Safety Study. Chain analysis: Supplying Flemish ports with LNG as a marine fuel. Fluxys LNG sa Rue Guimard Brussels. Analysis of safety aspects

Transcription

1 Fluxys LNG sa Rue Guimard Brussels Safety Study Chain analysis: Supplying Flemish ports with LNG as a marine fuel Analysis of safety aspects June 2012 final report 3500 Hasselt Maastrichtersteenweg 210 T. 011/ F. 011/ Ghent Industrieweg 118/4 T. 09/ F. 09/ Brussels Clovislaan 82 T. 02/ F. 02/ Bouge Route de Hannut 55 T. 081/ F. 081/

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3 Table of contents page iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of contents... iii List of tables and figures... v Terminology and abbreviations...xii I. Introduction...I.1 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports...ii.1 II.1. LNG supply chain...ii.1 II.1.1. Supply routes for ports without an LNG import terminal...ii.1 II.1.2. Supply routes for ports with an LNG import terminal...ii.4 II.2. Description of the individual components in the LNG supply chain...ii.4 II.2.1. LNG feeder vessels...ii.4 II.2.2. LNG bunker vessel...ii.8 II.2.3. LNG trucks... II.10 II.2.4. LNG bunker terminals... II.12 II.2.5. LNG bunkering stations... II.16 II.2.6. Liquefaction units... II.19 II.2.7. LNG bunkering operation... II.26 III. Calculation of risk distances for generic components of the LNG supply chain... III.1 III.1. General methodology... III.1 III.2. Overview of components examined... III.4 III.2.1. Installations and activities within demarcated establishments... III.4 III.2.2. LNG transport by truck... III.6 III.2.3. LNG transport by ship... III.6 III.3. Generic risk analysis for LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments... III.6 III.3.1. Overview of reported incidents... III.7 III.3.2. Representative accident scenarios... III.7 III.3.3. Impact study... III.12 III.3.4. Probability study... III.26 III.3.5. Calculated risk distances... III.27 III.3.6. Risk distances for liquefaction installations... III.64 III.4. Quantitative risk analysis of LNG road transport... III.72 III.4.1. Overview of historical incidents... III.72 III.4.2. Representative accident scenarios... III.72 III.4.3. Impact study... III.76 III.4.4. Probability study... III.77 III.4.5. Calculated risk distances... III.80 III.5. Quantitative risk analysis of LNG ship transport... III.86 III.5.1. Overview of historic incidents... III.86 III.5.2. Representative accident scenarios... III.87 III.5.3. Impact study... III.91 III.5.4. Probability study... III.94 III.5.5. Calculated risk distances... III.98 IV. References... IV.1

4 Table of contents page iv V. Annexes... V.1 V.1. Annex 1: Overview of the generic LNG supply chain components examined... V.2 V.1.1. Installations and activities within demarcated establishments... V.3 V.1.2. LNG road transport... V.7 V.1.3. LNG ship transport... V.8 V.2. Annex 2: Accident history... V.10 V.2.1. Incidents involving loading installations... V.10 V.2.2. Incidents during LNG (un)loading... V.13 V.2.3. Incidents during LNG road transport... V.15 V.2.4. Incidents involving LNG ships while in port or during navigation... V.16 V.3. Annex 3: Hazardous properties and physical characteristics of LNG... V.21 V.4. V.5. Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments... V.23 Annex 5: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport... V.24 V.6. Annex 6: Draft designs for LNG bunker vessels and feeder vessels... V.25 V.7. V.6.1. LNG bunker vessel (capacity: 800 m³)... V.26 V.6.2. LNG bunker vessel (capacity: 1,500 m³)... V.27 V.6.3. LNG feeder vessel (capacity: 7,500 m³)... V.28 V.6.4. LNG feeder vessel (capacity: 20,000 m³)... V.29 V.6.5. LNG feeder vessel (capacity: 30,000 m³)... V.30 Annex 7: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG ship transport... V.31 V.8. Annex 8: Meteorological data... V.32

5 List of tables and figures page V LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Tables Table II.2.1.1: Table II.2.3.1: Table II.2.4.1: Table II.2.4.2: Table II.2.4.3: Table II.2.5.1: Table II.2.6.1: Table II.2.6.2: Table II.2.7.1: Table II.2.7.2: Table III.1.1: Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : List of LNG feeder vessels [4,5]...II.6 General specifications of LNG trucks... II.11 Characteristic dimensions of medium-sized LNG tanks [12]... II.15 Dimensions of the hoses, arms and pipes used for unloading LNG feeder vessels at a bunker terminal... II.15 Dimensions of the hoses, arms and pipes used for loading LNG bunker vessels at a bunker terminal... II.15 Characteristic dimensions of storage tanks... II.18 Examples of medium-sized liquefaction units... II.19 Examples of small liquefaction units... II.20 Suitable bunkering methods for different types of vessel [4]... II.27 LNG bunkering rates and configurations for different vessel types [4]... II.28 Risk criteria used for the individual risk of Seveso establishments in Flanders [17]... III.3 Generic types of failure for installations used in LNG storage, transfer and distribution [18]... III.8 Effects and lethal response for each incident outcome... III.15 Characteristic dimensions of medium-sized atmospheric LNG tanks... III.16 Calculated maximum outflow rates for the representative types of failure of an atmospheric storage tank... III.17 Characteristic dimensions of LNG pressure tanks... III.17 Characteristic dimensions of common bunds... III.18 Release of cold LNG at -160 C and 150 mbarg (degree of filling: 90%)... III.18 Release of warm LNG at -138 C and 4 barg (degree of filling: 90%)... III.18 Maximum size of a pool fire in case of direct ignition of the incidentally released LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.19 Maximum size of a pool fire in case of delayed ignition of the incidentally released LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.19 Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters used for (un)loading LNG ships at bunker terminals and bunkering stations... III.20 Release of LNG following failure of an (un)loading hose or arm during (un)loading of a ship... III.21 Release of LNG vapour following failure of a vapour return hose or arm during (un)loading of a ship... III.21 Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire on water in case of direct or delayed ignition of the released LNG (- 160 C)... III.21 Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters used for (un)loading LNG trucks... III.22 Key characteristics of a representative LNG truck... III.22 Release of LNG following failure of the (un)loading hose or arm during a truck (un)loading... III.23 Release of LNG following failure of the vapour return hose or arm during a truck loading... III.23 Release of LNG following failure of an LNG truck (assuming a maximum degree of filling)... III.23 Maximum size of a pool fire on land in case of direct or delayed ignition of the incidentally released LNG (no containment, -160 C)... III.23 Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters... III.24

6 List of tables and figures page VI Table III : Table III : Release of LNG following failure of (un)loading hose or arm... III.24 Release of LNG vapour following failure of vapour return hose or arm... III.25 Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire on water in the event of direct or delayed ignition of the released LNG (- 160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.25 Table III Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Figure III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Overview of generic probabilities of ignition for LNG/natural gas according to the Safety Reporting Division s Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 [18]... III.27 Risk distances for atmospheric LNG storage tanks... III.28 Results of the societal risk calculations for atmospheric LNG storage tanks (based on a uniform population density)... III.30 Maximum allowable uniform population density in the vicinity of an atmospheric LNG storage tank based on Flemish risk criteria... III.30 Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.31 Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg)... III.33 Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-160 C to -138 C)... III.34 Maximum allowable uniform population density in the vicinity of an LNG station containing pressure tanks, based on Flemish risk criteria... III.35 Risk distances for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C) via hoses... III.36 Risk distances for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C) via arms... III.39 Risk distances for the (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C)... III.42 Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG via hoses (-160 C to -138 C)... III.45 Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG via arms (-160 C to -138 C)... III.46 Risk distances for LNG truck (un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h without containment system (-160 C)... III.47 Risk distances for LNG truck (un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h with containment system (-160 C)... III.47 Risk distances for LNG truck(un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h with and without containment system (-138 C)... III.51 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with warm LNG via hoses (-138 C)... III.51 Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG trucks via hoses at an (un)loading location without containment system (-160 C to -138 C)... III.52 Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG trucks via hoses at an (un)loading location with containment system (-160 C to -138 C)... III.53 Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via hoses... III.54 Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via arms... III.56 Risk distances for the bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C)... III.59 Risk distances for the bunkering of LNG via hoses (-160 to -138 C)... III.62 Risk distances for the bunkering of LNG via arms (-160 to -138 C)... III.62 Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via trucks... III.63 Risk distances for the bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C) via trucks... III.64 Contribution of the liquefaction unit to the total individual risk arising from the LNG terminal in Risavika, Norway [28]... III.66 Specifications of the main installation components of a small liquefaction unit (cf. production unit at Snurrevarden, Norway)... III.69 Generic types of failure for installations used in the storage, transfer and distribution of LNG... III.69 Calculated outflow rates for the representative types of failure of the installation components examined... III.70

7 List of tables and figures page VII Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III.4.5.1: Table III.4.5.2: Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III : Table III Table III.5.5.1: Table III.5.5.2: Table III.5.5.3: Table III.5.5.4: Calculated risk distances for a small liquefaction unit with a maximum production capacity of 20,000 tpa... III.71 Key characteristics of a representative LNG truck... III.76 Maximum pool surface area in the event of an incidental release of cold LNG (-160 C) on the public highway... III.77 Maximum pool surface area in the event of an incidental release of warm LNG (-138 C) on the public highway... III.77 Frequency of injury accidents involving HGVs in Belgium (2006 data)... III.78 Probability of a release from a truck in the event of a traffic accident... III.79 Ignition probabilities for incidental releases of LNG during road transport... III.80 Risk distances for the road transport of cold LNG (-160 C)... III.81 Risk distances for the road transport of warm LNG (-138 C)... III.83 Main characteristics of the LNG ships examined... III.92 Representative release scenarios for nautical accidents involving LNG ships and cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.92 Representative release scenarios for nautical accidents involving LNG ships and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg)... III.93 Representative release scenarios for inherent defects in LNG ships with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.93 Representative release scenarios for inherent defects in LNG ships with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg)... III.93 Calculated pool diameters of fires that could occur following a release of cold LNG as the result of a nautical accident (direct ignition)... III.94 Calculated pool diameters of fires that could occur following a release of cold LNG as the result of a nautical accident (delayed ignition)... III.94 Impact probability for a berthed LNG ship... III.95 Probability of an inherent defect in a berthed LNG ship... III.96 Probability of nautical accidents involving a moving LNG ship... III.97 Overview of generic ignition probabilities for LNG releases resulting from inherent defects in the cargo system of an LNG ship... III.97 Risk distances for LNG ships navigating inside a port (-160 C)... III.98 Risk distances for berthed LNG ships with a low (un)loading rate (-160 C)... III.99 Risk distances for LNG ships navigating inside a port (-138 C)... III.102 Risk distances for berthed LNG ships with a low (un)loading rate (-138 C)... III.102 Table B1.1.1: Examined components for LNG storage... V.3 Table B1.1.2: Examined components for LNG ship (un)loading... V.4 Table B1.1.3: Examined components for LNG truck (un)loading... V.5 Table B1.1.4: Examined components for bunkering ships with LNG using fixed bunkering installations or bunker vessels... V.6 Table B1.1.5: Examined components for bunkering ships with LNG using trucks... V.7 Table B1.1.6: Examined components for LNG production (liquefaction)... V.7 Table B1.2.1: Examined components for LNG road transport... V.7 Table B1.3.1: Examined components for LNG ship transport in a port... V.8 Table B2.2.1: LNG releases during (un)loading of LNG ships... V.13 Table B2.3.1: Accidents during LNG road transport... V.15 Table B2.4.1: Leaks from storage tanks... V.16

8 List of tables and figures page VIII Table B2.4.2: Fires caused by lightning strikes... V.16 Table B2.4.3: Collisions... V.16 Table B2.4.4: Groundings... V.18 Table B2.4.5: Drifting / Propulsion problems... V.19 Table B2.4.6: Miscellaneous incidents... V.20 Table B3.1: Typical characteristics and hazardous properties of LNG/natural gas... V.21 Table B8.1: Probability of occurrence of different weather types (Deurne, )... V.33 Table B8.2: Representative weather types and probability of occurrence (Deurne, )... V.33 Figures Figure II.1.1: Figure II.1.1.1: Figure II.1.1.2: Figure II.1.1.3: Figure II.1.2.1: Figure II.2.1.1: Figure II.2.1.2: Figure II.2.1.3: Schematic representation of the different supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports...ii.1 Main supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports (excluding Zeebrugge)..II.2 Direct supply of ships with LNG fuel from an LNG import terminal...ii.3 Supply of ships with LNG fuel from a local bunker terminal with its own liquefaction unit...ii.3 Alternative supply chain for the delivery of LNG as a fuel to ships in the port of Zeebrugge...II.4 Coral Methane, an LNG feeder vessel with two cylindrical cargo tanks and a total capacity of 7,500 m³...ii.5 Norgas Innovation, an LNG feeder vessel with a total capacity of 10,000 m³ (two cylindrical cargo tanks of 6,000 and 4,000 m³)...ii.5 FKAB L2, example of an LNG feeder vessel with three bilobe cargo tanks and a total capacity of 16,500 m³ (source: FKAB)...II.5 Figure II.2.1.4: Example of an LNG feeder vessel with four bilobe cargo tank and a total capacity of 30,000 m³ (source: TGE Marine)...II.6 Figure II.2.1.5: Figure II.2.1.6: Figure II.2.2.1: Figure II.2.2.2: Figure II.2.2.3: Figure II.2.2.4: Figure II.2.3.1: Figure II.2.3.2: Figure II.2.4.1: Figure II.2.4.2: Figure II.2.4.3: Figure II.2.4.4: Figure II.2.4.5: Figure II.2.5.1: Figure II.2.5.2: Figure II.2.5.3: Figure II.2.5.4: Figure II.2.5.5: Schematic representation of an IMO type C cylindrical and bilobe cargo tank...ii.7 Cross section of an IMO type C cylindrical cargo tank with a volume of 6,000 m³...ii.8 WS1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 700 m³ of LNG...II.8 FKAB L1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 800 m³ of LNG...II.9 FKAB L1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 800 m³ of LNG...II.9 Example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 3,000 m³ of LNG...II.9 Example of an LNG truck with a capacity of 56 m³... II.10 Example of an ISO tank container suitable for transporting LNG... II.10 AGA s medium-sized LNG terminal in Nynäshamn, Sweden (storage capacity: 20,000 m³)... II.12 Skangass AS s medium-sized LNG terminal with liquefaction unit in Risavika, Norway (storage capacity: 30,000 m³)... II.13 Schematic representation of a single containment atmospheric tank in a conventional bund... II.14 Schematic representation of a double containment tank... II.14 Schematic representation of a full containment tank... II.14 LNG storage station with one 250-m³ pressure tank used to supply PSVs (platform supply vessels) in Bergen (Norway)... II.16 LNG storage station with two 500-m³ pressure tanks used to supply three ferries in Halhjem (Norway)... II.17 LNG storage station with three 500-m³ pressure tanks (Norway)... II.17 LNG storage station with five 700-m³ tanks in Mosjoen (Norway)... II.17 Schematic representation of a vacuum-insulated LNG pressure tank... II.18

9 List of tables and figures page IX Figure II.2.6.1: Figure II.2.6.2: Figure II.2.6.3: Figure II.2.6.4: Figure II.2.6.5: Figure II.2.6.6: Figure II.2.6.7: Figure II.2.6.8: Figure II.2.6.9: Figure II : Figure II : Figure II.2.7.1: Figure II.2.7.2: Figure II.2.7.3: Figure II.2.7.4: Figure III.1.1: Figure III.1.2: Figure III Figure III Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Example of a medium-sized LNG terminal with 120,000-tpa liquefaction unit in Kolsness (Norway)II.19 Example of a medium-sized LNG terminal with 62,500-tpa liquefaction unit in Kwinana (Australia)II.20 Examples of small LNG stations with 10,000- and 20,000-tpa liquefaction units in Norway... II.20 Example of a small liquefaction unit with a capacity of 20,000 tpa in Porvoo (Finland)... II.21 Example of a small liquefaction unit with a capacity of 5,000 tpa in Porvoo (Finland)... II.21 Process diagram of an open cycle with turboexpander liquefaction unit... II.22 Process diagram of a closed cycle with nitrogen refrigerant liquefaction unit... II.23 Process diagram of a closed cycle with pure refrigerant liquefaction unit... II.24 Process diagram of a closed cycle with mixed refrigerant liquefaction unit... II.25 Process diagram of a liquefaction unit using the PRICO process (closed cycle with mixed refrigerant)... II.25 Process diagram of a liquefaction unit using the LIMUM process (closed cycle with two-stage compression and a mixed refrigerant)... II.26 Schematic representation of the different bunkering methods [4]... II.27 Bunkering a ship via a fixed installation in Halhjem (Norway)... II.28 Truck-to-ship bunkering in Arsvägen (Norway)... II.28 Ship-to-ship bunkering using flexible hoses or a fixed arm... II.29 Schematic representation of the steps involved in a quantitative risk analysis... III.2 Risk criteria used for the societal risk of Seveso establishments in Flanders... III.4 Event tree for a release of LNG at near-atmospheric pressure... III.10 Event tree for a release of LNG at increased pressure... III.11 Idealised representation of a flame according to POOLFIRE6... III.12 Soot formation in an LNG fire with a diameter of 35 m (photo: Montoir tests)... III.13 Example of a calculated flame geometry according to Chamberlain s model... III.13 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of LNG in atmospheric tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.29 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of LNG in atmospheric tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.29 Calculated societal risk curves for a 40,000 m³ atmospheric LNG tank (red line: risk criterion)... III.31 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of cold LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.32 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of cold LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg)... III.32 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of warm LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg)... III.33 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of warm LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg)... III.34 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses without emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.37 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses with manual emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.37 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses without emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.38 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses with manual emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.38 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms without emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.40

10 List of tables and figures page X Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms with manual emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.40 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms without emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.41 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms with manual emergency shutdown system (-160 C)... III.41 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using hoses (-138 C)... III.43 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using hoses (-138 C)... III.43 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using (un)loading arms (-138 C)... III.44 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using (un)loading arms (-138 C)... III.44 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (no emergency shutdown system)... III.48 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (manual emergency shutdown system)... III.48 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (automatic emergency shutdown system)... III.49 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (no emergency shutdown system)... III.49 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (manual emergency shutdown system)... III.50 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (automatic emergency shutdown system)... III.50 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with warm LNG via hoses (-138 C)... III.52 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (no emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.54 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (manual emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.55 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (no emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.55 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (manual emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.56 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (no emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.57 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (manual emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.58 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (no emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.58 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (manual emergency shutdown system, -160 C)... III.59 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using hoses (-138 C)... III.60 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using hoses (-138 C)... III.60 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using arms (-138 C)... III.61

11 List of tables and figures page XI Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III : Figure III.4.5.1: Figure III.4.5.2: Figure III.4.5.3: Figure III.4.5.4: Figure III.4.5.5: Figure III.4.5.6: Figure III : Figure III : Figure III.5.5.1: Figure III.5.5.2: Figure III.5.5.3: Figure III.5.5.4: Figure III.5.5.5: Figure III.5.5.6: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using arms (-138 C)... III.61 Overview of the main installations on the LNG terminal site at Risavika, Norway... III.65 Liquefaction unit at the Skangass LNG terminal in Risavika, Norway... III.65 Locations at which the individual risk of the LNG terminal in Risavika was analysed (indicated by yellow dots)... III.66 Individual risk from the liquefaction unit at the Skangass LNG terminal in Risavika (Norway), according to the distance to the centre of the installation... III.67 Overview of the main installations belonging to the small Gasnor liquefaction unit at Snurrevarden, Norway... III.68 Process diagram of the Gasnor liquefaction unit at Snurrevarden (type: closed 1-stage N2 cycle)... III.68 Event tree for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport... III.75 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C)... III.82 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C)... III.82 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in vacuum-insulated pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C)... III.83 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (-138 C)... III.84 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (-138 C)... III.84 Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in vacuum-insulated pressure trucks (-138 C)... III.85 Event tree for a release of cold LNG (-160 C) on water following the failure of an LNG ship s cargo tank... III.90 Event tree for a release of warm LNG (-138 C) on water following the failure of an LNG ship s cargo tank... III.91 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a quiet waterway for 500 hours per year... III.100 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a busy waterway for 500 hours per year... III.101 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a very busy waterway for 500 hours per year... III.101 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a quiet waterway for 500 hours per year... III.103 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a busy waterway for 500 hours per year... III.104 Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a very busy waterway for 500 hours per year... III.104 Figure B8.1 Percentage probability of wind-direction occurrence... V.32

12 Terminology and abbreviations page XII TERMINOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS The terminology and abbreviations used in this report are listed below in alphabetical order, together with their meaning. ADR AGA Bara Barg BLEVE Bunker terminal Bunkering Bunkering station FKAB HSE IMDG IMO Import terminal Individual risk ISO LEL LNE Department LNG Accord européen relatif au transport international des marchandises Dangereuses par Route or European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road American Gas Association Absolute pressure Overpressure, i.e. pressure above atmospheric pressure Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion Medium-sized LNG terminal with a storage capacity of 10,000 to 100,000 m³ of LNG, used as an intermediary storage facility for LNG at a port The act or process of supplying a ship with fuel Station with a small storage capacity (< 10,000 m³) where ships can bunker LNG via a fixed installation Fartygskonstruktioner AB Health, Safety and Environment International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code International Maritime Organisation Terminal with a storage capacity of more than 100,000 m³ which is supplied by LNG ships with a capacity of 140,000 m³ to 265,000 m³ The individual human risk is the probability for a single unprotected person to be killed by accidents related to the installation or activity considered and this over a period of 1 year. In the calculation it is assumed that the person is permanently present at the location. International Organisation for Standardisation Lower Explosion Limit Environment, Nature and Energy Department of the Flemish government Liquefied Natural Gas m³ (n) Normal m 3 at 0 C and mbar absolute MAM PSV QRA RPT SMR TNO Societal risk SR requirement SR Division tpa UEL vehkm Maximum Authorised Mass Platform Supply Vessel Quantitative Risk Assessment or Quantitative Risk Analysis Rapid Phase Transition Single flow Mixed Refrigerant Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek [Dutch research organisation] The societal risk expresses the probability that groups of people will die due to separate accidents related to the installation or activity considered and this over a period of one year. In Flanders, safety reports (SRs) must be drawn up for establishments in which hazardous substances may be present in quantities that equal or exceed the so-called Seveso high threshold, or which are considered as highthreshold establishments based on the summation rule. Safety Reporting Division Tonnes per annum Upper Explosion Limit Vehicle-kilometre

13 I. Introduction page I.1 I. INTRODUCTION The use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a fuel for powering ships is increasingly prevalent. This trend is expected to continue in Europe, primarily because of the more stringent regulations set to be applied to oceangoing vessels sailing in North European seas. In Scandinavia, LNG has been used as ship fuel since The experience there has been positive. Technically speaking, there are no major problems either with making the necessary alterations to ship propulsion systems or with the distribution of LNG as a ship fuel. Given the anticipated increase in this use of LNG, ports will have to provide LNG bunkering facilities in addition to the traditional bunkering services. Bunkering requires transport, storage and transfer operations. Since LNG is a flammable cryogenic fluid, a number of safety risks are connected to the use of LNG. The scale of the operations and the quantities of LNG involved justify the need for a thorough analysis of these risks. In the present study, the safety risks associated with LNG bunkering in the Flemish ports are analysed. The activities examined relate to the local storage, handling and transport of LNG, as well as the actual bunkering activities in the ports. Because some installations in the LNG supply chain fall under the Seveso II Directive, the risk assessment method chosen is the quantitative risk analysis (1). In the first phase, the external human risks posed by the individual components in the supply chain are calculated in a generic way. In the second phase of the study, risk analyses will be performed for the supply chain as a whole, taking into account the alternatives developed by the working group as regards transport routes, storage locations and annual throughputs. (1) In Flanders, the external human risks associated with serious accidents involving hazardous substances are determined, for safety reporting purposes (Seveso II Directive), by means of a quantitative risk analysis (QRA).

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15 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.1 II. LNG SUPPLY CHAIN FOR FLEMISH PORTS In the first part of the study, the possible alternative supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports are discussed. In this connection, a distinction is made between ports that have an LNG import terminal (Zeebrugge) and those that do not (e.g. Antwerp and Ghent). In addition, the individual components of the LNG supply chain are discussed in depth, with particular focus on the characteristic size of the installations (e.g. storage volume and transfer rates) and the technical specifications that could potentially influence the external human risk arising from the installation concerned. II.1. LNG supply chain Figure II.1.1 presents a general overview of the different supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports. The diagram is partly based on the supply chains already used in Scandinavian countries [1-4]. Figure II.1.1: Schematic representation of the different supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports natural gas network liquefactionunit LNG bunker vessel (500 3,000 m³) LNG import terminal (380,000 m³) LNG feeder vessel (7,500 20,000 m³) bunker terminal (10,000 40,000 m³) LNG truck (50 m³) LNG-fuelled ship LNG (bunker) vessel (1,000 20,000 m³) bunkering station (100 3,500 m³) fixedbunkering installation LNG truck (50 m³) supply transport local storage or production Bunkering operation II.1.1. Supply routes for ports without an LNG import terminal MAIN ROUTES Figure II gives an overview of the main LNG supply routes for Flemish ports that do not have an LNG import terminal (e.g. Antwerp and Ghent).

16 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.2 Figure II.1.1.1: Main supply routes for the delivery of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports (excluding Zeebrugge) bunker vessel (500-3,000 m³) LNG import terminal (380,000 m³) feeder ship (7,500 20,000 m³) bunker terminal (10,000 40,000 m³) LNG truck (50 m³) LNG-fuelled ship bunkering station (100 3,500 m³) fixedbunkering installation(pipeline) supply transport local storage bunkering operation Given the close proximity of the Zeebrugge LNG import terminal (2) and the export facilities already offered at that terminal (e.g. loading of small LNG ships and LNG trucks), this import terminal is a major potential source for the supply of LNG as a ship fuel to Flemish ports. Further, it is expected that demand for LNG as a fuel at Flemish ports will increase sharply and that different types of vessels will need to be supplied with LNG at high frequency, which will require local storage of LNG (3). This intermediate storage can be achieved by building a medium-sized LNG bunker terminal (capacity: 10,000 40,000 m³), which is responsible for the onward distribution of LNG fuel at the port concerned. LNG can be distributed from a bunker terminal by means of a fixed bunkering installation at the terminal, by bunker vessels or by trucks. The bunker terminal itself is supplied from a large LNG import terminal using feeder vessels with a typical capacity of 7,500 to 30,000 m³ (4). Local distribution of LNG can also take place via small-scale LNG bunkering stations supplied using LNG trucks (capacity: 50 m³) from a local bunker terminal. Such smallscale LNG bunkering stations typically have a capacity of 100 to 3,500 m³ and are responsible for supplying specific end users with a limited fuel consumption. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES For supplying LNG to the ports of Antwerp and Ghent, there are a number of alternative routes which are represented schematically in Figures II and II These are as follows: Direct supply of end users via bunker vessels with a capacity of 1,000 to 10,000 m³ which are loaded at an LNG import terminal. This supply route could possibly be used during the project start-up phase, during which mainly end users requiring (2) (3) (4) The distance between the LNG import terminal in Zeebrugge and the ports of Ghent and Antwerp is just 80 and 100 km, for both road and water transportation. The LNG need forecasts of Flemish ports for the period suggest that it is mainly the port of Antwerp that requires local storage of LNG. Depending on their storage capacity and throughput, LNG bunker terminals are supplied by ship 10 to 20 times a year from a large LNG import terminal.

17 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.3 large amounts of LNG ( 500 m³) will be supplied (e.g. tankers, container ships and cargo ships). Such LNG bunker vessels can also be used to supply small bunkering stations used by specific end users requiring small amounts of LNG (5). The construction of small to medium-sized liquefaction units at Flemish ports, with gas being extracted from the existing natural gas network. The production capacity of such liquefaction units can vary from 5,000 to 300,000 tpa (11, ,000 m³/y), depending on local demand. The advantages of small-scale liquefaction units are the low investment costs and the fact that the LNG can be produced close to end users (no or limited transport risks). The drawback of small-scale production units is that they are less energy-efficient than large liquefaction units, which results in higher production costs [3]. Figure II.1.1.2: Direct supply of ships with LNG fuel from an LNG import terminal LNG import terminal (380,000 m³) LNG bunker vessel (1,000 20,000 m³) LNG-fuelled ship Bunkering station (100 3,500 m³) fixedbunkering installation(pipeline) supply transport local storage Bunkering operation Figure II.1.1.3: Supply of ships with LNG fuel from a local bunker terminal with its own liquefaction unit naturalgas network liquefactionunit bunker vessel (500 3,000 m³) bunker terminal (10,000 40,000 m³) LNG truck (50 m³) LNG-fuelled ship bunkering station (100 3,500 m³) fixedbunkering installation(pipeline) supply transport local storage or production bunkering operation (5) Small bunkering stations at neighbouring ports can also be supplied using trucks loaded at an LNG import terminal. However, it should be noted that this is only logistically feasible for small bunkering stations (capacity: m³) with a limited throughput, so as to minimise the number of shipments by road [4].

18 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.4 II.1.2. Supply routes for ports with an LNG import terminal The presence of an LNG import terminal in Zeebrugge s outer port simplifies the supply chain for LNG fuel at the port of Zeebrugge. The LNG can be distributed directly by means of a bunker vessel or LNG trucks loaded at the LNG import terminal. The biggest bottleneck in this supply chain is the available loading capacity at the LNG import terminal (i.e. availability of the jetties). Generally speaking, to enable successful distribution of LNG as a ship fuel, an LNG import terminal must have a specific jetty for bunker vessels or a truck loading station with sufficient loading capacity [4]. Distribution can also take place via local LNG bunkering stations supplied from the LNG import terminal using small LNG ships (capacity: 1,000 3,000 m³) or LNG trucks. Figure II.1.2.1: Alternative supply chain for the delivery of LNG as a fuel to ships in the port of Zeebrugge bunker vessel (500 3,000 m³) LNG import terminal (380,000 m³) LNG truck (50 m³) bunkering station (100 3,500 m³) fixedbunkering installation(pipeline) LNG-fuelled ship LNG truck (50 m³) supply local transport local storage bunkering operation II.2. II.2.1. Description of the individual components in the LNG supply chain LNG feeder vessels GENERAL LNG feeder vessels are small to medium-sized LNG carriers used for regional transport of LNG with a view to its use as ship fuel or the industrial use of natural gas in remote places (cf. Scandinavia). The LNG feeder vessels currently in operation or under construction are double-hulled gas carriers with a capacity of 7,500 to 30,000 m³ [4]. The size and main dimensions of the vessels vary depending on market demand and the physical limitations of the intended unloading location (e.g. dimensions of the berthing site and draught at the jetty). The figures below show some examples of LNG feeder vessels with different capacities. Table II gives an overview of LNG feeder vessels currently in service or under construction [4,5].

19 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.5 Figure II.2.1.1: Coral Methane, an LNG feeder vessel with two cylindrical cargo tanks and a total capacity of 7,500 m³ Figure II.2.1.2: Norgas Innovation, an LNG feeder vessel with a total capacity of 10,000 m³ (two cylindrical cargo tanks of 6,000 and 4,000 m³) Figure II.2.1.3: FKAB L2, example of an LNG feeder vessel with three bilobe cargo tanks and a total capacity of 16,500 m³ (source: FKAB)

20 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.6 Figure II.2.1.4: Example of an LNG feeder vessel with four bilobe cargo tank and a total capacity of 30,000 m³ (source: TGE Marine) Name Table II.2.1.1: List of LNG feeder vessels [4,5] Year of construction Capacity [m³] Tank type Aman Bintulu ,900 Mark III (membrane) Surya Aki ,500 Moss tanks Aman Sendai ,900 Mark III (membrane) Aman Hakata ,800 Mark III (membrane) Surya Satsuma ,100 Mark III (membrane) Sun Arrows ,100 Moss tanks Coral Methane ,500 IMO type C tank Norgas Innovation ,000 IMO type C tank Norgas Creation ,000 IMO type C tank Norgas Unikum ,000 IMO type C tank Norgas Vision ,000 IMO type C tank Norgas Invention ,000 IMO type C tank Norgas Conception ,000 IMO type C tank CARGO SYSTEM For the cargo tanks used on gas carriers, a distinction is generally made between non-self-supporting tanks (atmospheric membrane tanks) and self-supporting tanks (actual pressure tanks) [6]. The self-supporting cargo tanks are subdivided into three classes according to their strength: IMO TYPE A TANK These are prismatic cargo tanks with a low design pressure ( 0.7 barg). The material used in the construction of these tanks offers insufficient resistance to crack propagation, so that for safety reasons a second shell (tank wall) has to be provided to contain any leaks. This second shell can also be formed by parts of the ship (e.g. inner hull) provided that these are capable of resisting the low temperature of the cargo.

21 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.7 IMO TYPE B TANK These are prismatic or spherical cargo tanks with a low design pressure ( 0.7 barg), for which a great deal of attention has been paid in the design phase to detailed stress analyses (inter alia in relation to fatigue and crack propagation). Spherical Moss-Rosenberg tanks are the best known example of this type of tank. Because of the improved design, a type B cargo tank only needs to have a partial second shell, fitted on the underside of the tank in the form of a drip tray. IMO TYPE C TANK These are spherical, cylindrical or bilobe pressure tanks with a design pressure greater than 2 barg. The tanks are designed and built according to the conventional pressure vessel codes and, as a result, can be subjected to accurate stress analyses. Moreover, in the design phase much attention is paid to eliminating possible stresses in the tank material. For these reasons, type C cargo tanks do not require a second shell. For ships in which the cargo is transported in a cooled and partially pressurised state, the cargo tanks and associated apparatus are typically designed for a working pressure of 4 to 6 barg and a vacuum of 0.5 bar. This latter tank type (IMO type C) is mainly found on LNG feeder vessels used for the onward inland distribution of LNG (6). They are primarily cylindrical and bilobe cargo tanks with a volume of 3,000 to 7,500 m³ and a design pressure of 3 to 4 barg (see Figures II and II.2.1.6) [7]. The cargo tanks are typically insulated with polystyrene or polyurethane panels attached to the tank wall. Figure II.2.1.5: Schematic representation of an IMO type C cylindrical and bilobe cargo tank (source: TGE Marine) (6) The design of the LNG feeder vessel s cargo system is largely based on the cargo system of ethylene vessels. However, the materials used for the cargo system of an LNG ship must be able to resist temperatures as low as -163 C. Suitable materials are: 9% Ni steel, stainless steel 304L and aluminium.

22 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.8 Figure II.2.1.6: Cross section of an IMO type C cylindrical cargo tank with a volume of 6,000 m³ (Norgas Innovation) (UN)LOADING RATES LNG feeder vessels can be loaded at large LNG import terminals (such as the Zeebrugge LNG terminal). Loading takes place via fixed cryogenic pipes and flexible hoses or fixed arms at a typical rate of 1,000 to 6,000 m³/h depending on the size of the feeder vessel. The LNG vapour displaced from the ship s cargo tanks is returned to the terminal via a vapour return line. Unloading of the vessel at a bunker terminal or bunkering station is also done using fixed cryogenic pipes and flexible hoses or fixed arms. The LNG is pumped to the terminal by the submersible pumps fitted in the ship s cargo tanks at a typical rate of 1,000 to 6,000 m³/h. II.2.2. LNG bunker vessel GENERAL LNG bunker vessels are small LNG ships used for the direct supply of LNG fuel to ships inside or outside a port. During bunkering, the LNG is pumped from the bunker vessel s cargo tanks directly into the fuel tanks of the ship being supplied. LNG bunker vessels are identical in design to LNG feeder vessels and typically have a capacity of 500 to 20,000 m³. Some examples of LNG bunker vessels are shown in the figures below. However, no LNG bunker vessels are yet in operation. The only LNG ship currently in service which has a similar design and capacity to a bunker vessel is the Pioneer Knutsen. This ship has a capacity of 1,100 m³ and is currently chartered by Gasnor to distribute LNG in the Norwegian Fjords [8]. Figure II.2.2.1: WS1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 700 m³ of LNG (source: White Smoke)

23 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.9 Figure II.2.2.2: FKAB L1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 800 m³ of LNG (source: FKAB) Figure II.2.2.3: FKAB L1, an example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 800 m³ of LNG (source: FKAB) Figure II.2.2.4: Example of an LNG bunker vessel with a capacity of 3,000 m³ of LNG (source: TGE Marine)

24 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.10 CARGO SYSTEM Small LNG bunker vessels (500 3,000 m³) are usually equipped with one or two cargo tanks. These are mainly cylindrical cargo tanks with a design pressure of 3 to 4 barg (IMO type C tank) and an individual tank capacity of 500 to 2,000 m³ of LNG. Large bunker vessels ( 3,000 m³) are identical in design to LNG feeder vessels (see section II.2.1). (UN)LOADING RATES LNG bunker vessels can be loaded at medium-sized bunker terminals or large LNG import terminals. Loading takes place via fixed cryogenic pipes and flexible hoses or fixed loading arms at a rate of 200 to 3,000 m³/h depending on the size of the bunker vessel. Bunkering is done using flexible hoses or fixed arms at a rate of 60 to 3,000 m³/h depending on the size of the fuel tanks on the receiving vessel (see Table II.2.7.1) [4]. II.2.3. LNG trucks GENERAL Regional transport and local distribution of LNG can also be performed using LNG trucks provided that the distance between the loading and unloading locations is not too great (max. 500 km) and the consumption of the local consumer is small. The capacity of LNG trucks varies from 35 to 56 m³ for conventional trucks and up to 80 m³ for a truck/trailer combination. As an alternative to trucks, ISO tank containers with a capacity of 21 m³ (20 container) or 45 m³ (40 container) can also be used. In Belgium, the maximum authorised mass (MAM) of trucks used for domestic transport is 44 tonnes and the maximum length is m. Consequently, only conventional trucks or tank containers with a capacity of up to 56 m³ can be used for regional distribution of LNG. Figure II.2.3.1: Example of an LNG truck with a capacity of 56 m³ Figure II.2.3.2: Example of an ISO tank container suitable for transporting LNG

25 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.11 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS In terms of cargo tank design, LNG trucks can be divided into two types [9]: trucks with a single-walled cargo tank made of stainless steel, insulated with rigid polyurethane panels and fitted with a thin aluminium or stainless-steel protective cover (7) ; trucks with a double-walled vacuum-insulated cargo tank comprising an inner tank made of aluminium or stainless steel and an outer tank of carbon steel. The space between the inner and outer tanks is a vacuum and is further insulated with perlite, glass wool or a super-insulating foil (8). The cargo tank of an LNG truck typically has a design pressure of 5 to 6 barg and is equipped with a redundant overpressure protection system with two safety valves. LNG trucks initially had a fairly high centre of gravity and a number of measures had to be taken to reduce the risk of the truck overturning (e.g. rigid spring suspension and special training for drivers). Recently, truck manufacturers have made extra efforts to lower the centre of gravity, thereby also significantly improving truck manoeuvrability. The main specifications of LNG trucks (volume, degree of filling, design pressure, etc.) are shown in Table II The pressure and temperature of the LNG in the truck during transportation is typically between 0 and 3 barg (-160 C and -142 C) (9). Table II.2.3.1: General specifications of LNG trucks Volume m³ (14-23 tonnes of LNG) Degree of filling max. 90% Design pressure (test pressure) Set pressure of safety valves 5-6 barg (9 barg) typically 5-6 barg APPROVAL PROCEDURE AT ZEEBRUGGE LNG trucks or tank containers that come to load at the Zeebrugge LNG import terminal must first be officially approved under the terminal s LNG Truck Approval Procedure [10]. The Truck Approval Procedure includes a number of minimum technical requirements relating to the design of the truck or tank container in order to guarantee the inherent safety of the truck or container. The main requirements are as follows: LNG trucks must be fully compliant with ADR regulations and, if applicable, with the IMDG Code. Every LNG truck must be super vacuum-insulated (i.e. double-walled tank with insulating material and vacuum atmosphere between the walls), must have three rear axles and be designed for maximum road stability. The outer tank wall must be made of carbon steel or stainless steel with sufficient mechanical and thermal resistance. The mechanical resistance must be demonstrated by means of a safety impact study in which the resistance to lateral (7) (8) (9) US law does not allow the use of single-wall trucks for domestic transportation of LNG due to concerns about the fire safety of these trucks given the flammable nature of the insulating material. The super-insulating foil consists of alternating layers of thin glass wool paper and metal foil. If an LNG truck is loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at an LNG import terminal or a medium-sized bunker terminal, the initial tank pressure in the truck is 100 to 200 mbarg. During transportation of LNG to or in Flemish ports, these conditions will barely change due to the relatively short distances involved and the effective insulation of the trucks.

