2011 Size: Magnitude 9.0 *the largest earthquake in Japan s recorded history Hypocenter: approximately 130 km off the coast of Sanriku Depth: approximately 24 km Distance (btw. the hypocenter and Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (NPS)): approximately 180 km 5

7 Tsunami hit Tohoku Area of Japan Inundated Areas: up to 561 km 2 - Miyagi Prefecture: 327 km 2 - Fukushima Prefecture: 112 km 2 - Iwate Prefecture: 58 km 2 (Data: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI)) Residential Buildings Damage: about 475, 000 (Sources: Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters) First wave: 15:27 (JST) on March 11, 2011 Second wave: 15:35 (JST) Height of the Tsunami (estimate): 14 ~ 15 meters *the waves and height observed at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS 6

8 Nuclear Power Stations in Tohoku Area 7

9 TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit6 Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit5 Fukushima Prefecture Unit1 Fukushima Daini NPS Unit2 Unit3 Unit4 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Electric output(10,000kw) Start of commercial operation 1971/3 1974/7 1976/3 1978/ /4 1979/10 Reactor type BWR3 BWR4 BWR5 Cooling system (High pressure) IC, HPCI RCIC, HPCI Cooling system (Low pressure) CS, SHC CS, LPCI LPCS, LPCI Model of PCV Mark I Mark II Number of fuel assemblies IC: Isolation Condenser, RCIC; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, HPCI: High Pressure Coolant Injection System, HPCS: High Pressure Core Spray System CS: Core Spray System, SHC: Shut Down Cooling System, LPCI: Low Pressure Coolant Injection System, LPCS: Low Pressure Core Spray System RCIC, HPCS 8

10 TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Before the Earthquake and Tsunamis After the Earthquake and Tsunamis TEPCO Air Photo Service Inc (Myoko, Niigata Japan) 9

11 Maximum Acceleration observed at Reactor Building Base Mat of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Almost all of PGAs(peak ground acceleration) were smaller than the maximum acceleration response spectra for the standard seismic ground motions except east-west PGAs at Units 2, 3 and 5. Loc. Of Seismometer (at the reactor building base mat) Fukushima Dai-ichi Observed data Max. response acceleration Max. acceleration (gal) (gal) of the standard seismic ground motions NS EW UD NS EW UD Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit

12 Damages at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS designed basis tsunami height = +5.7m observed tsunami running-up height = +14m~15.5m < Height above the sea level of building at Unit1~Unit4 and tsunami > sea side main building area designed basis Max sea level O.P.+5.7m O.P.0m O.P.+4m seawater pump observed tsunami running-up height O.P.+14m~15.5m 扉 Tubine Buiding height above the sea level of building O.P.+10m O.P.+13m at Unit 5 and Unit 6 Reactor Building 扉 11

13 Comparison of Nuclear Power Stations in Tohoku Area Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daini Onagawa Tokai Dai-ni Maximum acceleration response observed (at the reactor building base mat) Compare to the standard seismic ground motions 550 gal (the east-west PGA at Unit 2) bigger than standard seismic ground motions in some areas 305 gal (the up-down PGA at Unit 1) smaller than standard seismic ground motions 607 gal (the north-south PGA at Unit 2) bigger than standard seismic ground motions in some areas 225 gal (the east-west PGA) smaller than standard seismic ground motions Height above the sea level of building Unit1~Unit4: 10m Unit5~Unit6: 13m 12m 14.8m 8m Designed basis tsunami height 5.4m~5.7m 5.1m~5.2m 13.6m 5.75m Observed tsunami running-up height Unit1~Unit4: 14m ~15.5m Unit5~Unit6: 13m ~14.5m 7.0m~7.3m (15.3m~15.9m only at Unit1 building in south side ) 13.8m 6.2m 12

14 Inundation Areas of Tsunami in Each NPS Fukushima dai-ichi Fukushima dai-ni inundation inundation run-up run-up Onagawa Tokai dai-ni inundation inundation run-up 13

