THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS IN MULTINATIONAL MISSIONS

Transcription

1 Zbyšek KORECKI Zdeněk MÁLEK THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS IN MULTINATIONAL MISSIONS Recenzent Jaroslav JÍRŮ Abstract: This article is focus on the Logistics Support for NATO Response Forces Operations, JLSG primary roles and activities. It should provide useful background information in view of the more specific articles with main aims to clarify NRF concept, principles and first of all briefings and discussions which will follow later. 1 NRF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT Prague Summit Declaration (Nov 2002) has created a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces including land, maritime and air elements, ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as directed by the Council. The declaration has been a fundamental for Military Concept for the NATO Response Force which was formed via Military Committee resolution MC 477 in April The following elaboration of the Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations was made in June 2005 based on MC The NATO Response Force is intended to be a military capability to provide an Expeditionary Force able to be projected over extended lines of communication into a distant operational area to accomplish specific missions. It consists of multinational land, naval, air and special operations forces; which are held at a high readiness of 5 to 30 days Notice to Move and which should be self-sustaining up to 30 days (or longer if re-supplied). This Force will be tailored to be able to fulfil the full range of missions within and beyond NATO s Area of Responsibility. The NRF is not a Standing Force. The headquarters and forces that make it up will be periodically committed by the member States of the Alliance. That s the reason why, at least 2 years (6 in the new Long Term Force Generation Concept) before every new rotating period, the elements of the NRF must be pre-identified. During this preparation phase the headquarters and units will be certified. NRF missions are based on Military Committee 477 (later MC) and there is a list of NRF missions: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); Support to Consequence Management (CBRN or Humanitarian Crises); Crisis Response Operations (Including Peace Keeping); Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations; Embargo Operation; Demonstration of Force/ Show of Force ; Initial Entry Force Operation. 7

2 NRF Missions are vague enough to be acceptable by the nations but also leaves room for different interpretation. We can easily imagine that Support to Counter terrorism is understood differently from a nation to another; for some, it goes up to war fighting, for others it is only intelligence gathering.it is unlikely that NATO will run a NEO (which is generally accepted to be a national responsibility) or IEO in hostile environment, but this spectrum of missions was the basis upon which the list of capabilities was built. Guiding principles are based on five high level requirements (pillars) which were identified as the foundation for the FOC declaration. The MC Action Plan approved the stepped implementation of joint logistic capabilities and although NATO does not possess immediate guaranteed access to enough strategic lift capabilities, shortfalls should not prevent a declaration of FOC, as nations are expected do possess the necessary capabilities. To improve the operational capability of NRF and in accordance with the decisions made by the Military Committee, SHAPE has developed a concept for the Long Term Force Generation of the NRF. It has also transformed the NRF CJSOR into a Capability Module CJSOR. The new CJSOR format uses the existing NRF force structure subdivided into various components required to support the NRF missions, which are then described as capability modules with a capability description. Both documents have been used to confirm Nations commitments at the Global Force Generation Conference in Nov 06; although the perennial shortfalls in the CJSOR remain. The Force Generation process covers 6 years instead of 2. The CJSOR roster will span a 6- year timeframe and show proposed national commitments made during the first two years. This will increase transparency, help Nations to plan with longer time horizons and ensure full preparedness of national contributions at the start of the Joint Preparation phase, this has offered during the last Global Force Generation Conference more room for improvement than the 2-Year frame used till now. That extra time will be used for further bilateral contacts between SHAPE and the nations. The capability driven approach will improve the efficiency of the NRF and it will facilitate the contributions by the Nations, by providing them with a more accurate description of what is really needed. The revised CJSOR will allow burden sharing (allowing equitable contribution by nations to the NRF over the time), the concept of lead nation and an initial definition of capability modules. The description of how the structures & roles of the NATO Response Force and the Combined Joint Task Force are linked. Once deployed, the NATO Response Force can be transitioned into a Combined Joint Task Force. The designated Joint Force Commands Headquarters Brunssum and Naples or the Joint Command Headquarters Lisbon will as Parent Headquarters is responsible for the major planning, Intelligence issues, the Joint Operations Planning Group and the co-ordination with the higher headquarters. The Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team will be an ad-hoc group of about 20 persons ready to move within 48 Hr and upon arrival in the Joint Operation Area it will provide in-theatre liaison, on-the-ground verification of theatre capabilities. It will deploy in advance of the DJTF HQ as an initial fact-finding element. The Deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters is deployable at 5 days NTM and is responsible to establish links with the assigned NRF components. It will co-ordinate the intra-theatre Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) and sustainment. It 8