26 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.12 impact and overturning of the truck is determined. As regards fire resistance, the tank wall must be able to withstand temperatures of at least 700 C. (UN)LOADING RATES LNG trucks can be loaded at large LNG import terminals or mediumsized bunker terminals at a rate of 50 to 100 m³/h. The LNG is pumped from the LNG storage tanks into the truck using a submersible pump via a fixed cryogenic pipe and a flexible (un)loading hose. The displaced LNG vapour is returned to the storage tanks via a vapour return line. Unloading of LNG trucks at a bunker terminal or local bunkering station is also done using a flexible hose (2-3 ) and a fixed cryogenic pipe at a typical rate of 40 to 60 m³/h. The LNG can be transferred using a pump fitted on the truck or by raising the pressure in the truck using a pressure build-up coil or a connection to an external nitrogen or natural gas network. II.2.4. LNG bunker terminals GENERAL A medium-sized LNG bunker terminal serves as an intermediate storage facility in a port from where the onward distribution of LNG as a ship fuel can be organised. The storage capacity of such bunker terminals is typically 10,000 to 40,000 m³ (10). A medium-sized bunker terminal is generally supplied by LNG feeder vessels (capacity: 7,500 30,000 m³) which bring in the LNG from a large LNG import terminal (11). The construction of a medium-sized liquefaction unit (capacity: 45,000 to 300,000 tpa) close to the bunker terminal is a possible alternative to bringing in LNG by ship. The onward distribution of LNG in a port can be done using LNG bunker vessels or LNG trucks loaded at the bunker terminal. The terminal can also be equipped with a fixed bunkering installation at which ships can be directly supplied with LNG for fuel. The figures below show some examples of medium-sized LNG terminals in Sweden and Norway. Figure II.2.4.1: AGA s medium-sized LNG terminal in Nynäshamn, Sweden (storage capacity: 20,000 m³) LNG storage tank (20,000 m³) Ship loading/unloading installation Truck loading station (10) (11) In very large ports (cf. port of Antwerp), the storage capacity of a local bunker terminal can be as much as 100,000 m³ [4]. Assuming the throughput of the bunker terminal is 10 times the storage capacity, 10 to 20 LNG feeder vessels a year can be expected to unload at a bunker terminal.

27 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.13 Figure II.2.4.2: Skangass AS s medium-sized LNG terminal with liquefaction unit in Risavika, Norway (storage capacity: 30,000 m³) The main installations at an LNG bunker terminal (namely the storage tank, vessel loading/unloading installation and truck loading station) are discussed below. In addition to the above, a bunker terminal may also contain other installations (such as a fixed bunkering installation or a liquefaction unit). These are discussed in sections II.2.5 and II.2.6 respectively. STORAGE TANK The atmospheric storage tank of a bunker terminal typically has a capacity of 10,000 or 40,000 m³, so that the entire cargo of a single LNG feeder vessel can be transferred to the tank. The LNG is stored in the tanks at a temperature of around C and a pressure of 40 to 170 mbarg. With respect to the design of the atmospheric storage tank, the same types of tank are used as in large LNG import terminals. These are single-walled storage tanks in a conventional bund (known as single containment tanks ), double containment tanks and full containment tanks comprising an outer tank of reinforced concrete and a nickel steel inner tank (12). Double containment tanks and full containment tanks can also be placed in an emergency retention pit to further enhance their safety (13). The figures below show schematic representations of the different types of tank. An overview of the characteristic dimensions of these medium-sized storage tanks is given in Table II [11,12]. (12) (13) The LNG storage tanks at the LNG terminals in Risavika near Stavanger (Norway) and Nynäshamn (Sweden) are both full containment tanks. The LNG storage tanks at the Zeebrugge LNG terminal are full containment tanks placed in an additional emergency retention pit.

28 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.14 Figure II.2.4.3: Schematic representation of a single containment atmospheric tank in a conventional bund [11] Figure II.2.4.4: Schematic representation of a double containment tank [11] Figure II.2.4.5: Schematic representation of a full containment tank [11]

29 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.15 Table II.2.4.1: Characteristic dimensions of medium-sized LNG tanks [12] Tank volume 10,000 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ 40,000 m³ Internal diameter of inner tank [m] Diameter of outer tank [m] Liquid height [m] Liquid height/internal diameter [m] SHIP LOADING/UNLOADING INSTALLATIONS The LNG feeder vessels unloaded at a bunker terminal have a capacity of 7,500 to 30,000 m³. Unloading takes place using one or more flexible hoses or fixed unloading arms at a rate of approximately 1,000 to 6,000 m³/h (14). The size (diameter) of the hoses or unloading arms used for this purpose depends on the unloading rate as indicated in Table II The LNG is transferred to the storage tank using one or more cryogenic unloading pipes. These unloading pipes must be kept as short as possible ( 250 m) to minimise boil-off gas losses. Table II.2.4.2: Dimensions of the hoses, arms and pipes used for unloading LNG feeder vessels at a bunker terminal Unloading rate Hose or arm diameter Unloading pipe diameter 1,000 m³/h 1x8 or 2x6 1x10 or 2x8 2,000 m³/h 1x12 or 2x8 1x14 or 2x10 3,000 m³/h 1x14 or 2x10 1x16 or 2x12 4,000 m³/h 1x16 or 2x12 1x18 or 2x14 6,000 m³/h 1x20 or 2x14 1x22 or 2x16 Bunker vessels loaded at a bunker terminal typically have a capacity of 500 to 3,000 m³. Such vessels are loaded using a flexible hose or a fixed arm at a rate of approximately 200 m³/h to 1,000 m³/h. In principle, the same cryogenic pipes used for unloading LNG feeder vessels can be used for the connection between the storage tank and the jetty. Table II.2.4.3: Dimensions of the hoses, arms and pipes used for loading LNG bunker vessels at a bunker terminal Loading rate Hose or arm diameter Pipe diameter 200 m³/h 1x4 1x4 500 m³/h 1x6 1x7 1,000 m³/h 1x8 1x10 Between two (un)loading operations, the cryogenic unloading lines can be kept in cold circulation or they can be emptied by rinsing them with nitrogen. The advantage of cold circulation is that the installation takes much less time to cool down. The drawback of cold circulation is the larger amount of boil-off gas that has to be processed at the site and the larger risks posed by the installation between two (un)loading operations. The drawback of emptying the lines with nitrogen is that they have to be rinsed with natural gas before being put back into service in order to avoid contaminating the LNG with nitrogen. Also, emptying the lines and then putting them back into service is a very time-consuming (14) Examples of LNG feeder vessels are the Coral Methane (capacity: 7,500 m³) and the FKAB L2 (capacity: 16,500 m³). The Coral Methane has an unloading capacity of 900 m³/h (2x450 m³/h). The FKAB L2 has an unloading capacity of 1,800 m³/h (6x300 m³/h) [8].

30 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.16 activity, so if the loading/unloading installations are being used intensively, a cold circulation is the preferred option. TRUCK UNLOADING/LOADING STATION Loading of LNG trucks takes place at a special loading station within the bunker terminal. The LNG is pumped to the truck by one or two pumps installed in the storage tank via a fixed cryogenic pipe (3/4 ) and a flexible loading hose or fixed loading arm (3 ). The loading rate is typically between 50 and 100 m³/h. The LNG vapour displaced from the truck is returned to the storage tank via a vapour return line. The truck loading installation may or may not be equipped with cold circulation, depending on how intensely the loading station is used. Optionally, the necessary arrangements may be made at a bunker terminal to supply the terminal using LNG trucks. Trucks can be unloaded by using boil-off gas from the storage tank to empty the truck or by means of a pump fitted on the truck. Trucks are generally unloaded via a flexible hose (3 ) at a rate of 40 to 60 m³/h. II.2.5. LNG bunkering stations GENERAL Local jetties can be equipped with a small-scale LNG bunkering station that is used to supply specific end users (e.g. service vessels or ferries). The storage capacity of such bunkering stations is typically 100 to 3,500 m³ (15). Bunkering takes place by means of a fixed bunkering installation (i.e. a cryogenic pipe and loading arm or flexible hose) from the stationary LNG storage tanks at a rate of 50 to 500 m³/h depending on the size of the vessel being supplied. Such stations are generally supplied by small LNG ships (capacity: 500 to 3,000 m³) or LNG trucks that bring the LNG from a nearby LNG bunker terminal or from a large LNG import terminal (16). A possible alternative to supplying LNG by ship or truck is to build a small-scale liquefaction unit with a capacity of 5,000 to 20,000 tpa in the immediate vicinity of the station. The figures below show some examples of small-scale LNG stations in Norway. The main installations at a bunkering station are the storage tanks, the ship and/or truck unloading installation and the fixed ship bunkering installation. These are discussed briefly below. Figure II.2.5.1: LNG storage station with one 250-m³ pressure tank used to supply PSVs (platform supply vessels) in Bergen (Norway) (15) (16) The Gasnor gas storage station in Mosjoen (Norway) currently has the largest amount of LNG stored in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks. The station has a storage capacity of 3,500 m³ (5 x 700 m³). Skangass AS is building a similar station near Fredrikstad (Norway) with an even larger storage capacity, namely 6,461 m³ (2 x 500 m³, 5 x 683 m³, 2 x 1,023 m³). Assuming the throughput of a bunkering station is 10 times the storage capacity, around 10 LNG ships per year are unloaded at a bunkering station. If the station is supplied by trucks, between 50 and 700 trucks are unloaded per year, depending on the station s storage capacity.

31 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.17 Figure II.2.5.2: LNG storage station with two 500-m³ pressure tanks used to supply three ferries in Halhjem (Norway) Figure II.2.5.3: LNG storage station with three 500-m³ pressure tanks (Norway) Figure II.2.5.4: LNG storage station with five 700-m³ tanks in Mosjoen (Norway) STORAGE TANKS The storage tanks used at a local LNG bunkering station are cylindrical tanks with a volume of 100 to 1,000 m³. More specifically, they are double-walled vacuuminsulated pressure tanks set up either horizontally or vertically. The degree of filling of the tanks must not exceed 95% under any circumstances, in line with ADR requirements. The LNG is stored in the tanks at a pressure of 0 to 4 barg and a temperature of -160 C to -138 C. Because the tanks are vacuum-insulated, little heat is lost through the tank wall and the tank pressure will only rise very gradually during long periods when no LNG is

32 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.18 withdrawn. The tanks are also fitted with an ambient air vaporiser to keep the tank pressure at the desired level as well as a redundant overpressure protection system with two safety valves. The figure below shows a schematic representation of a vacuum-insulated LNG tank. The characteristics dimensions of such tanks are given in Table II Table II.2.5.1: Characteristic dimensions of storage tanks Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Diameter [m] Length [m] Max. connection [inches] Figure II.2.5.5: Schematic representation of a vacuum-insulated LNG pressure tank SHIP UNLOADING INSTALLATION Small LNG ships unloaded at a bunkering station have a typical capacity of 500 to 3,000 m³. Unloading takes place via a fixed arm or a flexible hose at a rate of 200 m³/h to 1,000 m³/h (17). The diameter of the unloading arm or hose used for this purpose is 4 to 8. The LNG is transferred to the storage tank via a cryogenic unloading pipe with a diameter of 4 or 10. The unloading pipes must be kept as short as possible ( 250 m) to minimise boil-off gas losses. FIXED BUNKERING INSTALLATION The ship bunkering installation is similar to the installation used to unload LNG ships, namely a fixed cryogenic pipe and a flexible hose or loading arm. The flow rates applied when bunkering vessels using a fixed installation are typically 50 to 500 m³/h depending on the size of the ship being supplied (see Table II.2.7.1). TRUCK UNLOADING INSTALLATION The LNG trucks used to supply the station are generally unloaded at a rate of 40 to 60 m³/h using a flexible unloading hose (3 ) and a cryogenic LNG pipe (3 /4 ). The LNG can be transferred using a pump fitted on the truck or by raising the pressure in the truck using a pressure build-up coil. (17) An example of a small LNG ship is the Pioneer Knutsen with a capacity of 1,100 m³ (2 x 550 m³). It is currently being used to distribute LNG in the Norwegian Fjords, with a loading and unloading rate of 200 m³/h.

33 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.19 II.2.6. Liquefaction units GENERAL Building a small to medium-sized liquefaction unit is a possible alternative to shipping in LNG to bunker terminals and bunkering stations. Such liquefaction units have a production capacity of 5,000 to 20,000 tpa (for bunkering stations) and 40,000 to 300,000 tpa (for bunker terminals) [4,13-14]. Medium-sized liquefaction units typically have a production capacity of 270 to 2,000 m³ of LNG per day, which implies a natural gas consumption of 7,200 to 54,000 m³(n)/h. Examples of medium-sized liquefaction units are given in Table II and in the figures below. Operator Table II.2.6.1: Examples of medium-sized liquefaction units Location Year commissioned Capacity Type San Diego Gas and Electric (18) San Diego (USA) ,000 tpa open cycle with turboexpander Gasnor Beihai XinAo Gas Company Kollsnes I (N) ,000 tpa closed 1-stage MR cycle Kollsnes II (N) ,000 tpa closed 2-stage N2 cycle Wiezhou Island (CN) ,000 tpa open cycle with turboexpander Westfarmers Gas Limited Kwinana (AUS) ,500 tpa closed 2-stage MR cycle (LIMUM) Skangass AS Risavika (N) ,000 tpa closed 2-stage MR cycle (LIMUM) China Natural Gas Jingbian (CN) ,000 tpa closed 1-stage MR cycle (PRICO) Figure II.2.6.1: Example of a medium-sized LNG terminal with 120,000-tpa liquefaction unit in Kolsness (Norway) (18) This unit is no longer being operated due to seismic activity in the region.

34 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.20 Figure II.2.6.2: Example of a medium-sized LNG terminal with 62,500-tpa liquefaction unit in Kwinana (Australia) Small liquefaction units typically have a production capacity of 35 to 135 m³ of LNG per day, which implies a natural gas consumption of 900 to 3,600 m³(n)/h. Examples of smallscale liquefaction units are given in Table II and in the figures below. Operator Table II.2.6.2: Examples of small liquefaction units Location Year commissioned Capacity Statoil Tjeldbergodden (N) ,000 tpa liquid nitrogen (LIN) Gasnor Snurrevarden (N) ,000 tpa closed 1-stage N2 cycle Gasum Porvoo (FIN) ,000 tpa liquid nitrogen LIN) Gasum Porvoo (FIN) ,000 tpa liquid nitrogen (LIN) Type Figure II.2.6.3: Examples of small LNG stations with 10,000- and 20,000-tpa liquefaction units in Norway

35 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.21 Figure II.2.6.4: Example of a small liquefaction unit with a capacity of 20,000 tpa in Porvoo (Finland) Figure II.2.6.5: Example of a small liquefaction unit with a capacity of 5,000 tpa in Porvoo (Finland) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS For LNG liquefaction units with a capacity of 5, ,000 tpa, the following process cycles are mainly used [15]: an open cycle with turboexpander; a closed one- or two-stage cycle with nitrogen refrigerant; a closed one- or two-stage cycle with mixed refrigerant. OPEN CYCLE WITH TURBOEXPANDER An example of an LNG liquefaction unit using an open cycle with turboexpander is shown in Figure II

36 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.22 Figure II.2.6.6: Process diagram of an open cycle with turboexpander liquefaction unit Natural gas from a 21-bar natural gas pipeline is first purified using a molecular sieve. The gas flow of 710,000 m 3 (s) per day (around 170,000 tpa) is then split. The first subflow of 590,000 m 3 (s) per day is sent to the turboexpander, in which it expands to a pressure of 4.1 bar. This subflow will ultimately be responsible for partly cooling the second subflow of 120,000 m 3 (s) per day in a first and second heat exchanger. After this, the first subflow will be compressed in the compressor (coupled to the turboexpander) to 5.6 bar and later used to generate electricity. The second subflow flows through all three heat exchangers and through a throttle valve. Thanks to the heat exchange in the three heat exchangers, the gas is cooled sufficiently so that part of the gas becomes liquid after the throttling. Next, liquid and gas are separated from each other, after which the gas flows through the heat exchangers. The gas released from the storage tank through evaporation of the liquid also flows through the heat exchangers. CLOSED CYCLE WITH TURBOEXPANDER WITH NITROGEN REFRIGERANT In a closed cycle, another refrigerant instead of natural gas is expanded in the turbine. Nitrogen is often used in the liquefaction of LNG.

37 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.23 The closed cycle has a number of advantages compared with the open cycle: If nitrogen is used, safety is enhanced as there are fewer stages in the process in which (flammable) natural gas is employed. The closed cycle would require simpler and cheaper procedures for shutting down the process and it would be more economical. Because the natural gas does not flow through the turboexpander, the demands placed on the purification system are lower. Nitrogen is compressed and cooled to ambient temperature. Next, the nitrogen is expanded in the turbine, with the heavily cooled gas being used to cool and liquefy natural gas in a heat exchanger. This technology is used, for example, in LNG liquefaction units in Snurrevarden (Norway) with a capacity of 21,000 tpa and in Kollsnes II (Norway) with a capacity of 84,000 tpa. The Snurrevarden unit consists of a single nitrogen cycle (see Figure II (left)). This basic system can be improved by splitting the compression and expansion in the nitrogen cycle into several stages, as happens in the Kollsnes II unit, which consists of two stages. Figure II (right) shows the BHP two-stage nitrogen cycle. Figure II.2.6.7: Process diagram of a closed cycle with nitrogen refrigerant liquefaction unit Another possible two-stage nitrogen cycle (Statoil) is illustrated in Figure II (right), while Figure II (left) shows the combination of a nitrogen cycle (Niche) with a methane cycle.

38 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.24 Figure II.2.6.8: Process diagram of a closed cycle with pure refrigerant liquefaction unit The two-stage nitrogen cycle can be further improved by adding an extra cooling cycle (e.g. using CO 2 or propane as a refrigerant) prior to the two-stage nitrogen cycle. CLOSED CYCLE WITH MIXED REFRIGERANT By replacing different pure refrigerants (characterised by an isothermal evaporation process at the constant pressure in a heat exchanger) in separate cycles with a single refrigerant consisting of multiple components that evaporate at different temperatures in a single cycle, the temperature difference in the heat exchangers can be reduced, thereby increasing the energetic (and exergetic) efficiency of the system. The simplest system is the single flow mixed refrigerant (SMR) system. A schematic diagram of this system is given in Figure II The refrigerant is usually a mixture of nitrogen, methane, ethane, propane, butane and possibly pentane. The exact composition of the refrigerant depends on the composition of the natural gas to be liquefied. The refrigerant is compressed and partially condensed in a heat exchanger with water. The refrigerant then undergoes a series of expansions and liquid-vapour separations. This results in different substreams (fractions) at different temperatures with which the natural gas can be cooled and liquefied in a heat exchanger. The SMR system is suitable for a production capacity of up to 1,300,000 tpa. This technology is used, for example, in the LNG liquefaction units at Kollsnes I (Norway) with a capacity of 42,000 tpa and in Jingbian (China) with a capacity of 100,000 tpa (see Figure II for Black & Veatch s PRICO system).

39 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.25 Figure II.2.6.9: Process diagram of a closed cycle with mixed refrigerant liquefaction unit Figure II : Process diagram of a liquefaction unit using the PRICO process (closed cycle with mixed refrigerant) The SMR system can be improved by using two-stage compression. This technology is used, for example, in the LNG liquefaction units in Kwinana (Australia) with a capacity of 62,500 tpa and in Risavika (Norway) with a capacity of 300,000 tpa (see Figure II ). After the first compression stage, the heavy faction of the mixed refrigerant (red line) is cooled and throttled in order to then cool the natural gas in the heat exchanger. After the second compression stage, the light fraction of the MR (blue line) is cooled. Next, the heavy and light fractions are separated from one another. The heavy fraction (green line) is cooled and throttled in order to liquefy it, while the light fraction (blue line) is cooled and throttled in order to subcool the natural gas. The heat exchanges between the natural gas and MR take place in the LIMUM process in a coil-wound heat exchanger specially designed by Linde.

40 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.26 Figure II : Process diagram of a liquefaction unit using the LIMUM process (closed cycle with two-stage compression and a mixed refrigerant) II.2.7. LNG bunkering operation GENERAL For supplying ships with LNG fuel (bunkering), three different solutions are generally used (see Figure II.2.7.1) [4]. They are as follows: BUNKERING DIRECTLY FROM AN LNG BUNKER VESSEL (SHIP-TO-SHIP, STS) This method is mainly used for large bunker volumes (100 to 20,000 m³) and high bunker frequencies, with the bunker vessel being supplied from a large import terminal or medium-sized bunker terminal. Bunkering can take place at the quay where the ship is berthed or at a specific anchorage in port or out at sea. The capacity of the bunker vessel and the bunkering rate applied must be tailored to the fuel needs of the ships being supplied (19). This is a flexible method with which high bunkering rates can be achieved. The downsides are the high costs (initial investment and use) and possible interference with through traffic in the port. BUNKERING DIRECTLY FROM LNG TRUCKS (TRUCK-TO-SHIP, TTS) This is a flexible and cost-efficient method for applications where the bunker frequency is not too high and only small bunker volumes (50 to 200 m³) are required. The bunkering rates that can be applied with this method are low (40 60 m³/h). BUNKERING USING A FIXED PIPELINE AT A STATION OR TERMINAL (ITPS (20) ) This is an inflexible method because the bunkering location must be close to the LNG storage tank(s) ( 250 m). Also, there may be conflicts with other activities taking place on the quay (i.e. loading/unloading of ships). The method is mainly (19) (20) The duration of the bunkering operation should ideally be tailored to the unloading and loading times of the ship being supplied. LNG Intermediate Tank to Ship via Pipeline

41 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.27 suitable for niche markets with high bunker frequencies and small bunker volumes (e.g. supplying service vessels or scheduled ferry services). It is possible for more than one bunkering method to be used at the same port. Indeed, multiple bunkering methods are necessary if different types of vessel have to be fuelled with LNG at the port (see Table II.2.7.1). Furthermore, if demand for LNG fuel is expected to peak at certain times, it is advisable to provide sufficient LNG bunkering facilities in the port, even if LNG demand is initially low (21). Table II.2.7.1: Suitable bunkering methods for different types of vessel [4] Vessel type Service vessels, tugboats, patrol boats and fishing boats Bunkering method Via bunker vessel (STS) Via truck (TTS) Fixed installation (ITPS) Small RoRo and RoPax vessels x x Large RoRo and RoPax vessels x x Cargo, container and freight vessels x (x) x x Large tankers and container ships x Figure II.2.7.1: Schematic representation of the different bunkering methods [4] TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LNG bunkering via a fixed pipeline is done in the same way as the loading of LNG ships at an LNG import terminal or a bunker terminal. The installations and operational procedures used are therefore the same as with LNG ship loading. Table II gives an overview of the rates used when bunkering ships via a fixed installation. (21) It may also be possible to increase the port s bunkering capacity gradually in order to better match supply to demand.

42 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.28 Figure II.2.7.2: Bunkering a ship via a fixed installation in Halhjem (Norway) Table II.2.7.2: LNG bunkering rates and configurations for different vessel types [4] Hose or arm Vessel type Bunker quantity Rate Duration diameter Service vessels, tugboats, patrol boats and fishing boats 50 m³ 60 m³/h 45 min 2x2 or 1x3 Small RoRo and RoPax vessels 400 m³ 400 m³/h 1 hr 2x4 or 1x6 Large RoRo and RoPax vessels 800 m³ 400 m³/h 2 hr 2x4 or 1x6 Small cargo, container and freight vessels 2,000 3,000 m³ 1,000 m³/h 2 to 3 hr 2x8 or 1x12 Large freight vessels 4,000 m³ 1,000 m³/h 4 hr 2x8 or 1x12 Large tankers and container ships 10,000 m³ 2,500 m³/h 4 hr 2x10 Very large container ships and oil tankers 20,000 m³ 3,000 m³/h 7 hr 2x12 LNG bunkering via trucks is similar to unloading LNG trucks at a terminal or bunkering station. The bunkering operation generally takes place at a rate of 40 to 60 m³/h via a 3 flexible unloading hose. The driver of the offloading truck has a lot of responsibility in this process. To minimise the risks associated with the bunkering operation, clear operational guidelines and specific training must be provided to truck drivers. Figure II.2.7.3: Truck-to-ship bunkering in Arsvägen (Norway)

43 II. LNG supply chain for Flemish ports page II.29 Unlike the above-mentioned methods, direct ship-to-ship (STS) bunkering of LNG is a totally new activity. The need for clear operational guidelines is therefore greatest in this area. Several studies are currently ongoing to examine the operational aspects of STS bunkering and to establish the minimum safety distances for this activity (22) [16]. The installations and technical facilities used during STS bunkering need to be standardised but are very similar to those used for transferring LNG from ship to storage tank (e.g. cryogenic pipelines in combination with hoses or arms). Further research is needed into how to deal with an unexpected pressure increase in the system, as relieving pressure directly into the atmosphere poses a potential safety problem. In principle, the bunkering rates and connection diameters during STS bunkering are the same as those used with a fixed bunkering installation. They are indicated in Table II Figure II.2.7.4: Ship-to-ship bunkering using flexible hoses or a fixed arm (22) Defining safety distances or exclusion zones is important, for example, when bunkering operations are being carried out at the same time as the loading/unloading of the ship being supplied.

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45 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.1 III. CALCULATION OF RISK DISTANCES FOR GENERIC COMPONENTS OF THE LNG SUPPLY CHAIN This part of the study contains a generic study of the external human risks associated with various components of the LNG supply chain. First, the characteristic sizes and designs of the components are established, based on the literature study conducted (see Chapter II); these are then adjusted based on the results of a market research and a logistics study carried out by DNV. In the following sections, the general methodology is first discussed; next, an explanation is given of the representative set of installation components for which the external human risk is determined. The proposed methodology is then applied to installations and activities that take place at fixed locations within demarcated establishments (LNG import terminal, bunker terminal or bunkering stations) and then for transport activities that take place in public space (road and ship transport) in order to arrive at generic risk distances for the activities examined. III.1. General methodology In Flanders, for the purposes of safety reporting under the Seveso II Directive, the external human risks arising from installations and activities involving hazardous substances are determined using a quantitative risk analysis (QRA). In such analyses, the risk to external persons is presented in two characteristic ways, namely as the individual risk and as the societal risk. The individual risk indicates the extent to which a single person risks death in the vicinity of the examined installation or activity and can be calculated without prior knowledge of the external environment. The societal risk, on the other hand, is a measure of the size of the population that may be affected by a fatal accident. The societal risk can only be determined if a prior estimate has been made of the population present in the vicinity of the examined installation or activity. Given the generic nature of the risk analysis in this phase of the study (23), only the individual risk posed by the various installations and activities in the LNG supply chain can be assessed. Regarding the societal risk engendered by the installations and activities, only qualitative conclusions can be drawn. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS (QRA) The quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a method for analysing and evaluating risks based on numerical values. The advantage of this method is that the risk is determined in a systematic and uniform way, thus providing a good understanding of the contribution made by each of the installations and accident scenarios to the overall risk. A downside is that it requires a lot of time, resources and expertise. The methodology comprises the following steps, which are represented schematically in Figure III.1.1: For the various installations and activities being examined, a number of representative accident scenarios are first established. The accident scenarios are (23) In the initial phase, the external human risks are determined for so-called generic unit components in the LNG supply chain. These are typical installations or activities with a characteristic size and design. The possible locations of the components in the port are not yet known in this phase of the study.

46 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.2 developed based on generic failure and release scenarios and potential incident outcomes (e.g. a pool fire). The possible effects of the selected accident scenarios are then calculated. The effects of an accident are expressed as the probability of death of nearby persons. An accident is taken into consideration for the subsequent risk assessment if the effect is such that the expected lethal response among external persons is 1% or more. Next, the probability of occurrence of the selected accidents is determined by using generic failure frequencies and outcome probabilities. Finally, the external human risk is determined by combining the effects of the selected accidents and the associated accident frequencies (24). Figure III.1.1: Schematic representation of the steps involved in a quantitative risk analysis identify serious accidents (types of failure and incident outcomes) determine accident frequencies determine consequences of accidents calculate and evaluate external human risk It should be noted that the storage and transfer activities examined in this study are highly likely to fall under the terms of the Seveso II Directive and that the establishments in which they take place will therefore be subject to the safety reporting (SR) requirement. For that reason, the technical guidelines on safety reporting compiled by the relevant Flemish government department will be taken into account as much as possible when carrying out the quantitative risk analysis (25). BASIS FOR ASSESSING EXTERNAL HUMAN RISK IN FLANDERS The risk criteria used in Flanders to assess the individual risk of Seveso establishments are shown in Table III.1.1. At the establishment s own boundary, the maximum acceptable individual risk level equals 10-5 /y. At the boundary of an area with residential function or an area containing a vulnerable location (school, hospital, nursing home or care establishment), the maximum acceptable individual risk level is 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y respectively [17]. (24) (25) Specific characteristics of the external environment (most notably population densities) are not available in a generic study. Consequently, such a study can only draw qualitative conclusions about the societal risk. Establishments in which more than 50 tonnes of extremely flammable liquid gases (such as LNG) may be present are classed as low-threshold Seveso establishments. Establishments in which more than 200 tonnes of extremely flammable liquid gases (such as LNG) may be present are classed as high-threshold Seveso establishments and are subject to the SR requirement.

47 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.3 An area with residential function means a) any area indicated as a residential zone on the regional zoning plan or any other applicable land-use plans and b) groups of at least five existing dwellings residential units that are located in the wrong type of land-use zone. Location test Table III.1.1: Risk criteria used for the individual risk of Seveso establishments in Flanders [17] Iso-risk contour (IRC) Establishment boundary 10-5 /y Area with residential function 10-6 /y Area containing vulnerable location 10-7 /y The criterion used in Flanders to assess the societal risk of Seveso establishments is shown in Figure III.1.2. A societal risk curve below the red line is considered acceptable. Above the red line the societal risk is deemed to be unacceptable. It should be noted that the criteria for external human risk are not binding legal standards but provide a benchmark for assessing the external human risks posed by Seveso establishments [17]. As regards transportation of hazardous substances, Flanders does not yet have an approved risk analysis methodology and there is currently no objective assessment framework for external human risks. In this analysis, the transport risks will therefore be assessed in a purely indicative way against the risk criteria for Seveso establishments, which are by extension also applicable to transport activities. More specifically, the individual risk arising from transport activities are assessed against the risk criteria of 10-6 /y (areas with residential function) and 10-7 /y (vulnerable locations) which apply to establishments. It is not possible to assess against the 10-5 /y risk criterion due to the absence of a site boundary. Regarding the societal risk criterion for transport activities, there is a problem because the risks from transport activities are not tied to a particular location, unlike those of an establishment (stationary installations); they may therefore extend over a large area, i.e. an area stretching along the entire route. Consequently, the societal risk increases the longer the transport route becomes, which means that a standardisation of the societal risk is necessary prior to the risk assessment. Because there are no guidelines for such standardisation in Flanders, it has been decided that this study will not make any judgement about the societal risk associated with the transport activities under examination. GENERIC RISK DISTANCES Based on a QRA, this part of the study determines the maximum distances at which an individual risk of 10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y respectively is present. These distances are calculated for the different generic components of the LNG supply chain (storage tanks, offloading installations, liquefaction units, etc.). The calculated risk distances for the individual components give an idea of, firstly, the amount of space taken up by the individual installations (26) and, secondly, the separation distances that need to be maintained between the installations under study and the vulnerable land-use zones and locations in the vicinity from the perspective of external safety. (26) The 10-5 /y iso-risk contour must, in principle, be situated inside the establishment s premises.

48 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III Figure III.1.2: Risk criteria used for the societal risk of Seveso establishments in Flanders 10-4 frequency number of fatalities III.2. Overview of components examined Prior to the actual risk analysis, the representative set of generic components (i.e. installations and activities) for which the external human risk needs to be determined will be established. A distinction will be made between installations and activities that are present or take place within demarcated establishments (27) and activities that take place in public space, namely the transport of LNG by road and water. III.2.1. Installations and activities within demarcated establishments In the first part of the generic study, the risks arising from activities and installations within demarcated establishments (namely bunker terminals or bunkering stations) are examined. Specifically, these are: LNG storage; LNG ship (un)loading; LNG truck (un)loading; LNG ship bunkering; LNG production (liquefaction). The main installation components involved in the above activities and whose risks are calculated generically are explained in the following sections. A full overview of the components examined is given in Annex 1, Part 1. (27) Such establishments may fall under the Seveso II Directive and be subject to the SR requirement, which means that an environmental safety report (including calculation and assessment of the external human risk) must be enclosed with the establishment s licence application.

49 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.5 LNG STORAGE LNG can be stored in large atmospheric tanks (capacity: 10,000 to 40,000 m³) or in smaller pressure tanks (capacity: 100 to 1,000 m³). The large atmospheric tanks tend to be used at bunker terminals, the smaller pressure tanks at bunkering stations. As regards the construction of atmospheric tanks, there are essentially three different types. These are, in increasing order of integrity (safety): the single containment tank in a conventional bund (see Figure II.2.4.3), the double containment tank (see Figure II.2.4.4) and the full containment tank (see Figure II.2.4.5). The safety level of a double containment or full containment tank can be further enhanced by placing the tank in an additional emergency retention pit. Pressure tanks are generally constructed as vacuum-insulated cylindrical tanks set up either vertically or horizontally. The tanks may or may not be placed in a conventional bund. LNG SHIP (UN)LOADING Ships are (un)loaded at a jetty or quay using flexible hoses or fixed (un)loading arms. Typical (un)loading rates vary from 200 m³/h (for small bunker vessels) to 6,000 m³/h (for medium-sized feeder vessels). The hoses or arms used typically have a diameter of 4 (100 mm) to 14 (350 mm) for LNG transfer and 3 (75 mm) to 10 (250 mm) for vapour return. The (un)loading installation may or may not be equipped with an emergency shutdown system, with a distinction being made in terms of system reliability between a manual system (leak detection by supervising operator) and an automatic system (automatic leak detection). LNG TRUCK (UN)LOADING Trucks are mainly (un)loaded using flexible hoses. The (un)loading rate is typically 50 to 100 m³/h. The (un)loading hose typically has a diameter of 3 (75 mm), for both LNG transfer and vapour return. The (un)loading can take place at an (un)loading station that may or may not be equipped with a containment system for spills and/or an emergency shutdown system (manual or automatic). LNG SHIP BUNKERING Bunkering of LNG ships is also done using flexible hoses or fixed arms. The LNG can be delivered via a fixed bunkering installation at a bunker terminal or bunkering station, via truck or via a bunker vessel. If the LNG is delivered by truck, this typically occurs at a rate of 50 m³/h via a 3 hose. In the case of bunkering via a fixed installation or bunker vessel, different rates (50 to 3,000 m³/h) can be used depending on the size of the ship being supplied. Typical diameters of the hoses or arms used for this purpose vary from 2 (50 mm) to 12 (300 mm). Finally, the risk analysis also takes account of the possible presence of a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system. LNG PRODUCTION As regards the production of LNG, this study distinguishes between medium-sized liquefaction units with a production capacity of 40,000 to 300,000 tpa and small liquefaction units with a maximum production capacity of 20,000 tpa. Because medium-sized liquefaction units are relatively complex installations, whose risks are difficult to determine generically, the external human risk arising from such units is estimated in this study based on available safety reports and quantitative risk analyses [28-29]. The risk arising from small liquefaction units ( 20,000 tpa) is determined based on a simple risk assessment.