15 Incident and Development of the Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 1 Any damage on PRV, PCV and critical piping devices for safety caused by earthquake has not been identified as of now. In early stage after Tsunami, the cooling function of RPV and PCV was lost (the function of IC was lost). The condition in the reactor was getting worse rapidly. Work condition at the site was significantly bad due to scattered rubble. The start of water injection had been late to 3/12 5:46 a.m.. Time and date 3/11 14:46 Earthquake occurred reactor automatically shutdown external power supply was lost emergency DGs automatically started up About 17:00 14:52 IC automatically started up (thereafter, IC was manually shut down) Main events 15:37 Tsunami onslaught seawater pumps for cooling were submerged emergency DGs were stopped all DC power was lost the function of IC was lost(estimated) fuel exposed(estimated) fuel started to melt(estimated) 3/12 05:46 fresh water injected by fire pump 14:30 PCV venting(pcv pressure was decreased) 15:36 hydrogen explosion at reactor building 19:04 seawater injection started For 14h9m water injection stopped. 14

16 Incident and Development of the Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 2 Any damages on PRV, PCV and critical piping devices for safety caused by earthquake has not been identified as of now. Water level of RPV had been kept in the safety level by RCIC until 3/14 11:00am. Leakage from PCV possibly started before 3/12 12 a.m. because the increasing pace of PCV pressure was slower than expected. Water injection by fire pump wasn t available until 3/13 19:54 due to failure of PCV venting. Time and date 3/11 14:47 Earthquake occurred reactor automatically shutdown external power supply was lost emergency DGs automatically started up 14:50 RCIC manually started up Main events 15:41 Tsunami onslaught seawater pumps for cooling were submerged emergency DGs were stopped all DC power being lost 3/13 about 11:00 PCV venting(pcv pressure wasn t decreased) 3/14 13:25 the function of RCIC was lost(estimated) About 18:00 RPV depressurized(srv opened) fuel exposed fuel stared to melt(estimated) 19:54 seawater injection started 3/15 about 06:10 big impulsive sound observed For 6h29m water injection stopped. 15

17 Incident and Development of the Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 3 Any damages on PRV, PCV and critical piping devices for safety caused by earthquake has not been identified as of now. DC power was available for running RCIC and HPCI. Water level of RPV had been kept in safety level by RCIC and HPCI until 3/12 2:43 a.m.. Valves for venting cannot be kept open by lacking of air pressure, even though an transportable compressors and other equipment were used. So, the depressurization of PCV was not measured and water injection by fire pump wasn t available until 3/13 9:25 a.m.. Time and date Main events 3/11 14:47 Earthquake occurred automatic reactor shutdown external power supply was lost emergency DGs automatically started up 15:05 RCIC manually started up 15:42 Tsunami onslaught seawater pumps for cooling were submerged emergency DGs were stopped 3/12 11:36 the function of RCIC was lost 12:35 HPCI automatically started up 3/13 02:42 HPCI stopped about 08:00 fuel exposed(estimated) fuel started to melt(estimated) For 6h43m water injection stopped. 08:41 PCV venting about 09:20 PCV pressure was decreased 09:25 sea water injected by fire pump 3/14 11:01 hydrogen explosion at reactor building 16

