Accident Management and Emergency Preparedness of Korea in Regulatory Perspective

Transcription

1 TM on Accident Management Guidelines and Emergency Preparedness/Response (TM J , IAEA, Vienna, Austria) Accident Management and Emergency Preparedness of Korea in Regulatory Perspective September 27-29, 2017 AUH, Geun-Sun Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety

2 Table of Contents 1. Responses to Fukushima Accident 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response 4. Topics to Discuss on SAMGs and EPR 5. Closing Remarks u Appendix I. NPP Status of Korea u Appendix II. Historical Background u Appendix III. Stress Test of NPPs 2

3 1. Responses to Fukushima Accident (1) uspecial Inspections by Regulatory Body (~ May 2011) Inspection teams organized by regulatory inspectors and external experts 21 operating nuclear power plants and 1 research reactors uobjectives of the Special Inspections Design and operation measures against natural Mitigation capability against severe accident Effectiveness of emergency response system uenforcement order to implement 50 action items identified by the inspection To minimize the impact of extreme natural hazards disasters (e.g., Automatic Reactor Trip System in earthquake) To make emergency power and ultimate heat sink available (e.g., Mobile Generator) To prevent and mitigate severe accidents (e.g., Water Injection Systems to primary/secondary systems) 3

4 1. Responses to Fukushima Accident (2) unuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) reviewed the effectiveness and the status of Fukushima Action Items (March 2014) ubased on the review results, NSSC issued supplemental administrative order for the licensees to implement additional 3 action items (March 2014) : Additional Action Items Improving the emergency response measures against man-made disasters as well as natural disasters Operating an dedicated emergency response organization for severe accident management Securing emergency response center(facility) to protect emergency workers and to secure equipment for command and control 4

5 1. Responses to Fukushima Accident (3) unssc decided to require Stress Tests for old plants (April 2013) Objectives Evaluation of coping capability against large scale natural disasters that beyond design basis (Appendix III for details) Scope Wolsong Unit 1 and Kori Unit 1 (more than 30 years of operation) unssc decided to expand the scope of Stress Tests to include all operating NPPs (September 2015) Phase 1 Perform Stress Tests for a few selected NPPs that can represent various designs of all operating NPPs Phase 2 Prioritization of the rest of NPPs considering their plant-specific aspects in comparison with the results of Stress Tests for the representative NPPs Stress Tests for the rest of the NPPs focusing on the plant-specific aspects 5

6 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (1) ubackground of the Amendment of NSA Previous regulatory activities on severe accidents were on the basis of administrative orders (Appendix II for details). After Fukushima accident, National Assembly decided that regulation on severe accident should have clear legal basis. uamendment of Nuclear Safety Act (2015) National Assembly amended the Nuclear Safety Act to clearly stipulate the regulatory control on severe accident. The amendment requires that Accident Management Program (including severe accident management) shall be submitted in the application of operating license of NPPs. The effective date of the amendment is 23 June, The amendment also requires that AMPs for existing (operating) reactors shall be submitted to NSSC within 3 years after the effective date. 6

7 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (2) usubsequent rulemaking after the Amendment of NSA To support the amendment of NSA, subsequent rulemaking was done to amend the presidential decree, the prime ministry s decree and NSSC rules (June 2016). 7

8 Background - Plant States, TECDOC-1791(2016) - 8

9 Background - Defense in Depth, TECDOC-1791(2016) - 9

10 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (3) ubasic Concept for Accident Management Program Definition of Accident Management by Nuclear Safety Act A set of actions to prevent the escalation of accidents, to mitigate the consequence of accidents and to recover a nuclear power plant from accident conditions Level Plant State (Accident Condition) Management Measures Adoption of IAEA s Defense in Depth (DiD) Concept Design Basis Accident Prevention of Severe Accident Mitigation of Severe Accident Single failure of Safety System Design Basis Event (Seismic, Flood, ) Multiple failure of Safety System Extreme natural/man-made hazards Core melt-down Engineered safety features Emergency procedures SA prevention features SA prevention guidelines SA mitigation features SA mitigation guidelines (3) recovery (1) Prevention of escalation (2) Mitigation of consequence New rules explicitly introduce additional two levels of defense, the prevention and mitigation of severe accident. 10

11 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (4) 11

12 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (5) (Sum of frequencies for the accident scenarios being exceeded) 12

13 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (6) 13

14 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (7) uaccidents considered in the prevention level Multiple Failure Accidents ATWS, Station black out, Accidents from extreme natural/man-made hazards Tsunami, Aircraft impact, ucapabilities to control accidents from multiple failures Design/operational measures to prevent the significant damage of fuel in reactor core or spent fuel pool ucapabilities to control accidents from extreme hazards Strategy and measures (including mobile equipment) to recover and maintain safety functions including core cooling, SFP cooling, 14