50 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.6 III.2.2. LNG transport by truck The second part of the generic study examines the risks associated with the transport of LNG by road. As regards LNG truck construction, a distinction is made between singlewalled and double-walled pressure trucks. Single-walled trucks have a lower mechanical resistance to impact and a lower resistance to fire. Transporting LNG in single-walled pressure trucks therefore involves a higher risk than transporting it in double-walled vacuum-insulated pressure trucks. The calculations also factor in three different types of road: motorways, regional/municipal roads with one lane in each direction, and regional/municipal roads with two lanes in each direction. This is because the likelihood of a traffic accident occurring along a route and the extent to which spilled liquids may spread out on the route is influenced by the road type. An overview of the components examined (set of assumptions) for LNG road transport is given in Annex 1, Part 2. III.2.3. LNG transport by ship The final part of the generic study investigates the risks associated with the presence of LNG bunker vessels and feeder vessels in a port. Specifically, calculations are performed for five different LNG ships: bunker vessels with a capacity of 800 m³ and 3,000 m³ and feeder vessels with a capacity of 7,500, 20,000 and 30,000 m³. The risks are determined for ships navigating inside the port and for ships that are berthed at a quay or jetty. In the analysis, a distinction is also made between quiet waterways with around 5,000 ship movements per year, busy waterways with around 50,000 ship movements per year and very busy waterways with around 100,000 ship movements per year. An overview of the components examined (set of assumptions) for LNG ship transport is given in Annex 1, Part 3. III.3. Generic risk analysis for LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments In this section, the human risks associated with the storage, transfer and distribution of LNG at fixed locations within demarcated establishments (bunker terminals, bunkering stations, etc.) are investigated in a generic way. The installations examined are: atmospheric storage tanks; vacuum-insulated pressure tanks; ship (un)loading installations (hoses and arms); truck (un)loading installations (hoses, arms and trucks); LNG bunkering installations (hoses, arms and trucks). Firstly, an overview is given of a number of reported accidents involving the storage, transfer and production of LNG (section III.3.1). Next, the representative accident scenarios for the different installation components are established (III.3.2). The effects linked to these accident scenarios (III.3.3) and the associated scenario probabilities

51 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.7 (III.3.4) are determined. Finally, the external human risk presented by the different components is estimated and represented in the form of risk distances for the individual risk (III.3.5). The human risk from liquefaction units is assessed in a different way (see section III.3.6). For medium-sized liquefaction units, the human risk is estimated based on the available safety reports and quantitative risk analyses for a similar production unit in Risavika, Norway. For small liquefaction units, the risk is estimated based on a simple but conservative risk assessment. III.3.1. Overview of reported incidents Prior to the analysis of serious accidents, an overview is given of a number of accidents/near-accidents that have occurred during the production, storage, transfer and distribution of LNG (see Annex 2). The overview in Annex 2 shows that the LNG industry has an outstanding track record when it comes to external safety. Accident case studies are generally taken as the starting point for selecting a representative set of serious accidents used to determine the external human risk of an installation or performed activity. However, in the case of the LNG industry, the available data set is too small to derive representative accident scenarios and associated frequencies. The selection of representative accident scenarios and failure frequencies for LNG installations and activities is therefore based on a broader set of case studies involving hydrocarbon releases. III.3.2. Representative accident scenarios Installations in which hazardous substances are present can fail in various ways, with the severity of the accident being to a large extent determined by the size of the release (i.e. the amount of substance released) and the speed at which the substance is released into the environment. The actual consequences of a release are further determined by the occurrence, or otherwise, of certain events (e.g. direct or delayed ignition) and by the nature of the environment into which the hazardous substance is released (whether on land or water, for example). The representative types of failure and possible incident outcomes for the various components examined in this part of the study are listed below. III Failure types or release scenarios For establishments that fall under the terms of the Seveso II Directive, determination of the external human risk posed by the establishment is based on the generic types of installation failure set out in the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 published by the Flemish government s Safety Reporting Division [18]. Table III gives an overview of the generic types of failure affecting installations used for the storage, transfer and distribution of LNG together with the recommended generic failure frequencies.

52 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.8 Table III : Generic types of failure for installations used in LNG storage, transfer and distribution [18] Installation type Generic failure types Generic failure frequencies Single containment atmospheric storage tank Double containment atmospheric storage tank ( * ) Full containment atmospheric storage tank ( * ) Pressure tank (storage) Pressure truck within an establishment Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year /tank year Centrifugal pump ( ** ) Leak ( leak = 0.1 x pipeline) /pump year Flexible (un)loading hose (***) Rupture Leak ( leak = 0.1 x pipeline) /hour of use /hour of use Fixed (un)loading arm Rupture Leak ( leak = 0.1 x pipeline) /hour of use /hour of use (* ) In the case of instantaneous releases (catastrophic rupture and release of entire content in 10 minutes), a failure of the tank s primary and secondary shells is assumed. By contrast, the leak scenarios only apply to the primary (inner) shell, with the tank s secondary shell being assumed to remain intact. (** ) A centrifugal pump with gasket ( /y) has a higher probability of failure than a centrifugal pump without gasket ( /y). (*** ) It is assumed that the flexible hoses used for (un)loading LNG are at least equivalent to those used for (un)loading LPG. III Incident outcomes The incident outcomes that could occur after an incidental release of a hazardous substance depend on the hazardous properties of the substance concerned, the physical state in which the substance is released (liquid or gas), the occurrence of possible consequential events (e.g. ignition) and the environment in which the product is released (whether in a building or in the open air, for example). The possible accidents that can occur after an incidental release of LNG are discussed in the following sections. Here, a distinction is made between a release of LNG at its normal boiling point at near-atmospheric pressure and a release of LNG at a higher pressure and temperature (e.g. 4 barg, -138 C). The conditions needed to bring about a particular accident are mapped using generic event trees.

53 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.9 An overview of the main hazardous properties and physical characteristics of LNG is given in Annex 3. III Releases of LNG at near-atmospheric pressure ACCIDENTS The possible accidents that can occur after an instantaneous or continuous release of an extremely flammable gas stored as cryogenic liquid at near-atmospheric pressure (LNG) are similar to those that occur following the release of an extremely flammable liquid. In the event of an instantaneous or continuous release of LNG at near-atmospheric pressure, a liquid pool is formed from which heavy evaporation initially takes place due to contact with the warm ground. Contact with the cryogenic liquid will cause the ground to cool substantially, thus significantly slowing evaporation of the remaining liquid. The speed and extent of the decrease in evaporation rate is determined mainly by the nature of the ground and by the atmospheric conditions. In the event of direct ignition, a pool fire occurs at the source. In the absence of direct ignition, evaporation from the liquid pool forms a flammable cloud which will drift in a downwind direction and, in the event of delayed ignition, will result in the occurrence of a flash fire. With free vapour clouds of natural gas, flame speeds are relatively slow so no relevant overpressure effects are to be expected if the cloud combusts. Only if the flammable cloud is fully or partially enclosed or if installations with a high obstacle density are present inside the cloud may a build-up of pressure possibly occur, resulting in a vapour cloud explosion. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that delayed ignition of the flammable cloud may also result in the occurrence of a pool fire at the source. Direct contact with a cryogenic liquid can also cause serious freezing injuries. However, because the LNG pools formed remain relatively small, such cryogenic effects are not usually considered when determining the external human risk (i.e. risk for persons outside the establishment). Finally, in the event of an LNG release on water, in addition to the accidents described above a so-called rapid phase transition (RPT) can take place. An RPT is a physical explosion that occurs as the result of the violent boiling of cryogenic LNG through intense contact with warm seawater (28). Because the overpressures caused by an RPT remain confined to the immediate vicinity of the release, this accident scenario is not usually considered when determining the external human risk. EVENT TREE Figure III gives an overview of the different accidents that can occur as the result of the release of cryogenic LNG at near-atmospheric pressure (at a temperature of -160 C). (28) Studies have shown that rapid phase transition only occurs when the temperature of the seawater is high enough (12 to 17 C depending on the intensity of the mixing) and when the methane concentration in the cryogenic liquid is low (< 40 mol%).

54 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.10 Figure III Event tree for a release of LNG at near-atmospheric pressure conditions aard type of v/d the upon vrijzetting release vrijzettingswijze type of the release directe ontsteking ignition uitgestelde delayed ontsteking ignition ingeklemde confined vapour gaswolk cloud consequences gevolg ja yes plasbrand pool fire instantaneous instantaan nee no yes ja yes ja no nee gaswolkexplosie vapour cloud / plasbrand explosion, pool fire vuurzee flash fire, / plasbrand pool fire LNG at atm. ontvlambare pressure at vloeistof -160 C no nee geen cryogenic effecten effects ja yes plasbrand pool fire continuous no nee yes ja yes ja no nee gaswolkexplosie vapour cloud / plasbrand explosion, pool fire vuurzee flash fire, / plasbrand pool fire nee no geen cryogenic effecten effects III Releases of LNG at higher pressure and temperature ACCIDENTS If a liquid at an increased pressure and at a temperature above its atmospheric boiling point is released incidentally, it undergoes a sudden drop in pressure to atmospheric pressure. Immediately after the release, the liquid is in an overheated condition and some or all of it (known as the flash fraction ) can transition to the gas phase due to the available heat content. Part of the overheated liquid will be drawn into the vapour cloud in the form of a fine liquid mist where it will further evaporate (this is called the spray fraction ). In the case of a low degree of overheating, it is also possible that part of the liquid will end up on the ground and will further evaporate under the influence of heat exchange with the ground ( rainout fraction ). The possible accidents that can occur as the result of a release of an extremely flammable gas stored as a cryogenic liquid at a temperature above the atmospheric boiling point are explained in more detail below. A BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) is a physical explosion in which the rapid boiling of liquid and the ensuing rapid expansion of the vapour formed leads to the formation of pressure waves in the environment. This is possible if a liquid at far above its atmospheric boiling point undergoes a sudden drop in pressure to atmospheric pressure as the result of the catastrophic failure of a pressure vessel. There are various reasons why a pressure vessel may fail. If a fire is responsible for the failure, it is known

55 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.11 as a hot or thermally induced BLEVE. This is in contrast to a cold BLEVE, which may be triggered for example by overfilling or by the impact of a projectile (29). If the catastrophic failure of the pressure vessel is combined with direct ignition of the released gas, a fireball also occurs. If the released gas is not directly ignited, it may disperse into the environment. Delayed ignition of the flammable cloud that forms in the environment can result in a flash fire or an unconfined vapour cloud explosion. A flash fire occurs when the flammable cloud is formed in an environment with a low obstacle density. If the cloud is ignited, the flame speeds remain low and no relevant pressure build-up takes place (> 40 mbarg). If, at the moment of ignition, the flammable cloud is located in an area with a high obstacle density (e.g. process installation), flame acceleration can give rise to pressure waves in the environment. This is known as an unconfined vapour cloud explosion. If the outflow results in a significant rainout fraction, a pool fire may also occur at the discharge point. In the event of the continuous outflow of a liquid which is above its atmospheric boiling point, direct ignition of the gas jet will result in a jet fire. If the jet is not directly ignited, the released gas may disperse into the environment. As with an instantaneous release, the vapour cloud may be ignited from a distance, in which case, depending on the environment in which the flammable cloud is located, a flash fire or unconfined vapour cloud explosion will occur. A jet fire or pool fire may also break out at the discharge point. EVENT TREE Figure III gives an overview of the different accidents that can occur as the result of the release of cryogenic LNG at increased pressure (e.g. 4 barg, at a temperature of -138 C). Figure III Event tree for a release of LNG at increased pressure conditions aard v/dupon vrijzetting release vrijzettingswijze type of the release directe ontsteking ignition uitgestelde delayed ontsteking ignition ingeklemde confined vapour gaswolk cloud consequences gevolg ja yes plasbrand BLEVE, fireball LNG at an ontvlambare elevated vloeistof pressure (e.g. 4 barg) instantaan instantaneous nee no yes ja nee no yes ja nee no gaswolkexplosie BLEVE, / plasbrand vapour cloud expl., pool fire vuurzee BLEVE, / plasbrand flash fire, pool fire geen BLEVE, effecten cryogenic effects ja yes plasbrand jet/pool fire continuous nee no yes ja yes ja no nee gaswolkexplosie vapour cloud expl., / plasbrand jet/pool fire vuurzee flash fire, / plasbrand jet/pool fire nee no geen cryogenic effecten effects (29) In the event of tank failure, the temperature of the LNG inside the tank is a decisive factor in determining the amount of LNG that will evaporate instantaneously upon release (flash). The flash fraction is in turn a decisive factor in determining the power of the explosion and the size of the fireball.

56 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.12 III.3.3. Impact study The impact study examines whether or not the selected representative accidents could result in relevant lethal effects for external persons (30) and the maximum distance at which such lethal effects could manifest themselves. The following methodology is adopted: Firstly, the physical effects of the different accident scenarios (namely the incident thermal radiation, the size of the flammable cloud and the overpressure resulting from an explosion) are determined using methodologies and models that are generally accepted in the context of external risk analysis. Then, the consequences of these effects on unprotected persons in the vicinity are estimated using probit functions and criteria imposed by the relevant Flemish government department (SR Division). In the following sections, the calculation models, assumptions and results of the impact calculations are explained. An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for all selected accident scenarios for the components examined is given in Annex 4. III Calculation models and assumptions POOL FIRE The effects of a burning LNG pool on land or on water are calculated using the solid flame surface emitter model POOLFIRE6, which has been validated for LNG fires (31) [19,20]. The model assumes an idealised flame geometry, namely an elliptical cylinder which tilts in the direction of the wind (see Figure III ). As regards the radiation intensity of the flame surface, two zones can be distinguished: a lower zone that radiates at maximum intensity (32) and an upper zone that is partially covered by soot and therefore radiates at a lower average intensity. The fact that thermal radiation from the upper part of the flame decreases in large LNG fires as the result of soot formation is confirmed by observations during large-scale experiments (see Figure III ). Figure III : Idealised representation of a flame according to POOLFIRE6 (30) (31) (32) Relevant lethal effect means an effect that results in an expected lethal response among external persons of 1% or more. Validation was performed against experimental data from LNG fires with a diameter of 2 to 35 m. The experiments were carried out by Shell on the one hand and a consortium of gas and/or oil companies on the other (= Montoir tests). For a bright LNG flame, the model assumes a radiation intensity of 265 kw/m².

57 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.13 Figure III : Soot formation in an LNG fire with a diameter of 35 m (photo: Montoir tests) The geometry of the flame (including flame length and angle of inclination) is determined by the combustion rate, the equivalent diameter of the pool and by the prevailing wind speed. The specific combustion rate is calculated in this analysis based on a maximum combustion rate of and kg/m²s respectively for LNG pools on land and on water. Regarding the size of the burning pool, a distinction is made in this analysis between a pool fire that arises as the result of direct ignition of the outflowing LNG ( early pool fire ) and one that is caused by delayed ignition of the outflowing LNG ( late pool fire ) (33). The presence of a containment system (e.g. bund) is also taken into account when determining the pool size. JET FIRE The effects of a jet fire are calculated using Chamberlain s solid flame surface emitter model [21]. The model assumes an idealised flame geometry, namely a truncated cone which radiates with uniform intensity (see Figure III ). Figure III : Example of a calculated flame geometry according to Chamberlain s model height above ground level [m] height above ground level [m] hellingshoek Lift-off downwind distance [m] (33) Direct ignition of the outflowing LNG usually results in a fire with a smaller seat as a balance is achieved between the outflow rate and the combustion rate. With delayed ignition, the ignition is assumed to occur at the moment when the pool is at its maximum size (assuming a maximum outflow duration of 30 minutes).

58 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.14 The geometry of the flame (including flame diameters, flame length, lift-off (34) and tilt angle) is determined by the condition of the released product after expansion (the jet velocity, vapour fraction and the expanded radius of the jet) and by the prevailing wind speed. The radiation intensity of the flame surface (typically kw/m²) is calculated based on the released combustion heat per time unit and the fraction of the total heat that is radiated. This radiated fraction is no more than 32% for natural gas and is determined based on the expanded jet speed. Depending on the position of the leak on the perimeter of the pressure vessel or pipe, ignition of the jet will produce a horizontal or vertical jet fire. In this study, the effects of a jet fire are always determined based on a vertical jet, which simplifies the risk analysis (35). FLASH FIRE If the released LNG vapours are not directly ignited, they may disperse into the environment and thin out as they mingle with the ambient air. The size of the flammable cloud is calculated using the Slab and Hegadas heavy gas dispersion models [22,23]. The dispersion calculations factor in the highly transient evaporation rates of a boiling LNG pool. As regards the properties of the LNG, the calculations are based on pure methane with a lower flammable limit (LFL) of 4.5 vol%. The dispersion behaviour of the flammable clouds is calculated for six standard weather types, namely B30, D15, D50, D90, E30 and F15, of which the first two only occur by day and the last two only at night (see Annex 8 meteorological conditions). For the ground, a roughness length of 0.3 m is applied. When determining the effects of a flash fire, a conservative assumption is made that ignition will occur at the moment the flammable cloud reaches its biggest size at ground level. In addition, horizontal emission is always assumed in the case of continuous release. VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION A vapour cloud explosion can only occur if combustion of the flammable vapour cloud happens fast enough. The speed of the combustion process in a vapour cloud is determined, on the one hand, by the reactivity of the flammable gas and, on the other, by the nature of the environment in which the flammable cloud is formed (36). Given the low reactivity of natural gas (low combustion speed) and the generic character of the risk analysis in which the nature of the external environment is not known, in this study no account is taken, in the first instance, of the occurrence of vapour cloud explosions. If the immediate environment of a bunker terminal or bunkering station is characterised by areas with a high obstacle density or degree of confinement (e.g. process installations in the petrochemical sector), the occurrence of a vapour cloud explosion may be considered as a possibility in the event of the formation and ignition of flammable clouds in the environment. To be able to estimate the effects of such an explosion, first the confined flammable mass and then the power of the explosion must be determined based on the (34) (35) (36) Lift-off during a jet fire occurs when the outflow speed is greater than a critical value, namely the combustion speed of the outflowing gas. In that case, the flame can no longer stabilise itself around the outflow opening (attached flame), but it will stabilise itself at a certain distance from the outflow plane (i.e. lift-off distance). In the case of a horizontal outflow, the effects of the jet fire must not only be determined for different wind speeds but also for different wind angles (angle between the outflow direction and the wind direction). The combustion speed is greatest in environments with a high obstacle density. In such environments, combustion is promoted by the turbulence that occurs behind the obstacles as the flame front passes. Also, if the vapour cloud is subject to a certain degree of confinement (e.g. enclosure between parallel planes), the free expansion of the hot combustion products is hindered, which accelerates the combustion process.

59 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.15 characteristics of the neighbouring installations. The expected overpressure effects of the vapour cloud explosion can then be calculated using the Multi-Energy method. BLEVE The effects of a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) are determined using a TNT equivalence model. The most important parameter in the model is the explosion energy. The theoretical explosion energy, i.e. the work done by the expanding fluid, is determined based on an isentropic expansion. The actual explosion energy is a fraction of that which is theoretically available. It is estimated by introducing a yield factor of 80%. FIREBALL In the event of the instantaneous failure of a pressure vessel containing LNG at above its atmospheric boiling point, a cloud is formed in the environment consisting of LNG vapours and drawn-in liquid droplets. If this cloud is directly ignited (before diluting through dispersion in the ambient air), a fireball is created. A fireball is characterised by the fact that it only burns on its surface, where fuel and air have mixed sufficiently, and that it has a tendency to rise due to the difference in density between the hot combustion gases and the ambient air. The geometry and radiation intensity of the fireball are calculated based on the burst pressure and the flammable mass involved, according to the correlations put forward by Roberts [24]. III Damage functions LETHAL RESPONSE The physical effects of the accident scenarios discussed in the previous section are summarised in Table III together with the functions used to determine the lethal response. MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCE To indicate the maximum distance at which a particular accident scenario has a relevant impact on the people present in the environment, the term maximum impact distance is used. The maximum impact distance corresponds to the distance at which the accident scenario in question results in a 1% fatality rate among exposed persons (outside or inside) during the most unfavourable type of weather. A lethal response of less than 1% is considered negligible. The maximum impact distance therefore indicates the maximum distance at which the effects of an accident scenario must be viewed as relevant. Table III sets out the criteria for the maximum impact distance for each incident outcome. For most accident scenarios, the impact distance is measured from the source, i.e. the discharge point. In the case of a pool fire, the impact distance is measured from the centre of the pool or the containment system (if present). Table III : Effects and lethal response for each incident outcome Accident scenario Physical effect Lethal response BLEVE Overpressure Pr = ln(p) p : peak overpressure of pressure wave [Pa] Criterion for maximum impact distance (1% fatality rate) p = 4000 Pa Fireball Jet fire Pool fire Thermal radiation Pr = ln(q 4/3 t) Q : heat flux [W/m²] during time t [s] (Q 4/3 t) = (W/m 2 ) 4/3 s or Q = 10 kw/m² during t = 20 s Combustion 100% in the fire envelop Edge of the fire envelop

60 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.16 Accident scenario Physical effect Lethal response Flash fire BLEVE Vapour cloud explosion Combustion Overpressure 100% in cloud 0% outside cloud Pr = ln(p) p : peak overpressure of pressure wave [Pa] Criterion for maximum impact distance (1% fatality rate) Distance to LEL at the moment the cloud has its maximum surface area p = 4000 Pa PROJECTILES When a pressure tank suddenly ruptures, fragments are likely to be projected into the environment. Available case studies suggest that the number of such projectiles following the explosion of a small pressure tank (< 700 m³) is limited to two or three, while up to 10 may be emitted in the case of large pressure tanks [25]. As regards the distance over which fragments are projected, it has been found that, in the case of a small pressure tank (< 90 m³), most fragments (80%) are retrieved within a radius of 300 m. When larger pressure tanks explode, most fragments are retrieved within a radius of 100 m. Finally, in the case of cylindrical tanks it should be noted that most fragments land in the longitudinal direction of the tank. Based on the above data, it is concluded that the probability of being hit by a projected fragment is small because a) the number of fragments is small and b) the area within which the fragments can land is extensive. The external human risk associated with projectile formation is therefore seen as not relevant and certainly inferior to the risk associated with other incident outcomes that occur when an LNG pressure tank fails. III Results of the impact calculation III Atmospheric storage tanks GENERAL In this study, calculations are performed for medium-sized atmospheric LNG storage tanks with a useful volume of 10,000, 20,000 and 40,000 m³ respectively. Also taken into consideration are three different tank designs: the single containment tank in a conventional bund, the double containment tank and the full containment tank. For the double containment and full containment tanks, the impact of an additional emergency retention pit on the calculated risk distances is also investigated. Typical dimensions of the tanks examined are given in the table below. The storage conditions (temperature and pressure) in atmospheric LNG tanks are typically -160 C and 150 mbarg. Table III : Characteristic dimensions of medium-sized atmospheric LNG tanks Tank volume 10,000 m³ 20,000 m³ 40,000 m³ Internal diameter of inner tank [m] Diameter of outer tank [m] Liquid height [m] Liquid height/internal diameter [m] For a single containment tank, the bund area is determined based on a bund wall height of 2.5 m. For tanks of 10,000 m³, 20,000 m³ and 40,000 m³, the bund area is therefore 4,320 m² (66 x 66 m), 8,630 m² (93 x 93 m) and 17,290 m² (132 x 132 m) respectively.

61 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.17 RELEASE SCENARIOS The generic types of failure analysed in the risk analysis are shown in Table III They are: a catastrophic rupture of the tank and an outflow of the entire content in 10 minutes, as well as large, medium and small leaks in the primary tank (inner tank). The large leak scenario is modelled as a hole in the tank with an equivalent diameter equal to the diameter of the largest connection. In this study, a value of 300 mm (12 ) is used for the diameter of the largest connection to the LNG storage tank. Because LNG is stored in an atmospheric tank as a cryogenic liquid at its atmospheric boiling point (approx C), the LNG will flow out of the tank as a pure liquid in the event of the tank s failure. The release rates are calculated based on the maximum degree of filling of the tank and a leak location close to the tank floor. The maximum outflow rates obtained are shown in Table III Table III : Calculated maximum outflow rates for the representative types of failure of an atmospheric storage tank Tank volume 10,000 m³ 20,000 m³ 40,000 m³ Outflow in 10 minutes 7,080 kg/s 14,170 kg/s 28,330 kg/s Large leak 411 kg/s 447 kg/s 481 kg/s Medium leak 2.9 kg/s 3.1 kg/s 3.3 kg/s Small leak 0.46 kg/s 0.50 kg/s 0.53 kg/s INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after a release of LNG from an atmospheric storage tank are shown in Figure III In the event of LNG leakage between the inner tank and the outer tank, LNG vapours are formed as the cold LNG comes into contact with warm parts of the outer tank. In the case of a double containment tank, these LNG vapours will be released at roof level into the environment. In the case of a full containment tank, the LNG vapours will be released during serious leakages via the pressure relief valves in the tank roof. MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for the representative accidents analysed for atmospheric storage tanks is given in Annex 4, Table 4.1. III Vacuum-insulated pressure tanks GENERAL In this study, risk distances are also calculated for double-walled vacuuminsulated pressure tanks (known as Dewar tanks ) with a volume of 100 to 700 m³. The characteristic dimensions of the pressure tanks examined are shown in the table below. Table III : Characteristic dimensions of LNG pressure tanks Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Diameter [m] Length [m] Max. connection [inch] As regards tank design, the calculations are based on a cylindrical tank with a maximum degree of filling of 90%, set up horizontally. Calculations are performed for tanks located on unpaved terrain without any containment system for spills and for tanks located in a

62 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.18 conventional bund. Table III gives an overview of the characteristic dimensions of the bunds for different storage configurations. Table III : Characteristic dimensions of common bunds Configuration Length [m] Width [m] Height [m] Bund area [m²] Bund capacity [m³] 1 x 100 m³ x 100 m³ x 250 m³ x 250 m³ x 250 m³ x 500 m³ x 500 m³ x 500 m³ x 700 m³ x 700 m³ x 700 m³ The LNG is stored in the tanks as a cryogenic liquid at a small overpressure ( barg). The temperature of the LNG in the tanks varies from -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg). RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure examined in this risk analysis are shown in Table III They are: a catastrophic rupture, an outflow of the entire content in 10 minutes, and large, medium ( = 25 mm) and small ( = 10 mm) leaks. The large leak scenario is modelled as the rupture of the largest-diameter tank connection (see Table III ). The temperature and pressure in the tank can vary from -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg). At a temperature of -160 C, the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid in the event of a defect. At a temperature of -138 C, the LNG will flow out as a two-phase jet with a vapour fraction of around 17%. In this study, calculations are performed for both storage conditions. The calculated release rates are given in Tables III and III Table III : Release of cold LNG at -160 C and 150 mbarg (degree of filling: 90%) Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Outflow in 10 minutes 63.8 kg/s kg/s kg/s kg/s Large leak 22.7 kg/s 53.9 kg/s 56.3 kg/s kg/s Medium leak 1.42 kg/s 1.50 kg/s 1.56 kg/s 1.61 kg/s Small leak 0.23 kg/s 0.24 kg/s 0.25 kg/s 0.26 kg/s Table III : Release of warm LNG at -138 C and 4 barg (degree of filling: 90%) Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Outflow in 10 minutes 57.8 kg/s kg/s kg/s kg/s Large leak 34.5 kg/s 78.7 kg/s 79.6 kg/s kg/s Medium leak 5.37 kg/s 5.39 kg/s 5.41 kg/s 5.42 kg/s Small leak 0.86 kg/s 0.86 kg/s 0.87 kg/s 0.87 kg/s

63 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.19 INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that may occur after a release of LNG from a pressure tank are shown in Figure III At a storage temperature of -160 C (150 mbarg), the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid in the event of a leak. A direct or delayed ignition of the released product will result in a pool fire at the source. The maximum size of the fire attained for the various representative types of tank failure is given in Table III (for direct ignition) and Table III (for delayed ignition). In case of delayed ignition, pool evaporation may result in a flammable cloud forming in the environment which will be driven downwind by the wind. At a storage temperature of -138 C (4 barg), the LNG will flow out as a two-phase jet in the event of a leak (with a vapour fraction of around 17%); direct ignition of the product will result in a jet fire and delayed ignition in a flash fire and pool fire and/or jet fire at the source. When determining the effects of a BLEVE and a fireball, it is assumed that the safety valves on the tanks open at a pressure of 6 barg. In this case, the failure pressure of the tanks is equal to 8.5 bara (= 1.21 x safety valve opening pressure) in accordance with the Purple Book [26]. Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire in case of direct ignition of the incidentally released LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Rupture 2376 m² ( = 55.0 m) 5688 m² ( = 85.1 m) m² ( = 119 m) m² ( = 140 m) Outflow in 10 minutes 471 m² ( = 24.5 m) 1134 m² ( = 38.0 m) 2265 m² ( = 53.7 m) 3167 m² ( = 63.5 m) Large leak 184 m² ( = 15.3 m) 401 m² ( = 22.6 m) 419 m² ( = 23.1 m) 740 m² ( = 30.7 m) Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Medium leak 22.1 m² ( = 5.3 m) Small leak 5.7 m² ( = 2.7 m) Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire in case of delayed ignition of the incidentally released LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Tank volume 100 m³ 250 m³ 500 m³ 700 m³ Rupture 2376 m² ( = 55.0 m) 5688 m² ( = 85.1 m) m² ( = 119 m) m² ( = 140 m) Outflow in 10 minutes 1698 m² ( = 46.5 m) 4255 m² ( = 73.6 m) 8511 m² ( = 104 m) m² ( = 123 m) Large leak 1276 m² ( = 40.3 m) 3157 m² ( = 63.4 m) 3370 m² ( = 65.5 m) 6179 m² ( = 88.7 m) Medium leak 94.2 m² ( = 11.0 m) Small leak 14.9 m² ( = 4.4 m) MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios examined for vacuum-insulated pressure tanks are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances is given in Annex 4, Table 4.2. III (Un)loading of LNG ships using flexible hoses and fixed arms GENERAL In this study, risk distances are also calculated in relation to the loading and unloading of LNG ships at bunker terminals and bunkering stations. The typical flow rates and hose/arm diameters used for this purpose are given in the table below. When

64 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.20 determining the appropriate hose and arm diameters, a maximum liquid speed of 9 m/s in the flexible hoses and fixed arms during LNG (un)loading operations is assumed. Table III : Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters used for (un)loading LNG ships at bunker terminals and bunkering stations (Un)loading rate Arm or hose diameter - liquid phase Arm or hose diameter - gas phase (vapour return) 200 m³/h 1x 4 1x m³/h 1x 6 1x 4 1,000 m³/h 2,000 m³/h 3,000 m³/h 2x 6 1x 6 1x 8 1x 6 2x 8 1x 8 1x 12 1x 8 2x 10 1x 10 1x 14 1x 10 4,000 m³/h 2x 12 1x 12 6,000 m³/h 2x 14 1x 14 When determining the risk distances, the conservative assumption is made that no containment system for spills is in place at the quay or jetty and that the incidentally released LNG therefore ends up entirely in the water. Regarding the possibilities for intervention that are present, a distinction is made in the calculations between (un)loading installations without an emergency shutdown system, installations with a manual emergency shutdown system which has to be activated by an operator or deck watch, and installations with an automatic emergency shutdown system. RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure for an (un)loading hose or arm are given in Table III They are: a rupture of the hose or arm, and a leak with an equivalent diameter equal to 10% of the hose or arm diameter. For the loading and unloading of LNG ships at a bunker terminal, the LNG is assumed to be at -160 C (150 mbarg) because the LNG at a bunker terminal is stored in atmospheric tanks. At a bunkering station, on the other hand, LNG is stored in pressure tanks at a temperature of -160 C to -138 C. For the loading and unloading of LNG ships at bunkering stations, consideration must therefore be given to an incidental release of both cold LNG (at -160 C) and warm LNG (at -138 C). In the event of a rupture of the (un)loading hose or arm downstream of the pump, an outflow rate equal to 1.5 times the nominal pump rate is assumed (50% increase due to loss of back pressure). In case of a leak in the (un)loading hose or arm, the outflow rate is calculated based on an additional pump pressure of 5 barg in the transfer pipe. The calculated release rates are given in Tables III (for LNG) and III (for vapour return).

65 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.21 Table III : Release of LNG following failure of an (un)loading hose or arm during (un)loading of a ship Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: -160 C, 5 barg Conditions: -138 C, 9 barg Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 4 LNG kg/s 1.0 kg/s 32.1 kg/s 1.3 kg/s 6 LNG kg/s 2.3 kg/s 80.2 kg/s 2.9 kg/s 8 LNG kg/s 4.0 kg/s kg/s 5.1 kg/s 10 LNG kg/s 6.3 kg/s kg/s 8.0 kg/s 12 LNG kg/s 9.0 kg/s kg/s 11.5 kg/s 14 LNG kg/s 12.3 kg/s kg/s 15.6 kg/s Table III : Release of LNG vapour following failure of a vapour return hose or arm during (un)loading of a ship Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: -160 C. 150 mbarg Conditions: -138 C. 4 barg Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 3 vapour return 0.7 kg/s kg/s 4.2 kg/s 0.04 kg/s 4 vapour return 1.3 kg/s 0.01 kg/s 7.5 kg/s 0.08 kg/s 6 vapour return 2.8 kg/s 0.03 kg/s 16.9 kg/s 0.17 kg/s 7 vapour return 3.9 kg/s 0.04 kg/s 23.0 kg/s 0.23 kg/s 8 vapour return 5.0 kg/s 0.05 kg/s 30.1 kg/s 0.30 kg/s 10 vapour return 7.8 kg/s 0.08 kg/s 47.0 kg/s 0.47 kg/s INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after the failure of a flexible hose or fixed (un)loading arm during the loading or unloading of a ship are given in Figures III and III (continuous releases only). At a storage temperature of -160 C, the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid and direct or delayed ignition of the product will result in a pool fire at the source. In case of delayed ignition, pool evaporation may result in a flammable cloud being formed in the environment which will drift in a downwind direction. The maximum size of the pool fire on water, for the various types of hose or arm failure, is given in Table III At a storage temperature of -138 C, the LNG will flow out as a two-phase jet (with a vapour and a liquid fraction); direct ignition of the product will result in a jet fire and delayed ignition in a flash fire and pool fire and/or jet fire at the source. Type of (un)loading hose or arm Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire on water in case of direct or delayed ignition of the released LNG (-160 C) Direct ignition Delayed ignition Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 4 LNG 127 m² ( = 12.7 m) 3.5 m² ( = 2.1 m) 201 m² ( = 16.0 m) 5.7 m² ( = 2.7 m) 6 LNG 314 m² ( = 20.0 m) 8.0 m² ( = 3.2 m) 507 m² ( = 25.4 m) 12.6 m² ( = 4.0 m) 8 LNG 629 m² ( = 28.3 m) 14.5 m² ( = 4.3 m) 1012 m² ( = 35.9 m) 22.9 m² ( = 5.4 m) 10 LNG 940 m² ( = 34.6 m) 22.1 m² ( = 5.3 m) 1514 m² ( = 43.9 m) 35.3 m² ( = 6.7 m) 12 LNG 1257 m² ( = 40.0 m) 32.2 m² ( = 6.4 m) 2019 m² ( = 50.7 m) 51.5 m² ( = 8.1 m) 14 LNG 1886 m² ( = 49.0 m) 44.2 m² ( = 7.5 m) 3039 m² ( = 62.2 m) 69.4 m² ( = 9.4 m)

66 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.22 MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for accidents that could occur during the loading or unloading of LNG ships at a terminal or station is given in Annex 4, Table 4.3. III (Un)loading of LNG trucks using flexible hoses GENERAL In this study, risk distances are also calculated in relation to the loading and unloading of trucks. The typical (un)loading rates and hose or arm diameters used for this purpose are given in Table III Because a truck-related accident could also occur while the truck is at the terminal or station, the characteristic features of a representative LNG truck also need to be known. These are given in Table III (37). Table III : Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters used for (un)loading LNG trucks (Un)loading rate Arm or hose diameter - liquid phase Arm or hose diameter - gas phase (vapour return) 50 m³/h 1x 3 1x m³/h 1x 3 1x 3 Table III : Key characteristics of a representative LNG truck Truck characteristics Typical value Volume 50 m³ Degree of filling Maximum connection diameter Truck characteristics Design pressure (test pressure) Safety valve set pressure max. 90% (approx. 19 tonnes of LNG) 4 (100 mm) Typical value min. 6 barg (9 barg) typically 6 barg The calculation of the risk distances also takes into consideration a number of risk mitigation measures that may be present at the truck (un)loading station. More specifically, the risk distances are calculated for an (un)loading location with and without a containment system for spills (typically 200 m²). The risk distances are also calculated for an (un)loading station without an emergency shutdown system, one with a manual emergency shutdown system and one with an automatic emergency shutdown system. RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure for the (un)loading hose or arm, the pump used during the loading or unloading and the LNG truck present at the (un)loading location are given in Table III The representative types of failure for the hose or arm are: a rupture of the hose or arm, and a leak with an equivalent diameter equal to 10% of the hose or arm diameter. The representative type of failure for the (un)loading pump is a leak with an equivalent diameter equal to 10% of the connection diameter. Finally, the representative types of failure for the truck are the same as those for a stationary pressure tank, namely: a catastrophic rupture, an outflow of the entire content in 10 minutes, and large ( = 100 mm), medium ( = 25 mm) and small ( = 10 mm) leaks. (37) Because the characteristics of an LNG truck (volume, design pressure, safety valve set pressure, etc.) can vary from truck to truck, this study uses generic values for the main truck characteristics.