18 Event sequence (main events in common among Units 1, 2 and 3) automatic reactor shutdown and loss of external power supply by earthquake fully depend on emergency DGs - emergency DGs automatically started up - cooling RPV by ECCS(Emergency Core Cooling System) IC and RCIC was manually operated between on and off almost all of DGs and DC power, voltage switching gear were lost function by tsunami (only 1 air-cooled emergency DG at Unit6 was functioning) seawater pumps for cooling located onto the sea lost function (loss of heat sink ) SBO(loss of all AC power) (3/13, unit5 shared emergency power supplies by unit6) electric pumps for cooling lost function (emergency cooling system started up by IC for unit1,rcic for unit2,rcic and HPCI for unit3) batteries submerged/depleted, compressed air depleted etc ECCS lost function working at the site became hard and tough, because of the difficulty in the measurement of reactor condition, the loss of cooling system control and communication system such as telephone. unit1 lost the cooling function in early stage, it estimated that there wasn t enough time to take measures to reconstruct the cooling system fuel exposed and started melting when cooling was stopped containment function was significantly depleted, it resulted an release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere water injection by fire pump (alternative water injection) Because the start of PCV depressurization that enabled water injection by fire pump was late, it is estimated that time for fuel exposed was long - by Zirconium-Water Reaction, hydrogen was generated - hydrogen explosion at unit1, unit3 and uni4 (PCV pressure decreased at the same time of unit4 explosion) - by the affect of explosion, workability at the site worsened - leaked water from PCV and reactor building 17

19 Situations at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ni NPS (BWR 4 units) Units 1 through 4 of the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS were all in operation but scrummed due to the earthquake at 14:48 on March 11, Units 1, 2, and 4 lost their reactor cooling functions because the seawater system pumps could not be operated after the tsunami hit the NPS at 15:34. After the restoration work was completed on March 12, Units 1, 2 and 4 recovered cooling functions. Unit 1 was brought to a cold shutdown condition (the temperature of reactor coolants below 100 degree C) at 17:00 on March 14, Unit 2 at 18:00 on the same day, and Unit 4 at 7:15 on March 15. Unit 3 was brought to a cold shutdown condition at 12:15 on March 12 without losing reactor cooling functions and suffering other kinds of damage. 18

20 Situations at Onagawa NPS of Tohoku Electric Power Co. (BWR 3 units) Units 1 and 3 were under operation and Unit 2 was under start-up operation. All 3 reactors were scrammed by the earthquake. Four of five external power supply lines stopped due to the earthquake, leaving one line remaining. Unit 1 suffered an on-site power loss. Power was supplied by emergency diesel generators and water injection into the reactor was carried out by the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), etc. Unit 1 reached cold shutdown status at 0:57 on March 12. Unit 2 shifted to cold shutdown promptly after the reactor stopped automatically due to the earthquake at 14:46 on March 11. The external power supply was maintained and the cooling function was not affected. In Unit 3, although the external power supply was maintained, the auxiliary equipment cooling seawater pump stopped. Water was injected into the reactor by the RCIC, etc. and reactor reached cold shutdown at 1:17 on March

21 Situations at Tokai Dai-ni of Japan Atomic Power Company (BWR 1 unit) Tokai Dai-ni NPS was undergoing rated thermal power operation. The reactor was automatically scrammed due to the earthquake. Although all 3 lines of external power supply stopped, 3 emergency diesel generators started up. One of those emergency diesel generators stopped doe to the tsunami, but with the remaining 2 DGs securing the power supply, the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 0:40 on March

22 TEPCO s Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident Mar.11 Apr.17 Step 1 started. July.19 Completion declaration of Step 1 December.16 Completion declaration of Step 2 Completed targets Target Step1 Completed Radiation dose in steady decline Step 2 Completed Controlling release of radioactive materials Mid-term Issues (Around 3 years) Reactors Stable cooling -Prevention of hydrogen explosion -Injection of water Cold shutdown -Circulating injection cooling Maintain and continue cold shutdown Nitrogen gas injection Protection against cracking of structural materials Spent Fuel Pools Stable cooling -Remote-control operation -Circulating cooling system More stable cooling Removal of fuels Accumulated Water, Atmosphere Secure storage -Installation of storage facilities/decontamination processing Reduction of total amount of contaminated water -Expansion of processing capacity -Storage/Manage sludge waste etc. Prevention of scattering - Installation of reactor building cover(unit1) - Removal of debris(unit 3 & 4) Installation of full-fledged water processing facilities. Mitigation of contamination groundwater Storage/Manage sludge waste etc. Installation of reactor building cover(unit3&4) 21