15 2. Rulemaking on Accident Management Program (8) uphenomena considered in the mitigation level Hydrogen explosion Over pressure/temperature of the containment Fuel-coolant interaction, MCCI, Direct Containment Heating, ucapabilities to control severe accident phenomena To maintain containment integrity against severe accident phenomena by control of hydrogen, To prevent large release of radioactive materials to the environment 15

16 u Amendments on the Nuclear Safety Act (NSA) l Article 20 (Operating License) Applicant shall submit the Accident Management Program (AMP) as one of OL application documents. ØInclude the Severe accident in the AMP l Article 21 (Acceptance Criteria) AMP shall meet the acceptance criteria set up by NSSC (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission). l Addenda Existing NPPs (NPPs in operation or under regulatory reviews for operating licenses on the effective date of the amendment) shall submit the Accident Management Programs within three years. ØAll existing NPPs shall submit their AMPs by June

17 u Amendments on the Enforcement Regulations of the NSA l Article 4 (Application of construction permit) Applicant shall submit the Preliminary Accident Management Program (PAMP) as one of CP application documents. l Article 9 (Application of standard design certificate) Applicant shall submit the Preliminary Accident Management Program (PAMP) as one of SDC application documents. l Article 16 (Application of operating license) The AMP shall cover the followings; ØScope of accidents and equipment to control them ØAccident management strategies ØAccident management implementation framework ØEvaluation of accident management capabilities (Include PSA) ØEducation and training 17

18 u Amendments on the Regulations on Technical Standards for Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Etc. l Article (Evaluation of accident management capability) Evaluation of accident management capability shall verify the followings; ØLarge release which may cause long term off-site contamination or significant public health effect shall be prevented. ØRisk increase from the operation of NPP shall be extremely low. Both deterministic approach and probabilistic approach shall be used in the evaluation of accident management capability. Details for the evaluation of accident management capability shall be determined by NSSC. 18

19 u Legislation of new NSSC rules for the details for the evaluation of accident management capability l Article 9 (Risk evaluation) Technical adequacy, level of details and scope of PSA should be appropriate for comprehensive evaluation of risk from the accident of the NPP. Risk targets ØThe prompt fatality or cancer fatality risks of the population near a NPP from the accident should not exceed 0.1% of the sum of risks resulting from all other causes; or the equivalent performance goals for the prompt fatality and the caner fatality risks should be satisfied. ØThe sum of frequencies for the accident scenarios in which the amount of Cs-137 release exceeds 100 TBq should be less than 1.0E-06/ry. PSA results should be utilized to enhance the capability in prevention and mitigation of severe accidents. l Addenda PSA results should be used in selecting the accidents which shall be analyzed with a deterministic approach. 19

20 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (1) l In the event of a nuclear emergency, Generic Criteria are applied. l Public within PAZ are evacuated at General Emergency to prevent deterministic effects. l System of Generic and Operational Criteria of GSG-2 20

21 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (2) Dosimetric quantities and their application in emergency exposure situations (GSG-2) 21

22 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (3) Pathways, Phases and Protective Actions 22

23 Default OIL for Field Survey (GSG-2, page36~36) OIL OIL value Response action OIL 1 OIL 2 OIL 3 Gamma, 1000 μsv/h at 1 m count/s (β) surface - 50 counts/s (α) surface Gamma, 100 μsv/h at 1 m count/s (β) surface - 10 counts/s (α) surface Gamma, 1 μsv/h at 1 m - 20 count/s (β) surface - 2 counts/s (α) surface - Immediately evacuate or substantial shelter - Stop consumption of local produced, rainwater and milk - Stop consumption of local produced, rainwater and milk - Temporarily relocate those living in the area - Stop consumption of non-essential local produced - Screen local produce, rainwater and milk - Consider providing iodine thyroid blocking OIL 4 OIL 5 Gamma, 1 μsv/h at 10 cm from skin count/s (β), skin - 50 counts/s (α), skin Gross beta, 100 Bq/kg or Gross alpha, 5Bq/kg - Provide for skin decontamination and reduce inadvertent ingestion - Register and provide for a medical examination Above OIL5: Assess using OIL6 Below OIL5: Safe for consumption during the emergency phase OIL 6 Table 10 (GSG-2) Screen local produced food, milk, and water 23