67 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.23 For the (un)loading of LNG trucks at a bunker terminal, it can be assumed that the LNG is at -160 C because LNG at a bunker terminal is stored in atmospheric tanks. At a bunkering station, on the other hand, LNG is stored in pressure tanks at a temperature of C to -138 C; when determining the risk distances, consideration must therefore be given to an incidental release of both cold LNG (at -160 C) and warm LNG (at -138 C). In the event of a rupture of the (un)loading hose or arm downstream of the pump, an outflow rate equal to 1.5 times the nominal pump rate is assumed (50% increase due to loss of back pressure). In case of a leak in the (un)loading hose or arm or the pump, the outflow rate is calculated based on an additional pump pressure of 5 barg in the transfer pipe. The calculated release rates are given in Tables III to III Table III : Release of LNG following failure of the (un)loading hose or arm during a truck (un)loading Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: -160 C, 5 barg Conditions: -138 C, 9 barg Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 3 LNG (50 m³/h) 8.9 kg/s 0.56 kg/s 8.0 kg/s 0.72 kg/s 3 LNG (100 m³/h) 17.7 kg/s 0.56 kg/s 16.0 kg/s 0.72 kg/s Table III : Release of LNG following failure of the vapour return hose or arm during a truck loading Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: -160 C, 150 mbarg Conditions: -138 C, 4 barg Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 3 vapour return 0.7 kg/s kg/s 4.2 kg/s 0.04 kg/s Installation type Table III : Release of LNG following failure of an LNG truck (assuming a maximum degree of filling) Rupture Outflow in 10 minutes Large leak Medium leak Small leak Truck (50 m³) LNG at -160 C and 0.15 barg Truck (50 m³) LNG at -138 C and 4 barg 19 tonnes 31.7 kg/s 20.5 kg/s 1.3 kg/s 0.21 kg/s 19 tonnes 31.7 kg/s 33.9 kg/s 5.4 kg/s 0.86 kg/s INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after the failure of the flexible hose, the fixed arm, the (un)loading pump and the truck are given in Figures III (LNG at -160 C) and III (LNG at -138 C). The surface area of the pool that is formed in the event of an incidental release of cold LNG (-160 C) at the (un)loading location is given in Table III for the different types of failure of the installations concerned. Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire on land in case of direct or delayed ignition of the incidentally released LNG (no containment, -160 C) Installation Type of failure Direct ignition Delayed ignition 3 hose or arm (50 m³/h) 3 hose or arm (100 m³/h) Rupture 149 m² ( = 13.8 m) 1,089 m² ( = 37.2 m) Leak 10 m² ( = 3.6 m) 34 m² ( = 6.6 m) Rupture 84 m² ( = 10.3 m) 542 m² ( = 26.3 m) Leak 10 m² ( = 3.6 m) 34 m² ( = 6.6 m) (Un)loading pump Leak 10 m² ( = 3.6 m) 34 m² ( = 6.6 m)

68 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.24 Installation Type of failure Direct ignition Delayed ignition Rupture 2,326 m² ( = 54.4 m) 2,326 m² ( = 54.4 m) Outflow in 10 minutes 248 m² ( = 17.8 m) 1,063 m² ( = 36.8 m) Truck Large leak 202 m² ( = 16.0 m) 964 m² ( = 35.0 m) Medium leak 22 m² ( = 5.3 m) 96 m² ( = 11.0 m) Small leak 6 m² ( = 2.7 m) 15 m² ( = 4.4 m) MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for accidents that could occur during a truck (un)loading at a terminal or a station is given in Annex 4, Table 4.4. III Bunkering of ships with LNG using flexible hoses and fixed arms GENERAL In this section, the effects of possible accidents relating to the bunkering of ships using (un)loading arms and flexible hoses are determined. The typical bunkering rates and hose or arm diameters used at bunker terminals or stations are given in the table below. When determining the appropriate hose and arm diameters, a maximum liquid speed of 7 m/s in the hoses or arms during the LNG bunkering is assumed. Table III : Typical (un)loading rates and hose/arm diameters Loading rates Arm or hose diameter - liquid phase Arm or hose diameter - gas phase (vapour return) 50 m³/h 2x 2 1x m³/h 2x 6 1x 6 1,000 m³/h 2x 8 1x 8 2,000 m³/h 2x 10 1x 10 3,000 m³/h 2x 12 1x 12 RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure for an (un)loading hose or arm are given in Table III They are: a rupture of the hose or arm, and a leak with a characteristic diameter equal to 10% of the hose or arm diameter. The temperature and pressure of the LNG in the storage tanks of a bunkering station can vary from -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg). Consequently, the effects of possible accidents during LNG bunkering are calculated for both storage conditions. The calculated release rates in the event of the failure of the bunker hose or arm are given in Tables III (for LNG) and III (for vapour return). Table III : Release of LNG following failure of (un)loading hose or arm Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: 150 mbarg, -160 C Conditions: 4 barg, -138 C Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 2 LNG 4.43 kg/s 0.25 kg/s 4.01 kg/s 0.32 kg/s 6 LNG 44.3 kg/s 2.3 kg/s 40.1 kg/s 2.9 kg/s 8 LNG 88.6 kg/s 4.0 kg/s 80.2 kg/s 5.1 kg/s 10 LNG kg/s 6.3 kg/s kg/s 8.0 kg/s 12 LNG kg/s 9.0 kg/s kg/s 11.5 kg/s

69 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.25 Table III : Release of LNG vapour following failure of vapour return hose or arm Type of (un)loading hose or arm Conditions: 150 mbarg, -160 C Conditions: 4 barg, -138 C Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 2 vapour return 0.30 kg/s kg/s 1.9 kg/s 0.02 kg/s 6 vapour return 2.8 kg/s 0.03 kg/s 16.9 kg/s 0.17 kg/s 8 vapour return 5.0 kg/s 0.05 kg/s 30.1 kg/s 0.30 kg/s 10 vapour return 7.8 kg/s 0.08 kg/s 47.0 kg/s 0.47 kg/s 12 vapour return 11.2 kg/s 0.11 kg/s 67.6 kg/s 0.68 kg/s INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after the failure of a flexible hose or fixed arm during LNG bunkering are given in Figures III and III (continuous release only). At a temperature of -160 C, the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid. It is assumed that there is no containment system for spills at the location in question and that the LNG therefore ends up entirely in the water. The direct or delayed ignition of the LNG pool will result in a pool fire on the water. Delayed ignition of the flammable cloud that is formed through evaporation of the LNG leads to a flash fire. The maximum size of the pool fires that could be created on the water as the result of the failure of the hoses or arms used is given in Table III Table III : Maximum size of a pool fire on water in the event of direct or delayed ignition of the released LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Type of (un)loading hose or arm Direct ignition Delayed ignition Rupture Leak Rupture Leak 2 LNG 24.2 m² ( = 5.5 m) 1.4 m² ( = 1.3 m) 15.7 m² ( = 4.5 m) 0.9 m² ( = 1.1 m) 6 LNG 157 m² ( = 14.1 m) 8.0 m² ( = 3.2 m) 253 m² ( = 18.0 m) 12.6 m² ( = 4.0 m) 8 LNG 314 m² ( = 20.0 m) 14.5 m² ( = 4.3 m) 507 m² ( = 25.4 m) 22.9 m² ( = 5.4 m) 10 LNG 629 m² ( = 28.3 m) 22.1 m² ( = 5.3 m) 1012 m² ( = 35.9 m) 35.3 m² ( = 6.7 m) 12 LNG 940 m² ( = 34.6 m) 32.2 m² ( = 6.4 m) 1514 m² ( = 43.9 m) 51.5 m² ( = 8.1 m) MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for accidents that could occur during the bunkering of a ship with LNG is given in Annex 4, Table 4.5. III Bunkering of ships by LNG truck GENERAL The bunkering of ships with LNG using trucks typically takes place at a flow rate of 50 m³/h via a 3 flexible hose or arm for the LNG and a similar hose or arm for the vapour return at a location where no containment system for spills is present. Typical characteristics of trucks used for LNG bunkering are given in Table III As regards the possibilities for driver intervention, the calculations factor in the possible presence of a manually operated emergency shutdown system (e.g. dead man s switch). RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure for the (un)loading hose or arm, the pump used during bunkering and the LNG truck itself are given in Table III

70 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.26 The bunkered LNG may come from a bunkering station, where the LNG is stored under pressure in pressure tanks. When determining the effects of an accident during bunkering, consideration must therefore be given to an incidental release of both cold (-160 C) and warm LNG (-138 C). The calculated release rates in the event of the failure of the truck or the connected hoses or arms are given in Tables III to III (results for an (un)loading rate of 50 m³/h). INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after the failure of the flexible hose, the fixed arm, the (un)loading pump and the truck are given in Figures III (LNG at -160 C) and III (LNG at -138 C). The surface area of the pool formed following an incidental release of cold LNG (-160 C) at the bunkering location is given in Table III III.3.4. Probability study For the representative accident scenarios selected in the impact study, the probabilities of occurrence of those accidents are estimated. The total probability of an accident occurring is determined by the probability of a hazardous product being released from an installation (failure frequencies) and the probability of a specific follow-up event or condition occurring (outcome probability), the probability of the activation or otherwise of repression systems (failure frequencies of emergency shutdown systems) and by the annual operating time of the installation. III Failure frequencies or release probabilities For establishments that fall under the terms of the Seveso II Directive, determination of the external human risk posed by the establishment is based on the generic types of failure and failure frequencies of installations set out in the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 published by the Flemish government s Safety Reporting Division [18]. An overview of the generic failure frequencies of installations used for the storage, transfer and distribution of LNG is given in Table III It should be noted that the failure frequencies indicated for flexible hoses and fixed arms are per hour of use of the hose or arm. The failure frequencies applying to (un)loading pumps and trucks present within the establishment are also multiplied by their relative annual operating time or presence. III Outcome probabilities PROBABILITIES OF IGNITION The outcome probabilities are limited to the occurrence or otherwise of ignition. For natural gas and LNG, the generic probabilities of ignition used are those for gases with low reactivity as set out in Table 15 of the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 [18]. They are shown in the table below. For scenarios where very large quantities of LNG are released directly into the environment (i.e. failure of atmospheric storage tanks without a bund), the probabilities of direct and delayed ignition are increased to 30% and 50% respectively [27].

71 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.27 Table III Overview of generic probabilities of ignition for LNG/natural gas according to the Safety Reporting Division s Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 [18] continuous [kg/s] SOURCE instantaneous [kg] Probability of direct ignition [%] Probability of delayed ignition [%] Probability of explosion [%] < 10 < 1, and 100 1,000-10, > 100 > 10, III Failure frequencies and response times for emergency shutdown systems For the (un)loading of LNG trucks and ships, the impact study takes into consideration the possible presence of an automatically or manually activated emergency shutdown system. Such a system enables an incidental release of a hazardous substance to be stopped more quickly, which has a positive impact in reducing the effects of the accident. Guideline values for the probability of failure and for the response time of such emergency shutdown systems are given in the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 [18]. For a redundant automatic emergency shutdown system, the probability of failure is assumed to be 1% and the response time 120 s. For a manually activated emergency shutdown system, the same response time and a probability of failure of 10% (i.e. failure of the operator to intervene) are used. The Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 specifies a number of conditions that must be met for a manually operated emergency shutdown system to be taken into account in a risk analysis. These are: the on-site presence of the operator is guaranteed by a device such as a dead man s switch or by a procedure in the safety management system and is checked during inspections; the activation of the emergency shutdown system by the operator present in case of leakage during (un)loading is described in a procedure; the operator present on site is adequately trained and is also familiar with the applicable procedures; from the start to the end of the (un)loading operation the operator present on-site has a view of the entire (un)loading installation; the emergency shutdown button is positioned according to the applicable standards, so that it can be activated quickly regardless of the direction of the outflow. III.3.5. III Calculated risk distances Atmospheric storage tanks Table III and Figures III and III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) for different types of atmospheric LNG storage tanks with a useful capacity of 10,000 to 40,000 m³. The calculations show that the individual risk from a full containment LNG tank is always less than 1 x 10-7 /y. The individual risk arising from such tanks is therefore always considered acceptable according to Flemish risk criteria.

72 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.28 For double containment LNG tanks with a maximum capacity of 40,000 m³, an individual risk of 10-6 /y (maximum allowable risk in residential areas) and 10-7 /y (maximum allowable risk at vulnerable locations) is attained up to a distance of 100 m and 165 m respectively from the centre of the tank. The impact of an additional emergency retention pit on the individual risk posed by the tank is negligible (38). For single containment LNG tanks in a conventional bund (height of the bund wall: 2.5 m), an individual risk of 10-6 /y is attained up to a distance of 215 to 360 m depending on the volume of the tank. An individual risk of 10-7 /y is attained up to a distance of 230 to 450 m from the centre of the bund. The individual risk of 10-5 /y which must, in principle, be situated within the boundary of the establishment, reaches to a distance of 175 to 285 m from the centre of the bund. The use of single containment LNG tanks therefore implies that the establishment must be situated on a large industrial site (12 to 33 ha) and at a sufficient distance from residential areas and vulnerable locations. Tank type and storage capacity Table III : Risk distances for atmospheric LNG storage tanks Distance 10-5 /y Tank without a bund Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y Tank in a bund Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7/y Single containment tank Double containment tank Full containment tank 10,000 m³ x x x 176 m 216 m 230 m 20,000 m³ x x x 228 m 298 m 332 m 40,000 m³ x x x 286 m 360 m 448 m 10,000 m³ 16 m 92 m 148 m 16 m 92 m 148 m 20,000 m³ 16 m 94 m 158 m 16 m 92 m 156 m 40,000 m³ 16 m 102 m 166 m 16 m 102 m 166 m 10,000 m³ ,000 m³ ,000 m³ (38) The individual emergency impounding system around a double or full containment tank only affects the scenarios of instantaneous tank failure and outflow of the entire tank contents in 10 minutes. These scenarios have a probability of occurrence in the order of 10-8 /y to 10-9 /y (see Table B3.1 in Annex 3) and do not therefore contribute to the individual risk of 10-5 /y to 10-7 /y.

73 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.29 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of LNG in atmospheric tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg) single containment tank in a bund double containment tank without a retention pit double containment tank in a retention pit Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] Storage capacity of the LNG tank [m³] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of LNG in atmospheric tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] single containment tank in a bund double containment tank without a retention pit double containment tank in a retention pit Storage capacity of the LNG tank [m³] The societal risk arising from an installation can only be calculated if the population present in the vicinity of the installation concerned is known. Because a medium-sized LNG storage tank can potentially have a big influence on the societal risk posed by an establishment, guideline calculations have been made based on a homogeneous population density in the external vicinity of the establishment. The results of the societal risk calculations (see Tables III and III ) indicate that the societal risk posed by single containment LNG tanks in a bund, double and full containment LNG tanks without an emergency rention pit is only acceptable in industrial areas with a very low population density. In industrial zones with a high population density ( 25 pers/ha), the societal risk from a medium-sized LNG tank (10,000-40,000 m³) is

74 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.30 only acceptable if it is designed as a double containment or full containment tank in an emergency retention pit. Table III : Results of the societal risk calculations for atmospheric LNG storage tanks (based on a uniform population density) Tank type and storage capacity Single containment tank in a conventional bund Industrial zone 80 pers/ha Industrial zone 40 pers/ha Industrial zone 25 pers/ha Industrial zone 5 pers/ha 10,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable unacceptable acceptable 20,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable unacceptable acceptable 40,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable unacceptable unacceptable ( * ) Double containment tank Double containment tank in an emergency retention pit 10,000 m³ unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities acceptable 20,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities ( * ) 40,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities 10,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 20,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 40,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 10,000 m³ unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities acceptable Full containment tank 20,000 m³ unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities ( * ) Full containment tank in an emergency retention pit (* ) Risk criteria only slightly exceeded 40,000 m³ unacceptable unacceptable > 1,000 fatalities > 1,000 fatalities 10,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 20,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 40,000 m³ acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable Table III : Maximum allowable uniform population density in the vicinity of an atmospheric LNG storage tank based on Flemish risk criteria Tank type and storage capacity Single containment tank in a conventional bund Maximum uniform population density for which the societal risk curve meets Flemish risk criteria 10,000 m³ 10.4 pers/ha 20,000 m³ 5.9 pers/ha 40,000 m³ 3.5 pers/ha Double or full containment tank without an emergency retention pit 10,000 m³ 6.0 pers/ha 20,000 m³ 4.5 pers/ha 40,000 m³ 2.3 pers/ha

75 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III Figure III : Calculated societal risk curves for a 40,000 m³ atmospheric LNG tank (red line: risk criterion) Single containment tank in a bund - 25 pers/ha Single containment tank in a bund - 3,5 pers/ha Full containment tank without a retention pit - 25 pers/ha Full containment tank without a retention pit - 2,3 pers/ha Full containment tank in a retention pit - 25 pers/ha 10-5 frequency number of fatalities III Vacuum-insulated pressure tanks Tables III , III and III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) for the storage of LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks as used at smaller bunkering stations. In the calculations, the total storage capacity of the bunkering station was varied from 100 to 3,500 m³. As regards the storage conditions, calculations were made for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Table III and Figures III and III show the results of the calculations made on the basis of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg). The results show that the individual risk arising from the tanks is always lower than 10-5 /y and that the placement of the tanks in a bund has a small, positive effect on the individual risk posed by the tanks. Table III : Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Storage capacity Distance 10-5 /y Tanks without a bund Distance 10-6/y Distance 10-7/y Distance 10-5/y Tanks in a common bund Distance 10-6/y Distance 10-7/y 100 m³ m m 200 m³ (2 x 100 m³) - 22 m 124 m - 18 m 90 m 250 m³ - 4 m 134 m - 4 m 82 m 500 m³ (2 x 250 m³) - 36 m 176 m - 32 m 122 m 500 m³ - 4 m 164 m - 4 m 102 m 700 m³ - 6 m 196 m - 6 m 114 m 750 m³ (3 x 250 m³) - 60 m 202 m - 60 m 172 m 1,000 m³ (2 x 500 m³) - 44 m 222 m - 40 m 160 m 1,500 m³ (3 x 500 m³) - 72 m 254 m - 70 m 220 m 2,100 m³ (3 x 700 m³) m 286 m - 90 m 246 m 3,500 m³ (5 x 700 m³) m 342 m m 324 m

76 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.32 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of cold LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of cold LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-160 C, 150 mbarg) WARM LNG Table III and Figures III and III show the results of the calculations made on the basis of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). For the given volumes and storage conditions, an individual risk of 10-5 /y is not attained in the vicinity of the tanks and the placement of the tanks in a bund has a negligible effect on the individual risk posed by the LNG storage.

77 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.33 Table III : Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg) Storage capacity Distance 10-5 /y Tanks without a bund Distance 10-6/y Distance 10-7/y Distance 10-5/y Tanks in a common bund Distance 10-6/y Distance 10-7/y 100 m³ m m 200 m³ (2 x 100 m³) - 14 m 124 m - 14 m 122 m 250 m³ m m 500 m³ (2 x 250 m³) - 26 m 178 m - 26 m 174 m 500 m³ m m 700 m³ - 4 m 164 m - 4 m 142 m 750 m³ (3 x 250 m³) - 52 m 214 m - 52 m 214 m 1,000 m³ (2 x 500 m³) - 32 m 228 m - 32 m 222 m 1,500 m³ (3 x 500 m³) - 64 m 282 m - 64 m 282 m 2,100 m³ (3 x 700 m³) - 82 m 326 m - 82 m 326 m 3,500 m³ (5 x 700 m³) m 376 m m 376 m Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the storage of warm LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] single tank (no bund) single tank (with bund) two tanks (no bund) two tanks (with bund) three tanks (no bund) three tanks (with bund) five tanks (no bund) five tanks (with bund) Total LNG storage capacity [m³]

78 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.34 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the storage of warm LNG in vacuum-insulated pressure tanks (-138 C, 4 barg) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] Total LNG storage capacity [m³] single tank (no bund) single tank (with bund) two tanks (no bund) two tanks (with bund) three tanks (no bund) three tanks (with bund) five tanks (no bund) five tanks (with bund) GENERAL CONCLUSION For pressure tanks in which the storage temperature of the LNG can vary from -160 C (cold LNG) to -138 C (warm LNG), the greatest risk distances must be considered when establishing the necessary separation distances between the storage tanks and environmental areas or objects of concern. These risk distances are indicated in Table III Table III : Risk distances for LNG storage in pressure tanks (-160 C to -138 C) Storage capacity Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund Distance 10-5 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 100 m³ m m 200 m³ (2 x 100 m³) - 22 m 124 m - 18 m 122 m 250 m³ - 4 m 134 m - 4 m 98 m 500 m³ (2 x 250 m³) - 36 m 178 m - 32 m 174 m 500 m³ - 4 m 164 m - 4 m 122 m 700 m³ - 6 m 196 m - 6 m 142 m 750 m³ (3 x 250 m³) - 60 m 214 m - 60 m 214 m 1,000 m³ (2 x 500 m³) - 44 m 228 m - 40 m 222 m 1,500 m³ (3 x 500 m³) - 72 m 282 m - 70 m 282 m 2,100 m³ (3 x 700 m³) m 326 m - 90 m 326 m 3,500 m³ (5 x 700 m³) m 376 m m 376 m The table shows that as the storage capacity of the station increases (up to a maximum of 3,500 m³), the distance to which an individual risk of 10-6 /y is present increases to 114 m for pressure tanks in a common bund and 148 m for tanks without a bund. An individual risk of 10-7 /y is present up to a maximum distance of 376 m from the tanks for a total storage capacity of 3,500 m³.

79 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.35 Table III : Maximum allowable uniform population density in the vicinity of an LNG station containing pressure tanks, based on Flemish risk criteria Storage capacity Maximum uniform population density for which the societal risk curve meets Flemish risk criteria 100 m³ 130 pers/ha 200 m³ (2 x 100 m³) 130 pers/ha 250 m³ 58 pers/ha 500 m³ (2 x 250 m³) 58 pers/ha 500 m³ 32 pers/ha 700 m³ 24 pers/ha 750 m³ (3 x 250 m³) 58 pers/ha 1,000 m³ (2 x 500 m³) 32 pers/ha 1,500 m³ (3 x 500 m³) 32 pers/ha 2,100 m³ (3 x 700 m³) 24 pers/ha 3,500 m³ (5 x 700 m³) 24 pers/ha III (Un)loading of LNG ships using hoses and arms Tables III to III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with the (un)loading of LNG ships using flexible hoses and fixed arms at a terminal or station. In the calculations, the (un)loading rate and associated hose or arm diameters were varied from 200 m³/h (4 hose/arm) for small ships to 3,000 m³/h (14 hose/arm) for large ships, and a total LNG throughput of 50,000 to 6,000,000 m³/year was assumed. As regards the conditions of the (un)loaded LNG, calculations were performed for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) (39). COLD LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via flexible hoses. The table shows that the impact of a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system on the risk level of 10-5 /y is fairly limited. Only in case of high (un)loading rates ( 1,000 m³/h) and a high operating time of the hoses ( 1,000 h/y) is the risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-5 /y reduced to a limited extent by the presence of an emergency shutdown system. By contrast, the risk distances to the individual risk of 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y are clearly positively influenced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system, for different release rates and different operating times of the hoses. Automatic implementation of the emergency shutdown system has only a limited impact on the distance to the risk level of 10-6 /y, but does result in a clear reduction in the distance to a risk level of 10-7 /y compared with a manual emergency shutdown system. (39) LNG that is stored in an atmospheric storage tank (at a bunker terminal) must be kept at a temperature of around -160 C. LNG that is stored in a pressure tank (at a bunkering station) may possibly be at a higher temperature and pressure.

80 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.36 Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C) via hoses Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y 28 m 68 m 186 m 26 m 70 m 104 m 26 m 70 m 100 m 4 (200 m³/h) 500 h/y 42 m 88 m 228 m 42 m 80 m 110 m 42 m 80 m 106 m 1,000 h/y 54 m 118 m 230 m 54 m 88 m 128 m 54 m 86 m 110 m 2,000 h/y 66 m 154 m 232 m 66 m 100 m 154 m 66 m 94 m 110 m 250 h/y 42 m 104 m 286 m 38 m 98 m 152 m 38 m 98 m 140 m 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 60 m 136 m 348 m 60 m 118 m 160 m 60 m 118 m 154 m 1,000 h/y 78 m 194 m 352 m 78 m 132 m 208 m 78 m 130 m 158 m 2,000 h/y 98 m 246 m 356 m 94 m 140 m 246 m 94 m 138 m 160 m 250 h/y 86 m 210 m 464 m 86 m 162 m 216 m 86 m 160 m 198 m 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 106 m 310 m 470 m 108 m 178 m 310 m 108 m 174 m 200 m 1,000 h/y 148 m 404 m 476 m 128 m 196 m 404 m 128 m 182 m 212 m 2,000 h/y 188 m 462 m 478 m 154 m 206 m 462 m 150 m 198 m 252 m 250 h/y 102 m 256 m 536 m 102 m 196 m 260 m 102 m 192 m 224 m 10 (1500 m³/h) 500 h/y 126 m 390 m 546 m 126 m 214 m 390 m 126 m 208 m 228 m 1,000 h/y 186 m 496 m 552 m 154 m 220 m 496 m 154 m 218 m 252 m 2,000 h/y 232 m 534 m 554 m 188 m 250 m 534 m 182 m 222 m 284 m 250 h/y 118 m 292 m 610 m 118 m 218 m 294 m 118 m 214 m 246 m 12 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 144 m 456 m 620 m 144 m 236 m 456 m 144 m 230 m 254 m 1,000 h/y 216 m 574 m 626 m 174 m 244 m 574 m 174 m 238 m 288 m 2,000 h/y 266 m 606 m 630 m 210 m 282 m 606 m 204 m 242 m 294 m 250 h/y 140 m 358 m 728 m 140 m 258 m 358 m 140 m 250 m 304 m 14 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 172 m 564 m 744 m 170 m 292 m 564 m 170 m 280 m 306 m 1,000 h/y 260 m 684 m 750 m 204 m 304 m 684 m 202 m 296 m 346 m 2,000 h/y 338 m 722 m 762 m 242 m 346 m 722 m 238 m 304 m 350 m

81 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.37 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses without emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses with manual emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

82 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.38 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses without emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG to/from ships via hoses with manual emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via fixed arms. The table shows that the impact of a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system on the risk level of 10-5 /y and 10-6 /y is fairly limited. Only in case of high (un)loading rates ( 1,000 m³/h) and a high operating time of the arms ( 2,000 h/y) is the risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y clearly reduced. By contrast, the risk distance to the individual risk of 10-7/y is clearly positively influenced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system, for different release rates and different operating times of the arms. Automatic implementation of the emergency shutdown system only results in a very limited reduction in the distance to the risk level of 10-7 /y compared with a manual emergency shutdown system.

83 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.39 Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C) via arms Type of arm and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y - 18 m 60 m - 16 m 60 m - 16 m 60 m 4 (200 m³/h) 500 h/y - 30 m 70 m - 28 m 70 m - 28 m 70 m 1,000 h/y 8 m 44 m 92 m 8 m 44 m 80 m 8 m 44 m 80 m 2,000 h/y 16 m 56 m 124 m 14 m 56 m 90 m 14 m 56 m 88 m 250 h/y - 24 m 86 m - 24 m 84 m - 24 m 84 m 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y - 46 m 106 m - 42 m 102 m 2 m 42 m 100 m 1,000 h/y 12 m 64 m 146 m 12 m 64 m 120 m 12 m 64 m 120 m 2,000 h/y 20 m 80 m 206 m 20 m 80 m 134 m 20 m 80 m 132 m 250 h/y - 66 m 164 m - 66 m 138 m - 64 m 136 m 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 10 m 90 m 216 m 10 m 90 m 164 m 10 m 90 m 162 m 1,000 h/y 24 m 110 m 318 m 24 m 110 m 178 m 24 m 110 m 176 m 2,000 h/y 58 m 154 m 430 m 56 m 132 m 196 m 54 m 132 m 184 m 250 h/y - 80 m 206 m - 80 m 168 m - 80 m 166 m 10 (1500 m³/h) 500 h/y 12 m 106 m 266 m 12 m 106 m 198 m 12 m 106 m 196 m 1,000 h/y 30 m 130 m 398 m 28 m 130 m 216 m 28 m 130 m 212 m 2,000 h/y 70 m 192 m 524 m 68 m 158 m 222 m 66 m 156 m 218 m 250 h/y - 92 m 240 m - 90 m 188 m - 90 m 186 m 12 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 14 m 122 m 298 m 14 m 122 m 220 m 14 m 122 m 218 m 1,000 h/y 34 m 148 m 468 m 32 m 148 m 238 m 32 m 148 m 232 m 2,000 h/y 80 m 224 m 596 m 78 m 178 m 248 m 78 m 176 m 240 m 250 h/y 8 m 112 m 300 m 8 m 110 m 220 m 8 m 110 m 216 m 14 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 26 m 144 m 376 m 24 m 144 m 262 m 24 m 144 m 256 m 1,000 h/y 44 m 178 m 578 m 42 m 176 m 294 m 42 m 176 m 286 m 2,000 h/y 98 m 280 m 702 m 94 m 208 m 306 m 94 m 206 m 298 m

84 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.40 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms without emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms with manual emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

85 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.41 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms without emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of cold LNG from ships via arms with manual emergency shutdown (-160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/j] WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) via flexible hoses and fixed (un)loading arms. Because warm LNG is released into the environment as a two-phase jet (vapour and droplets) with a high momentum, the maximum size of the flammable cloud is quickly reached. As a result, the impact of an emergency shutdown system (with a response time of 120 s) on the individual risk of the (un)loading operations is limited.

86 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.42 Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C) Type of hose/arm and operating time Distance 10-5 /y (Un)loading via flexible hoses Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y (Un)loading via fixed arms Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 250 h/y 14 m 42 m 96 m - 10 m 36 m 4 (200 m³/h) 500 h/y 20 m 48 m 110 m - 16 m 44 m 1,000 h/y 32 m 62 m 134 m 4 m 22 m 50 m 2,000 h/y 40 m 90 m 138 m 10 m 34 m 74 m 250 h/y 20 m 64 m 174 m - 14 m 56 m 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 34 m 74 m 222 m - 20 m 64 m 1,000 h/y 50 m 124 m 248 m 6 m 36 m 76 m 2,000 h/y 60 m 164 m 256 m 12 m 52 m 132 m 250 h/y 54 m 118 m 388 m - 34 m 98 m 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 76 m 210 m 408 m 2 m 58 m 136 m 1,000 h/y 90 m 272 m 414 m 12 m 78 m 214 m 2,000 h/y 106 m 370 m 418 m 26 m 92 m 282 m 250 h/y 66 m 154 m 504 m - 42 m 116 m 10 (1500 m³/h) 500 h/y 90 m 266 m 532 m 4 m 70 m 170 m 1,000 h/y 108 m 348 m 538 m 16 m 94 m 270 m 2,000 h/y 130 m 482 m 540 m 32 m 110 m 366 m 250 h/y 78 m 182 m 600 m - 52 m 130 m 12 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 102 m 310 m 628 m 10 m 82 m 200 m 1,000 h/y 120 m 412 m 634 m 24 m 106 m 316 m 2,000 h/y 144 m 572 m 636 m 42 m 124 m 432 m 250 h/y 94 m 240 m 806 m 2 m 64 m 154 m 14 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 122 m 400 m 846 m 12 m 98 m 278 m 1,000 h/y 144 m 554 m 856 m 28 m 126 m 434 m 2,000 h/y 180 m 778 m 858 m 52 m 146 m 566 m

87 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.43 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using hoses (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using hoses (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading hoses 6" (un)loading hoses 8" (un)loading hoses 10" (un)loading hoses 12" (un)loading hoses 14" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

88 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.44 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using (un)loading arms (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of LNG ships using (un)loading arms (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " (un)loading arms 6" (un)loading arms 8" (un)loading arms 10" (un)loading arms 12" (un)loading arms 14" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] GENERAL CONCLUSION For installations used to (un)load both cold LNG (-160 C) and warm LNG (-138 C), the greatest risk distances must be considered when establishing the necessary separation distances (see Tables III and III ). The distances in red are derived from calculations with warm LNG, those in black are from calculations with cold LNG. The tables show that, for the (un)loading of ships via arms, the greatest risk distances are obtained based on calculations with cold LNG. The only exception to this are the distances to a risk level of 10-7 /y, which are calculated for high release rates ( 1,000 m³/h) and a high operating time ( 1,000 h/y).

89 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.45 For the (un)loading of ships via hoses without an emergency shutdown system, the greatest risk distances are also obtained for the (un)loading of cold LNG. The only exception to this are installations with high (un)loading rates ( 2,000 m³/h), for which the greatest risk distances to 10-7 /y are obtained for warm LNG. For the (un)loading of ships via hoses with an emergency shutdown system (manual or automatic), the greatest distances to a risk level of 10-5 /y are obtained for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C) and the greatest distances to a risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C). As regards the risk distance to 10-6 /y, the distances are greatest for the (un)loading of cold LNG in case of a low (un)loading rate and throughput and greatest for warm LNG in case of a high (un)loading rate and throughput. Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG via hoses (-160 C to -138 C) Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y 28 m 68 m 186 m 26 m 70 m 104 m 26 m 70 m 100 m 4 (200 m³/h) 500 h/y 42 m 88 m 228 m 42 m 80 m 110 m 42 m 80 m 110 m 1,000 h/y 54 m 118 m 230 m 54 m 88 m 134 m 54 m 86 m 134 m 2,000 h/y 66 m 154 m 232 m 66 m 100 m 138 m 66 m 94 m 138 m 250 h/y 42 m 104 m 286 m 38 m 98 m 174 m 38 m 98 m 174 m 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 60 m 136 m 348 m 60 m 118 m 222 m 60 m 118 m 222 m 1,000 h/y 78 m 194 m 352 m 78 m 132 m 248 m 78 m 130 m 248 m 2,000 h/y 98 m 246 m 356 m 94 m 164 m 256 m 94 m 164 m 256 m 250 h/y 86 m 210 m 464 m 86 m 162 m 388 m 86 m 160 m 388 m 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 106 m 310 m 470 m 108 m 210 m 408 m 108 m 210 m 408 m 1,000 h/y 148 m 404 m 476 m 128 m 272 m 414 m 128 m 272 m 414 m 2,000 h/y 188 m 462 m 478 m 154 m 370 m 462 m 150 m 370 m 418 m 250 h/y 102 m 256 m 536 m 102 m 196 m 504 m 102 m 192 m 504 m 10 (1500 m³/h) 500 h/y 126 m 390 m 546 m 126 m 266 m 532 m 126 m 266 m 532 m 1,000 h/y 186 m 496 m 552 m 154 m 348 m 538 m 154 m 348 m 538 m 2,000 h/y 232 m 534 m 554 m 188 m 482 m 540 m 182 m 482 m 540 m 250 h/y 118 m 292 m 610 m 118 m 218 m 600 m 118 m 214 m 600 m 12 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 144 m 456 m 628 m 144 m 310 m 628 m 144 m 310 m 628 m 1,000 h/y 216 m 574 m 634 m 174 m 412 m 634 m 174 m 412 m 634 m 2,000 h/y 266 m 606 m 636 m 210 m 572 m 636 m 204 m 572 m 636 m 250 h/y 140 m 358 m 806 m 140 m 258 m 806 m 140 m 250 m 806 m 14 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 172 m 564 m 846 m 170 m 400 m 846 m 170 m 400 m 846 m 1,000 h/y 260 m 684 m 856 m 204 m 554 m 856 m 202 m 554 m 856 m 2,000 h/y 338 m 778 m 858 m 242 m 778 m 858 m 238 m 778 m 858 m

90 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.46 Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG via arms (-160 C to -138 C) Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y - 18 m 60 m - 16 m 60 m - 16 m 60 m 4 (200 m³/h) 500 h/y 4 m 30 m 70 m - 28 m 70 m - 28 m 70 m 1,000 h/y 8 m 44 m 92 m 8 m 44 m 80 m 8 m 44 m 80 m 2,000 h/y 16 m 56 m 124 m 14 m 56 m 90 m 14 m 56 m 88 m 250 h/y - 24 m 86 m - 24 m 84 m - 24 m 84 m 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 4 m 46 m 106 m 4 m 42 m 102 m 4 m 42 m 100 m 1,000 h/y 12 m 64 m 146 m 12 m 64 m 120 m 12 m 64 m 120 m 2,000 h/y 20 m 80 m 206 m 20 m 80 m 134 m 20 m 80 m 132 m 250 h/y - 66 m 164 m - 66 m 138 m - 64 m 136 m 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 10 m 90 m 216 m 10 m 90 m 164 m 10 m 90 m 162 m 1,000 h/y 24 m 110 m 318 m 24 m 110 m 214 m 24 m 110 m 214 m 2,000 h/y 58 m 154 m 430 m 56 m 132 m 282 m 54 m 132 m 282 m 250 h/y - 80 m 206 m - 80 m 168 m - 80 m 166 m 10 (1500 m³/h) 500 h/y 12 m 106 m 266 m 12 m 106 m 198 m 12 m 106 m 196 m 1,000 h/y 30 m 130 m 398 m 28 m 130 m 270 m 28 m 130 m 270 m 2,000 h/y 70 m 192 m 524 m 68 m 158 m 366 m 66 m 156 m 366 m 250 h/y 10 m 92 m 240 m 10 m 90 m 188 m 10 m 90 m 186 m 12 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 20 m 122 m 298 m 20 m 122 m 220 m 20 m 122 m 218 m 1,000 h/y 34 m 148 m 468 m 34 m 148 m 316 m 34 m 148 m 316 m 2,000 h/y 80 m 224 m 596 m 78 m 178 m 432 m 78 m 176 m 432 m 250 h/y 10 m 112 m 300 m 10 m 110 m 220 m 10 m 110 m 216 m 14 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 26 m 144 m 376 m 24 m 144 m 278 m 24 m 144 m 278 m 1,000 h/y 44 m 178 m 578 m 42 m 176 m 434 m 42 m 176 m 434 m 2,000 h/y 98 m 280 m 702 m 94 m 208 m 566 m 94 m 206 m 566 m III (Un)loading of LNG trucks using flexible hoses Tables III to III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with the (un)loading van LNG trucks using flexible hoses. The calculations were made for the (un)loading of trucks at (un)loading locations with and without containment systems for spills and for installations with and without a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system. In the calculations, an (un)loading rate of 50 and 100 m³/h (via a 3 hose or arm) was assumed and the number of trucks (un)loaded at a given location was varied from 50 to 4,000 trucks per year. As regards the conditions of the (un)loaded LNG, calculations were once again performed for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Tables III and III show the results of the risk calculations performed for the (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via flexible hoses. The greatest risk distances are obtained for an (un)loading location without a containment system and without an emergency shutdown system (see column 3 of Table III ). The smallest risk distances are obtained for an (un)loading location with a containment

91 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.47 system and with an automatic emergency shutdown system (see last column of Table III ). Based on the results, it should be noted that the impact of an emergency shutdown system is very limited for the (un)loading of trucks at a high rate (100 m³/h) at (un)loading locations with containment systems. (Un)loading rate and number of trucks Table III : Risk distances for LNG truck (un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h without containment system (-160 C) Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 6 m 24 m 70 m 4 m 18 m 40 m 4 m 16 m 38 m 100 tr./y 12 m 38 m 78 m 8 m 26 m 46 m 8 m 24 m 40 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 24 m 70 m 88 m 18 m 40 m 70 m 16 m 38 m 48 m 1,000 tr./y 38 m 78 m 90 m 26 m 46 m 78 m 24 m 40 m 50 m 2,000 tr./y 56 m 82 m 92 m 32 m 56 m 84 m 32 m 44 m 66 m 4,000 tr./y 68 m 86 m 94 m 38 m 68 m 90 m 36 m 48 m 80 m 50 tr./y - 26 m 94 m - 22 m 54 m - 22 m 50 m 100 tr./y 8 m 52 m 104 m 4 m 36 m 62 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 3 (100 m³/h) 500 tr./y 26 m 94 m 122 m 22 m 54 m 96 m 22 m 50 m 66 m 1,000 tr./y 52 m 104 m 126 m 36 m 62 m 104 m 34 m 56 m 70 m (Un)loading rate and number of trucks 2,000 tr./y 76 m 112 m 130 m 44 m 76 m 114 m 44 m 60 m 82 m 4,000 tr./y 92 m 122 m 130 m 52 m 92 m 122 m 50 m 64 m 96 m Table III : Risk distances for LNG truck (un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h with containment system (-160 C) Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 6 m 22 m 48 m 4 m 18 m 38 m 4 m 16 m 38 m 100 tr./y 10 m 30 m 54 m 8 m 24 m 42 m 8 m 24 m 40 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 22 m 48 m 62 m 18 m 38 m 50 m 16 m 38 m 48 m 1,000 tr./y 30 m 54 m 64 m 24 m 42 m 56 m 24 m 40 m 50 m 2,000 tr./y 38 m 58 m 66 m 32 m 46 m 60 m 32 m 44 m 50 m 4,000 tr./y 46 m 60 m 66 m 36 m 50 m 62 m 36 m 46 m 54 m 50 tr./y - 22 m 50 m - 22 m 50 m - 22 m 50 m 100 tr./y 8 m 34 m 56 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 3 (100 m³/h) 500 tr./y 22 m 50 m 64 m 22 m 50 m 64 m 22 m 50 m 64 m 1,000 tr./y 34 m 56 m 66 m 34 m 56 m 66 m 34 m 56 m 66 m 2,000 tr./y 42 m 60 m 68 m 42 m 60 m 68 m 42 m 60 m 68 m 4,000 tr./y 50 m 64 m 70 m 50 m 62 m 70 m 50 m 62 m 70 m

92 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.48 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (no emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " hose -50 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -50 m³/h -with bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (manual emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " hose -50 m³/h - no bund 3" hose -50 m³/h - with bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

93 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.49 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (automatic emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] " hose -50 m³/h - no bund 3" hose -50 m³/h - with bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (no emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " hose -50 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -50 m³/h -with bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -no bund 3" hose -100 m³/h -with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

94 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.50 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (manual emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " hose - 50 m³/h -no bund 3" hose - 50 m³/h -with bund 3" hose m³/h - no bund 3" hose m³/h - with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with cold LNG via hoses (automatic emergency shutdown) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] " hose - 50 m³/h -no bund 3" hose - 50 m³/h -with bund 3" hose m³/h - no bund 3" hose m³/h - with bund Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the (un)loading of trucks with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) via flexible hoses. As previously stated, the impact of an emergency shutdown system on the individual risk arising from the (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C) is limited because warm LNG is released into the environment as a high momentum two-phase jet (vapour and droplets) for which the maximum size of the flammable cloud is quickly attained. It also follows from the calculations that the presence of a containment system has a negligible impact on the individual risk arising from the (un)loading of warm LNG (see Table III ).