23 Cool Down the Reactors TEPCO has started all circulating cooling systems for the reactors. Cold shutdown condition for all the reactors and pools has been achieved. (Declaration was made on December 16th) Steady and Sustainable Circulating Cooling System Leak of highly radioactive water is prevented. Multiple safety measures have been introduced against troubles or accidents. RPV Bottom Temperature : less than 100 degrees. No.1 : 25.5 (Spent Fuel Pool: 12 ) No.2 : 48.6 (Spent Fuel Pool: 12.7 ) No.3 : 54.6 (Spent Fuel Pool: 13.5 ) As of January 12th The radiation exposure at the site: 0.1mSv / year (Below the target of 1 msv / year.) As of December 16th Heat Exchanger Clean Water Reactor Spent Fuel Pool RPV PCV Water Purifying Installation of cover Turbine Building Highly Radioactive Water 22

24 Roadmap towards Decommission of Fukushima Dai-ichi Present (Step 2 Completed) Within 2 Years Within 10 Years After Years Step 1, 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Period to the commencement of the fuel removal from the Spent Fuel Pools (Within 2 years) Period to the commencement of the removal of fuel debris (Within 10 years) Period to the end of the decommissioning (In years) -Commence the removal of fuels from the spent fuel pools (Unit 4 in 2 years) -Reduce the radiation impact due to additional emissions from the whole site and radioactive waste generated after the accident (secondary waste materials via water processing and debris etc.) Thus maintain an effective radiation dose of less than 1 msv/yr at the site boundaries caused by the aforementioned. -Maintain stable reactor cooling and accumulated water processing and improve their credibility. -Commence R&D and decontamination towards the removal of fuel debris -Commence R&D of radioactive waste processing and disposal -Complete the fuel removal from the spent fuel pools at all Units -Complete preparations for the removal of fuel debris such as decontaminating the insides of the buildings, restoring the PCVs and filling the PCVs with water Then commence the removal of fuel debris (Target: within 10 years) -Continue stable reactor cooling -Complete the processing of accumulated water -Continue R&D on radioactive waste processing and disposal, and commence R&D on the reactor facilities decommission -Complete the fuel debris removal (in years) -Complete the decommission (in years) -Implement radioactive waste processing and disposal Actions towards systematic staff training and allocation, improving motivation, and securing worker safety 23 will be continuously implemented. 23

25 2. Lessons Learned from the Accident KYODO NEWS 24

26 Strengthen Preventive Measures against Severe Accidents 1. Strengthen measures against earthquakes and tsunamis The tsunami damage that caused the Accident was brought about because of inadequate preparedness against large tsunamis, including the failure to adequately envisage the frequency of occurrence and the height of tsunamis. Discussion from the viewpoint of having defense in-depth has been going on, especially in terms of a design basis that assumes adequate frequency of occurrence, height of tsunami, and of criteria for safety design of structures that allows for the impact force of tsunami waves, etc. 2. Ensure power supplies A major cause of the Accident was the failure to secure the necessary power supply. The operators implemented the deployment of power-supply vehicles, the securing of emergency diesel generators capacity, the installation of large scale air-cooled emergency diesel generators and air-cooled emergency gas turbine generators, and the countermeasures against flooding important equipment within a rector building, and the countermeasures against collapses of transmission line towers, etc. 3. Thorough accident management measures The accident management measures were found to be insufficient during the Accident. In addition, accident management measures were basically regarded as voluntary initiatives by nuclear operators, not legal requirements. The accident management measures are changed from voluntary safety efforts to a part of regulatory requirements. 25