24 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (4) Generic Criteria for Urgent Protective Actions Controlling Stochastic Effects (GSR-Part7) Dosimetric quantity Projected dose in the 7 days and action Total effective dose (E) Total equivalent dose in fetus or embryo (EFetus) Committed equivalent dose in thyroid 100 msv in the first 7 days 100 msv in the first 7 days 50 msv in the first 7 days Sheltering, evacuation, decontamination, restriction of food consumption Iodine thyroid blocking 24

25 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (5) Taking protective action and other countermeasures in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency, OILs should be developed for uthe isolation of a contaminated area or dangerous source; uevacuation or substantial shelter; ustable iodine prophylaxis; udecontamination of people; udecontamination or control of vital equipment, vehicles and personal property; uimmediate medical treatment; ulong term medical monitoring; ucountermeasures against excessive doses from ingestion; ucontrol of international trade, goods and products. 25

26 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (6) Strategy" of EPR Precautionary Action Zone 3~5 km PAZ 1. Establish precautionary action zone (PAZ) in advance and do precautionary urgent protective actions (EAL, General Emergency) - to prevent the deterministic effects 2. From (projected) dose assessment result, to perform protective actions in accordance with GIL (Generic Intervention Level) - to reduce stochastic effect - before radiological materials release 3. Based on environmental monitoring (sampling and analysis) results, to perform protective actions applying OIL(Operational Intervention Level) - to reduce stochastic effect - after radiological materials release 26 26

27 Emergency Planning Zone of Korea (May, 2015) ( cf., IAEA GS-G-2.1) Classification PAZ UPZ Definition Protective actions within this area are to be taken before or shortly after a release of radioactive materials on the basis of conditions at the facility Protective actions within this area are to be taken on the basis of environmental monitoring, or, as appropriate, conditions at the facility Area Map Naming Range PAZ 3 ~ 5 km UPZ 20 ~ 30 km 27

28 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (7) l Response stage(iaea GS-G-2.1) 2Public Protective Action by Dose prediction Results National Environmental Monitoring (IERNet) Off-Site Environmental Monitoring 1 Evacuation on General Emergency PAZ (3~5km) 3 Public Protective Action by Environmental Monitoring Results Assembly Place UPZ(Urgent Protective action planning Zone)(20-30 km) cf. PAZ(Precautionary Action Zone) OEMC LEMC Evacuation center (msv) 28 28

29 Public Protection Action Strategy Flow Chart Red Emergency Declaration PAZ Residents Sheltering Evacuation of Affected Area Radioactive Material Release to Environ. Initiation of Environmental Monitoring Public Protection Action per OILs 29

30 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (8) Standards for Urgent Public Protection Actions Generic Intervention Level(GIL) (cf., IAEA) Classification Korea Standards Remarks Sheltering Evacuation 10mSv (2 days) 50mSv (1 week) Short-Term Protection Short-Term Protection Iodine Prophylaxis 100mGy Short/Mid-Term Protection Temporary Relocation 30mSv/first one month 10mSv/next one month Mid-Term Protection Permanent Settlement 1Sv/lifetime Long-Term Protection 30

31 Standards for Restrictions on Ingestion of Food l Mid & Long Term Protection Classification Meat, Fish, Crops (Bq/kg) Vegetable Fruit (Bq/kg) Water Milk (Bq/L) Infant Food (Bq/kg) Group1 Cs-134, Cs-137, Ru-103, Ru-106, Sr-89 2,000 1, Group2 I-131, Sr-90 1, Group3 U-235, U Group5 Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu- 240, Pu Group5 H kbq/l Ministry of Food and Drug Safety s Standards for normal times - I(131): all food 100 Bq/kg,L - Cs( ): infant food 50 Bq/kg,L, other food 100 Bq/kg,L 31

32 4. Topics to Discuss on SAMGs and EPR (1) u Implementation of accident management guidelines (SAMGs) and their interface with Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) u SAMG Implementation by KHNP and Residents Evacuation by Local Gov. u Role of KINS, NSSC, KHNP SAFE-T( 17.8, within 6 hrs. from CRI at Daejeon), Fire Station, Police, Army, Hospital, etc. u Impact on both on-site and off-site emergency response arising from the prolonged need for personnel and off-site resources u On-site Emergency Response Center (Seismic/radiation resistant facility building, 0.5g, 500 staff, 4 or 5 story-building of about 5,000m**2 at each site) by