95 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.51 Table III : Risk distances for LNG truck(un)loading via hoses at a rate of 50 and 100 m³/h with and without containment system (-138 C) Type of hose/arm and operating time Distance 10-5 /y Without containment system Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y With containment system Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 2 m 12 m 30 m 2 m 12 m 30 m 100 tr./y 6 m 16 m 34 m 6 m 16 m 34 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 12 m 30 m 42 m 12 m 30 m 42 m 1,000 tr./y 16 m 34 m 46 m 16 m 34 m 46 m 2,000 tr./y 24 m 38 m 54 m 24 m 38 m 52 m 4,000 tr./y 30 m 40 m 56 m 30 m 40 m 56 m 50 tr./y - 12 m 44 m - 12 m 44 m 100 tr./y 2 m 24 m 50 m 2 m 24 m 50 m 3 (100 m³/h) 500 tr./y 12 m 44 m 62 m 12 m 44 m 62 m 1,000 tr./y 24 m 50 m 72 m 24 m 50 m 72 m 2,000 tr./y 34 m 54 m 84 m 34 m 54 m 84 m 4,000 tr./y 42 m 60 m 88 m 42 m 60 m 88 m Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with warm LNG via hoses (-138 C) " hose -50 m³/h 3" hose -100 m³/h Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

96 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.52 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the (un)loading of trucks with warm LNG via hoses (-138 C) " hose - 50 m³/h 3" hose m³/h Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] GENERAL CONCLUSION For installations used to (un)load both cold LNG (-160 C) and warm LNG (-138 C), the greatest risk distances must be considered when establishing the necessary separation distances (see Tables III and III ). The distances in red are derived from calculations with warm LNG, those in black are from calculations with cold LNG. The tables show that the greatest risk distances for truck (un)loading are almost always obtained based on calculations performed for cold LNG. Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG trucks via hoses at an (un)loading location without containment system (-160 C to -138 C) (Un)loading rate and number of trucks Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 6 m 24 m 70 m 4 m 18 m 40 m 4 m 16 m 38 m 100 tr./y 12 m 38 m 78 m 8 m 26 m 46 m 8 m 24 m 40 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 24 m 70 m 88 m 18 m 40 m 70 m 16 m 38 m 48 m 1,000 tr./y 38 m 78 m 90 m 26 m 46 m 78 m 24 m 40 m 50 m 2,000 tr./y 56 m 82 m 92 m 32 m 56 m 84 m 32 m 44 m 66 m 4,000 tr./y 68 m 86 m 94 m 38 m 68 m 90 m 36 m 48 m 80 m 50 tr./y - 26 m 94 m - 22 m 54 m - 22 m 50 m 100 tr./y 8 m 52 m 104 m 4 m 36 m 62 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 3 (100 m³/h) 500 tr./y 26 m 94 m 122 m 22 m 54 m 96 m 22 m 50 m 66 m 1,000 tr./y 52 m 104 m 126 m 36 m 62 m 104 m 34 m 56 m 72 m 2,000 tr./y 76 m 112 m 130 m 44 m 76 m 114 m 44 m 60 m 84 m 4,000 tr./y 92 m 122 m 130 m 52 m 92 m 122 m 50 m 64 m 96 m

97 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.53 Table III : Risk distances for the (un)loading of LNG trucks via hoses at an (un)loading location with containment system (-160 C to -138 C) (Un)loading rate and number of trucks Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 6 m 22 m 48 m 4 m 18 m 38 m 4 m 16 m 38 m 100 tr./y 10 m 30 m 54 m 8 m 24 m 42 m 8 m 24 m 40 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 22 m 48 m 62 m 18 m 38 m 50 m 16 m 38 m 48 m 1,000 tr./y 30 m 54 m 64 m 24 m 42 m 56 m 24 m 40 m 50 m 2,000 tr./y 38 m 58 m 66 m 32 m 46 m 60 m 32 m 44 m 50 m 4,000 tr./y 46 m 60 m 66 m 36 m 50 m 62 m 36 m 46 m 56 m 50 tr./y - 22 m 50 m - 22 m 50 m - 22 m 50 m 100 tr./y 8 m 34 m 56 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 4 m 34 m 56 m 3 (100 m³/h) 500 tr./y 22 m 50 m 64 m 22 m 50 m 64 m 22 m 50 m 64 m 1,000 tr./y 34 m 56 m 72 m 34 m 56 m 72 m 34 m 56 m 72 m 2,000 tr./y 42 m 60 m 84 m 42 m 60 m 84 m 42 m 60 m 84 m 4,000 tr./y 50 m 64 m 88 m 50 m 62 m 88 m 50 m 62 m 88 m III Bunkering ships with LNG via hoses and arms Tables III to III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with the LNG bunkering of ships via fixed installations at bunkering stations and bunker terminals or via travelling bunker vessels (40). In the calculations, the bunkering rate and associated hose or arm diameters were varied from 50 m³/h (via 2 x 2 hoses/arms) to 3,000 m³/h (via 2 x 12 hoses/arms) and operating times of 250 to 2,000 hours per year are assumed 41. As regards the conditions of the bunkered LNG, calculations were once again made for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via flexible hoses. The table shows that the impact of a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system on the risk level of 10-5 /y is fairly limited. Only in case of high (un)loading rates (> 1,000 m³/h) the risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-5 /y is clearly reduced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system. By contrast, the risk distances to the individual risk of 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y are clearly positively influenced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system, for different release rates and different operating times of the hoses. Automatic implementation of the emergency shutdown system reduces the risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y only in case of bunkering at a high flow rate (> 1,000 m³/h) and a large operating time of the installation (> 1,000 h/y), compared with a manual emergency shutdown system. As regards the risk level of 10-7 /y, an automatic emergency shutdown system brings about a clear reduction in the risk distance compared with a manual system, for different bunkering rates and operating times of the installation. (40) (41) The results of the calculations (risk distances) are only valid for locations where ships are bunkered frequently (min. 250 h/y). The above-mentioned assumptions correspond to an annual LNG throughput of 12,5000 to 6,000,000 m³.

98 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.54 Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via hoses Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y 16 m 42 m 72 m 14 m 30 m 46 m 14 m 30 m 42 m 2x 2 (50 m³/h) 500 h/y 20 m 50 m 74 m 18 m 36 m 50 m 16 m 34 m 44 m 1,000 h/y 28 m 56 m 76 m 24 m 40 m 56 m 24 m 38 m 48 m 2,000 h/y 38 m 66 m 96 m 30 m 44 m 66 m 28 m 40 m 50 m 250 h/y 48 m 98 m 258 m 46 m 86 m 118 m 46 m 86 m 116 m 2x 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 60 m 134 m 260 m 60 m 98 m 134 m 60 m 98 m 118 m 1,000 h/y 72 m 170 m 262 m 72 m 108 m 170 m 72 m 104 m 120 m 2,000 h/y 86 m 256 m 264 m 84 m 118 m 256 m 82 m 114 m 120 m 250 h/y 64 m 136 m 348 m 60 m 118 m 160 m 60 m 118 m 154 m 2x 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 78 m 194 m 352 m 78 m 132 m 208 m 78 m 130 m 158 m 1,000 h/y 98 m 246 m 356 m 94 m 140 m 246 m 94 m 138 m 160 m 2,000 h/y 120 m 348 m 358 m 112 m 158 m 348 m 110 m 152 m 180 m 250 h/y 106 m 310 m 470 m 108 m 178 m 310 m 108 m 174 m 200 m 2x 10 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 148 m 404 m 476 m 128 m 196 m 404 m 128 m 182 m 212 m 1,000 h/y 188 m 462 m 478 m 154 m 206 m 462 m 150 m 198 m 252 m 2,000 h/y 266 m 468 m 480 m 172 m 280 m 468 m 168 m 200 m 296 m 250 h/y 126 m 390 m 546 m 126 m 214 m 390 m 126 m 208 m 228 m 2x 12 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 186 m 496 m 552 m 154 m 220 m 496 m 154 m 218 m 252 m 1,000 h/y 232 m 534 m 554 m 188 m 250 m 534 m 182 m 222 m 284 m 2,000 h/y 330 m 542 m 558 m 208 m 330 m 542 m 202 m 116 m 330 m Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (no emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading hoses 2x6" (un)loading hoses 2x8" (un)loading hoses 2x10" (un)loading hoses 2x12" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

99 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.55 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (manual emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading hoses 2x6" (un)loading hoses 2x8" (un)loading hoses 2x10" (un)loading hoses 2x12" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (no emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] x2" loading hoses 2x6" loading hoses 2x8" loading hoses 2x10" loading hoses 2x12" loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

100 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.56 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using hoses (manual emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distande to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] x2" loading hoses 2x6" loading hoses 2x8" loading hoses 2x10" loading hoses 2x12" loading hoses 100 Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the bunkering of LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via fixed arms. The table shows that the impact of a manual or automatic emergency shutdown system on the risk level of 10-5 /y and 10-6 /y is fairly limited. Only in case of high (un)loading rates ( 2,000 m³/h) and a large operating time of the hoses ( 1,000 h/y) is the risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y slightly reduced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system. By contrast, the risk distance to the individual risk of 10-7/y is clearly positively influenced by the presence of an emergency shutdown system, for different release rates and different operating times of the hoses. Automatic implementation of the emergency shutdown system has only a limited impact on the distance to the risk level of 10-7 /y compared with a manual emergency shutdown. Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via arms Type of hose and operating time Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h - 12 m 32 m - 10 m 26 m - 10 m 26 m 2x 2 (50 m³/h) 500 h 4 m 16 m 44 m 4 m 14 m 32 m 4 m 14 m 30 m 1,000 h 8 m 22 m 50 m 8 m 18 m 36 m 8 m 18 m 34 m 2,000 h 10 m 30 m 56 m 10 m 24 m 40 m 10 m 24 m 38 m 250 h - 36 m 78 m 2 m 32 m 76 m 2 m 32 m 76 m 2x 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h 12 m 50 m 104 m 10 m 48 m 88 m 10 m 48 m 88 m 1,000 h 20 m 62 m 142 m 20 m 62 m 100 m 20 m 62 m 98 m 2,000 h 30 m 74 m 188 m 28 m 74 m 110 m 28 m 74 m 106 m 250 h 4 m 48 m 106 m 4 m 44 m 102 m 4 m 44 m 100 m 2x 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h 16 m 66 m 146 m 14 m 64 m 120 m 14 m 64 m 120 m 1,000 h 24 m 80 m 206 m 24 m 80 m 134 m 24 m 80 m 132 m 2,000 h 40 m 102 m 262 m 38 m 96 m 144 m 38 m 96 m 140 m

101 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.57 Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h 12 m 90 m 216 m 10 m 90 m 164 m 10 m 90 m 162 m 2x 10 (2000 m³/h) 500 h 28 m 110 m 318 m 26 m 110 m 178 m 26 m 110 m 176 m 1,000 h 58 m 154 m 430 m 56 m 132 m 196 m 56 m 132 m 184 m 2,000 h 84 m 198 m 464 m 82 m 158 m 212 m 82 m 154 m 198 m 250 h 14 m 108 m 266 m 14 m 106 m 198 m 14 m 106 m 196 m 2x 12 (3000 m³/h) 500 h 32 m 130 m 398 m 32 m 130 m 216 m 32 m 130 m 212 m 1,000 h 70 m 192 m 524 m 68 m 158 m 222 m 66 m 156 m 218 m 2,000 h 100 m 246 m 536 m 98 m 192 m 254 m 98 m 188 m 222 m Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (no emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading arms 2x6" (un)loading arms 2x8" (un)loading arms 2x10" (un)loading arms 2x12" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

102 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.58 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (manual emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading arms 2x6" (un)loading arms 2x8" (un)loading arms 2x10" (un)loading arms 2x12" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (no emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] x2" loading arms 2x6" loading arms 2x8" loading arms 2x10" loading arms 2x12" loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

103 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.59 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of cold LNG using (un)loading arms (manual emergency shutdown, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] x2" loading arms 2x6" loading arms 2x8" loading arms 2x10" loading arms 2x12" loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the bunkering of ships with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) via flexible hoses and fixed arms. As previously stated, the impact of an emergency shutdown system on the individual risk arising from the (un)loading or bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C) is limited, because the maximum size of the flammable cloud is quickly reached in the event of an incidental release of warm LNG and the calculations assume a response time of 120 s for an emergency shutdown. Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C) Type of hose/arm Bunkering via flexible hoses Bunkering via fixed arms and operating time Distance 10-5 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 250 h 10 m 16 m 26 m - 8 m 14 m 2x 2 (50 m³/h) 500 h 10 m 20 m 30 m 2 m 10 m 16 m 1,000 h 12 m 20 m 32 m 4 m 10 m 20 m 2,000 h 16 m 24 m 34 m 6 m 12 m 20 m 250 h 26 m 50 m 120 m - 20 m 46 m 2x 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h 34 m 66 m 144 m 6 m 26 m 52 m 1,000 h 42 m 94 m 150 m 12 m 36 m 70 m 2,000 h 48 m 118 m 154 m 18 m 44 m 96 m 250 h 36 m 72 m 198 m - 26 m 64 m 2x 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h 48 m 108 m 234 m 8 m 38 m 74 m 1,000 h 60 m 150 m 242 m 16 m 50 m 122 m 2,000 h 70 m 182 m 244 m 24 m 62 m 156 m 250 h 72 m 198 m 382 m 4 m 56 m 116 m 2x 10 (2000 m³/h) 500 h 86 m 252 m 388 m 14 m 74 m 204 m 1,000 h 100 m 332 m 390 m 28 m 88 m 256 m 2,000 h 170 m 378 m 390 m 50 m 104 m 342 m

104 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.60 Type of hose/arm and operating time Distance 10-5 /y Bunkering via flexible hoses Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-5 /y Bunkering via fixed arms Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 250 h 86 m 252 m 504 m 10 m 70 m 154 m 2x 12 (3000 m³/h) 500 h 100 m 324 m 510 m 24 m 88 m 262 m 1,000 h 118 m 448 m 514 m 38 m 102 m 340 m 2,000 h 226 m 498 m 514 m 62 m 124 m 460 m Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using hoses (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading hoses 2x6" (un)loading hoses 2x8" (un)loading hoses 2x10" (un)loading hoses 2x12" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using hoses (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading hoses 2x6" (un)loading hoses 2x8" (un)loading hoses 2x10" (un)loading hoses 2x12" (un)loading hoses Annual LNG throughput [m³/y]

105 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.61 Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using arms (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] x2" (un)loading arms 2x6" (un)loading arms 2x8" (un)loading arms 2x10" (un)loading arms 2x12" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] Figure III : Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for the bunkering of warm LNG using arms (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] x2" (un)loading arms 2x6" (un)loading arms 2x8" (un)loading arms 2x10" (un)loading arms 2x12" (un)loading arms Annual LNG throughput [m³/y] GENERAL CONCLUSION If both cold LNG (-160 C) and warm LNG (-138 C) are bunkered at a given location, the greatest risk distances must be considered when establishing the necessary separation distances (see Tables III and III ). The distances in red are derived from calculations with warm LNG, those in black are from calculations with cold LNG. The tables show that the greatest risk distances for truck (un)loading are almost always obtained based on calculations performed for cold LNG.

106 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.62 Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of LNG via hoses (-160 to -138 C) Type of hose and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h/y 16 m 42 m 72 m 14 m 30 m 46 m 14 m 30 m 42 m 2x 2 (50 m³/h) 500 h/y 20 m 50 m 74 m 18 m 36 m 50 m 16 m 34 m 44 m 1,000 h/y 28 m 56 m 76 m 24 m 40 m 56 m 24 m 38 m 48 m 2,000 h/y 38 m 66 m 96 m 30 m 44 m 66 m 28 m 40 m 50 m 250 h/y 48 m 98 m 258 m 46 m 86 m 120 m 46 m 86 m 120 m 2x 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h/y 60 m 134 m 260 m 60 m 98 m 144 m 60 m 98 m 144 m 1,000 h/y 72 m 170 m 262 m 72 m 108 m 170 m 72 m 104 m 150 m 2,000 h/y 86 m 256 m 264 m 84 m 118 m 256 m 82 m 114 m 154 m 250 h/y 64 m 136 m 348 m 60 m 118 m 198 m 60 m 118 m 198 m 2x 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h/y 78 m 194 m 352 m 78 m 132 m 234 m 78 m 130 m 234 m 1,000 h/y 98 m 246 m 356 m 94 m 150 m 246 m 94 m 150 m 242 m 2,000 h/y 120 m 348 m 358 m 112 m 182 m 348 m 110 m 182 m 244 m 250 h/y 106 m 310 m 470 m 108 m 198 m 382 m 108 m 198 m 382 m 2x 10 (2000 m³/h) 500 h/y 148 m 404 m 476 m 128 m 252 m 404 m 128 m 252 m 388 m 1,000 h/y 188 m 462 m 478 m 154 m 332 m 462 m 150 m 332 m 390 m 2,000 h/y 266 m 468 m 480 m 172 m 378 m 468 m 168 m 378 m 390 m 250 h/y 126 m 390 m 546 m 126 m 252 m 504 m 126 m 252 m 504 m 2x 12 (3000 m³/h) 500 h/y 186 m 496 m 552 m 154 m 324 m 510 m 154 m 324 m 510 m 1,000 h/y 232 m 534 m 554 m 188 m 448 m 534 m 182 m 448 m 514 m 2,000 h/y 330 m 542 m 558 m 226 m 498 m 542 m 226 m 498 m 514 m Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of LNG via arms (-160 C to -138 C) Type of arm and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h - 12 m 32 m - 10 m 26 m - 10 m 26 m 2x 2 (50 m³/h) 500 h 4 m 16 m 44 m 4 m 14 m 32 m 4 m 14 m 30 m 1,000 h 8 m 22 m 50 m 8 m 18 m 36 m 8 m 18 m 34 m 2,000 h 10 m 30 m 56 m 10 m 24 m 40 m 10 m 24 m 38 m 250 h - 36 m 78 m 2 m 32 m 76 m 2 m 32 m 76 m 2x 6 (500 m³/h) 500 h 12 m 50 m 104 m 10 m 48 m 88 m 10 m 48 m 88 m 1,000 h 20 m 62 m 142 m 20 m 62 m 100 m 20 m 62 m 98 m 2,000 h 30 m 74 m 188 m 28 m 74 m 110 m 28 m 74 m 106 m 250 h 4 m 48 m 106 m 4 m 44 m 102 m 4 m 44 m 100 m 2x 8 (1000 m³/h) 500 h 16 m 66 m 146 m 14 m 64 m 120 m 14 m 64 m 120 m 1,000 h 24 m 80 m 206 m 24 m 80 m 134 m 24 m 80 m 132 m 2,000 h 40 m 102 m 262 m 38 m 96 m 156 m 38 m 96 m 156 m

107 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.63 Type of arm and operating time Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop Automatic emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 250 h 12 m 90 m 216 m 10 m 90 m 164 m 10 m 90 m 162 m 2x 10 (2000 m³/h) 500 h 28 m 110 m 318 m 26 m 110 m 204 m 26 m 110 m 204 m 1,000 h 58 m 154 m 430 m 56 m 132 m 256 m 56 m 132 m 256 m 2,000 h 84 m 198 m 464 m 82 m 158 m 342 m 82 m 154 m 342 m 250 h 14 m 108 m 266 m 14 m 106 m 198 m 14 m 106 m 196 m 2x 12 (3000 m³/h) 500 h 32 m 130 m 398 m 32 m 130 m 262 m 32 m 130 m 262 m 1,000 h 70 m 192 m 524 m 68 m 158 m 340 m 66 m 156 m 340 m 2,000 h 100 m 246 m 536 m 98 m 192 m 460 m 98 m 188 m 460 m III Bunkering ships via LNG trucks Tables III and III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with the LNG bunkering of ships using trucks. In the calculations, a bunkering rate of 50 m³/h via a 3 hose and an LNG throughput of 2,500 to 200,000 m³/year (50 to 4,000 trucks per year) at the same location are assumed. It is also assumed that there is no containment system at the truck location and that the truck driver can intervene using a manual emergency shutdown in the event of an incident. As regards the conditions of the bunkered LNG, calculations were once again performed for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the bunkering of LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) via trucks with and without a manually operated emergency shutdown system. The calculated risk distances correspond to those calculated for the loading/unloading of LNG trucks at a bunker terminal or bunkering station (see Table III ). Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C) via trucks (Un)loading rate and number of trucks Without emergency stop Manual emergency stop 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 6 m 24 m 70 m 4 m 18 m 40 m 100 tr./y 12 m 38 m 78 m 8 m 26 m 46 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 24 m 70 m 88 m 18 m 40 m 70 m 1,000 tr./y 38 m 78 m 90 m 26 m 46 m 78 m 2,000 tr./y 56 m 82 m 92 m 32 m 56 m 84 m 4,000 tr./y 68 m 86 m 94 m 38 m 68 m 90 m WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) via trucks. As previously stated, the impact of an emergency shutdown system on the individual risk arising from the (un)loading of warm LNG is limited, because the maximum size of the flammable cloud is quickly reached in the event of an incidental release of warm LNG.

108 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.64 Table III : Risk distances for the bunkering of warm LNG (-138 C) via trucks Type of hose/arm and operating time Distance 10-5 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 50 tr./y 2 m 12 m 30 m 100 tr./y 6 m 16 m 34 m 3 (50 m³/h) 500 tr./y 12 m 30 m 42 m 1,000 tr./y 16 m 34 m 46 m 2,000 tr./y 24 m 38 m 54 m 4,000 tr./y 30 m 40 m 56 m GENERAL CONCLUSION If both cold LNG (-160 C) and warm LNG (-138 C) can be bunkered at a given bunkering location or the conditions of the bunkered LNG are not known, the greatest risk distances must be considered when establishing the necessary separation distances. When bunkering ships via trucks (without a containment system), the greatest risk distances are always obtained for the bunkering of cold LNG (-160 C). III.3.6. Risk distances for liquefaction installations As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the external human risks associated with liquefaction units are assessed differently in this study. The reason for this is that liquefaction units are relatively complex installations, whose risks are difficult to determine generically. The risk arising from a medium-sized liquefaction unit (capacity of 40,000 to 300,000 tpa) is estimated based on the available safety reports and quantitative risk analyses of a similar production unit in Risavika (Stavanger), Norway. The risk posed by a small liquefaction unit (capacity of up to 20,000 tpa) is determined based on a simple but conservative risk assessment. III Medium-sized liquefaction units GENERAL The individual risk arising from medium-sized liquefaction units is estimated based on risk analyses that have been carried out for a Skangass LNG terminal at Risavika, Norway. Those studies are: Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1, Linde Engineering, August 2008 [28]. Energy Report - QRA for Skangass LNG plant, Train 1, Det Norske Veritas, May 2009 [29]. The LNG terminal in Risavika (Stanvanger) has a liquefaction unit with a production capacity of 300,000 tonnes of LNG per year. The unit uses Linde s LIMUM technology, which is based on a closed cycle with two-stage compression and mixed refrigerant. The mixed refrigerant consists inter alia of nitrogen, ethylene, propane, butane and pentane. The heat exchanges between the natural gas and the refrigerant mixture take place in a specially designed coil-wound heat exchanger (see Figure II ).

109 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.65 As well as the liquefaction unit, the LNG terminal in Risavika is also equipped with a 30,000-m³ atmospheric storage tank, a gas purification plant, a jetty at which LNG ships are loaded and a loading station for LNG trucks. Figure III gives an overview of the various installations on the terminal site. The liquefaction unit is shown in Figure III Figure III : Overview of the main installations on the LNG terminal site at Risavika, Norway Figure III : Liquefaction unit at the Skangass LNG terminal in Risavika, Norway RISK DISTANCES Most of the information about the individual risk generated by the terminal and more specifically the liquefaction unit is provided in the Linde Engineering report [28]. Appendix E of this report contains detailed results about the contribution of different installations and accident scenarios to the establishment s individual risk at 16 points in the vicinity of the terminal. Using these data, the individual risk arising from the terminal as a whole and specifically from the liquefaction unit can be determined as a

110 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.66 function of the distance to the centre of the liquefaction unit (see Table III ) (42). The locations at which the establishment s individual risk was analysed are shown in Figure III Table III : Contribution of the liquefaction unit to the total individual risk arising from the LNG terminal in Risavika, Norway [28] No. Distance to the centre of the liquefaction unit Individual risk of the whole terminal Individual risk of the liquefaction unit Percentage contribution of the liquefaction unit 1 0 m 2.90 x 10-3 /y 2.20 x 10-3 /y 75.9% 2 71 m 9.90 x 10-4 /y 5.05 x 10-4 /y 51.0% 3 88 m 6.20 x 10-4 /y 2.54 x 10-4 /y 41.0% 4 91 m 6.00 x 10-4 /y 2.40 x 10-4 /y 40.0% 5 92 m 8.20 x 10-4 /y 2.50 x 10-4 /y 30.5% 6 ( * ) 170 m 1.5 x 10-6 /y 1.52 x 10-6 /y 97.4% m 7.45 x 10-5 /y 5.03 x 10-5 /y 67.5% m 3.72 x 10-6 /y 2.25 x 10-6 /y 60.5% m 2.38 x 10-6 /y 1.81 x 10-6 /y 76.1% m 1.84 x 10-6 /y 1.09 x 10-6 /y 59.2% m 1.55 x 10-8 /y 9.30 x 10-9 /y 60.0% m 9.76 x /y 4.93 x /y 50.6% m 2.23 x 10-8 /y 1.78 x 10-8 /y 79.8% m 5.27 x /y 5.27 x /y 100% m 1.38 x /y 1.38 x /y 100% (* ) Point 6 is located on the peninsula to the northwest of the terminal, where the risk from the terminal is reduced by the presence of a rock wall between the terminal and the peninsula. Figure III : Locations at which the individual risk of the LNG terminal in Risavika was analysed (indicated by yellow dots) (42) The data from Table III and Figure III show that the individual risk arising from the liquefaction unit does not decrease evenly with the distance to the unit. This is particularly true of the risk at greater distances from the installations and is related to the probability of occurrence of a particular wind direction at a given location (wind rose). The individual risk will generally be greatest in the direction that coincides with the prevailing wind direction.

111 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.67 Figure III shows the individual risk arising from the liquefaction unit according to the distance to the centre of the unit. Based on the data in the figure, it can be deduced that a risk level of 1.0 x 10-5 /y, 1.0 x 10-6 /y and 1.0 x 10-7 /y is attained up to a distance of 340 m, 505 m and 670 m respectively from the installation. As regards the individual risk from the terminal as a whole, a risk level of 1.0 x 10-5 /y, 1.0 x 10-6 /y and 1.0 x 10-7 /y is attained up to a distance of 395 m, 560 m and 725 m respectively from the centre of the liquefaction installation Figure III : Individual risk from the liquefaction unit at the Skangass LNG terminal in Risavika (Norway), according to the distance to the centre of the installation 10-4 Localised human risk [/y] Distance to liquefaction unit [m] It should be noted that the above risk distances, which have been determined for a medium-sized liquefaction unit (capacity: 300, 000 tpa) in Risavika (Norway), must be considered as conservative risk distances for similar installations in Flanders. The reason for this is that the generic failure frequencies that were applied by Linde Engineering in the quantitative risk analysis for the Risavika terminal are higher than the generic failure frequencies imposed by the Flemish government (43). In the DNV report [29], only the individual risk of the terminal as a whole is shown. Depending on the direction in which the individual risk is determined, the risk level of 1.0 x 10-5 /y, 1.0 x 10-6 /y and 1.0 x 10-7 /y is attained between 115 and 390 m (1.0 x 10-5 /y), between 215 and 680 m (1.0 x 10-6 /y) and between 460 and 790 m (1.0 x 10-7 /y). These distances match the distances obtained in the Linde Engineering report. (43) The generic failure probability figures used by Linde Engineering in the QRA for the LNG terminal in Risavika (Norway) were calculated using DNV s LEAK 3.2 software. The LEAK data are based on the HSE failure frequencies for offshore installations, which are generally higher than the generic failure frequencies used in Flanders for onshore installations [18]. However, for process pressure vessels and pipelines, Linde Engineering adjusted the calculated failure frequencies in line with the failure frequencies given in the Purple Book [26]. Consequently, these failure frequencies correspond better to the failure frequencies used in Flanders.

112 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.68 III Small liquefaction units GENERAL The individual risk arising from small liquefaction units is estimated on the basis of a simple risk assessment for a small production unit with a capacity of approximately 20,000 tpa. The calculations are based on the description of a Gasnor liquefaction unit in Snurrevarden (Norway). Figure III shows an overview of the installations on the unmanned station site. The production process used is represented schematically in Figure III Figure III : Overview of the main installations belonging to the small Gasnor liquefaction unit at Snurrevarden, Norway LNG-storage (250 m³) Gas pretreatment Liquefaction unit (coldbox) Figure III : Process diagram of the Gasnor liquefaction unit at Snurrevarden (type: closed 1-stage N2 cycle) 50 bar N 2 refrigerationcycle gas supply (pipeline) > 120 bar gas pretreatment (removalof Hg, H 2 O, CO 2 ) LPG separator -30 C -110 C coldbox with three plate heat exchangers (precooler, liquefier, subcooler) LNG storage (250 m³) 1,5 bar -160 C The natural gas is transported to Snurrevarden from Kårstø via the Statpipe at a pressure of 120 to 150 bar. Upon arrival, the gas is dried and any traces of mercury are removed from the gas stream. The pressure of the gas is then reduced to around 50 bar and the gas is passed through a process column in which the CO 2 present in the gas is removed using molecular sieves. After that, the gas is sent to the actual liquefaction unit.

113 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.69 The liquefaction installation in Snurrevarden uses a closed 1-stage cycle with nitrogen refrigerant. The advantage of such a cycle is that the risk posed by the cooling cycle itself is very small due to the limited hazardous properties of the refrigerant. In the cooling cycle, nitrogen is first compressed and cooled to ambient temperature and then expanded in the turbine. The heavily cooled gas is then passed in counterflow with the natural gas through three plate heat exchangers, in which the natural gas is successively cooled (precooler), liquefied (liquefier) and finally further cooled in liquid form (subcooler). The heavier components are removed from the gas flow using a separator vessel located between the precooler and the liquefier. The production capacity of the installation is around 21,000 tpa, which corresponds to a throughflow rate of approximately 0.7 kg/s. The liquefied natural gas that leaves the liquefaction unit is stored in a 250-m³ vertical pressure tank and is transported from the site in trucks. RISK ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS The liquefaction unit components (including gas treatment) posing the greatest risk to people in the vicinity of the station and therefore included in the quantitative risk analysis are: the CO 2 adsorption column; the three plate heat exchangers (precooler, liquefier, subcooler) forming part of the liquefaction unit; the separator vessel for LPGs. The key specifications of the installations are summarised in Table III They were estimated based on a description of the installation by Hamworthy Gas Systems [30]. Table III : Specifications of the main installation components of a small liquefaction unit (cf. production unit at Snurrevarden, Norway) Installation Installation type Volume Product type Operating conditions component CO2 adsorption column process pressure vessel 20 m³ gaseous natural gas 20 C, 50 bar Precooler plate heat exchanger 0.1 m³ gaseous natural gas 20 to -30 C, 50 bar Liquefier plate heat exchanger 0.3 m³ liquefied natural gas -110 C, 50 bar Subcooler plate heat exchanger 0.1 m³ liquefied natural gas -160 C, 1,5 bar LPG separator vessel process pressure vessel 0.5 m³ liquefied LPGs -30 C, 50 bar As regards the types of failure affecting the installations, the risk analysis is based on generic types of failure as set out in the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 published by the Flemish government s Safety Reporting Division [18]. Table III gives an overview of the generic types of failure and the associated failure frequencies that were considered for the installation types examined. Table III : Generic types of failure for installations used in the storage, transfer and distribution of LNG [18] Installation type Generic failure types Generic failure frequencies Process pressure vessel Catastrophic rupture Outflow of entire content in 10 minutes Large leak (i.e. rupture of largest connection) Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) /tank.year /tank.year /tank.year /tank.year /tank.year

114 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.70 Installation type Generic failure types Generic failure frequencies Plate heat exchanger (pressure > 8 bar) Catastrophic rupture Medium leak ( leak = 25 mm) Small leak ( leak = 10 mm) /heat exchanger.year /heat exchanger.year /heat exchanger.year The calculated release rates for the above types of failure of the installations examined are shown in Table III The possible accident scenarios that could occur after a release of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the liquefaction unit are discussed in section III The possible accident scenarios that occur after a continuous release of gaseous natural gas from the CO 2 adsorption column or the precooler are a jet fire (following direct or delayed ignition of the outflowing gas) and a flash fire (following delayed ignition of the outflowing gas). In the event of a catastrophic rupture of the installation, the possibility of a physical explosion and a fire ball are also considered. As regards the probability of ignition of natural gas and LNG, the generic ignition probabilities for low-reactivity gases from Table 15 of the Handbook for Failure Frequencies [18] are used. These are shown in Table III Table III : Calculated outflow rates for the representative types of failure of the installation components examined Installation Failure type Release rate [kg/s] or released mass [kg] Rupture 721 kg kg/s (1,800 s) CO2 adsorption column Large leak 14.2 kg/s (1,800 s) Medium leak 3.55 kg/s (1,800 s) Small leak 0.60 kg/s (1,800 s) Rupture 14.7 kg/s (1,800 s) Precooler Medium leak 8.1 kg/s (1,800 s) Small leak 0.66 kg/s (1,800 s) Rupture 50 kg kg/s (1,800 s) Liquefier Medium leak 9.2 kg/s (1,800 s) Small leak 1.62 kg/s (1,800 s) Rupture 45 kg kg/s (1,800 s) Subcooler Medium leak 1.05 kg/s (1,800 s) Small leak 0.3 kg/s (1,800 s) LPG separator vessel Rupture 138 kg kg/s (1,800 s) Leaks 0.6 kg/s (1,800 s) The effects of the different accident scenarios are ultimately determined using the models discussed in sections III and III An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for the representative accidents studied for a small liquefaction unit is given in Annex 4, Table 9. RISK DISTANCES Table III shows the calculated distances to an individual risk level of 10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y for a small liquefaction unit with a capacity of around 20,000 tpa. The risk distances were determined for the CO 2 adsorption column used for gas pretreatment and for the actual liquefaction installation.

115 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.71 Table III : Calculated risk distances for a small liquefaction unit with a maximum production capacity of 20,000 tpa Installation component 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y Gas pretreatment (CO2 adsorber) - 45 m 85 m Liquefaction unit (cold box and LPG separator) 36 m 50 m 70 m

116 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.72 III.4. Quantitative risk analysis of LNG road transport In this part of the study, the risks associated with the transport of LNG by truck are investigated. Firstly, an overview is given of a number of reported accidents involving LNG trucks. Next, the representative accident scenarios for LNG trucks on the road are established. The effects associated with these accidents and the probabilities of occurrence of the selected accidents are determined. Finally, the external human risk arising from LNG road transport is calculated and represented in the form of risk distances for the individual risk. III.4.1. Overview of historical incidents Annex 2 contains an overview of a number of accidents that have taken place involving LNG road transport by truck (between 1971 and 2009). Of the 21 reported accidents described in Annex 2, six resulted in a release of LNG from the truck. One accident resulted in an explosion of the truck (BLEVE) and another one in a small LNG fire. It should also be noted that, to date, not a single person except for the truck driver has been killed or seriously injured as the result of a road accident involving an LNG truck. The most serious accident during road transportation of LNG took place in Tivissa (Spain) in The Journal of Loss Prevention reported that the LNG truck lost control on a downhill section of the road and subsequently turned over. Immediately after the accident, a fire broke out which was fed by leaking diesel from the truck s fuel tanks and possibly by LNG leaking from the safety valves or a broken appendage on the tank. Around 20 minutes after the accident, the truck exploded and ignition of the instantaneously released LNG caused a fire ball. The driver of the truck was killed. Two other people in the vicinity of the accident sustained burns. It should be noted that the truck s design played an important role in the development of the accident. The truck in question featured a single-walled pressure tank made of stainless steel (6 mm thick), covered with a polyurethane insulation layer (130 mm thick) kept in place by a light aluminium shell (2 mm thick). The overturning of the truck and the subsequent fire damaged the protective shell, such that the tank lost part of its insulation. Direct contact with the flames rapidly increased the temperature and pressure in the LNG tank, which ultimately triggered a BLEVE of the tank. LNG trucks with a double-walled vacuum-insulated pressure tank generally have a much greater resistance to impact and fire because the secondary wall of a vacuum-insulated tank is designed as a second full-strength carbon-steel containment having the same wall tickness as the primary tank. If the outer tank wall remains intact during the incident, the primary tank is extremely well protected from the heat of the nearby fire and the risk of a BLEVE is greatly reduced. III.4.2. Representative accident scenarios If an LNG truck is involved in a serious road accident, two situations can arise that potentially pose a relevant risk to persons present in the vicinity of the accident. The first

117 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.73 situation involves a relevant release of LNG (>100 kg) from the truck. The second is the presence of an engulfing fire (44) around the LNG truck. Aside from traffic accidents, other factors can cause the release of LNG from a truck (e.g. corrosion and inherent defects in the tank or appendages). However, the likelihood of a serious accident occurring during road transport as the result of such factors is negligible compared with the probability of a serious accident caused by a traffic accident, given the truck s brief presence at any location on the route (45). III Failure types or release scenarios In this risk analysis, accidents entailing a relevant release of LNG (>100 kg) are modelled as an instantaneous release of the entire content or as a continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 50 mm, in accordance with the Dutch calculation protocol for the risks of transporting hazardous substances [31]. In addition to these representative release scenarios, the scenario of the explosive rupture of the truck as the result of exposure to an engulfing fire (thermally induced BLEVE) is also examined. III Incident outcomes in the event of a release The incident outcomes that could occur after an instantaneous or continuous release of LNG from a truck are the same as those that could occur following the release of LNG from a stationary pressure tank (see section III.3.2.2). Direct ignition of the released LNG results in the occurrence of a pool fire or a jet fire depending on the temperature of the LNG in the truck. Delayed ignition of the flammable cloud that can form in the vicinity of the LNG leak results in the occurrence of a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion, followed by a pool fire or jet fire at the source. Regarding the scenario of a vapour cloud explosion, it should be noted that this scenario can only occur if the combustion of the flammable gas cloud happens fast enough. The speed of the combustion process in a vapour cloud is determined by the reactivity of the flammable gas and the nature of the environment in which the flammable cloud is formed (46).Given the low reactivity of natural gas (low combustion speed) and the generic character of this risk analysis in which the nature of the external environment is not known, in this study no account is taken of the occurrence of a vapour cloud explosion following an incidental release from an LNG truck. (44) (45) (46) An engulfing fire might be caused, for example, by the rupturing of the fuel tanks of the vehicles involved in the accident. Assuming a generic failure probability for a pressure truck of 2.84 x 10-6 /y (rupture, large and medium leak) [18] and a residence time of 72 seconds per km (average speed of 50 km/h), we obtain a probability of release that is 400 to 800 times lower than the probability of release as the result of a traffic accident (see section III.4.4). The combustion speed is greatest in environments with a high obstacle density. In such environments, combustion is promoted by the turbulence that occurs behind the obstacles as the flame front passes. Also, if the vapour cloud is subject to a certain degree of confinement (e.g. release of LNG in a tunnel), the free expansion of the hot combustion products is hindered and overpressures can occur in the surrounding area.