27 Enhance Nuclear Emergency Responses 1. Responses to combined emergencies of both large-scale natural disasters and prolonged nuclear accident There was tremendous difficulty in securing means of communication and of procurement, as well as in mobilization of the full range of support personnel for the Accident and disaster response, when addressing nuclear accident that coincided with massive natural disaster. Off-site center was reinforced by deploying satellite phones, emergency power supplies and reserves of goods. Moreover, a review of the full readiness and chain-of-command structure will be made across ministries and agencies for response to a complex disaster. 2. Reinforcement of environmental monitoring During the initial stages of the Accident, appropriate environmental monitoring became impossible due to damage of local authorities monitoring equipment and facilities caused by the earthquake and tsunami. The monitoring system will be designed to maintain its functionality in crucial moment against various incidents such as earthquake, tsunami. Measures should be taken to function even in the complex disasters. 3. Accurate understanding and prediction of the effect of released radioactive materials The use of the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) and disclosure of its calculation results, etc. were not properly conducted. The operational procedures of the SPEEDI will be improved for providing the useful information to the public in a timely manner and preventing the expansion of damage. The hardware of the SPEEDI will be also upgraded. 26

28 Enhance Safety Infrastructure and Culture 1. Enhancement of safety regulatory and administrative systems The establishment of a Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (provisional name) was approved by the Cabinet meeting on August 15, To fully achieve separation of authorities for regulation and promotion. - An external agency of the Ministry of Environment (from April 1, 2012). 2. Reinforcement of legal frameworks, standards and guidelines A revision of the legal framework, standards and so on with regard to nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness is scheduled, based on knowledge learned from the Accident, including the introduction of new safety regulatory framework ( back fitting ), enhancement of safety standards and the streamlining of complicated nuclear safety regulatory and legislative systems. 3. Human resources for nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness The new safety regulatory body will have among its basic policies securing personnel who are highly qualified with regard to regulatory matters through reinforcing training. 4. Thoroughly instill a safety culture Thoroughness of safety culture, the foundation of nuclear safety was strongly recognized through the Accident. For those engaged in nuclear safety, it is a starting point, an obligation, and a responsibility for each organization and individual to firmly acquire a culture of nuclear safety. 27

29 Summary of the Interim Report (December ) Investigation Committee of Japanese Government on the Accidents at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company The Investigation Committee is of the view, from its investigation and evaluation up to now, that the following three factors had major influence over many problems. The Committee reports that any damages on PRV, PCV and critical piping devices for safety caused by earthquake have not been identified as of now. The Committee continues to conduct its investigation and evaluation and will issue its Final Report in the summer of Lack of severe accident measures against tsunami TEPCO did not take precautionary measures in anticipation that a severe accident could be caused by tsunami such as the one hit at this time. Neither did the regulatory authorities. Even for an accident of low probabilities so long as extremely large scale damages are anticipated once it occurs such as the tsunami of this time, due consideration should be given to the risks involved and precautionary measures should be taken. 2. Lack of viewpoint of complex disaster It was a major shortcoming for the safety of both nuclear power plants and surrounding communities that nuclear accident had not been assumed to occur as complex disaster. Disaster prevention program should be formulated by assuming complex disaster, which will be the major point in reviewing nuclear power plant safety for the future. 3. Lack of viewpoint of looking at the whole picture of accident It cannot be denied that viewpoint of looking at a whole picture of an accident was not adequately reflected in nuclear disaster prevention program in the past. The nuclear disaster prevention program had serious shortfalls. It cannot be excused that the nuclear accidents could not be managed because of an extraordinary situation that the tsunamis exceeded the assumption. The Investigation Committee is convinced of the need of paradigm shift in the basic principles of disaster prevention programs for such a huge system, which may result in serious damage once it has an accident. 28

30 3. Nuclear Energy Policy of Japan KYODO NEWS 29

31 Basic Concepts of Energy Policy of Japan In light of the two oil crises, Japan has been making efforts to ensure a stability of energy supply, while reducing the rate of dependency on external resources through: - Diversification of the generation mix - Conservation of energy resources. As Japan is a country with limited natural resources, its energy policy is based on the best mix of the 3 E : - Energy security - Economic efficiency - Environmental preservation. 30

