Organization, conduct and evaluation of INEX-4 radiological dispersion device exercise for local decision makers in Budapest, Hungary

Transcription

1 Organization, conduct and evaluation of INEX-4 radiological dispersion device exercise for local decision makers in Budapest, Hungary Dr. Gábor Petőfi, Géza Macsuga Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority 21 st National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference, Hotel Rosen Plaza, Orlando, U.S.A.

2 Contents Few words about Hungary and Hungarian nuclear programme Roles of Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority Introduction to INEX exercises INEX-4 exercise in Hungary Preparation methodology Scenario Conduct Lessons learned 2

3 Basic data on Hungary Republic Area: km 2 Population: 10 million Capital: Budapest (1,8 million) Highest point: 1015 m Largest lake: Balaton (cca. 75 x 3 km) Neighbouring countries: Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia 3/32

4 4

5 Hungarian nuclear programme Paks NPP four VVER-440/213 type reactors of cca. 500 MWe commissioned in 1983, 84, 86, 87 six-loop, horizontal steam-generators provides 40% of domestic electric energy production extension of design lifetime after 30 years of operation consideration of new builds 5

6 Hungarian nuclear programme Interim spent fuel storage facility dry storage for 50 years next to the NPP 10 MWth research reactor VVER-SM operated by KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute 6

7 Hungarian nuclear programme 100 kw training reactor Budapest University of Technology and Economy Education Low and intermediate level radwaste storage Location: Bátaapáti Operator: PURAM Construction will terminate soon 7

8 Task of Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority Licensing Inspection Evaluation Assessment Enforcment Emergency preparedness and response Nuclear and radiological safeguards Accountancy for nuclear and radiological materials Nuclear security 8

9 Tasks of HAEA in emergency preparedness and response During preparation and planning phase International Contact Point and Competent Authority Regulatory tasks in nuclear safety matter Own preparedness In emergency Facility diagnosis and prognosis Evaluation of the radiological situation and consequences International communication Decision support Public information 9

10 Hungarian emergency management system Governmental Coordination Committee Ministry of internal affairs Defense committee Technical Scientific Council Operative Staff National PIC Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority Sectors Local organizations Directorate General for National Emergency Management 10

11 INEX-4 exercise 11

12 International preparation INEX International Nuclear Emergency Exercise Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters INEX nuclear power plant emergency exercise INEX series of facility emergency exercises INEX-2-HUN: 1998 November: Paks NPP exercise INEX emergency exercise of Gravelines NPP (France) INEX contamination of large agricultural field 12

13 Exercise concept To be executed by OECD NEA member states Series of national table top exercises (no field activity) Defined and variable information RDD device (10 kg C-4, 3.7 TBq Cs-137) Meteorology (calm, sunny weather, no rain) Consequence management and the transition to recovery System of objectives International objectives National objectives After the early phase crisis! System of manuals General Information Guide for National Planning Committees Guide for Exercise Players Evaluation Questionnaire 13

14 Hungarian participation not obvious Last 20 years no actual terrorist attack (no considerable threat) Preparedness? Conventional (incl. nuclear) is OK: planned, trained and exercised Consequence management phase Are we in the position to exercise such a scenario and such a phase of that? No plan Never exercised (not even the early phase) What would be the outcome? What we can demonstrate? What we can learn? Or would there be more important tasks instead? Difficult questions decision after many consultations 14

15 Decision Organizing committee set up General objectives identified Methodology Location: Budapest STARTEX Planning Stage Event / Response Initiation Crisis Management Consequence Management Transition to Recovery Recovery / Long-term Rehabilitation Preparedness Early Intermediate Late Emergency exposure situation Existing exposure situation 15

16 Challenges identified for early phase Radioactive material in urban area First responders No dosimeters Protective equipment for police and ambulance Security and safety Role of the brand new Counter Terrorist Center Role of police Role of disaster management By whom and how is it recognized that an RDD exploded? 16

17 Methodology and timeline Period 1 Preparation for preparation Period 2 Organization of exercise Period 3 Preparation to implement Period 4 Exercise Period 5 Evaluation Preparation of concept FLÉT Developing background material about: tasks and responsibilities identification of gaps in tools and equipment determination of critical tasks development of crisis management methodology To create basis for planning 17

18 Topics for the materials and exercise 5 groups of questions, questions in each Answered by organizing committee, then finalized to create background documentation for planning Topics and responsible organizations Decision-making (HAEA) Public health (Ministry of health) Monitoring and evaluation (Disaster management) Safety and security (Police) Preparation for recovery (Local jurisdiction of Budapest) Public and media information (Disaster management) 18