3 consists of designated personnel (90 posts) from within the Parent HQ. And finally a Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters can be deployed after 30 days NTM. Besides the option of having first a NRF deployed, the NAC could also authorize the pre-deployment of an Initial Entry Capable Force, generated through the CJTF generation process. CJ CJTF NR CJTF OLR Figure 1 CJTF generation process Let s turn now to the generic, or the theory of the NRF C2 structure. The most commonly used to depict PHQ, DJTF and Static CC and NRF CC command and support relationships. The key issue here is the level of command which the DJTF and its COM will exercise. It will obviously depend on the mission and on your decision, as the JFC commander and thus COM NRF. OPCON delegated by you to the COM DJTF will centralise and focus C2 of the deployed NRF forces, thus creating the ideal C2 structure. For this C2 structure, the deployed HQ are limited in number, so there is a need to use Reach Back, - means some functions stay at the rear in the Parent HQ, and strong CIS enables the information exchange. 2 EXERCISES AND TRAINING NRF Forces require 6 months of preparation prior to assuming their Stand-By Period when each of the three J(F)Cs remains in a Ready Period for one year intervals. In order to achieve common cooperation and integrity NRF Forces, CCs and DJTF/CJTF HQs require training. The result of the common ability to conduct NRF mission NRF Forces are certified by Nations as ready for combat, but are not validated in combined operations. The level of the common ability to achieve mission tasks multinational nature of forces requires LIVEXs to validate interoperability at the tactical level. Multinational nature of forces require LIVEXs to validate interoperability at tactical level (comms, SOPs, friendly force interoperability, time/space coordination, etc.). Due to supposed change of NRF CC every changes requires training and validation. In order to examine NRF ability to be deployed there is requirement to tests of deployability at all levels. Principles have been developed as part of Deployable Forces Training 9

4 Concept. They are specific enough to ensure we train the right people to the right level at the right time, but are flexible enough to allow Commanders leeway to decide how they want to do it. 3 JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP This is where the JLSG HQ fits into the overall C2 structure, subordinate to the DJTF HQ and with strong information links to the CCs. We envisage very little direct reach back from the JLSG HQ. If there is a requirement to seek policy guidance or request additional assistance, then we would expect to pass that back through the DJTF HQ. There has been much debate about the overall C2 structure for the NRF, but we see it in strictly conventional terms as a hierarchical unified chain of command. The JLSG has been compared to a Component Command and we have deliberately put it on the same level as the other CCs, leaving open the possibility of it being the Supported Command, e.g. in the case of reverse RSOM. However, at this stage, the JLSG is very definitely not a CC in its own right, as it has neither the staff resources nor the capability to act as such. Whether or not it should develop into one (e.g. a Joint Theatre Support Command) is a matter for much wider debate. The Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) the evolution background is based on the Prague Summit Declaration detailing the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) in November 2002 the Military Committee endorsed in April 2003 MCC 477 the Military Concept for the NRF. Following on from this document was MC 0526 Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations this was developed and signed by the Military Committee in June However, JFC Brunssum s formal involvement with the development of the JLSG started with SHAPE s Planning Guidance (August 2005) which directed us to establish the first ever JLSG HQ and to assist in other JLSG activities in time for Exercise Steadfast Jaguar (June 2006). This LIVEX held on the Cape Verde Islands was a success and validated to a degree the validity of the JLSG. Firstly, it is necessary to stress the basic idea behind the JLSG by describing what it is: 1. Combination of HQ and logistic capabilities/units, subordinate to COM JFC and tasked and commanded by COM DJTF, responsible for control and delivery of third line (theatre level) logistic support to all elements of deployed NRF 2. Stand-alone HQ capable of exercising authority over all available logistic assets and responsible for maintaining the relevant logistic situational awareness at the theatre level in conjunction with the DJTF HQ; 3. JLSG CJSOR (total. PAX) tailored to three main roles: C2 and coordination of third line theatre logistics. Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM). Sustainment (Classes I to V). Although the HQ is the core, the JLSG also requires a wide range of capabilities assigned to it in order to fulfill its role. The HQ is therefore a combination of an operational level HQ and an organization exercising direct command, control and coordination of units at the tactical level. But please be aware that the JLSG HQ is based on the JFC MJLC (Multi- National Joint Logistic Centre) core nucleus that exists on Brunssum s PE. The currently agreed CJSOR elements of the JLSG that have formed the basis for the Force Generation for NRF 7 and now 8 produces a manpower liability of 1885 personnel for our three keyroles of command, control and coordination, RSOM and sustainment. 10

5 Main sustainment units are grouped under the Theatre Logistic Base (TLB), which is the main focus for support of land-based force elements.for RSOM we have a Port Operating Company, a Staging Area Unit, a Movement Control Unit, a Convoy Support Centre Operating Unit and last but not least a Force Protection Unit. We also have within the CJSOR additional capabilities if required (Info Ops/CIMIC/CI), but these are not core to the role of the HQ. In addition two medical units and an engineer construction company are under JLSG operational control. THEATRE OF OPERATIONS JLSG HQ JLSA HOME BASES ALSS SP OD RSOM TLB FLS MCC NATIONAL STOCKS SP OE LLN DOB Spt Gro ACC AP OE AP OD NSE CC Level Log MEDICAL CSS Bn LCC ONE-DAY ROTATION PRINCIPLE ONE-DAY ROTATION PRINCIPLE 4 th LEVEL LOGISTICS 3 rd LEVEL LOGISTICS 1 st /2 nd LEVEL LOGISTICS STRATEGIC LEVEL LOGISTICS OPERATIONAL LEVEL LOGISTICS TACTICAL LEVEL LOGISTICS 13 DOS 10 DOS 7 DOS Figure 2 Joint logistics Support Architecture Common understanding of the NRF logistics support architecture and new experiences on the procedures during NRF logistics support in mission can postpone our knowledge in logistics support activities and could be a base of the future changes during LIVEX and NRF mission. BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine. NATO, July [2] KREJCAR, L. Joint Logistic Support Group. Conference Economics, Logistics and Ecology in the Armed Forces, Brno, May [3] MC 477 Military Concept for the NATO Response Force. NATO, April