32 History of Energy Policy of Japan 1970 s 1980 s Oil crisis ( 73 and 79) Stable supply Ensuring stable supply by reducing the dependency on oil and introducing alternative energy to oil. Promotion of energy conservation. Demand for economic structural reform 1990 s 2000 s Stable supply + Economic efficiency Ensuring economic efficiency through electricity/gas service reform. Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol ( 97) Stable supply + Economic efficiency + Environment Further promotion of the introduction of alternative energy to oil and energy conservation. Enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol ( 05), increased competition for resources Stable supply + Economic efficiency + Environment Reinforcement of the efforts to ensure resources Expanded introduction of non-fossil energy (renewable, nuclear). Strengthening of resource diplomacy. Current Basic Energy Plan (decided in June 2010) 31

33 Energy Demand and Supply Mix of Japan Energy demand increased with economic growth (1.4-times increase from 1973 to 2008) Improved efficiency through energy conservation (By 40% from 1973 to 2008) Renewable energy, etc. Water power Coal The 1 st Oil Shock Dependence on oil: Nuclear energy Natural gas Coal 3% 3% 10% 19% 23% 42% Oil 32

34 2010 Basic Energy Plan Japan adopted Basic Energy Plan in June 2010 setting force energy targets envisaging the year 2030 and concrete measures to realize the targets. The major energy targets: - Double the energy self-sufficiency ratio (from 38% to 70%) and the selfdeveloped fossil fuel supply ratio. - Raise the zero-emission power source ratio (from 34% to 70%), increasing renewable energy (from 10% to 20%) and nuclear energy (from 30% to 50%). - Reduce CO2 in the household sector to half. The major actions to be taken in nuclear energy: -Facilitate construction of new NPPs and replacement of existing NPPs. (Goal: 9 units in operation by 2020, and at least 14 units in operation by Improve the rate of capacity utilization of NPPs. (Goal: up to about 85% by 2020, and up to about 90% by 2030) 33

35 Supply Forecast in 2010 Basic Energy Plan (100 million kwh) Total: 10,305 Total: 10,200 9% Zero-emission power source: Renewable 34% energy, Nuclear 8000 etc:21% 26% Coal 25% Generated Output Renewable energy, etc: Zero-emission power source: about 70% Nuclear 53% LNG28% Oil 13% Coal 11% LNG 13% estimate 2007 年度実績 2030 年推計 Oil 2% 34

36 Nuclear Power Plants in Japan Currently 54 units of nuclear power plants are in operation. (The Units 1~ 4 at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were decided to be decommissioned.) 5 units (in blue) are operating and 45 units (in red) are in stoppage for the reasons of periodical inspection or unplanned outage NPP in Operation NPP in Stoppage 35

37 Restarting of Nuclear Power Plants 54 units of nuclear power plants are in operation. The Units 1~ 4 at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were decided to be decommissioned. 5 units are operating and 45 units are in stoppage for the reasons of periodical inspection or unplanned outage. Decisions concerning the restarting of nuclear power plants after their scheduled outage are subject to a comprehensive judgment upon the completion of the procedure, including the Stress Test, seismic back check, and approval of local government. 36

38 Procedure for Restarting of Nuclear Power Plants 1. Stress Test ----Comprehensive Assessment for the safety of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities - On July 22, 2011, NISA requested electric utilities to conduct Stress Tests - On October 28, the first submission of the test was done by KEPCO. - It takes about two months for evaluation and judgment by NISA. - Another month for evaluation and judgment by NSC. - IAEA peer review. 2. Seismic Back Check - On October 28, NISA requested the seismic back check based on the knowledge of the earthquake which occurred on March 11, Some of the nuclear power plant sites need to be evaluated regarding the possibility of being hit by unknown fault or expected tsunami. 3. Approval of local government - Each utility needs to get the approval of local government before restarting NPPs. 37