33 Nuclear Emergency Response Steps in Korea EOF (Licensee) Emergency Operation Facility President Emergency Report Emergency MCR/TSC/OSC (Licensee) LEMC (Local Government) Direct Sheltering/Evacuation Emergency Report Protective Action Measure Order Dispatch Prime Minister NEMC (NSSC ) National Emergency Management Committee OEMC (NSSC) Off-site Emergency Management Center Site-area Emergency & General Emergency Management Decision of Protective Action OEMCAC Advise Committee JPIC Joint Public information Center Other Ministries Coordination Disaster Declaration/Cancellation Dispatch RETAC (KINS) Technical Advice Experts Dispatch Run AtomCARE system JRMC (Civil, Official. Military) Environ. Monitoring Center JREMSC Medical Service Center Dispatch REMC (KIRAMS) Medical Team Dispatch Protective Action Implementation 33

34 4. Topics to Discuss on SAMGs and EPR (2) u Consideration of the prolonged need for instrumentation and equipment necessary to assess and protect critical safety functions u (~ 8hr) Batteries, Turbine-driven Aux-Feed Pumps, Condensate Storage Tank u (~ 72hr) Mobile Generator(MG), Water Injection Systems to Primary/Secondary Sides u (72hr ~) Additional MG, Power from Grid, Outside Water Sources, Fire Trucks u Information needed to make decisions regarding protective actions u Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6&7 NPP of TEPCO installed 2 instrumentation systems of hydrogen concentration monitoring and water level monitoring in MCR using a back-up power source. u Selected candidate parameters for PWR : RV water level, ICI tube room water level, CV pressure, Hi range area radiation monitor, CV temperature, radiation monitoring post, CV hydrogen concentration, etc. (FK lessons learned) 34

35 5. Closing Remarks (1) u Accident Management u Applicant submit the AMP as one of OL application documents. - Include the severe accidents, OP, AOP, EOP, SAMG, etc. - All existing NPPs shall submit their AMPs by June Evaluation of accident management capabilities (including PSA) - Both deterministic approach and probabilistic approaches u Exposure Dose : 250 msv at Site Boundary u Risk targets - Prompt fatality or cancer fatality risks of the population near a NPP from the accident should not exceed 0.1% of the sum of risks resulting from all other causes. - Sum of frequencies for the accident scenarios in which the amount of Cs- 137 release exceeds 100 TBq should be less than 1.0E-06/ry. 35

36 5. Closing Remarks (2) u Emergency Preparedness u PAZ(Precautionary Action Zone) km u UPZ(Urgent Protective action planning Zone) km u Sheltering(2 days) - 10 msv u Evacuation(1 week) - 50 msv u Distribution of Iodine Prophylaxis mgy 36

37 Appendix I. NPP Status of Korea (As of September 2017) In Operation Under Construction Safe Shutdown for Decommissioning ` 24 Units in Operation (22,529 MW) Hanul 6 units Shin-Hanul 4 units(60 yrs) Wolsong 4 units Wolsong Unit 1 was shut down since Nov & operational from March 2015 ` 5 Units Under Construction (7,000 MW) Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility (Operational after 05.7) Shin-Wolsong 2 units Kori 4 units Shin-Kori 6 units(40&60 yrs) ` 2 Units under Construction Permit review ( 16.1 ~ ) (2x1400 MW) Hanbit 6 units 37

38 Joint Radiological Environmental Monitoring Aerial Survey Radioactive Airborne Dust Sampling Marine Survey Car-borne Survey Data/location transmission Mobile Monitoring Post National Wide Systems (IRENet) SIREN System for Identifying Radiation in Environments Nationwide 38 In Situ Gamma Spectroscopy

39 Korea China Japan - Joint Emergency Drill (JED) Ø Participants in the TRM Drill (Nov , 2014, Kori Site) Korea (10) : NSSC(3), KINS(3), KORSAFe(2), interpreters(2) China (2) : NSC(2) - liaison official(1) and observer(1) Japan (5) : NRA(5) - liaison officials(2) and observers(3) Ø Respective message regarding measures by stage(event scenario) Time Details Stage 09:58 IAEA receiving early notification message 1 Blue(Site) Emergency 10:31 IAEA receiving early notification message 2 Blue(Site) Emergency 11:23 IAEA receiving early notification message 3 Red(General) Emergency 11:23 IAEA receiving early notification message 4 Public Protection Measure 11:55 IAEA receiving early notification message 5 Red(General) Emergency 12:25 IAEA receiving early notification message 6 Environmental Monitoring 39

40 Appendix II. Historical Background (1) utmi Accident (1979) The first severe accident of NPP in human history. US NRC ordered licensees to implement more than hundred Post- TMI action items after TMI accident to enhance safety of NPPs against severe accident (1980). ukorea s response after TMI accident Regulatory authority ordered the licensee to implement Post-TMI action items of US NRC (1983) Severe accident mitigation measures for new reactors were continuously strengthened, including hydrogen control after severe accident (~ 1990s). Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) for some operating reactors and all new reactors were performed. 40