118 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.74 III Scenario of a thermally induced BLEVE In the event that the LNG truck s pressure tank remains intact and the truck is exposed to an engulfing fire, a dangerous situation may still arise since the fire may cause the temperature of the LNG in the truck and the associated pressure in the truck to rise. This combined with a weakening of the metal tank wall due to a sharp increase in its temperature can result in an explosive rupture of the pressure tank (BLEVE). The fire will also trigger the igniting of the released flammable product, meaning that the explosion is accompanied by a large fire ball. A general overview of all representative accident scenarios that could occur after a transport-related accident involving an LNG truck is given in Figure III The probabilities indicated in the figure are further explained in section III.4.4.

119 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.75 Figure III : Event tree for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport

120 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.76 III.4.3. Impact study The impact study investigates the distance and the extent to which representative accidents result in the occurrence of lethal effects at the accident location. The following methodology is adopted: Firstly, the physical effects of the different accident scenarios (namely the incident thermal radiation, the size of the flammable cloud and the overpressure resulting from an explosion) are determined using methodologies and models that are generally accepted in the context of external risk analysis. Then, the consequences of these effects on unprotected persons in the vicinity are estimated using damage functions and criteria imposed by the relevant Flemish government department (SR Division). The calculation models and damage functions used in this stage of the analysis are the same as those described in sections III and III of this study. III Results of the impact calculation GENERAL In this part of the study, risk distances are calculated for the transport of LNG by road using trucks. With regard to the characteristics of the LNG trucks used for the transportation, which could possibly influence the results of the risk assessment, this study works with representative generic values (see Table III ). Regarding the conditions of the LNG in the truck during transport, calculations were performed for a) LNG at near-atmospheric pressure and a temperature of -160 C (cold LNG) and b) LNG at a pressure of 4 barg and a temperature of -138 C (warm LNG). Table III : Key characteristics of a representative LNG truck Truck characteristic Assumption in the risk analysis Volume 50 m³ Degree of filling Maximum connection diameter Design pressure (test pressure) Safety valve set pressure max. 90% (approx. 19 tonnes of LNG) 4 (100 mm) min. 6 barg (9 barg) typically 6 barg RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failures for LNG trucks driving on the public highway are given in section III A leak on the truck with a representative diameter of 50 mm results in an outflow rate of 6.3 kg/s at a storage temperature of -160 C (cold LNG) and 21.4 kg/s at a storage temperature of -138 C (warm LNG). At a temperature of -160 C, the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid. By contrast, at a temperature of -138 C the LNG will flow out as a two-phase jet with a vapour fraction of around 17%. A rupture of the truck results in the release of 19 tonnes of LNG, which is the entire contents of the truck. INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible accident scenarios that could occur after the failure of the truck on the public highway are shown in Figure III Direct ignition of the released LNG results in the occurrence of a pool fire (in the case of cold LNG) or a jet fire

121 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.77 (in the case of warm LNG). Delayed ignition of the flammable cloud that can form in the vicinity of the LNG leak results in the occurrence of a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion, followed by a pool fire or jet fire at the source. The maximum size of the LNG pool that could form in the event of an incidental release from a truck is determined by the nature of the release (rupture or leak) and by the available space at the accident location. For a motorway or a regional road with at least 2 x 2 lanes, this study assumes a maximum pool surface area of 1,500 m² [26]. For a regional road with one lane in each direction, it is assumed that the maximum pool surface area is limited to 750 m². Tables III and III show the calculated maximum pool surface areas for the different release scenarios and road types. Table III : Maximum pool surface area in the event of an incidental release of cold LNG (-160 C) on the public highway Installation Failure type Direct ignition Delayed ignition Motorway or regional road with 2 x 2 lanes Regional road with 2 x 1 lanes Rupture 1,500 m² ( = 43.7 m) 1,500 m² ( = 43.7 m) Leak (50 mm) 63 m² ( = 9.0 m) 414 m² ( = 23.0 m) Rupture 750 m² ( = 10.3 m) 750 m² ( = 26.3 m) Leak (50 mm) 63 m² ( = 9.0 m) 394 m² ( = 22.4 m) Table III : Maximum pool surface area in the event of an incidental release of warm LNG (-138 C) on the public highway Installation Failure type Direct ignition Delayed ignition Motorway or regional road with 2 x 2 lanes Regional road with 2 x 1 lanes Rupture 1,500 m² ( = 43.7 m) 1,500 m² ( = 43.7 m) Leak (50 mm) 63 m² ( = 9.0 m) 152 m² ( = 13.9 m) Rupture 750 m² ( = 10.3 m) 750 m² ( = 26.3 m) Leak (50 mm) 63 m² ( = 9.0 m) 133 m² ( = 13.0 m) MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III of this study. An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport is given in Annex 5. III.4.4. Probability study For the scenario of a thermally induced BLEVE, a probability of occurrence per km is determined in section III For the other accident scenarios, the probability of a traffic accident per km is first deduced (section III.4.4.1), then the probability of a relevant LNG release in the event of a traffic accident (section III.4.4.2) and finally the outcome probability in the event of an LNG release (section III.4.4.3). The probabilities must be combined in order to determine the probability of occurrence of the representative accidents shown in Figure III

122 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.78 III Accident frequencies The probability of occurrence of a serious traffic accident involving an LNG truck is determined based on the statistics for injury accidents (47) involving heavy goods vehicles (HGVs), in accordance with the calculation protocol used in the Netherlands [31]. If the statistical basis allows, distinctions can also be made according to the nature of the road or the road type. For Belgium, the necessary data are obtained from the accident database of the Policy Research Centre for Traffic Safety. Table III shows the probability of occurrence of an injury accident per vehicle-kilometre, in which at least one HGV is involved. Table III : Frequency of injury accidents involving HGVs in Belgium (2006 data) Road type Overall accident frequency (all road types) Accident frequency on motorways Accident frequency on other roads outside built-up areas (regional or municipal roads) Probability of an injury accident 3.0 x 10-7 /vehkm 1.6 x 10-7 /vehkm 5.3 x 10-7 /vehkm INFLUENCE OF LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES The accident frequencies shown in the above table are average frequencies derived from historical statistics for accidents involving HGVs across the entire Belgian road network. At specific locations within the road network (such as difficult junctions on regional roads or junction complexes on motorways) the accident frequencies recorded may be significantly higher than the average accident frequencies shown above. However, given the generic nature of this study (the transport routes are not yet known), the risk analysis cannot take into account increased accident frequencies at such hot spots. INFLUENCE OF DRIVERS The experience, training and driving style of the truck driver also affects the probability of an LNG truck being involved in a traffic accident [32,33]. Given the generic nature of this study (driver experience and training cannot yet be estimated), the present risk analysis cannot take this factor into account. III Release probabilities GENERAL In a traffic accident involving a truck, the probability of occurrence of a relevant release from the truck (>100 kg) is determined by the road type and the vehicle type. The probability of the product being released is lower for a truck with a pressure tank (pressure truck) than for a truck with an atmospheric tank (atmospheric truck). Furthermore, the probability of release is greater for accidents on motorways than for accidents on regional or municipal roads, due to the higher vehicle speed. Table III shows the probability of a relevant release in the event of a traffic accident, as featured in the Dutch calculation protocol for the transportation of hazardous substances, RBM II [31]. (47) An injury accident (letselongeval) is an accident between two or more road users on the public highway which results in physical injury. There may be more than one casualty. The term injury accident is frequently used in accident statistics, which means that the information can be easily requested.

123 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.79 Table III : Probability of a release from a truck in the event of a traffic accident Road type Pressure truck Probability of release (> 100 kg) Atmospheric truck Motorway 5.2% 10.1% Other roads outside built-up areas 3.4% 7.7% Other roads inside built-up areas 0.6% 2.1% For LNG road transport, this study uses the release probabilities for pressure trucks, in accordance with the ADR classification of LNG trucks. INFLUENCE OF TRUCK DESIGN LNG trucks which want to load at the Zeebrugge LNG terminal must go through the LNG Truck Approval Procedure before being admitted to the LNG terminal. Among other things, the Approval Procedure includes a number of conditions relating to the construction of the truck which affect its vulnerability in the event of a traffic accident. More specifically, those requirements are: LNG trucks must have a double-walled vacuum-insulated LNG tank; the outer tank wall must demonstrate a certain resistance to the impact of collision or overturning (in accordance with the required safety impact study); the outer tank wall must be able to resist temperatures of up to 700 C or higher. If the truck meets the above conditions, a further reduction of failure frequency with a factor 10 is justifiable, according to the risk analyses carried out for LNG road transport on the territory of the city of Bruges [33]. SIZE OF THE RELEASE Regarding the size of the release, this risk analysis once again applies the guidelines contained in the Dutch calculation protocol RBM II. This assigns values of 10.5% and 19.5% respectively to the probability of an instantaneous release and the probability of a leak ( = 50 mm). For the remaining 70% of releases, the release rate is assumed to be so low that no life-threatening situation will arise for external persons. III Outcome probabilities The outcome probabilities in the event of an LNG release are limited to the occurrence or otherwise of ignition. For natural gas and LNG, standard ignition probabilities are set out in Table 15 of the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 (group 0 low reactivity) [18]. These ignition probabilities are used in Flemish safety reports for the ignition of flammable liquids or gases that are incidentally released within demarcated establishments, where measures have normally already been taken to prevent ignition. For an incidental release of LNG as the result of a traffic accident involving an LNG truck on the public highway, higher probabilities of ignition are applied in this study. The probability of direct ignition is deemed to be greater under the circumstances in question due to sparks that may form if the LNG truck overturns or impacts another vehicle or object. The probability of delayed ignition is also rated more highly due to the possible presence of multiple vehicles (with engines running) in the vicinity of the accident.

124 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.80 The ignition probabilities used in this study for the transport of LNG by road are shown in Table III These probabilities are derived from American accident history for LPG road transport (48) [34]. Table III : Ignition probabilities for incidental releases of LNG during road transport Scenario Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 This study Direct ignition Delayed ignition Direct ignition Delayed ignition Rupture 9% 9% 40% 48% Hole ( = 2 ) 2% 2% 10% 4.5% III Probability of a thermally induced BLEVE (hot BLEVE) The probability of a truck experiencing a thermally induced BLEVE resulting from an accident on the public highway is to a large extent determined by the speed at which the temperature and pressure in the truck can rise and the speed at which the (primary) tank wall can heat up and weaken. The construction of the pressure tank and more specifically the thermal and mechanical fire-resistance of the outer tank wall is a decisive factor in this connection. The longer it takes for the tank to fail, the greater the probability of a successful intervention and the lower the BLEVE risk. In this respect, a vacuum-insulated truck offers a very good protection against the occurrence of a BLEVE. This is because the presence of a full-strength second tank wall (i.e. outer tank) made of carbon steel or stainless steel capable of resisting temperatures of up to 700 C or higher ensures that the primary tank wall (i.e. inner tank) is excellently protected from the heat of the fire. Moreover, a double tank wall separated by a vacuum atmosphere or air (49) has excellent insulating properties, which means that the LNG in the truck s inner tank will only heat up very slowly when the truck is exposed to an external fire. The protection that a vacuum-insulated truck (with carbon steel or stainless steel outer tank) offers against the occurrence of a thermally induced BLEVE is therefore deemed to be at least equivalent to the passive protection offered by a heat-insulating coating (50) applied to a truck s pressure tank. Consequently, in accordance with the case studies for such trucks, a probability of 2.7 x /vehkm may be used for the scenario of a thermally induced BLEVE [35,36]. For LNG trucks with a single-walled pressure tank insulated with polyurethane foam and surrounded by a protective shell made from light material (i.e. a conventional pressure truck), the probability of a BLEVE is estimated arbitrarily at ten times higher. III.4.5. Calculated risk distances Tables III and III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with LNG road transport by truck. The calculations have been performed for (48) (49) (50) Given that LPG clouds in the event of a release are bigger than LNG clouds and that LPG clouds ignite more easily than LNG clouds, the ignition probabilities used are considered as conservative. If the outer tank wall has been damaged in a traffic accident, the vacuum atmosphere between the primary and secondary tank walls may not be preserved. The heat-insulating coating referred to in the text is a hard epoxy coating or a fibreglass composite coating applied to the pressure tanks of trucks (including LPG trucks), which delays the scenario of a truck BLEVE by at least 75 minutes assuming that the coating on the truck is still intact.

125 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.81 two different types of truck (single-walled pressure trucks with a polyurethane foam insulation layer and double-walled vacuum-insulated trucks). In addition, the risk distances were calculated for the transport of LNG on motorways, regional roads with one lane in each direction and regional roads with two lanes in each direction. As regards the conditions of the LNG in the truck, calculations were performed for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the road transport of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) in single-walled and double-walled trucks. The greatest risk distances are obtained for LNG transport in single-walled trucks on regional roads with several lanes in each direction. The smallest risk distances are obtained for LNG transport in double-walled vacuum-insulated trucks on motorways. Table III.4.5.1: Risk distances for the road transport of cold LNG (-160 C) Road type and number of transports Trucks with single-walled pressure tank Double-walled vacuum-insulated trucks Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 100 tr./y tr./y motorway 1,000 tr./y - 62 m - - 2,000 tr./y - 88 m - - 4,000 tr./y m - - 8,000 tr./y 50 m 120 m - 50 m 100 tr./y tr./y - 38 m - - regional road with 1 lane in each direction 1,000 tr./y - 60 m - - 2,000 tr./y - 76 m - - 4,000 tr./y 22 m 88 m - 22 m 8,000 tr./y 56 m 96 m - 56 m 100 tr./y tr./y - 64 m - - regional road with 2 lanes in each direction 1,000 tr./y - 88 m - - 2,000 tr./y m - - 4,000 tr./y 52 m 118 m - 52 m 8,000 tr./y 80 m 130 m - 80 m

126 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.82 Figure III.4.5.1: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y] Figure III.4.5.2: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y]

127 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.83 Figure III.4.5.3: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in vacuum-insulated pressure trucks (cold LNG, -160 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y] WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the road transport of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). Once again, the greatest risk distances are obtained for LNG transport in single-walled trucks on regional roads with several lanes in each direction. The smallest risk distances are obtained for LNG transport in vacuuminsulated trucks on motorways. Table III.4.5.2: Risk distances for the road transport of warm LNG (-138 C) Road type and number of transports Trucks with single-walled pressure tank Vacuum-insulated trucks Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 100 trucks/y trucks/y - 42 m - - motorway 1,000 trucks/y - 82 m - - 2,000 trucks/y m - - 4,000 trucks/y 14 m 122 m - 14 m 8,000 trucks/y 74 m 144 m - 74 m 100 trucks/y trucks/y - 72 m - - regional road 1 lane in each direction 1,000 trucks/y - 92 m - - 2,000 trucks/y m - - 4,000 trucks/y 62 m 122 m - 62 m 8,000 trucks/y 88 m 134 m - 88 m

128 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.84 Road type and number of transports Trucks with single-walled pressure tank Vacuum-insulated trucks Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y Distance 10-6 /y Distance 10-7 /y 100 trucks/y trucks/y - 84 m - - regional road with 2 lanes in each direction 1,000 trucks/y m - - 2,000 trucks/y 22 m 122 m - 22 m 4,000 trucks/y 76 m 144 m - 76 m 8,000 trucks/y 98 m 166 m - 98 m Figure III.4.5.4: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-6 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-6/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y] Figure III.4.5.5: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in single-walled pressure trucks (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y]

129 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.85 Figure III.4.5.6: Risk distance to an individual risk level of 10-7 /y for LNG transport in vacuum-insulated pressure trucks (-138 C) Distance to a risk level of 10-7/y [m] motorway regional road (2x1 lane) regional road (2x2 lanes) Annual number of LNG road transports [/y] GENERAL CONCLUSION If the conditions of the LNG in the truck during transportation are not known, the greatest risk distances must be applied in order to limit the maximum number of LNG road transports on a particular route from the perspective of external safety. Accordingly, based on the calculations performed, the risk distances calculated for the transport of warm LNG (-138 C) appear to be representative (see Table III and Figures III to III.4.5.6).

130 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.86 III.5. Quantitative risk analysis of LNG ship transport In this final part of the study, the risks associated with the presence of LNG ships in a port are investigated. Firstly, an overview is given of a number of reported accidents involving LNG ships (section III.5.1). Next, the representative accident scenarios for berthed and moving LNG ships in the port are established (section III.5.2). The effects associated with these accidents (section III.5.3) and the probabilities of occurrence of the selected accidents (section III.5.4) are determined. Finally, the external human risk posed by LNG ships in a port is calculated and represented in the form of risk distances for the individual risk (section III.5.5). III.5.1. Overview of historic incidents International LNG shipping has an excellent safety record. Over a period of more than 40 years during which more than 30,000 shipments were made, only 55 incidents were reported. Moreover, not a single incident has resulted in a serious accident involving a large LNG release or a fatality. Based on the accident history for LNG shipping (see Annex 2), the following types of incident can be distinguished: Incidents during LNG (un)loading at a quay/jetty (17 incidents) Collisions in port or at a quay/jetty (7 incidents) Ship collisions at sea (6 incidents) Grounding of vessel during navigation (9 incidents) Cargo system defects (4 incidents) Fires caused by lightning strikes (4 incidents) Propulsion problems or drifting (10 incidents) INCIDENTS DURING (UN)LOADING Over a period of more than 40 years, 17 incidents were reported related to the loading or unloading of LNG ships at a jetty or quay. Thirteen of the 17 incidents resulted in a small release of LNG. The principal causes of LNG release were: overfilling of a cargo tank, leaking valves or flanges on the ship, the breaking-off of (un)loading arms caused by drifting of the vessel, and premature disconnection of the (un)loading arms. COLLISIONS IN PORT OR AT A QUAY/JETTY A total of seven incidents were reported relating to nautical accidents in ports or at quays or jetties. Two of the seven reported incidents involved impacts to an LNG ship while berthed at a quay or jetty. Two incidents occurred while manoeuvring the vessel to the jetty. The other three took place while the ship was navigating inside the port: one involved a collision with another vessel and two were collisions with a fixed object (crane and dolphin). Not one of the reported accidents resulted in a release of LNG from the ship s cargo tanks. SHIP COLLISIONS AT SEA Over a period of more than 40 years, six ship collisions at sea were reported in which an LNG vessel was involved. Not one of the reported accidents resulted in a release of LNG from the ship s cargo tanks.

131 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.87 GROUNDINGS A total of nine incidents were reported in which an LNG ship ran aground in a port (at least three incidents) or out at sea (at least four incidents). LNG was not released in any of the incidents reported. CARGO SYSTEM DEFECTS Over a 40-year period, four incidents were reported involving a defect (leak) in the cargo system of an LNG ship. Two of the four incidents were caused by the sloshing of small quantities of LNG in a cargo tank, resulting in LNG entering the space between the primary and secondary tank wall. FIRES CAUSED BY LIGHTNING STRIKES There were four reported incidents involving a ship being struck by lightning. Three of these took place while the vessel was berthed in a port, and one occurred at sea. In all cases, the lightning strike resulted in a small fire around the discharge pipe for boil-off gases. In none of the reported incidents was LNG released. PROPULSION PROBLEMS There were 10 reported incidents in which a ship drifted as the result of an engine defect or damage to the rudder. In five of the 10 cases, the ship was towed safely to a port and in four cases the necessary repairs were carried out at sea. One incident occurred while the ship was being manoeuvred to the jetty. The ship struck the jetty, but the cargo tanks were not damaged. III.5.2. Representative accident scenarios GENERAL When defining representative accident scenarios for LNG ships in a port, a distinction is made between accidents that could occur while the ship is navigating in the port and those that could occur at the vessel s berthing location. The analysis also distinguishes between accidents that are attributable to a nautical incident (e.g. collision between ships, or contact between the ship and a fixed object) and accidents that are caused by inherent defects in the ship s cargo system while the vessel is navigating or while it is at a jetty (e.g. material defects). ACCIDENTS AT THE QUAY/JETTY Based on the accident history, it is concluded that potential incidents involving LNG ships berthed at a quay or jetty relate mainly to the (un)loading or bunkering activities that are performed at the location in question (see sections III and III.3.5.5). An inherent defect or the impacting of the berthed ship by another passing vessel (ramming) can also result in an incidental release of LNG from the ship s cargo system. The external human risks arising from such accidents are examined in this part of the generic risk analysis. An incidental contact between the LNG ship and a fixed object while manoeuvring the ship to or away from the quay or jetty can also cause damage to the vessel. However, a release of LNG from the ship s cargo system under these circumstances is very unlikely given the low manoeuvring speed and robust construction of LNG ships. This scenario is therefore not considered in the subsequent risk analysis. ACCIDENTS DURING NAVIGATION Given the short length of time that a moving ship is present at a particular location in a port (residence time), the probability of a release

132 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.88 caused by an inherent defect in the ship s cargo system is negligible compared with the probability of a release caused by a nautical accident (51). In view of this, the accidents taken into consideration for navigating LNG ships relate solely to external impacts (nautical accidents). More specifically, these are: a collision with another vessel on the waterway; a collision between the ship and a fixed object on the waterway; a collision between the ship and a berthed vessel along the waterway; the ship running aground in the port. The occurrence of an incidental release of LNG from the ship s cargo tanks as the result of the ship running aground in port is considered highly unlikely, given the low speed at which LNG ships navigate inside ports, the soft bottom of waterways in Flemish ports and the robust construction of LNG ships. CONCLUSION Based on the above discussion of possible accidents involving berthed or navigating LNG ships in a port, the following representative accident scenarios are selected for determining the external human risk: impacting of an LNG ship while berthed at a quay or jetty; inherent defect in an LNG ship while berthed at a quay or jetty; collision between an LNG ship and another vessel during navigation; collision between an LNG ship and a fixed object on the waterway; collision between an LNG ship and a berthed vessel along the waterway. III Failure types or release scenarios The leaks that could potentially arise in an LNG ship s cargo tank as the result of the selected accident scenarios cover the entire spectrum from small punctures to large holes through which the entire content of a tank is released almost instantaneously. Given the generic character of the risk analysis in which the key characteristics of the waterway are not known (traffic intensity, transit speed, energy spectrum of the vessels on the waterway, width of the waterway, number of objects on the waterway, etc.), the representative release scenarios in this study are established based on the available literature [26,37]. IMPACTING OF A SHIP AT A QUAY/JETTY For the scenario whereby an LNG ship is impacted while berthed at an unprotected jetty or quay, TNO defines two representative release scenarios [26]: a large leak whereby, in the case of a gas carrier, 126 to 180 m³ of product is released in a period of 30 minutes; a small leak whereby, in the case of a gas carrier, 32 to 90 m³ of product is released in a period of 30 minutes. (51) Depending on the number of cargo tanks the ship has, the probability of an inherent defect in the cargo system is estimated at between 1.5 x 10-5 and 6 x 10-5 /year [18]. Assuming an in-port navigating speed of 8 knots and an associated residence time of 7.7 x 10-6 years per kilometre, one obtains a probability of release of between 1.2 x and 4.6 x /vehkm. By contrast, the probability of a nautical accident is estimated at approximately 2.2 x 10-5 /vehkm with an associated probability of release of 1.2 x 10-4 for large leaks and 2.5 x 10-2 for small leaks [37,38].

133 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.89 It should be noted in this connection that the amount of product released is heavily determined by the temperature and pressure of the liquefied gas being transported. Given that TNO determined the aforementioned release scenarios based on a representative leak with a diameter of 150 mm (6 ) and 75 mm (3 ) respectively on a cargo tank with a volume of 180 m³, this study prefers, where the representative release scenarios are concerned, to work on the basis of these representative hole sizes instead of the proposed release quantities. INHERENT DEFECT IN A SHIP AT A QUAY/JETTY The representative failure or release scenarios selected for the scenario of an inherent defect in the cargo system of an LNG ship while berthed at a quay or jetty are the same as those defined for stationary pressure tanks. They are: a rupture of the cargo tank; release of the entire content in 10 minutes; a large leak ( leak = largest connection ); a medium leak ( leak = 25 mm); a small leak ( leak = 10 mm). ACCIDENT INVOLVING AN LNG SHIP DURING TRANSIT In the event of nautical accidents during transit (e.g. collision with another moving vessel or with a fixed object or berthed ship), the kinetic energy of the vessel(s) involved in the collision will to a large extent determine the damage caused and the size of any release. Because the energy spectrum of the waterway is not known in this generic study, the representative release scenarios are established based on the available literature [26,37-39]. The scenario whereby the ship in question, while navigating inside the port, collides with a fixed object (such as a bridge pier or jetty) or a berthed ship, is comparable to the scenario whereby a berthed ship is impacted by a passing vessel (see previous section). It is only logical, therefore, that the same representative release scenarios are used for this accident scenario, namely holes with diameters of 150 mm (6 ) and 75 mm (3 ) [26,37]. In a collision between two moving vessels, the impact energy is normally greater, which means that the estimate of the damage and the extent of the LNG release is expected to be greater. In this risk analysis, the risk associated with a collision between a navigating LNG ship and another vessel in a port is determined on the basis of two representative release scenarios, namely: a hole in a cargo tank with a representative diameter of 1,000 mm; a hole in a cargo tank with a representative diameter of 150 mm. The choice of these representative release scenarios was based on a nautical risk analysis for transport of LNG from and to Zeebrugge [39]. That study found that a collision between a small LNG ship (7,500 m³) and another vessel in the mouth of Zeebrugge harbour could cause a hole in the LNG ship s cargo tank with an effective outflow opening of up to about 1 m² ( leak = 1,130 mm). For a ship collision inside the port of Zeebrugge, calculations showed that such a scenario could result in a hole with an effective outflow opening of m² ( leak = 178 mm).

134 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.90 III Incident outcomes in the event of a release The incident outcomes that could occur following a release of LNG from a ship s cargo tank are the same as those that could occur following the release of LNG from a stationary pressure tank (see section III.3.2.2). Direct ignition of the released LNG results in the occurrence of a pool fire on the water or a jet fire, depending on the temperature of the LNG in the cargo tanks. Delayed ignition of the flammable cloud that may form around the ship results in the occurrence of a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion, followed by a pool fire or jet fire at the source. Regarding the scenario of a vapour cloud explosion, it should be noted that in this study given the low reactivity of natural gas (low combustion speed) and the generic character of this study in which the nature of the external environment is not known no account is taken of the occurrence of a vapour cloud explosion following an incidental release of LNG from a ship. An overview of the possible accident scenarios that could occur after a release of cold and warm LNG from a ship s cargo tank is given in Figures III and III Figure III : Event tree for a release of cold LNG (-160 C) on water following the failure of an LNG ship s cargo tank LNG conditions type of failure direct delayed ignition ignition confinement consequences yes pool fire cold LNG (-160 C) instantaneous BLEVE (*) no yes no yes no explosion (UVCE), pool fire wolkbrand flash fire, plasbrand pool fire cryogene cryogenic effecten damage/injury yes pool plasbrand fire continuous no gaswolkexplosie explosion (UVCE), plasbrand pool fire flash wolkbrand fire, pool plasbrand fire cryogene cryogenic effecten damage/injury ( * ) If the cargo tanks are filled with cold LNG (-160 C), a BLEVE can only be initiated through heat radiation of a cargo tank from a nearby fire. However, the probability of such a thermally induced BLEVE is small because the cargo tanks are shielded from fire by the ship s hull. yes no yes no

135 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.91 Figure III : Event tree for a release of warm LNG (-138 C) on water following the failure of an LNG ship s cargo tank LNG conditions failure type direct delayed ignition ignition confinement incidents yes fireball, pool fire warm LNG (-138 C) instantaneous BLEVE no yes no yes no explosion (UVCE) pool fire wolkbrand flash fire, plasbrand pool fire cryogene cryogenic effecten damage/injury yes jet plasbrand fire, pool fire continuous no yes no yes no gaswolkexplosie explosion (UVCE) plasbrand jet fire, pool fire wolkbrand flash fire, plasbrand jet fire, pool fire cryogene cryogenic effecten damage/injury III.5.3. Impact study The impact study investigates the distance and extent to which representative accidents with LNG ships result in the occurrence of lethal effects. The following methodology is adopted: Firstly, the physical effects of the different accident scenarios (namely the incident thermal radiation, the size of the flammable cloud and the overpressure resulting from an explosion) are determined using methodologies and models that are generally accepted in the context of external risk analysis. Then, the consequences of these effects on unprotected persons in the vicinity are estimated using probit functions and criteria imposed by the relevant Flemish government department (SR Division). The calculation models and probit functions used in this stage of the analysis are the same as those described in sections III and III of this study. III Results of the impact calculation GENERAL In this part of the study, risk distances are calculated for the presence of LNG ships in Flemish ports. The LNG ships examined are double-walled gas carriers with a capacity of 500 to 30,000 m³, whose cargo tanks are constructed as IMO type C tanks (pressure tanks). Because no specific data is yet available about the LNG ships that will be supplying Flemish ports, the risks are estimated based on a number of available draft designs of LNG feeder and bunker vessels. The ships in question have a capacity of 800 to 30,000 m³ and were designed by FKAB Marine Design and TGE Marine Engineering. Their main

136 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.92 specifications are given in Table III The draft designs of the vessels can be found in Annex 6. Ship capacity Table III : Main characteristics of the LNG ships examined Ship dimensions ( * ) Configuration of cargo tanks ( ** ) Dimensions of cargo tanks ( *** ) Pipe connection diameter Max. liquid column above waterline 800 m³ L = 67.6 m 1 x 800 m³ H = 2.8 m (cold LNG) B = 11.6 m L = 35.6 m; = 5.5 m = 150 mm (6 ) (cylindrical) H = 3.0 m (warm LNG) D = 3.5 m 3,000 m³ L = 98.6 m 2 x 1,500 m³ H = 4.0 m (cold LNG) B = 14.2 m L = 32.9 m; = 8.0 m = 150 mm (6 ) (cylindrical) H = 4.4 m (warm LNG) D = 4.0 m 7,500 m³ L = m 2 x 3,750 m³ H = 5.6 m (cold LNG) B = 18.6 m L = 35.9 m; = 12.3 m = 200 mm (8 ) (cylindrical) H = 6.2 m (warm LNG) D = 6.3 m 20,000 m³ L = m 3 x 6,670 m³ H = 8.8 m (cold LNG) B = 24.2 m L = 37.1 m; = 16.4 m = 250 mm (10 ) (cylindrical) H = 9.6 m (warm LNG) D = 7.14 m 30,000 m³ L = m L = 29.9 m; B = 24.6 m; H = 6.9 m (cold LNG) B = 27.6 m 4 x 7,500 m³ (bilobe) = 250 mm (10 ) H = 15.2 m H = 7.6 m (warm LNG) D = 8.8 m (* ) L = length overall; B = breadth moulded; D = design draught (** ) In the event of a leak in a bilobe cargo tank caused by a nautical accident, only half of the tank content will be able to flow out due to the tank s construction. (*** ) L = length of the cargo tank; = diameter of the tank; B = breadth of a bilobe tank; H = height of a bilobe tank Regarding the conditions of the LNG in the ship during transportation, calculations were performed for a) LNG at near-atmospheric pressure and a temperature of -160 C (cold LNG) and b) LNG at a pressure of 4 barg and a temperature of -138 C (warm LNG). RELEASE SCENARIOS The representative types of failure or release scenarios for LNG ships in ports are defined in section III For nautical accidents that could occur during transit or at the berthing location (collision/ramming), three representative release scenarios are defined: a hole with a representative diameter of 1,000 mm; a hole with a representative diameter of 150 mm; a hole with a representative diameter of 75 mm. It is assumed that the holes occur at the waterline, which results in the highest release rates. Tables III and III give the calculated release rate, the corresponding release duration and the total amount of LNG released, for each scenario and each ship type. Ship capacity Table III : Representative release scenarios for nautical accidents involving LNG ships and cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) rate [kg/s] Hole ( = 75 mm) Hole ( = 150 mm) Hole ( = mm) duration [s] released mass [ton] rate [kg/s] duration [s] released mass [ton] rate [kg/s] duration [s] released mass [ton] 800 m³ , , ,000 m³ , , ,500 m³ , , ,000 m³ , , ,000 m³ , ,

137 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.93 Ship capacity Table III : Representative release scenarios for nautical accidents involving LNG ships and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) rate [kg/s] Hole ( = 75 mm) Hole ( = 150 mm) Hole ( = mm) duration [s] released mass [ton] rate [kg/s] duration [s] released mass [ton] rate [kg/s] duration [s] released mass [ton] 800 m³ , , ,000 m³ , , ,500 m³ , , ,000 m³ , , ,000 m³ , , The representative failure types examined for the scenario of an inherent defect in the cargo system of an LNG ship are based on those of stationary pressure tanks. They are: a catastrophic rupture of a cargo tank, an outflow of the entire content in 10 minutes, and a large, medium and small leak in the cargo tank. The large leak scenario is modelled as a hole in the cargo tank with an equivalent diameter equal to the diameter of the largest connection. The calculated release rates for inherent defects are shown in Tables III and III Table III : Representative release scenarios for inherent defects in LNG ships with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Ship type 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ Rupture tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) Outflow in 10 minutes 504 kg/s (600 s) 946 kg/s (600 s) 2364 kg/s (600 s) 4224 kg/s (600 s) 4728 kg/s (600 s) Large leak 72.8 kg/s (1,800 s) 87.8 kg/s (1,800 s) 194 kg/s (1,800 s) 350 kg/s (1,800 s) 337 kg/s (1,800 s) Medium leak ( = 25 mm) Small leak ( = 10 mm) 1.60 kg/s (1,800 s) 1.82 kg/s (1,800 s) 2.14 kg/s (1,800 s) 2.40 kg/s (1,800 s) 2.32 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.26 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.29 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.34 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.38 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.37 kg/s (1,800 s) Table III : Representative release scenarios for inherent defects in LNG ships with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) Ship type 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ Rupture tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) tonne (0 s) Outflow in 10 minutes 504 kg/s (600 s) 946 kg/s (600 s) 2364 kg/s (600 s) 4224 kg/s (600 s) 4728 kg/s (600 s) Large leak 80.7 kg/s (1,800 s) 85.4 kg/s (1,800 s) 183 kg/s (1,800 s) 330 kg/s (1,800 s) 317 kg/s (1,800 s) Medium leak ( = 25 mm) Small leak ( = 10 mm) 5.42 kg/s (1,800 s) 5.48 kg/s (1,800 s) 5.58 kg/s (1,800 s) 5.68 kg/s (1,800 s) 5.65 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.87 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.88 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.89 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.91 kg/s (1,800 s) 0.90 kg/s (1,800 s) INCIDENT OUTCOMES The possible incident outcomes that could occur after a release of LNG from an LNG ship s cargo tank are the same as those that could occur following the release of LNG from a stationary pressure tank (see section III.3.2.2). At a temperature of -160 C (150 mbarg), the LNG will flow out as a pure liquid in the event of a leak in a cargo tank. Direct ignition of the escaping LNG results in a pool fire on the water. Delayed ignition results in a flash fire, followed by a pool fire at the source. Tables III and III show the maximum pool diameters of the fires that could occur as the result of a representative outflow of LNG following a nautical accident.

138 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.94 Table III : Calculated pool diameters of fires that could occur following a release of cold LNG as the result of a nautical accident (direct ignition) Ship type 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ Hole ( = 75 mm) 7.2 m 7.6 m 8.0 m 8.6 m 8.3 m Hole ( = 150 mm) 14.5 m 15.2 m 16.0 m 17.3 m 16.6 m Hole ( = 1,000 mm) 92.9 m 98.3 m m m m Table III : Calculated pool diameters of fires that could occur following a release of cold LNG as the result of a nautical accident (delayed ignition) Ship type 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ Hole ( = 75 mm) 9.2 m 9.6 m 10.1 m 11.0 m 10.5 m Hole ( = 150 mm) 18.3 m 19.2 m 20.3 m 21.9 m 21.0 m Hole ( = 1,000 mm) m m m m m At a temperature of -138 C (4 barg), the LNG will flow out as a two-phase jet in the event of a leak (with a vapour fraction of around 17%). Direct ignition of the released LNG will result in a jet fire. Delayed ignition will result in a flash fire, followed by a pool fire and/or jet fire at the source. MAXIMUM IMPACT DISTANCES The effects of the different accident scenarios are determined using the models discussed in sections III and III of this study. An overview of the calculated maximum impact distances of the representative accidents that could occur with LNG ships in a port is given in Annex 7. III.5.4. Probability study In this section, the probabilities of occurrence of the representative accidents for ship transport of LNG in a port are determined. For nautical accidents (collisions/ramming), the accident frequency is determined by the probability of a collision and the probability of a release in the event of collision. For inherent defects in the ship s cargo system, the overall accident frequency is determined by the generic failure frequency of the cargo tanks and the relative annual presence of the ship at the location in question in the port. Finally, the probability of occurrence of a specific incident outcome (e.g. pool fire or flash fire) is obtained by multiplying the accident frequency by a probability of occurrence of a follow-up event (e.g. ignition). III Probabilities of ship accidents and cargo losses in a port IMPACTING OF A SHIP AT A QUAY/JETTY Various literature sources indicate that the probability of a ship being impacted while berthed at an unprotected quay or jetty is determined by the intensity of shipping traffic on the waterway concerned, the average residence time of a berthed ship at the quay or jetty and the annual number of (un)loadings (or bunker operations) performed at the quay or jetty. More specifically, the

139 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.95 probability of an LNG ship being impacted while berthed at an unprotected quay or jetty can be calculated as follows (52) : Fimpact = f0xtxtxn where f 0 is the basic impact frequency per passing vessel, T is the average number of passing vessels per hour on the waterway, t is the average residence time of a ship at the quay (in hours) and N is the annual number of (un)loadings or bunker operations at the location concerned. For the basic probability of impact f 0, [37] proposes a value of 4 x 10-6 /passage, which is somewhat more conservative than the value proposed by TNO, namely 5.87 x 10-7 /passage (= x 8760) [26]. Table III gives an overview of the calculated impact probabilities per (un)loading operation of an LNG ship at a quay or jetty for different traffic intensities on the waterway (10,000, 50,000 and 100,000 passages/year), different types of LNG ship and different residence times at the quay or jetty. Traffic intensity Table III : Impact probability for a berthed LNG ship Ship capacity Residence time ((un)loading rate) Probability of impact [1/ship visit] Total probability of release [1/ship visit] 10,000 passages/year (quiet waterway) 50,000 passages/year (busy waterway) 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ 4 h (200 m³/h) 1.83 x x h (400 m³/h) 9.13 x x h (500 m³/h) 2.74 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 1.37 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 3.42 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 1.71 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 4.57 x x h (4,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x h (3,000 m³/h) 4.57 x x h (6,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x h (200 m³/h) 9.13 x x h (400 m³/h) 4.57 x x h (500 m³/h) 1.37 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 6.85 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 1.71 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 8.56 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x h (4,000 m³/h) 1.14 x x h (3,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x h (6,000 m³/h) 1.14 x x 10-6 (52) If the (un)loading or bunkering operation is performed in an inlet dock or at a quay/jetty that is protected from passing traffic by a wall or if the speed of passing traffic at the berthing location is very low (<< 8 knots), then the probability of a cargo loss due to impacting of the berthed ship will be greatly reduced [39]. Under these circumstances, the probability of product being released as the result of an impact is considered negligible compared with the probability of inherent defects in the ship s cargo system.