39 Redefining the Optimum Energy Mix The optimum energy-mix portfolio in the mid- to long-term that people can trust should be discussed openly, while collecting opinions from various sectors of the general public, taking into account energy security and the results of cost analyses. The government will review the present model of the optimum energy mix that requires Japan to rely on nuclear power to meet more than half of the electricity demand. Within Japan, the government intends to continue nuclear power generation, with greater safety and less dependency. 38

40 Basic Philosophy of Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment (Interim Compilation of the Energy and Environment Council ((7/29)) (1) Basic Philosophy 1:Three principles for determining the best new energy sources Current Energy Mix Best New Energy Mix 1. Reducing dependency on nuclear energy. 2. Avoiding energy shortfalls and price increases. 3. A thorough review of nuclear power policies. (2) Basic Philosophy 2: Three principles for the realization of new energy systems Concentrated Energy System Distributed Energy System 1. Distributed energy system 2. International contribution as an advanced problem-solving nation 3. Multifaceted approach (3) Basic Philosophy 3: Three principles for the formation of national consensus Opposition to nuclear power versus Promotion National discussion with the theme of reducing dependency on nuclear power 1. Overcoming the confrontation between the opposition to nuclear power generation and its promotion 2. Verifying objective data 3. Maintaining dialogue with a broad range of citizens 39

41 New Cost Estimation of Nuclear Energy 1. Policy expenses (e.g., R&D, subsidies, etc.) For this model, policy expenses about 0.3 trillion yen such as R&D cost and subsidies paid for the local areas near NPSs are also added. The cost of generation increases 1.1/kWh from the 2004 estimate. 2. Costs of potential risk response preparedness (compensation for nuclear damages, reparation, decontamination, decommissioning, etc.) For this model, total amount of compensation for the severe nuclear damages is about 6 trillion yen. In such a case, the cost of generation increases at least 0.5/kWh. Each 1 trillion yen of compensation increase raises the cost of generation by 0.1/kWh. JP /kwh ~ 10.2 (Compensation for nuclear damage swells to 20 trillion yen.) Increase due to costs for construction and additional safety measures. At least (minimum) (Compensation for nuclear damage swells to 10 trillion yen.) With the compensation cost for severe nuclear damage, nuclear power would cost at least 8.9 yen (11 U.S. cents)/kwh of electricity generated Cost Estimate Current Cost Estimate 40

42 Japan s Strength in Nuclear Power Japan continued promoting nuclear power generation even during the nuclear winter when nuclear power projects stagnated globally. By accumulating experience of building nuclear power plants while strictly observing the schedule and budget, Japan has become a major player on the global nuclear power stage. Another strength of Japan is the manufacturing capability of its suppliers of materials and components. Japan has been leading discussions on international cooperation concerning nuclear power as a vice-chair country of the International Forum for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC). With abundant experience in the peaceful use of atomic energy, Japan has become the sole country in the world that does not possess nuclear weapons but is now able to complete the nuclear fuel cycle including the reprocessing of spent fuel. Japan helps countries intending to introduce nuclear power generation by supporting human resource development programs, etc. Japan is actively committed not only to bilateral cooperation schemes but also to the schemes of multilateral cooperation coordinated by the IAEA. 41

43 International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Japan stands ready to respond to the interest of countries seeking to use nuclear power generation with the needs for energy security and for responses to global warming. Japan has been supporting their efforts, including their improvements of nuclear safety. Japan believes that in case where those countries wish to utilize Japanese nuclear technologies, it should provide them with its technologies of the world highest safety level. Taking all the above into consideration, Japan is of the position to continue international nuclear energy cooperation that has been promoted with foreign countries. 42

44 Thank you for your attention!