41 Appendix II. Historical Background (2) usevere Accident Policy (SAP) (2001) establishes safety goals (quantitative health objectives), requires PSA for all operating and new reactors, requires design features for new reactors to prevent severe accident and, should it occur, to mitigate its consequence, and requires development and implementation of Severe Accident Management Program (SAMP) for all operating and new reactors. uimplementation of SAP by administrative orders PSAs for all reactors were completed and safety improvements identified by PSAs were implemented. SAMPs for all reactors were developed and in use. Design features for prevention and mitigation of severe accident are applied to the new reactors. 41

42 Appendix III. Stress Test of NPPs (1) NSSC s decision to require Stress Tests for old plants (April 2013) Objectives Evaluation of coping capability against large scale natural disasters that beyond design basis Scope NPPs with long operation period (more than 30 years) Ø Wolsong Unit 1 and Kori Unit 1 Methodology Based on EU Stress Test experiences and results Evaluation of large area fire hazards, human factors (errors, decision-making failures, etc.) were added. 42

43 Appendix III. Stress Test of NPPs (2) Evaluation Areas 1. Seismic Event Ø Ø Margin evaluation against seismic event Coping capability against large area damage (fire) 2. Tsunami and other natural disaster Ø Margin evaluation against tsunami, flooding, wind, 3. Loss of safety function, e.g. loss of AC power Ø Ø Evaluation of accident scenarios with loss of AC power and loss of ultimate heat sink Coping capability against such scenarios including alternative/mobile power sources 4. Severe accident management Evaluation of accident management capability for core cooling, containment integrity and SFP cooling 5. Emergency preparedness Evaluation of communication, monitoring of radiation levels, command and control, etc. 43

44 Appendix III. Stress Test of NPPs (3) How to perform 1. Evaluation guidelines provided by regulatory body 2. Performance of the Evaluation by the licensee 3. Review and Verification of the Evaluation Result by an expert organization composed of KINS staff and external experts Expectations of Stress Tests Specific evaluation of coping capability by the licensee Comprehensive improvement plan by the licensee Continuous regulatory control of implementation of the plan 44

45 Appendix III. Results of Stress Test for Wolsong Unit (4) NSSC approved the result of Stress Test for Wolsong Unit 1 (Feb. 2015), which has 19 items for improvement: Area 1 & 2 : seismic event, tsunami and natural disasters Ø 3 items (e.g. hazard re-evaluation including PSHA) Area 3 : loss of safety function 3 items (e.g. Improvement of performance of safety-grade batteries) Area 4 : severe accident management 7 items (e.g. update of SAMG) Area 5 : Emergency preparedness 2 items (e.g. on-site emergency response centre considering accident control of multiple units) Area 6 : Operation and Cross-cutting Issues 4 items (e.g. reinforcement of instrumentation for continuous monitoring of accident conditions) The licensee prioritized the items and developed a plan to implement the items for improvement by

46 Appendix III. Results of Stress Test for Kori Unit 1 (5) NSSC approved the result of Stress Test for Kori Unit 1 (Jan. 2016), which has 14 items for improvement: Area 1 & 2 : seismic event, tsunami and natural disasters Ø 2 items (e.g. seismic induced fire) Area 3 : loss of safety function 3 items (e.g. mobile generator performance) Area 4 : severe accident management 1 item (communication within site) Area 5 : Emergency preparedness 3 items (e.g. spent fuel red emergency) Area 6 : Operation and Cross-cutting Issues 4 items (e.g on-site emergency response centre habitability) Area of Permanent Shutdown(Decommissioning) 1 item (severe natural phenomena) The licensee prioritized the items and developed a plan to implement the items for improvement by

47 Appendix III. Future Plan for Stress Test (6) NSSC decided to expand the scope of Stress Tests to include all operating NPPs (September 2015) Effective Stress Tests for all operating NPPs based on experiences from the previous Stress Tests for the Wolsong unit 1 and Kori unit 1 Phased approach for Stress Tests for all operating NPPs Phase 1 (~ ) Ø Perform Stress Tests for a few selected NPPs that can represent various designs of all operating NPPs Phase 2 (~ ) Ø Ø Prioritization of the rest of NPPs considering their plant-specific aspects in comparison with the results of Stress Tests for the representative NPPs Stress Tests for the rest of the NPPs focusing on the plant-specific aspects 47

48 Appendix III. Future Plan for Stress Test (7) Duration : 2016 ~ 2020 KINS will start to review ST results of KHNP at around December,

49 Thank You for your Attention 49