19 Exercise objectives Review of response to terrorist attacks with radiological consequences National capabilities and national coordination Evaluation of preparedness for consequence management and preparation for recovery Identification of players and responsibilities Evaluation of availability of required tools and conditions Recommendations on improvement of organizational and preparedness system Develop background documentation to supplement the emergency plan Good practices for international feedback 19

20 Participants Nuclear Emergency Defense Committee Decision support body Operative Staff Coordination body for on-scene response Budapest Defence Committee Local decision maker Public Information Center National coordinator of public communication 20

21 Exercise conduct Main activities and timeline Unit 0: description of early phase Unit 1: decision making Unit 2: public health Unit 3: monitoring Unit 4: safety and security Unit 5: preparation for recovery Unit 6: public information Descriptive presentation For each a) Preparatory presentation b) Description of situation c) Task to perform, questions to answer d) Exercising Tasks in each unit unit 0 unit 1-5: a,b,c,d evaluation ~2 hours 2 hours for each unit ~1 hour 21

22 Scenario 1/2 Day E-1, Location: a busy junction in Budapest Soccer game with 8000 people Calm, spring weather 22

23 Scenario 2/ : report to national media by terrorist group radioctive bomb will explode at the stadium Media broadcasts the game Lot of police on the scene to secure the game (team has ultra supporters) Explosion: Nissan SUV 10 kg of C-4 Panic, traffic stops Stadium and overpass partially damaged Bus terminal damaged 23

24 Immediate response First responder activites Evacuation Life saving Securing the area (police) Counter Terrorist Group Transport of casualties Disaster management: survey to confirm radiation On-scene command post established 400 m radius circle to be evacuated as precautionary measure 24

25 Immediate consequences People: 25 dead, 59 serious injury, 231 slight injury Cars, buses, buildings, overpass are damaged Radiological Surface contamination Dose rate 25

26 Perimeters Command post Responder s area M 2.EÁP M DC Public registration Decontamination area RH 1. EÁP M Rad. Survey Center Medical center M 3. EÁP Responders area Decontamination area 4. EÁP M Secured area: m around ground zero február INEX-4 gyakorlat: A korai időszak eseményei és tevékenységei 26

27 Personal inuries due to explosion Ground zero Death: Serious injury: Slight injury: Hospitalized: On-scene treatmnet: 25 fő 59 fő 231 fő 214 fő 76 fő Max dose: 12 msv, no radiological consequence could be identified

28 Further response and consequences Heavy and immediate media and international interest Emergency Situation is decleared for the Capital On-scene response 369 person and 87 pieces of technical equipment Many cars and garbage has been left Some of them needs decontamination 28

29 Initial conditions for the exercise Exercise starts next day after explosion Crisis situation and life-saving is over Emergency organizations in operation On-scene investigation is over Radiological condition is stable and surveyed Decontamination is in progress 29

30 Example questions Several countries have offered assistance. What and how can be accepted, who decides? What are the real needs? Is there sufficient expertise and capacity to treat injured and potentially injured citizens? What kind of information will be made available to the general and affected public and how will this be done? Who is responsible for tracking responder injuries/damages? 30

31 Example questions How the effluents from decontamination should be treated? What will be done if the forecasted rain will wash the contamination into the canals? Can the citizens enter the cordonned area for different, but justified reasons (pets, medicaments, personal belongings)? What residual dose rates would be considered acceptable for return of evacuees? Are plans or arrangements in place for handling larger quantities of radioactive waste from decontamination actions? 31

32 2011. március 1. NMÉ: Az INEX-4 gyakorlat 32

33 2011. március 1. NMÉ: Az INEX-4 gyakorlat 33

34 Képek március 1. NMÉ: Az INEX-4 gyakorlat 34

35 Participation statistics Exercise role Day 1 Day 2 Total (persons) Controller Evaluator Photo/media Observer Players Operative Staff Budpest Defense Committee Nuclear Emergency DC Public Information Centre

36 Main lessons learned Gaps in emergency plan Background documentation containing analysis of current arrangements pages/unit Contains identification of gaps and recommendations for improvement Good basis for review of emergency plan Exercise methodology Long preparation received some critics lack of communication between various groups Implementation exercise is required 36

37 Main lessons learned Radiation protection training for members of decision support bodies First responders Radiation measurement devices Personal protective equipment Training to understand the effects of radiation Procedures How to handle contaminated injuries How to avoid spread of contamination How to limit consequences 37

38 Questions Thank you for listening to me! 38