140 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.96 Traffic intensity Ship capacity Residence time ((un)loading rate) Probability of impact [1/ship visit] Total probability of release [1/ship visit] 100,000 passages/year (very busy waterway) 800 m³ 3,000 m³ 7,500 m³ 20,000 m³ 30,000 m³ 4 h (200 m³/h) 1.83 x x h (400 m³/h) 9.13 x x h (500 m³/h) 2.74 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 1.37 x x h (1,000 m³/h) 3.42 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 1.71 x x h (2,000 m³/h) 4.57 x x h (4,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x h (3,000 m³/h) 4.57 x x h (6,000 m³/h) 2.28 x x 10-6 The probability of product being released from the cargo tank of a berthed ship in the event of an impact is given by TNO [26,37]. For the LNG ships examined (gas carriers), this probability is 1.2 x 10-4 for a large leak ( leak = 150 mm) and 2.5 x 10-2 for a small leak ( leak = 75 mm). INHERENT DEFECT IN A SHIP AT A QUAY/JETTY The probability of an inherent defect occurring in the cargo system of a gas carrier is estimated based on the generic failure frequency of stationary pressure tanks. This is approximately 1.5 x 10-5 /tank year [18]. The total probability of an inherent defect affecting a ship berthed at a quay or jetty is obtained by multiplying the above probability by the number of cargo tanks on the ship and by the average time the ship remains at the quay (residence time). Table III shows the calculated failure frequencies due to inherent defects in the ship s cargo system for the five LNG ships examined. Table III : Probability of an inherent defect in a berthed LNG ship Ship capacity Number of cargo tanks Residence time ((un)loading rate) Total probability of failure [1/ship visit] 800 m³ 1 3,000 m³ 2 7,500 m³ 2 20,000 m³ 3 30,000 m³ 4 4 h (200 m³/h) 6.78 x h (400 m³/h) 3.39 x h (500 m³/h) 2.03 x h (1,000 m³/h) 1.02 x h (1,000 m³/h) 2.54 x h (2,000 m³/h) 1.27 x h (2,000 m³/h) 5.08 x h (4,000 m³/h) 2.54 x h (3,000 m³/h) 6.78 x h (6,000 m³/h) 3.39 x 10-8 PROBABILITY OF COLLISIONS ON THE WATERWAY As indicated in section III.5.2, the probability of a nautical accident on the waterway and the associated damage are determined by the characteristics of the waterway and the nature of the shipping traffic on the route in question. Given the generic character of the risk analysis, in which the characteristics of the different waterways in Flemish ports are not known, the accident

141 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.97 frequencies in Flemish ports are determined on the basis of available case studies for accidents involving seagoing vessels in port areas [40]. Table III gives an overview of the generic accident frequencies used in this study for the different types of nautical accidents that could occur while an LNG ship is navigating inside a port. The generic accident frequencies are taken from [37,40]. Based on an average navigation distance of 10 km for a loaded ship in a port, the table below also sets out accident frequencies per kilometre travelled. Type of accident Table III : Probability of nautical accidents involving a moving LNG ship Generic accident frequency per ship visit per kilometre travelled Collision with another vessel on the navigation route 2.3 x x 10-6 Collision between the ship and a fixed object on the navigation route 1.5 x x 10-5 Collision between the ship and a berthed vessel along the navigation route 0.5 x x 10-5 The above generic accident frequencies are based on statistical data for shipping accidents in the port area around Canvey Island (UK) in the period In that period, the port area experienced around 50,000 ship movements per year [40]. In the present study, generic accident frequencies for calm and very busy waterways are obtained by taking the frequencies from Table III and dividing them by five (for calm waterways) and multiplying them by two (for very busy waterways). The probability of product being released from the ship s cargo tank in the event of a nautical accident is taken, once again, from the Purple Book [26,37]. For gas carriers, such as the LNG ships examined, the release probabilities are 1.2 x 10-4 and 2.5 x 10-2 for large and small releases respectively (53). III Outcome probabilities The probabilities of follow-up events occurring in case of a release of LNG from a ship s cargo tank are limited to the occurrence or otherwise of ignition. GENERIC IGNITION PROBABILITIES For natural gas and LNG, generic ignition probabilities are set out in Table 15 of the Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009 (group 0 low reactivity) [18]. These probabilities can also be applied to inherent defects in LNG ships berthed at a quay or jetty of a terminal or bunkering station. Table III Overview of generic ignition probabilities for LNG releases resulting from inherent defects in the cargo system of an LNG ship continuous [kg/s] SOURCE instantaneous [kg] Probability of direct ignition [%] Probability of delayed ignition [%] < 10 < 1, and 100 1,000-10, > 100 > 10, (53) The above values for the probability of release in the event of a collision are only valid, in principle, for inland waterway vessels [26]. Because no specific values for seagoing vessels are available, the probabilities of release for such vessels are assumed to be the same as for inland waterway vessels [38].

142 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.98 For scenarios where very large quantities of LNG are released directly into the environment (i.e. catastrophic failure of a cargo tank), the probabilities of direct and delayed ignition are increased to 30% and 50% respectively (see section III.3.4.2). PROBABILITY OF DIRECT IGNITION IN THE EVENT OF COLLISIONS For incidental LNG releases resulting from a nautical accident (collision/impact), this analysis assumes a higher probability of direct ignition given the high impact energy associated with nautical accidents. Because in this generic study no information is available regarding the location of the incidental contact (below or above the waterline), the probability of direct ignition in the event of a nautical accident is set at 50% in all instances [26]. III.5.5. Calculated risk distances Tables III to III show the calculated risk distances (10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) associated with the presence of LNG ships in a port. More specifically, the risk distances were calculated for the navigation of loaded LNG ships inside a port and for the presence of loaded LNG ships at an unprotected jetty or quay. The calculations were performed for five types of ship with capacities ranging from 800 to 30,000 m³ and for waterways with low, high and very high traffic intensities. Regarding the conditions of the LNG in the cargo tanks, calculations were performed for both cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) and warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg). COLD LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the navigation of ships carrying cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) inside a port. The table shows that the distance to an individual risk level of 1.0 x 10-6 /year for 200 loaded shipments on a busy and a very busy waterway is limited to 42 and 50 m respectively (54). For the same number of shipments, the risk level of 1.0 x 10-7 /year extends to a maximum distance of 98 m (for a busy waterway) and 134 m (for a very busy waterway). Table III.5.5.1: Risk distances for LNG ships navigating inside a port (-160 C) Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year m m 800 m³ 50 ships/year m m - 16 m 52 m 100 ships/year m - 16 m 52 m - 30 m 74 m 200 ships/year m - 30 m 74 m - 44 m 102 m 20 ships/year m m 3,000 m³ 50 ships/year m m - 18 m 58 m 100 ships/year m - 18 m 58 m - 34 m 76 m 200 ships/year m - 34 m 76 m - 46 m 110 m 20 ships/year m m 7,500 m³ 50 ships/year m m - 22 m 68 m 100 ships/year m - 22 m 68 m - 38 m 88 m 200 ships/year m - 38 m 88 m - 48 m 116 m (54) The risks increase as the volume of the individual cargo tanks increases. However, the 30,000-m³ LNG ship examined has four bilobe 7,500-m³ cargo tanks with partitions. The partition prevents the entire content of the tank from flowing out in the event of a nautical incident, which means that the risks calculated for a 30,000-m³ ship are lower than those for a 20,000-m³ vessel.

143 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.99 Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year m m 20,000 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 54 m - 26 m 72 m 100 ships/year m - 26 m 72 m - 42 m 98 m 200 ships/year m - 42 m 98 m - 50 m 134 m 20 ships/year m m 30,000 m³ 50 ships/year m m - 22 m 68 m 100 ships/year m - 22 m 68 m - 38 m 94 m 200 ships/year m - 38 m 94 m - 48 m 122 m Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the presence of ships loaded with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) at an unprotected jetty or quay. The table shows that an individual risk of 1.0 x 10-5 /year is attained up to a maximum distance of 88 m from the berthing location, depending on the type of LNG ship, the annual residence time of the ship at the quay or jetty and the traffic intensity of the waterway along which the ship is berthed. A risk level of 1.0 x 10-6 and 1.0 x 10-7 /year is attained up to a distance of 148 m (1.0 x 10-6 /year) and 778 m (1.0 x 10-7 /year) from the berthing location (55). Table III.5.5.2: Risk distances for berthed LNG ships with a low (un)loading rate (-160 C) Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year - 32 m 56 m 26 m 50 m 98 m 38 m 54 m 112 m 800 m³ 50 ships/year 14 m 48 m 74 m 42 m 62 m 116 m 46 m 74 m 122 m 100 ships/year 26 m 50 m 102 m 46 m 74 m 122 m 50 m 98 m 124 m 200 ships/year 38 m 56 m 116 m 50 m 98 m 124 m 54 m 112 m 126 m 20 ships/year - 44 m 70 m 38 m 50 m 110 m 44 m 68 m 118 m 3,000 m³ 50 ships/year 22 m 50 m 100 m 46 m 72 m 122 m 50 m 92 m 124 m 100 ships/year 36 m 52 m 118 m 50 m 92 m 124 m 50 m 110 m 126 m 200 ships/year 44 m 70 m 126 m 50 m 110 m 142 m 68 m 118 m 166 m 20 ships/year 8 m 46 m 76 m 40 m 60 m 118 m 46 m 74 m 124 m 7,500 m³ 50 ships/year 28 m 50 m 112 m 48 m 76 m 126 m 50 m 104 m 136 m 100 ships/year 40 m 62 m 124 m 50 m 106 m 144 m 60 m 116 m 148 m 200 ships/year 46 m 76 m 268 m 60 m 118 m 272 m 74 m 124 m 274 m (55) With small or medium leaks in the cargo tank, the outflow rate (and therefore also the effects of possible accidents) are mainly determined by the liquid column above the leak opening. This is greatest for a ship with a capacity of 20,000 m³ (see Table III ). In case of instantaneous tank rupture or an outflow of the entire tank content in 10 minutes, the effects of possible accidents are mainly determined by the volume of the cargo tanks, which is greatest for a ship with a capacity of 30,000 m³. For these reasons, the calculated distances to a risk level of 10-5 /y and 10-6 /y are greatest for a ship with a capacity of 20,000 m³ and the calculated distances for a risk level of 10-7 /y are greatest for a ship with a capacity of 30,000 m³.

144 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.100 Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year 16 m 50 m 100 m 44 m 72 m 144 m 48 m 88 m 148 m 20,000 m³ 50 ships/year 36 m 62 m 146 m 50 m 98 m 150 m 60 m 130 m 150 m 100 ships/year 44 m 74 m 348 m 60 m 132 m 348 m 72 m 142 m 348 m 200 ships/year 50 m 100 m 684 m 72 m 144 m 684 m 88 m 148 m 684 m 20 ships/year 16 m 48 m 104 m 44 m 70 m 138 m 48 m 86 m 144 m 30,000 m³ 50 ships/year 36 m 58 m 150 m 50 m 96 m 166 m 54 m 116 m 186 m 100 ships/year 44 m 74 m 614 m 54 m 120 m 614 m 70 m 132 m 614 m 200 ships/year 48 m 104 m 778 m 70 m 138 m 778 m 86 m 144 m 778 m Figures III to III show the calculated individual risk for LNG ships loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) which are berthed at the same location along a waterway for 500 hours per year. Because the individual risk is proportionate to the annual residence time of the LNG ship at the location in question, the risk distances (distance to 10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) can also easily be determined for other residence times. The calculated individual risk in the figures below simply has to be multiplied by the actual residence time (in hours), divided by 500. Figure III.5.5.1: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a quiet waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m]

145 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.101 Figure III.5.5.2: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a busy waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m] Figure III.5.5.3: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with cold LNG (-160 C) at the same location along a very busy waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m] WARM LNG Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the navigation of ships carrying warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) inside a port. The table shows that the distance to an individual risk level of 1.0 x 10-6 /year for 200 loaded shipments on a busy and a very busy waterway is limited to 50 and 72 m respectively. For the same number of shipments, the risk level of 1.0 x 10-7 /year extends to a maximum distance of 166 m (for a busy waterway) and 228 m (for a very busy waterway).

146 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.102 Table III.5.5.3: Risk distances for LNG ships navigating inside a port (-138 C) Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year m m 800 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 76 m - 34 m 108 m 100 ships/year m - 34 m 108 m - 50 m 162 m 200 ships/year m - 50 m 162 m - 70 m 224 m 20 ships/year m m 3,000 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 76 m - 34 m 108 m 100 ships/year m - 34 m 108 m - 50 m 162 m 200 ships/year m - 50 m 162 m - 70 m 224 m 20 ships/year m m 7,500 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 76 m - 34 m 110 m 100 ships/year m - 34 m 110 m - 50 m 164 m 200 ships/year m - 50 m 164 m - 70 m 224 m 20 ships/year m m 20,000 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 76 m - 34 m 110 m 100 ships/year m - 34 m 110 m - 50 m 166 m 200 ships/year m - 50 m 166 m - 72 m 228 m 20 ships/year m m 30,000 m³ 50 ships/year m - 2 m 76 m - 34 m 110 m 100 ships/year m - 34 m 110 m - 50 m 164 m 200 ships/year m - 50 m 164 m - 72 m 226 m Table III shows the results of the risk calculations performed for the presence of ships loaded with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) at an unprotected jetty or quay. The table shows that an individual risk of 1.0 x 10-5 /year is attained up to a maximum distance of 118 m from the berthing location, depending on the type of LNG ship, the annual residence time of the ship at the quay or jetty and the traffic intensity of the waterway along which the ship is berthed. A risk level of 1.0 x 10-6 and 1.0 x 10-7 /year is attained up to a distance of 238 m and 694 m respectively from the berthing location. Table III.5.5.4: Risk distances for berthed LNG ships with a low (un)loading rate (-138 C) Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year - 46 m 74 m 32 m 70 m 156 m 46 m 74 m 192 m 800 m³ 50 ships/year 14 m 58 m 114 m 48 m 76 m 208 m 58 m 108 m 230 m 100 ships/year 32 m 70 m 160 m 58 m 110 m 232 m 70 m 154 m 242 m 200 ships/year 46 m 74 m 206 m 70 m 156 m 242 m 74 m 192 m 248 m 20 ships/year - 50 m 86 m 40 m 72 m 174 m 50 m 78 m 216 m 3,000 m³ 50 ships/year 24 m 66 m 150 m 52 m 94 m 228 m 66 m 138 m 240 m 100 ships/year 40 m 74 m 204 m 66 m 140 m 244 m 72 m 172 m 248 m 200 ships/year 50 m 86 m 240 m 72 m 174 m 250 m 78 m 216 m 250 m

147 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.103 Ship type and number of journeys per year Quiet waterway (10,000 passages/year) Busy waterway (50,000 passages/year) Very busy waterway (100,000 passages/year) 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 10-5 /y 10-6 /y 10-7 /y 20 ships/year 4 m 52 m 102 m 44 m 74 m 198 m 52 m 92 m 224 m 7,500 m³ 50 ships/year 30 m 70 m 170 m 58 m 110 m 234 m 68 m 152 m 244 m 100 ships/year 44 m 74 m 224 m 68 m 156 m 248 m 74 m 192 m 250 m 200 ships/year 52 m 102 m 272 m 74 m 198 m 324 m 92 m 224 m 354 m 20 ships/year 14 m 60 m 142 m 48 m 76 m 224 m 60 m 116 m 238 m 20,000 m³ 50 ships/year 38 m 72 m 224 m 64 m 136 m 246 m 72 m 170 m 248 m 100 ships/year 48 m 82 m 348 m 72 m 174 m 374 m 76 m 218 m 400 m 200 ships/year 60 m 142 m 608 m 76 m 224 m 608 m 116 m 238 m 608 m 20 ships/year 14 m 60 m 150 m 48 m 76 m 224 m 60 m 118 m 238 m 30,000 m³ 50 ships/year 38 m 72 m 238 m 64 m 138 m 248 m 72 m 172 m 250 m 100 ships/year 48 m 88 m 520 m 72 m 176 m 526 m 76 m 216 m 530 m 200 ships/year 60 m 150 m 694 m 76 m 224 m 694 m 118 m 238 m 694 m Figures III to III show the calculated individual risk for LNG ships loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) which are berthed at the same location along a waterway for 500 hours per year. Because the individual risk is proportionate to the annual residence time of the LNG ship at the location in question, the risk distances (distance to 10-5 /y, 10-6 /y and 10-7 /y) can also easily be determined for other residence times by multiplying the calculated individual risk in the figures below by the actual residence time (in hours) and dividing by 500. Figure III.5.5.4: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a quiet waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m]

148 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.104 Figure III.5.5.5: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a busy waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m] Figure III.5.5.6: Individual risk arising from the presence of an LNG ship loaded with warm LNG (-138 C) at the same location along a very busy waterway for 500 hours per year LNG ship 800 m³ LNG ship 3,000 m³ LNG ship 7,500 m³ LNG ship 20,000 m³ LNG ship 30,000 m³ Individual risk [/j] Distance to the berthing location [m] GENERAL CONCLUSION If the conditions of the LNG in the ship s cargo tanks are not known, the greatest risk distances must be applied in order to limit the number of shipments on a particular waterway or the total annual residence time of loaded ships at a particular jetty or quay from the perspective of external safety. Based on the calculations performed, the risk distances obtained for ships carrying warm LNG (-138 C) appear to be conservative for navigating LNG ships in a port (see Table III.5.5.3).

149 III. Quantitative risk analysis to determine the external human risk from the LNG supply chain page III.105 For the presence of LNG ships at an unprotected jetty or quay, the greatest risk distances are generally obtained from calculations based on warm LNG (-138 C). Only for mediumsized LNG ships (20,000 and 30,000 m³) that are present for over 1,000 hours annually at a quay or jetty is the greatest distance to a risk level of 1.0 x 10-7 /year obtained from calculations based on cold LNG (-160 C) (56). (56) The reasons for this are that the scenario of a pool fire following a catastrophic rupture of a cargo tank produces the greatest impact with a ship carrying cold LNG (-160 C). And it is this scenario which, under the specified circumstances (more than 100 visits of medium-sized ships), is decisive in determining the location of the 10-7 /y risk contour.

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151 IV. References page IV.1 IV. REFERENCES [1] Developing LNG as a clean fuel for ships in the Baltic and North Seas, Maritime Gas Fuel Logistics (MAGALOG) Project, December [2] LNG Supply Chain Definition, Clean North Sea Shipping Project, Work Package 4, Activity 2, Action D, Swedish Maritime Forum, May [3] A feasibility study for an LNG filling station infrastructure and test of recommendations, Draft Baseline Report, North European LNG Infrastructure Project, September [4] A feasibility study for an LNG filling station infrastructure and test of recommendations, Authority Draft Feasibility Report, North European LNG Infrastructure Project, November [5] The World Fleet of LNG Carriers, January [6] International Safety Guide for Inland Navigation Tank-barges and Terminals, First Edition, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR), June [7] Bunkering, infrastructure, storage, and processing of LNG, J. Harperscheidt, Ship & Offshore, n 1, [8] Coral Methane broadens LNG supply chain, Ship Profile, LNG Worldshipping, May [9] Study of the overland transport of LNG, The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL), September [10] Fluxys LNG Truck Approval Procedure, Fluxys LNG, September [11] Economic Design of Small Scale LNG Tankers and Terminals, B. Munko, TGE Gas Engineering, LNG Conference, Offshore Center Denmark, June [12] All-concrete LNG tank for Small Scale LNG, B. Raine, Arup Energy, Conference Downscaling LNG Exports to Monetize Mid-Tier Reserves, Houston, August [13] LNG Technology, Engineering Division - Linde AG, Pullach (Germany), [14] Small Scale and Mini LNG Systems for LNG production and emission recovery, Hamworthy Gas Systems AS, Asker (Norway), [15] Fundamentals of Natural Gas Processing, A. J. Kidnay, W. R. Parrish, CRC Press, June [16] LNG ship to ship bunkering procedure, Greenshipping Project, Swedish Marine Technology Forum, June [17] Een code van goede praktijken inzake risicocriteria voor externe mensrisico s van Seveso-inrichtingen, LNE Department, October [18] Handbook Failure Frequencies for drawing up a safety report, Flemish government, LNE Department, Environment, Nature and Energy Policy Unit, Safety Reporting Division, May 2009.

152 IV. References page IV.2 [19] Development of a pool fire thermal radiation model, HSE contract research report No. 96/1996, P. J. Rew, W. G. Hulbert, WS Atkins Safety and Reliability [20] Modelling of thermal radiation from external hydrocarbon pool fires, P. J. Rew, W. G. Hulbert, Trans IchemE, Vol 75, Part B, [21] Developments In Design Methods For Predicting Thermal Radiation From Flares, Chamberlain G.A., Institution Of Chemical Engineers, vol. 65, [22] User s manual for Slab: an atmospheric dispersion model for denser-than-air releases, Ermak D.L., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Vol. 28, No. 18, June [23] The Hegadas model for ground-level heavy-gas dispersion II. Timedependent model, Witlox H.W.M., Atmospheric Environment, Vol. 28, No. 18, [24] Thermal Radiation Hazards from Releases of LPG from Pressurised Storage, Roberts A.F., Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 4, [25] Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2nd edition, 2000 [26] PGS3 (Purple Book), Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM), The Netherlands, [27] Risk Assessment Data Directory Ignition Probabilities, Report No , International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, March [28] Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1, Linde Engineering, August [29] Energy Report - QRA for Skangass LNG plant, Train 1, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), May [30] Verfahren zur Herstellung von LNG, Kunert S., Hamworthy Gas Systems, InnoGas Symposium, November [31] Achtergronddocument RBM II, version 1.2, Adviesgroep AVIV, on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, March [32] Risico-analyse diverse aardgasactiviteiten Zeebrugge, Jansen C.M.A, Pietersen C.M., TNO, April [33] Risicoanalyse voor het LNG-wegtransport op het grondgebied van de stad Brugge, version 3.1, M-tech, August [34] LPG-Integraal studie - Vergelijkende risico-analyse van de opslag, de overslag, het vervoer en het gebruik van LPG en benzine, MT-TNO, May [35] Quantitative Risk Assessment of the Transport of LPG and Naphtha in Hong Kong - Methodology Report, Project C6124, DNV Technica, [36] Risk Assessment Data Directory - Land transport accident statistics, Report No , International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, March [37] A quantitative risk analysis approach to port hydrocarbon logistics, Ronza A., Carol S. et al., Journal of Hazardous Materials, volume A128, 2006.

153 IV. References page IV.3 [38] TWOL-project: Risicoanalysesysteem voor transport van gevaarlijke stoffen: tunnels, rangeerstations, parkeerplaatsen, ontspanstations en havengebieden, DNV/Arcadis, February [39] Veiligheidsstudie voor het LNG transport naar en vanuit Zeebrugge Het frequentiedeel, Marin, October [40] Canvey: an investigation of potential hazards from operations in the Canvey Island/Thurrock area, Health and Safety Executive (UK), [41] Installations And Equipment For Liquefied Natural Gas General Characteristics Of Liquefied Natural Gas, NBN EN 1160, 1 st edition, August 1996.

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155 V. Annexes page V.1 V. ANNEXES Annex 1: Annex 2: Annex 3: Annex 4: Annex 5: Annex 6: Annex 7: Annex 8: Overview of the generic LNG supply chain components examined History of accidents involving LNG storage, handling and transport Hazardous properties and physical characteristics of LNG Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport Draft designs for LNG bunker vessels and feeder vessels Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG ship transport Meteorological data

156 V. Annexes page V.2 V.1. Annex 1: Overview of the generic LNG supply chain components examined

157 V. Annexes page V.3 V.1.1. Installations and activities within demarcated establishments Table B1.1.1: Examined components for LNG storage Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Single containment tank in a conventional bund 10,000 m³ Double containment tank with/without an emergency retention Full containment tank with/without an emergency retention Single containment tank in a conventional bund Atmospheric tank 20,000 m³ Double containment tank with/without an emergency retention -160 C (150 mbarg) Full containment tank with/without an emergency retention Single containment tank in a conventional bund 40,000 m³ Double containment tank with/without an emergency retention Full containment tank with/without an emergency retention 1 x 100 m³ Tank without a bund Tank in a bund 2 x 100 m³ Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund 1 x 250 m³ Tank without a bund Tank in a bund Pressure tank 2 x 250 m³ 3 x 250 m³ Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) 1 x 500 m³ Tank without a bund Tank in a common bund 2 x 500 m³ Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund 3 x 500 m³ Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund

158 V. Annexes page V.4 Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Pressure tank 1 x 700 m³ 3 x 700 m³ Tank without a bund Tank in a bund Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) 5 x 700 m³ Tanks without a bund Tanks in a common bund Table B1.1.2: Examined components for LNG ship (un)loading Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 4 (200 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 6 (500 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system Flexible (un)loading hose 8 (1,000 m³/h) (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 12 (2,000 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 14 (3,000 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system

159 V. Annexes page V.5 Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 4 (200 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 6 (500 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system Fixed loading arm 8 (1,000 m³/h) (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 12 (2,000 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system 14 (3,000 m³/h) (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown system Table B1.1.3: Examined components for LNG truck (un)loading Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Flexible (un)loading hose 3 (50 m³/h) (Un)loading location without containment system (Un)loading location with containment system (200 m²) (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) 3 (100 m³/h) (Un)loading location without containment system (Un)loading location with containment system (200 m²) (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown (Un)loading without emergency shutdown system (Un)loading with manual emergency shutdown (Un)loading with automatic emergency shutdown -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg)

160 V. Annexes page V.6 Table B1.1.4: Examined components for bunkering ships with LNG using fixed bunkering installations or bunker vessels Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Bunkering without emergency shutdown system 2 x 2 (50 m³/h) Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system 2 x 6 (500 m³/h) Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) Flexible hoses 2 x 8 (1,000 m³/h) Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system 2 x 10 (2,000 m³/h) Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system 2 x 12 (3,000 m³/h) Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system 2 x 2 (50 m³/h) Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system 2 x 6 (500 m³/h) Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Fixed arms 2 x 8 (1,000 m³/h) Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Bunkering without emergency shutdown system 2 x 10 (2,000 m³/h) Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system

161 V. Annexes page V.7 Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Fixed arms 2 x 12 (3,000 m³/h) Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system Bunkering with automatic emergency shutdown system Table B1.1.5: Examined components for bunkering ships with LNG using trucks Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Flexible hose 3 (50 m³/h) Bunkering without emergency shutdown system Bunkering with manual emergency shutdown system -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) Table B1.1.6: Examined components for LNG production (liquefaction) Type of installation Characteristic size Design Condition of LNG Liquefaction unit 20,000 tpa Closed cycle with single-stage compression and nitrogen refrigerant 300,000 tpa Closed cycle with two-stage compression and mixed refrigerant - V.1.2. LNG road transport Table B1.2.1: Examined components for LNG road transport Type of installation Characteristic size Design Location Condition of LNG Single-walled pressure tank Double-walled vacuum-insulated pressure tank Motorway Truck 50 m³ Single-walled pressure tank Double-walled vacuum-insulated pressure tank Regional road (1 lane in each direction) -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) Single-walled pressure tank Double-walled vacuum-insulated pressure tank Regional road (2 lanes in each direction)

162 V. Annexes page V.8 V.1.3. LNG ship transport Table B1.3.1: Examined components for LNG ship transport in a port Type of installation Characteristic size Design Location Condition of LNG Alongside a quiet waterway At the jetty Alongside a busy waterway Bunker vessel 800 m³ 1 cylindrical cargo tank (IMO type C) Alongside a very busy waterway On a quiet waterway -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) During navigation On a busy waterway On a very busy waterway Alongside a quiet waterway At the jetty Alongside a busy waterway Bunker vessel 3,000 m³ 2 cylindrical cargo tanks (IMO type C) Alongside a very busy waterway On a quiet waterway -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) During navigation On a busy waterway On a very busy waterway Alongside a quiet waterway At the jetty Alongside a busy waterway Feeder vessel 7,500 m³ 2 cylindrical cargo tanks (IMO type C) Alongside a very busy waterway On a quiet waterway -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) During navigation On a busy waterway On a very busy waterway Alongside a quiet waterway At the jetty Alongside a busy waterway Feeder vessel 20,000 m³ 3 cylindrical cargo tanks (IMO type C) Alongside a very busy waterway On a quiet waterway -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) During navigation On a busy waterway On a very busy waterway

163 V. Annexes page V.9 Type of installation Characteristic size Design Location Condition of LNG Alongside a quiet waterway At the jetty Alongside a busy waterway Feeder vessel 30,000 m³ 4 bilobe cargo tanks (IMO type C) Alongside a very busy waterway On a quiet waterway -160 C (150 mbarg) to -138 C (4 barg) During navigation On a busy waterway On a very busy waterway

164 V. Annexes page V.10 V.2. Annex 2: Accident history This annex contains an overview of a number of reported incidents that occurred during LNG storage, handling or transport. V.2.1. V Incidents involving loading installations LNG storage This section describes a number incidents involving stationary LNG storage tanks. CLEVELAND (OHIO, USA), OCTOBER 1944 Use of the wrong type of steel which it is now known can suffer brittle fracturing when exposed to very low temperatures led to a failure of the first LNG storage tank containing around 4,500 m³. Because the volume of the catch basin was only half that of the tank, the LNG dispersed over a large surface area. A vapour cloud formed, which spread into the neighbouring streets of a residential area and in the sewer system. Owing to the presence of a large number of ignition sources in the immediate vicinity, the flammable cloud that formed from evaporation of the LNG pool ignited very quickly, resulting in a flash fire. This fire raged around the other three storage tanks and around the houses and buildings in the surrounding area. Because the feet of a second storage tank were not insulated against fire, they gave way. As a result, this tank also failed. Almost all buildings in a radius of 90 m around the first storage tank were destroyed. In all, 128 people were killed and 225 injured due to the extensive fires. It should be noted that there is no evidence that overpressurisation occurred. The only explosions took place in the sewer system, where there was sufficient confinement for overpressures to arise. CANVEY ISLAND (ESSEX, UK), MAY 1965 During maintenance work, a small quantity of LNG leaked from a storage tank. The pool or cloud ignited and a worker was badly burnt. PORTLAND (OREGON, USA), 1968 The accident involved an LNG tank whose inner tank was made of aluminium and the outer tank of steel. The insulation material between the inner and outer tank was perlite. While the tank was being filled with LNG, a leakage occurred between the inner and outer tanks via a removed blind flange and a valve that had been left open by mistake. The space between the inner and outer tanks filled with boil-off gases. The gas was ignited by an unspecified source. Four people died in the accident. LA SPEZIA (ITALY), 1971 Following a rollover, the roof of the storage tank was damaged and vapour was released via the relief valves and vents. An estimated 4,000,000 m 3 of vapour was released in the space of a few hours. However, this vapour was not ignited. ARZEW (ALGERIA), MARCH 1977 A worker died after being frozen by LNG spray that was released through a broken valve on the top of a storage tank during unloading of an LNG ship. Around 2,000 m³ of LNG was released, although it did not ignite. The valve was made of aluminium, whereas nowadays LNG valves are made from stainless steel. DAS ISLAND (UAE), MARCH 1978 A pipe connection on the bottom of an LNG storage tank failed, resulting in a release of LNG inside the catch basin. The liquid outflow was

165 V. Annexes page V.11 stopped by closing an internal valve designed for this type of incident. A large vapour cloud formed but did not ignite. No fatalities or injuries were reported. PINSON (ALABAMA, USA), AUGUST 1985 The welds on a plate on a small aluminium vessel failed as the vessel was receiving LNG. The plate was propelled into a building housing the control room. Some of the windows in the control room were blown inward and vapour escaping from the vessel entered the building and ignited. Six workers were injured. BALTIMORE (MARYLAND, USA), DECEMBER 1992 A relief valve on an LNG pipe near one of three LNG storage tanks failed, causing the tank to open and LNG to be released for around 10 hours into the tank s catch basin. The total amount released was around 6,500 m³. Contact with the released LNG caused the outside of the tank to be damaged through embrittlement. The tank was taken out of service and repaired. Nobody was injured, there was no ignition of the vapour and the release was confined to the plant. V LNG process installations MONTREAL (CANADA), JANUARY 1972 A backflow of gaseous natural gas through a nitrogen line caused natural gas to enter the control room of an LNG peak shaving plant. The backflow was caused by valves in the nitrogen line not being closed. Because nitrogen was also used for the pneumatically operated instruments, there was a connection between the natural gas network and the instruments in the control room via the nitrogen network. An explosion occurred in the control room when an operator tried to light a cigarette. COVE POINT (MARYLAND, USA), OCTOBER 1979 A faulty gas seal in an electrical conduit in an LNG pump resulted in gaseous natural gas passing through a 60-m cable duct and entering a building in which workers were present. An explosion occurred in which one worker was killed and a second suffered heavy burns. BONTANG (INDONESIA), 1983 A blind flange in the flare line led to overpressurisation in the plant s main liquefaction column (a vertical shell-and-tube heat exchanger). The overpressure cause the heat exchanger to explode, and shrapnel was projected up to a distance of 50 m, killing three workers. The ensuing fire was extinguished in about 30 minutes. EVERETT (MASSACHUSETTS, USA), 1988 Around 114 m³ of LNG was released through a blown flange gasket during an interruption in LNG transfer. The cause was later determined to be condensation induced water hammer. The spill was contained in a small area, as designed. The weather conditions (it was a still night) prevented the vapour cloud from moving beyond the immediate area. No one was injured and no damage occurred beyond the blown gasket. THURLEY (UK), 1989 Due to the non-closure of a valve on a vaporiser, LNG was released as a high-pressure jet. The resulting vapour cloud ignited around 30 seconds after the release began. The flash fire covered an area approximately 40 by 25 m. Two workers received burns to their hands and faces. BONTANG (INDONESIA), 1993 LNG from a leak entered an underground concrete sewer system. Rapid expansion of the LNG led to overpressure in the sewer system, rupturing the concrete pipes. The vapour did not ignite. The leak occurred during a modification of the pipe network.

166 V. Annexes page V.12 SKIKDA (ALGERIA), JANUARY 2004 A leak in the cooling system of a liquefaction unit led to the formation of a vapour cloud consisting of hydrocarbons. This vapour cloud was drawn into the air inlet of a steam boiler s burners. The increased fuel to the burners caused the pressure in the steam circuit to rise. This caused the steam boiler to rupture, which ignited the vapour cloud resulting in an explosion and a fireball. The explosions and fires destroyed part of the plant and caused 27 deaths and injury to 72 more. No one outside the plant was injured and the LNG storage tanks were not damaged.

167 V. Annexes page V.13 V.2.2. Incidents during LNG (un)loading Table B2.2.1: LNG releases during (un)loading of LNG ships Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1965 Jules Verne (now Cinderella) 25,500 m 3 Gaz de France Vertical cylinders 1965 Methane Princess 27,400 m Esso Brega (now LNG Palmeria) Conch Prismatic tanks 41,000 m 3 Esso 1974 Massachusetts 5,000 m 3 Horizontal cylinders 1977 LNG Aquarius 125,000 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1979 Mostefa Ben Boulaid 125,000 m Pollenger (now Asake Maru) Technigaz Membrane tank 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 198x El Paso Consolidated 125,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 198x Larbi Ben M Hidi 129,500 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1983 Norman Lady 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1985 Isabella 35,500 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks Probably due to wrong measurement of the liquid level, one of the cargo tanks was overfilled during loading in the port of Arzew (Algeria). A small quantity of LNG was released. The tank cover plating and deck plating were damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. The ship had just been loaded when the transfer arms were disconnected before the liquid pipes had been fully drained. A small amount of LNG was released due to a leaking valve. The deck plating was damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. A rollover in the ship s cargo tank resulted in damage to the tank roof and the release of vapour via the relief valves and vents. An estimated 4,000,000 m 3 of vapour was released in the space of few hours. However, the vapour did not ignite. A small amount (less than 200 l) of LNG was released through a leaky valve on the collector pipe, probably owing to water hammer resulting from the unexpected closure of the main valves on the liquid pipes after a power cut. The deck was damaged over an area of around 2 m² due to low-temperature embrittlement. One of the cargo tanks was overfilled during loading. A small amount of LNG was released from the tank s vent riser. The overfilling was probably caused by the high-level alarm being placed in override mode to eliminate nuisance alarms. The LNG flowed over the tank s cover plating but no embrittlement occurred. A small amount of LNG was released through a leaking check valve in the liquid pipe during unloading at Cove Point, Maryland (USA). The deck plating was damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. A small amount of LNG (a few litres) was released through a leaking valve during unloading at the Distrigas Terminal in Everett, Massachusetts (USA). The tank s cover plating was damaged over an area of around 2 m² due to low-temperature embrittlement. A small amount of LNG was released through a leaking flange. The deck plating was damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. Vapour was released during transfer arm disconnection but no LNG was released. 1,2 The ship was in the port of Sodegaura (Japan) while the transfer arms were cooling down ahead of unloading. The ship suddenly moved astern under its own power. All transfer arms sheared and LNG was spilled, but there was no ignition. 1,3,4,6 1,2,3,4,6 3,4,5 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,6 1,2,3,4,6 LNG was released as a result of overfilling a cargo tank. The deck was damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. 1,2,3,4,6 2,3,4,6 1,2 1,2,5

168 V. Annexes page V.14 Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1985 Annabella 35,500 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1989 Tellier 40,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 2001 Khannur 124,890 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 2002 Mostefa ben Boulaid 125,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks LNG was probably released from the cargo tank or pipes. No other details are known. 1,2 Wind blew the ship from its berth in the port of Skikda (Algeria). The transfer arms sheared and LNG was released. The deck was damaged due to low-temperature embrittlement. An explosion occurred and a number of people were injured. During unloading, product leaked via a cargo tank vent due to overpressure in the tank. The protective capping run of the tank dome was damaged. An LNG leak during unloading resulted in damage to the deck due to low-temperature embrittlement. 4,6 1,2,3,5,6 4 4, Golar Freeze 125,850 m 3 During unloading, the ship was pulled 5 m from the pier by a surge from a passing ship. The transfer arms were disconnected by an emergency system. No LNG was released. 6 References 1. Quest, Safety Record of LNG Tank Ships 2. CH-IV International, Safety History of International LNG Operations 3. BP Process Safety Series, LNG Fire Protection & Emergency Response 4. LMG Marin, HAZID for LNG Tankers, Project SAFEDOR 5. Woodward and Pitblado, LNG Risk Based Safety 6. Björn Forsman (ÅF Industry AB and SSPA Sweden AB), North European LNG Infrastructure Project, Draft Feasibility Report, Appendix J

169 V. Annexes page V.15 V.2.3. Incidents during LNG road transport Table B2.3.1: Accidents during LNG road transport Year Location Description of incident Reference(s) 1971 Waterbury, VT (USA) A tyre blowout caused the truck to leave the road and hit rocks. This tore a hole in the tank, and 20% of the content was spilled. There was no fire Warner, NH (USA) Driver fatigue caused the truck to leave the road and roll over. There was a small gas leak but no fire N. Whitehall, WI (USA) The truck was involved in a head-on collision with another truck. There was a petrol and tyre fire. No LNG was released Raynham, MA (USA) The truck hit a parked car. The brakes locked and the trailer overturned. There was no cargo on-board and no fire Ridgefield Park, NJ (USA) The truck driver failed to negotiate a turn-off and the truck overturned. The tractor was destroyed and the trailer severely damaged. There was no fire NJ (USA) Faulty brakes caused a wheel fire. A check valve cracked and 5% of the cargo leaked from the tank. There was no fire Dalton, GA (USA) The driver swerved to avoid a pedestrian, hit the guardrail and rolled over and down a 25-m bank. There was no fire Chattanooga, TN (USA) Oil on the carriageway caused the truck to roll over on an exit ramp. The truck was righted and continued delivery of its cargo Pawtucket, RI (USA) The truck was hit by a car and rolled over. No LNG was released and there was no fire CT (USA) The parked truck was hit by a tow truck. There was no leak or fire Waterbury, CT The truck was hit by another truck and rolled over. No LNG was released Los Angeles, CA (USA) The truck rolled over but little LNG was released. There was no fire Barnagat, NJ (USA) The driver failed to negotiate a turn due to excessive speed, resulting in a leak through a safety valve. The truck was severely damaged Lexington, MA (USA) Rain and poor road conditions caused the truck to roll over. There was no cargo on-board and no fire Everett, MA (USA) A wheel came off the trailer just before the truck entered the highway. No LNG was released and there was no fire Revere, MA (USA) The trailer overturned due to excessive speed. No LNG was released and there was no fire Woburn, MA (USA) The truck was hit by a car and careened into the guardrail, ripping open the diesel tanks. The ensuing diesel fire trapped the driver in his cab, where he perished. The trailer was engulfed by fire. No LNG was released. The cargo was partially transferred to a second trailer Tivissa (Spain) The truck overturned and caught fire. About 20 minutes later, the tank exploded, creating an enormous fireball. The driver died and two people about 200 m away suffered burns. Fragments of the truck and tank landed up to around 260 m away Wobura, MA (USA) The truck overturned due to excessive speed. No LNG was released Reno, NV (USA) During a rest break, the driver noticed an LNG leak. He notified the emergency services. Shortly after their arrival, the LNG ignited. The fire subsided. The trailer suffered minor damage Cadiz (Spain) The truck left the road and slid 3 m down a bank. No LNG was released ,2 1 References 1. CH-IV International, Safety History of International LNG Operations 2. Woodward and Pitblado, LNG Risk Based Safety

170 V. Annexes page V.16 V.2.4. Incidents involving LNG ships while in port or during navigation Table B2.4.1: Leaks from storage tanks Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1966 Methane Progress 27,400 m 3 Conch Prismatic tanks 1969 Polar Alaska 71,500 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 1970 Arctic Tokyo 71,500 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 1971 Descartes 50,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks A leak from the storage tank was reported. No other details are known. 1,2 Sloshing of the LNG heel caused part of the supports for the cargo pump electric cable tray to break loose, resulting in perforation of the primary barrier. LNG leaked into the interbarrier space but no LNG was released from the secondary barrier. Sloshing of the LNG heel caused local deformation of the primary barrier. LNG leaked into the interbarrier space but no LNG was released from the secondary barrier. A fault in the connection between the primary barrier and the tank dome allowed gas into the interbarrier space. 1,2,4,6 Table B2.4.2: Fires caused by lightning strikes Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1964 Jules Verne (now Cinderella) 1965 Jules Verne (now Cinderella) 25,500 m 3 Gaz de France Vertical cylinders 25,500 m 3 Gaz de France Vertical cylinders 1977 LNG Aquarius 125,000 m 3 Moss Spheres The ship was being loaded in the port of Arzew (Algeria) when a storm hit the terminal. Loading was suspended. However, during loading vapour had been released routinely into the atmosphere, and this was ignited by lightning. The flames were quickly extinguished by purging the pipe with nitrogen. A lightning strike ignited vapour that had been routinely released into the atmosphere (because the vapour was not being used as fuel at that time) during navigation at sea. The flames were quickly extinguished by purging the pipe with nitrogen. A lightning strike ignited the vapour of two vent risers simultaneously while cargo was being discharged at the port of Tobata (Japan). The flames were quickly extinguished. The vapour release was believed to be due to leaking relief valves Methane Arctic 71,500 m 3 A lightning strike resulted in a fire during unloading in the port of Barcelona. Only minor damage was caused. 4 1,2,4,6 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 Table B2.4.3: Collisions Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1974 Methane Princess 27,400 m 3 Conch Prismatic tanks The ship was rammed by the coastal freighter Tower Princess while moored at an LNG terminal, creating a 1-m gash in the outer hull. No LNG was released. 1,2,5

171 V. Annexes page V.17 Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1974 Euclides 4,000 m LNG Challenger (now Asake Maru) Technigaz Spherical tanks 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1978 Khannur 124,890 m LNG Challenger (now Asake Maru) Moss Spherical tanks 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1985 Ramdane Abane 126,000 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1997 Northwest Swift 125,000 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1997 LNG Capricorn 126,300 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1999 Methane Polar 71,500 m 3 Gaz Transport Membrane tanks Minor damage was sustained due to contact with another vessel in the port. No LNG was released. 1,2 The ship was struck by the tank ship Lincolnshire and sustained minor damage. No cargo was released. The ship was lying at anchor off the coast of Bahrain. It was believed to be in LPG service at the time of the incident. The ship collided with the cargo ship Hong Hwa while at sea. Minor damage was caused. No LNG was released. 1,2,5 The ship was struck by the floating crane Magnus IX and sustained minor damage to the hull. No cargo was released. The ship was believed to be in LPG service at the time of the incident. The ship was impacted in the port during loading. The bow was damaged. No LNG was released. 1,2,5 The ship collided with a fishing vessel while at sea. The hull was damaged but there was no ingress of water. No LNG was released. The ship struck a mooring dolphin (a heavy pile or construction in sailing waters to which vessels can be moored) in the port. The hull was damaged but there was no ingress of water. No LNG was released. The ship drifted in port due to engine failure during approach to the jetty. The jetty was struck and damaged but nobody was injured and no LNG was released Hanjin Pyeong Taek 130,600 m 3 The ship collided with a cargo ship while at sea. The shell plating was damaged Methane Polar 71,500 m 3 Gaz Transport Membrane tanks 2002 Norman Lady 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 2005 Hispania Spirit 140,500 m 3 Membrane tanks The ship, while empty (only ballast tanks filled), collided with a cargo ship out at sea. The hull was damaged. No LNG was released, but three people were injured and one person killed on the cargo ship. The ship, while empty (only ballast tanks filled), collided with a nuclear submarine out at sea. The hull was damaged and the ship suffered a leakage of seawater into the double bottom dry tank area. The ship was struck during berthing operations. The hull was damaged and oil was released ,2,4,5 1,2,4,5 1,2,4 4 2,3,4,5,6

172 V. Annexes page V.18 Table B2.4.4: Groundings Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1968 Aristotle 5,000 m 3 Prismatic tanks 1974 Methane Progress 27,400 m 3 Conch Prismatic tanks 1974 Euclides 4,000 m 3 Technigaz Spherical tanks The ship ran aground at sea. The bottom was damaged but no cargo was released. The ship was believed to be in LPG service at the time of the incident. The ship ran aground in the port of Arzew (Algeria). The rudder was damaged. No LNG was released. 1,2,3,4,5 The ship ran aground in the port of Le Havre (France). The bottom and propeller were damaged. No LNG was released. 1, El Paso Paul Kayser 125,000 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1980 LNG Taurus 125,000 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1981 El Paso Columbia 125,000 m 3 Conch 2 Prismatic tanks The ship ran aground at sea at a speed of 19 knots (or 14 knots, depending on the source), fully loaded, while manoeuvring to avoid another vessel. This can be considered a worst-case scenario for a ship grounding. The bottom was severely damaged and the LNG tank deformed. The cargo was transferred at sea to a sister ship. No LNG was released. The ship ran aground at a speed of 12 knots. The bottom was severely damaged. However, the ship proceeded under its own power to the port, where the cargo was unloaded. No LNG was released. The ship ran aground off the coast of Nova Scotia while being towed to Halifax. The bottom was severely damaged, resulting in the engine room and one cargo hold being flooded. However, the ship was never used in LNG service due to problems with the storage tank insulation system that are unrelated to this incident. 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5, Tenage Lima 130,000 m 3 The ship made contact with a submerged rock. The hull was severely damaged. No LNG was released Gimi 126,300 m 3 The ship softly touched the bottom while approaching a pier. There was no damage Matthew 126,500 m 3 The ship ran aground. No LNG was released. 6

173 V. Annexes page V.19 Table B2.4.5: Drifting / Propulsion problems Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) Descartes 50,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 1980 LNG Libra 125,000 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks 1998 LNG Bonny 132,500 m 3 Gaz Transport Membrane tanks 1999 Methane Polar 71,500 m 3 Gaz Transport Membrane tanks The ship drifted following loss of the rudder at sea. It was towed to port. 1 The ship drifted after the rudder was damaged. It was towed to port, where the cargo was transferred to a sister ship. No LNG was released. The ship suffered an electric power failure. The generator was repaired at sea. 1,4 The ship drifted in port due to engine failure during approach to the jetty. The jetty was struck and damaged but nobody was injured and no LNG was released Matthew 126,500 m 3 The ship was towed to port following propulsion problems Ramdane Abane 126,000 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks The ship drifted at sea due to engine failure. It was towed away from the coast. The engines were repaired at sea Century 29,600 m 3 The ship drifted at sea due to engine failure. It was towed to port Höegh Galleon 87,600 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks The ship drifted at sea due to gearbox problems. It was towed to port Laieta 40,000 m 3 The ship drifted at sea due to engine failure. It was towed to port Catalunya Spirit 138,000 m 3 The ship drifted at sea due to engine failure. The engines were repaired at sea and the ship was assisted by a number of tugboats. 6 1,3,4,6 1,2,4,5

174 V. Annexes page V.20 Table B2.4.6: Miscellaneous incidents Year Name of ship Ship data Description of incident Reference(s) 1971 Methane Progress 27,400 m 3 Conch Prismatic tanks 1978 LNG Aries 125,000 m 3 Moss Spherical tanks Cracks in the inner hull allowed ballast water to enter the cargo hold and come into contact with storage tank insulation. 1 The ship was torn away from the dock by storm-force winds and a flood tide. The transfer arms were not connected Melrose A fire broke out in the engine room. Damage was confined to the engine room. 3, Larbi Ben M Hidi 129,500 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1990 Bachir Chihani 129,500 m 3 Gaz-Transport Membrane tanks 1996 Mostefa Ben Boulaid 125,000 m 3 Technigaz Membrane tanks 1996 LNG Portovenere 65,000 m 3 Gaz Transport Membrane tanks The ship was damaged by bad weather. No other details are known. 1 Cracks in the inner hull allowed ballast water into the cargo hold. 1,2,3,4,6 An electrical fire occurred in the engine room while the ship was docked at the LNG terminal in Everett, Massachusetts (USA). The fire was extinguished by the crew. The LNG was subsequently transferred to the terminal without incident. A fire broke out in the engine room during sea trials. The CO2 fire extinguishing system discharged before the engine room was evacuated. Six people died British Trader 138,000 m 3 An electrical fire broke out on-board while the ship was at sea. A transformer was damaged. 4 1,4 1,4,6 References 7. Quest, Safety Record of LNG Tank Ships 8. CH-IV International, Safety History of International LNG Operations 9. BP Process Safety Series, LNG Fire Protection & Emergency Response 10. LMG Marin, HAZID for LNG Tankers, Project SAFEDOR 11. Woodward and Pitblado, LNG Risk Based Safety 12. Björn Forsman (ÅF Industry AB and SSPA Sweden AB), North European LNG Infrastructure Project, Draft Feasibility Report, Appendix J

175 V. Annexes page V.21 V.3. Annex 3: Hazardous properties and physical characteristics of LNG GENERAL LNG (liquefied natural gas) is the name given to natural gas that has been converted to liquid form by being cooled to a very low temperature. To attain a liquid phase, the temperature must be lower than the critical temperature (-82 C in the case of methane). LNG is typically stored at near-atmospheric pressure at close to its atmospheric boiling point (-160 C). In liquid form, natural gas occupies 600 times less volume that in a gaseous state, making it easier to transport over long distances and enabling a large storage capacity to be achieved in a relatively small space. The main characteristics and hazardous properties of liquefied and gaseous natural gas are summarised in Table B3.1 and discussed in the paragraphs below. Table B3.1: Typical characteristics and hazardous properties of LNG/natural gas Identification and labelling Structural formula Mixture (mainly of methane with small fractions of ethane, propane or nitrogen) CAS number UN number 1972 GHS classification Risk phrases H220 flammable gas 1 H280 gases under pressure, compressed gas H281 contains refrigerated gas; may cause cryogenic burns R12 Physicochemical properties Molecular mass Normal boiling point Melting point Vapour pressure at 20 C approx g/mol -162 C -182 C N/A (gaseous at 20 C) Relative density - liquid (water = 1) Relative density - vapour (air = 1) 0.6 Solubility in water at 20 C g/l Hazardous properties Flash point N/A (flammable gas) Autoignition temperature 530 C Flammability limits Minimum ignition energy Heat of combustion Toxicity vol% 0.28 mj 50 MJ/kg No known toxic effects

176 V. Annexes page V.22 COMPOSITION LNG is typically a mixture of hydrocarbons consisting mainly of methane with smaller fractions of inter alia ethane, propane and nitrogen. The LNG imported to Zeebrugge typically consists of methane (90 weight percent) and ethane (10 weight percent). Components such as water vapour, carbon dioxide and heavier hydrocarbons have already been removed from the LNG. When the LNG is vaporised, it is methane that is first released as vapour. This is due to the difference in atmospheric boiling point between methane and ethane. More precisely, the vapour will consist almost entirely of pure methane as long as no more than around 70% of the liquid has been vaporised. PHYSICOCHEMICAL PROPERTIES Methane is a colourless and almost odourless gas. When LNG is released into the environment, cold vapours are formed that result in condensation of the water vapour present in the air. This phenomenon means that LNG vapour is visible at low temperature due to the mist created. The cold vapours formed by the vaporising of LNG are initially heavier than air and disperse close to the ground. As they mix with the ambient air, the cold LNG vapours gradually heat up and will behave neutrally at temperatures of around -110 C, eventually becoming lighter than air under normal pressure and temperature conditions. At ambient temperature and pressure, natural gas has a density of around 0.72 kg/m 3. HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES LNG vapour in air is flammable within specific concentration limits. As LNG vapour consists mainly of methane, the flammability limits of methane ( vol%) are generally used to estimate the size of the flammable clouds formed after an incidental release of LNG. It should also be noted that free natural gas clouds, once ignited, burn at a relatively low speed, which means that only relatively small overpressures are likely to occur in an open environment ( 50 mbarg) [41]. Only if the flammable natural gas cloud formed is confined or is present in an installation with a high obstacle density may higher overpressures possibly occur in the surrounding area. A pool fire or jet fire that occurs after an incidental release of LNG is characterised by a bright flame (little soot formation) and a high radiation intensity (typically: kw/m²). The effects of an LNG fire on nearby people or installations are therefore greater than those of fires that occur after an incidental release of conventional fuels such as petrol or diesel. Finally, it should be noted that direct contact with LNG (as a cryogenic liquid) can result in serious freezing injuries. If LNG comes into contact with steel, the steel will embrittle due to the low temperature and a steel structure may fracture. Stainless steel retains its ductility at low temperatures and is therefore more resistant to contact with cryogenic liquids.

177 V. Annexes page V.23 V.4. Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments

178 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments Table B4.1: Max. impact distances of accidents involving atmospheric LNG tanks installation Atmospheric single containment LNG tanks Single containment tank m³ in a conventional bund Single containment tank m³ in a conventional bund failure or release scenario rupture Release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture Release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact distance [m] weather type time fraction failure frequency [/year] outcome probability total frequency [/year] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 235 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 235 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 235 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 235 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 235 / E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 flash fire burning E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 18 50/ E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / 44 15/50/ E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 40 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 13 / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 21 / 14 15/ E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 20 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 310 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 310 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 310 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 310 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 215 / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 310 / E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 flash fire burning E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 30 / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 60 / 50 15/30/50/ E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 42 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 13 / 7 50/ E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 22 / 15 15/ E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 20 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 Page 1 of 4

179 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation Single containment tank m³ in a conventional bund Atmospheric double containment LNG tanks Double containment tank m³ Double containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit failure or release scenario rupture Release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 380 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 380 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 380 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 380 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 225 / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 380 / E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 flash fire burning E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 30 / 20 50/ E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 65 / 50 15/ E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 45 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 14 / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 23 / 16 15/ E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 22 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 990 / E E-09 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 990 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 590 / E E-09 Release in 10 min. pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 900 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 150 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 45 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 18 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 145 / E E-09 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 145 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 90 / 70 50/ E E-09 Release in 10 min. pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 90 / 70 50/ E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 150 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 45 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 18 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 Page 2 of 4

180 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation Double containment tank m³ Double containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit Double containment tank m³ Double containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit failure or release scenario rupture Release in 10 min. incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 1250 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1250 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 760 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1120 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 160 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 49 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 18 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E E-09 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 100 / E E-09 Release in 10 min. pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 160 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 49 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 18 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 1580 / E E-09 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1580 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 980 / E E-09 Release in 10 min. pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1400 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 169 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 49 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 20 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 195 / E E-09 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 195 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / 85 50/ E E-09 Release in 10 min. pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 110 / 85 50/ E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-09 large leak flash fire burning 169 F E-4 (1-0.09)* E-05 medium leak flash fire burning 49 F E-4 (1-0.02)* E-06 small leak flash fire burning 20 D E-3 (1-0.02)* E-05 Page 3 of 4

181 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation Atmospheric full containment LNG tanks Full containment tank m³ Full containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit Full containment tank m³ Full containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit Full containment tank m³ Full containment tank m³ with an emergency retention pit failure or release scenario rupture Release in 10 min. rupture Release in 10 min. rupture Release in 10 min. rupture Release in 10 min. rupture Release in 10 min. rupture Release in 10 min. incident outcome effect max. impact distance [m] weather type time fraction failure frequency [/year] outcome probability total frequency [/year] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 990 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 990 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 590 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 900 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 145 / E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 145 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 90 / 70 50/90 1 1E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 90 / 70 50/90 1 1E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 1250 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1250 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 760 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1120 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 100 / E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 1580 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1580 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 980 / E E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 1400 / E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.3)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 195 / E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 195 / E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 195 / E E-10 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 110 / 85 50/90 1 1E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 flash fire burning E-8 (1-0.09)* E-10 Page 4 of 4

182 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments Table B4.2: Max. impact distances of accidents involving vacuum-insulated pressure tanks installation failure or release max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency incident outcome effect scenario distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Vacuum-insulated pressure tanks filled with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 1 pressure tank 100 m³ (no bund) 1 pressure tank 100 m³ bund: 22,5 x 9,5 m rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 200 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 270 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 100 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / / E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 160 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 68 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 145 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 80 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 62 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 90 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 60 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 78 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 1 of 15

183 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 2 pressure tanks 100 m³ bund: 22,5 x 14 m 1 pressure tank 250 m³ (no bund) failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 74 / 82 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 104 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 74 / 82 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 74 / 82 50/ E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 102 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 60 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 74 / 82 50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 90 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 280 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 410 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 145 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 240 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 240 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 94 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 205 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 200 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 2 of 15

184 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 250 m³ bund: 29 x 10,5 m 2 pressure tanks 250 m³ bund: 29 x 16 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 110 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 105 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 100 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 82 / 90 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 125 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 3 of 15

185 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 3 pressure tanks 250 m³ bund: 29 x 21,5 m 1 pressure tank 500 m³ (no bund) failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 140 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 100 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 82 / 90 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 140 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 350 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 540 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 195 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 310 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 340 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 95 / 75 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 210 / / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 200 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 4 of 15

186 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 500 m³ bund: 36 x 11 m 2 pressure tanks 500 m³ bund: 36 x 17 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 110 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 120 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 120 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 98 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 84 / 90 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 140 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 5 of 15

187 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 3 pressure tanks 500 m³ bund: 36 x 23 m 1 pressure tank 700 m³ (no bund) failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 170 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 112 / / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 170 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 86 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 150 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 390 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 640 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 220 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 350 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 410 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 270 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 270 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 6 of 15

188 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 700 m³ bund: 41 x 11,5 m 3pressure tanks 700 m³ bund: 41 x 24,5 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 135 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 190 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 122 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 190 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 180 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 7 of 15

189 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 5 pressure tanks 700 m³ bund: 41 x 37,5 m failure or release scenario incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-07 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 1.46E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 230 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 150 / / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 230 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 124 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 210 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / 14 15/50/ E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 44 / 34 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 40 E E-6 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 10 / 5 50/ E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 15 / 11 15/30/50/ E-5 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 22 D E-5 (1-0.02)* E-06 Vacuum-insulated pressure tanks filled with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 1 pressure tank 100 m³ (no bund) rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 160 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 292 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 85 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 80 / E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 211 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 70 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 80 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 8 of 15

190 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 100 m³ bund: 22,5 x 9,5 m 2 pressure tanks 100 m³ bund: 22,5 x 14 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / 70 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 292 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 85 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / 70 15/30/50/ E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 211 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 70 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / 70 50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 74 / 82 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 292 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 85 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 74 / 80 50/ E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 211 F E-7 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 70 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 74 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 150 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 9 of 15

191 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 250 m³ (no bund) 1 pressure tank 250 m³ bund: 29 x 10,5 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 230 / /50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 441 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 120 / 90 15/50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 381 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 95 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 110 / 90 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 255 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 441 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 381 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 95 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 68 / 82 15/50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 255 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 10 of 15

192 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 2 pressure tanks 250 m³ bund: 29 x 16 m 3 pressure tanks 250 m³ bund: 29 x 21,5 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 441 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 381 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 95 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / 98 50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 255 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 441 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 381 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 95 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 100 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 255 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 11 of 15

193 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 500 m³ (no bund) 1 pressure tank 500 m³ bund: 36 x 11 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 290 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 595 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 165 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 160 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 610 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 100 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 120 / / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 260 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 595 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 165 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 610 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 100 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 76 / 90 15/30/50/ E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 260 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 12 of 15

194 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 2 pressure tanks 500 m³ bund: 36 x 17 m 3 pressure tanks 500 m³ bund: 36 x 23 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 5.82E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 595 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 165 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 610 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 100 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 98 / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 260 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 595 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 165 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 610 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 100 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 112 / / E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 260 F E-6 (1-0.04)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 13 of 15

195 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 1 pressure tank 700 m³ (no bund) 1 pressure tank 700 m³ bund: 41 x 11,5 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 330 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 685 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 190 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 180 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 760 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 160 / / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 380 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 2.91E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 685 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 190 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / 98 50/ E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 760 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 82 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 380 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 14 of 15

196 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 3pressure tanks 700 m³ bund: 41 x 24,5 m 5 pressure tanks 700 m³ bund: 41 x 37,5 m failure or release scenario rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak rupture release in 10 min. large leak medium leak small leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [/year] probability [/year] Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-08 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 8.74E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 685 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 190 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 760 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 380 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 122 / E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-08 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-07 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-07 Bleve + fireball heat radiation + overpressure E E-07 Bleve overpressure E-7 (1-0.09) 1.46E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 685 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 190 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 760 F E-7 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 125 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 150 / / E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 380 F E-6 (1-0.09)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 32 / E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 32 / 24 15/ E-6 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 52 F E-6 (1-0.02)* E-07 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 16 / E E-06 Fakkelbrand - vertraagd heat radiation 16 / E-5 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 18 F E-5 (1-0.02)* E-06 Page 15 of 15

197 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments Table B4.3: Max. impact distances of accidents that occur during ship (un)loading activities with fixed arms failure or release installation scenario LNG fixed arms - (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 4" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works incident outcome effect max. impact distance [m] weather type time fraction [h] failure frequency [/h] outcome probability total frequency [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / /200 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / /200 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 230 F /200 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / /200 3E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ /200 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 46 D /200 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / /200 3E-8* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / /200 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 230 F /200 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / /200 3E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ /200 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 46 F /200 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / /200 3E-8* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / /200 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 145 F /200 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / /200 3E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ /200 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 24 E /200 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / /500 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / /500 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 360 F /500 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ /500 3E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 56 F /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / /500 3E-8* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / /500 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 360 F /500 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ /500 3E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / /500 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 56 F /500 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / /500 3E-8* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / /500 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 215 F /500 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ /500 3E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / /500 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 36 E /500 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 Page 1 of 5

198 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 8" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 8" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 12" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / /1000 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / /1000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 490 F /1000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / /1000 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / /1000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 68 F /1000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / /1000 3E-8* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / /1000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 490 F /1000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / /1000 3E-7* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / /1000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 68 F /1000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / /1000 3E-8* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / /1000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 295 F /1000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / /1000 3E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / /1000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 48 E /1000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / /1500 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / /1500 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 570 F /1500 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / /1500 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 88 F /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / /1500 3E-8* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / /1500 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 570 F /1500 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / /1500 3E-7* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ /1500 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 88 F /1500 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / /1500 3E-8* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / /1500 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 355 F /1500 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / /1500 3E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ /1500 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 60 E /1500 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / /2000 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / /2000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 630 F /2000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / /2000 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / /2000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 108 F /2000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 Page 2 of 5

199 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 12" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading arm without emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading arm with manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works shutdown works Vapour return arms - (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 3" vapour return arm (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" vapour return arm (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" vapour return arm (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 7" vapour return arm (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / /2000 3E-8* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / /2000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 630 F /2000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / /2000 3E-7* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / /2000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 108 F /2000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / /2000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / /2000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 385 F /2000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / /2000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / /2000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 72 F /2000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / /3000 3E E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / /3000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 730 F /3000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / /3000 3E E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / /3000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 130 F /3000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / /3000 3E-8* E-09 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / /3000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-09 flash fire burning 730 F /3000 3E-8*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-09 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / /3000 3E-7* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / /3000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 130 F /3000 3E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / /3000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / /3000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-08 flash fire burning 415 F /3000 3E-8*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-08 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / /3000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / /3000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 80 F /3000 3E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-07 rupture rupture jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation / /500 3E-8 3E-8 (1-0.02)* (1-0.02)* E E-07 flash fire flash fire burning burning F15 F / /500 3E-8 3E E E-07 leak jet fire heat radiation /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 rupture leak rupture leak jet fire heat radiation /1000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 3 D15/F /1000 3E E-07 jet fire heat radiation 4 50/ /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 3 D15/E30/F /1500 3E E-07 jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation / /1500 3E-8 3E-8 (1-0.02)* (1-0.02)* E E-08 flash fire flash fire burning burning F15 F / /1500 3E-8 3E E E-08 Page 3 of 5

200 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 8" vapour return arm (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 10" vapour return arm (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario LNG fixed arms - (un)loading of warm LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 4" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 8" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 12" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading arm (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) Vapour return arms - (un)loading of warm LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 3" vapour return arm (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" vapour return arm (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" vapour return arm (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] jet fire heat radiation /2000 3E-8 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 80 F /2000 3E E-08 jet fire heat radiation 5 50/ /2000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 4 F /2000 3E E-07 jet fire heat radiation /3000 3E-8 (1-0.02)* E-08 flash fire burning 106 F /3000 3E E-08 jet fire heat radiation 6 50/ /3000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 6 F /3000 3E E-07 jet fire heat radiation 60 / /200 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 140 F /200 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 16 / /200 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 25 F /200 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 86 / /500 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 260 F /500 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 24 / /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 35 F /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 125 / /1000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 420 F /1000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 30 / /1000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 50 F /1000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 145 / / /1500 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 541 F /1500 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 34 / /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 70 F /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 160 / /2000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 640 F /2000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 42 / /2000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 85 F /2000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-07 jet fire heat radiation 185 / /3000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 861 F /3000 3E-8 (1-0.09)* E-08 jet fire heat radiation 46 / /3000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 101 F /3000 3E-7 (1-0.04)* E-07 rupture jet fire heat radiation /200 3E-8 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 24 F /200 3E E-07 leak jet fire heat radiation /200 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 rupture jet fire heat radiation /500 3E-8 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 36 F /500 3E E-07 leak jet fire heat radiation /500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-06 rupture leak jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation / /1000 3E-8 3E-7 (1-0.04)* (1-0.02)* E E-06 flash fire flash fire burning burning 60 3 F15 alle / /1000 3E-8 3E E E-07 Page 4 of 5

201 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 7" vapour return arm (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 8" vapour return arm (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 10" vapour return arm (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type fraction [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] jet fire heat radiation /1500 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 74 F /1500 3E E-08 jet fire heat radiation 5 50/ /1500 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 3 alle /1500 3E E-07 jet fire heat radiation /2000 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 88 F /2000 3E E-08 jet fire heat radiation /2000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 4 D15/D50/E /2000 3E E-07 jet fire heat radiation /3000 3E-8 (1-0.04)* E-08 flash fire burning 118 F /3000 3E E-08 jet fire heat radiation /3000 3E-7 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 6 D15/D50/E /3000 3E E-07 Page 5 of 5

202 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments Table B4.4: Max. impact distances of accidents that occur during ship (un)loading activities with flexible hoses failure or release installation scenario LNG flexible hoses - (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 4" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works incident outcome effect max. impact distance [m] weather type time fraction [h] failure frequency [/h] outcome probability total frequency [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-05 flash fire burning 230 F / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 46 D / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / / E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 230 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / / E-6* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 46 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 78 / / E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 92 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 145 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 22 / / E-6* E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 24 / 14 15/50/ / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 24 E / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 360 F / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 56 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / / E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 360 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ / E-6* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 56 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 110 / / E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 124 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 215 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 28 / 16 50/ / E-6* E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 34 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 36 E / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-05 Page 1 of 5

203 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 8" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 8" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 12" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time fraction failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 490 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / / E E-05 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 68 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / / E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 490 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / / E-6* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 68 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 136 / / E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 162 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 295 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 36 / / E-6* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 42 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 48 E / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 570 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 88 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / / E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 570 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / / E-6* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 88 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 160 / / E-7* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 190 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 355 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 42 / / E-6* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 48 / 30 50/ / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 60 E / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 630 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 108 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 Page 2 of 5

204 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 12" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading hose without an emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading hose with a manual emergency shutdown system (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency shutdown works shutdown works Vapour return hoses - (un)loading of cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) 3" vapour return hose (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" vapour return hose (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" vapour return hose (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 7" vapour return hose (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture - emergency shutdown fails leak - emergency shutdown fails rupture - emergency shutdown works leak - emergency incident outcome effect max. impact weather time fraction failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / / E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 630 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / / E-6* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 108 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.02)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 180 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 215 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 385 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 48 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 56 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 72 F / E-6*0.9 (1-0.02)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 730 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / / E E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 130 F / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / / E-7* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 flash fire burning 730 F / E-7*0.1 (1-0.09)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / / E-6* E-07 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / / E-6*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-07 flash fire burning 130 F / E-6*0.1 (1-0.04)* E-07 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 210 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 250 / / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 415 F / E-7*0.9 (1-0.09)* E-06 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 54 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 62 / / E-6*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 80 F / E-6*0.9 (1-0.04)* E-06 rupture rupture jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation / / E E-07 (1-0.02)* (1-0.02)* E E-06 flash fire flash fire burning burning F15 F / / E E E E-06 leak jet fire heat radiation / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 rupture leak rupture leak jet fire heat radiation 4 50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 3 D15/E30/F / E E-06 jet fire jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation heat radiation / / / E E E-07 (1-0.02)* (1-0.02)* (1-0.02)* E E E-06 flash fire flash fire flash fire burning burning burning F15 D15/F15 F / / / E E E E E E-07 Page 3 of 5

205 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 8" vapour return hose (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 10" vapour return hose (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario LNG flexible hoses - (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) 4" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 6" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 8" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) 10" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 12" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 14" (un)loading hose (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) Vapour return hoses - (un)loading of warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) 3" vapour return hose (flow rate: 200 m³/h LNG) 4" vapour return hose (flow rate: 500 m³/h LNG) 6" vapour return hose (flow rate: 1000 m³/h LNG) rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time fraction failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 80 F / E E-07 jet fire heat radiation 5 50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 4 F / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.02)* E-07 flash fire burning 106 F / E E-07 jet fire heat radiation 6 50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 6 F / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation 60 / / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-05 flash fire burning 140 F / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-05 jet fire heat radiation 16 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-04 flash fire burning 25 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 jet fire heat radiation 86 / / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 260 F / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 24 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 35 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 jet fire heat radiation 125 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 420 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 30 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 50 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 jet fire heat radiation 145 / / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 541 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 34 / / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 70 F / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 160 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 640 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 42 / / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-05 flash fire burning 85 F / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-05 jet fire heat radiation 185 / / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 flash fire burning 861 F / E-07 (1-0.09)* E-06 jet fire heat radiation 46 / / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-05 flash fire burning 101 F / E-06 (1-0.04)* E-06 rupture jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 24 F / E E-06 leak jet fire heat radiation / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-04 rupture jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 36 F / E E-06 leak jet fire heat radiation / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 rupture leak jet fire jet fire heat radiation heat radiation / / E E-06 (1-0.04)* (1-0.02)* E E-05 flash fire flash fire burning burning 60 3 F15 alle / / E E E E-05 Page 4 of 5

206 Annex 4: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur involving LNG installations and activities within demarcated establishments installation 7" vapour return hose (flow rate: 1500 m³/h LNG) 8" vapour return hose (flow rate: 2000 m³/h LNG) 10" vapour return hose (flow rate: 3000 m³/h LNG) failure or release scenario rupture leak rupture leak rupture leak incident outcome effect max. impact weather time fraction failure frequency outcome total frequency distance [m] type [h] [/h] probability [/100,000m³] jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 74 F / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation 5 50/ / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 3 alle / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 88 F / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-05 flash fire burning 4 /D15/D50/E30/ / E E-06 jet fire heat radiation / E-07 (1-0.04)* E-06 flash fire burning 118 F / E E-07 jet fire heat radiation / E-06 (1-0.02)* E-06 flash fire burning 6 /D15/D50/E30/ / E E-06 Page 5 of 5

207 V. Annexes page V.24 V.5. Annex 5: Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport

208 Annex 5 - Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport Table B5.1: Max. impact distances of accidents occuring during LNG road transports failure or release installation incident outcome scenario LNG trucks with single-walled pressure tank filled with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) LNG road transport on a motorway LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 1 lane) LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 2 lanes) effect max. impactt distance [m] weather type time fraction release frequency [/m.year] outcome probability total frequency [/m.year] pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 flash fire burning 230 F E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-14 flash fire burning 72 E30/F E-7/1000*0.052* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 125 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 125 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 160 F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 84 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 62 E30/F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 230 F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 72 E30/F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 LNG trucks with single-walled pressure tank filled with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 LNG road transport on a motorway LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 1 lane) rupture Cold Bleve overpressure E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 Plasbrand heat radiation 155 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 flash fire burning 211 E E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7/1000*0.052* E-13 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 54 / 42 15/50/ E-7/1000*0.052* E-14 flash fire burning 124 F E-7/1000*0.052* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 rupture Cold Bleve overpressure E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Plasbrand heat radiation 120 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 176 E E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 52 / 36 50/ E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 124 F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 Page 1 of 3

209 Annex 5 - Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport installation LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 2 lanes) failure or release scenario incident outcome effect max. impactt distance [m] weather type time fraction release frequency [/m.year] outcome probability total frequency [/m.year] Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Cold Bleve overpressure E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Plasbrand heat radiation 155 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 211 E E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 54 / 42 15/50/ E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 flash fire burning 124 F E-7/1000*0.034* E-13 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-11/ E-14 Vacuum-insulated LNG trucks filled with cold LNG (-160 C, 150 mbarg) LNG road transport on a motorway LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 1 lane) LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 2 lanes) pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 flash fire burning 230 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-15 flash fire burning 72 E30/F E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-15 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 125 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 125 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 160 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 84 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 62 E30/F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 rupture pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 165 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 230 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 pool fire - direct ign. heat radiation 40 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 86 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 72 E30/F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 Vacuum-insulated LNG trucks filled with warm LNG (-138 C, 4 barg) Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 LNG road transport on a motorway rupture leak rupture Cold Bleve overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 Plasbrand heat radiation 155 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 flash fire burning 211 E E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 54 / 42 15/50/ E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-15 flash fire burning 124 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.052* E-15 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 Page 2 of 3

210 Annex 5 - Calculated impact distances for accidents that could occur during LNG road transport installation LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 1 lane) LNG road transport on a regional road (2 x 2 lanes) failure or release scenario incident outcome effect max. impactt distance [m] weather type time fraction release frequency [/m.year] outcome probability total frequency [/m.year] Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 rupture Cold Bleve overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Plasbrand heat radiation 120 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 176 E E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 52 / 36 50/ E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 124 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 Cold Bleve + vuurbal heat radiation + overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 rupture Cold Bleve overpressure E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Plasbrand heat radiation 155 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 211 E E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Fakkelbrand - direct heat radiation 54 / E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 leak pool fire - delayed ign. heat radiation 54 / 42 15/50/ E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 flash fire burning 124 F E-7*0.1/1000*0.034* E-14 Hot BLEVE Bleve heat radiation + overpressure E-12/ E-15 Page 3 of 3

211 V. Annexes page V.25 V.6. Annex 6: Draft designs for LNG bunker vessels and feeder vessels

212 V. Annexes page V.26 V.6.1. LNG bunker vessel (capacity: 800 m³)

213 V. Annexes page V.27 V.6.2. LNG bunker vessel (capacity: 1,500 m³)

214 V. Annexes page V.28 V.6.3. LNG feeder vessel (capacity: 7,500 m³)

215 V. Annexes page V.29 V.6.4. LNG feeder vessel (capacity: 20,000 m³)