Report to Haisla Nation Council. Developed by Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC

Transcription

1 Oil Spill Response Gap and Response Capacity Analysis for Proposed Northern Gateway Tanker Oil Spills in Open Water and Protected Water Operating Environments Report to Haisla Nation Council Developed by Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC July 2012

2 Contents Contents... 1 List of Tables... 2 List of Figures... 2 Authors... 4 Lead Authors and Primary Editors... 4 Contributing Authors and Analysts... 4 Meteorological Data and Analysis... 4 Executive Summary... 5 Overview... 5 Response Gap Analysis... 5 Response Capacity Analysis... 5 Conclusion... 6 Part 1: Introduction Background Northern Gateway Project Proposal Representative Operating Environments Mechanical Recovery of Marine Oil Spills Mechanical Recovery Methods Northern Gateway Oils Shipping Routes Part 2: Oil Spill Response Gap Analysis Overview Scope and Approach of Analysis Environmental Factors Assumptions Methodology Selected Operating Areas Datasets Assembled for Each Operating Area Response Operating Limits Response Gap Index Analysis Nanakwa Shoals Dixon Entrance Discussion Impact of Conservative Estimates to Response Gap Analysis Comparison with 2011 Preliminary Response Gap Study Combining Response Gap Data for Multiple Locations Along Proposed Shipping Routes Implications of Response Gap to Oil Spill Mitigation from Northern Gateway Tankers Part 3: Oil Spill Response Capacity Analysis Page 1 of 62

3 3.1 Overview of the Approach Purpose and Scope of Analysis Factors Considered in the Analysis Assumptions Methodology Response Options Calculator Oil Spill Simulation Parameters Operational Planning Parameters Spill Response Systems Equipment and Recovery Specifications Outputs from Response Options Calculator Simulations hour Recovery Estimates Task Force Requirements to Recover 10,000 m 3 spill in 72 hours Detailed Simulation Discussion Adjustment of Recovery Capacity Estimates based on Transit Times Part 4. Conclusion Part 5. References Part 6. Appendices Appendix A: ROC Output Summaries (Mass Balance) for 16 Simulations Appendix B. Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix C: Meteorological Data Summary List of Tables Table 2.1 Impact of Environmental Factors on Spill Response Operations Table 2.2. Limits Used for the Northern Gateway Response Gap Analysis Table 2.3. Applying the Response Gap Index Table 3.1. Environmental Conditions Applied for Summer and Winter Simulations at OWA and CCAA Table 3.2 Transit Times to Potential Spill Sites from Potential Oil Spill Response Hubs Table 3.3 Summary of equipment and recovery specifications used in ROC simulations Table 3.4. Summary of Recovery System Performance for All Simulations Based on ROC Outputs Table 3.5. Task Force Requirements for Sixteen Simulated Oil Spills (10,000 m3) Under Ideal Conditions as Calculated using ROC Table 3.6 Recovery Performance of a single OWTF in CLB OWA Winter Simulation Table A.1: Recovery capacity of a single NSTF for CCAA Summer Conditions Table A.2: Recovery capacity of a single NSTF for CCAA Winter Conditions Table A.3: Recovery capacity of a single OWTF for OWA Summer Conditions Table A.4: Recovery capacity of a single OWTF for OWA Winter Conditions List of Figures Figure 1.1 Proposed Oil Tanker Routes to Kitimat Marine Terminal... 7 Figure 1.2 Map Showing Open Water Area (OWA) and Confined Channel Access Area (CCAA)... 8 Figure 2.1 Methodology for Calculating Response Gap Page 2 of 62

4 Figure 2.2. Three Examples of Response Gap Index Application Figure 2.3. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, year- round Figure 2.4. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, spring/summer Figure 2.5. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, fall/winter Figure 2.6. Time periods for which response was deemed possible or not possible based on applying the RGI to environmental data at Nanakwa Shoals Figure 2.7. Scatter plot graphic showing wind, sea state (wave height and wave steepness), temperature, and day/night with RGI at Nanakwa Shoals (2005) Figure 2.8. Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, year- round Figure 2.9. Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, spring/summer Figure Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, fall/winter Figure Time periods for which response was deemed possible or not possible based on applying the RGI to environmental data at Dixon Entrance Figure Scatter plot graphic showing wind, sea state (wave height and wave steepness), temperature, and visibility with RGI at Dixon Entrance (2005) Figure Preliminary Response Gap at Locations along Proposed Shipping Route, and Response Gap Calculated Using RGI Methodology at Dixon Entrance and Nanakwa Shoals Figure Combined RGI throughout the year at both Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance Figure 3.1 Map Showing Location of Potential Spill Sites and Spill Response Hubs in Northern Gateway Tanker Region Figure 3.2 Examples of Open Water Task Force Configuration and Equipment Figure 3.3. Calculations and conversions used to derive 72- hour task force needs from ROC outputs Figure 3.4 Recovery Mass Balance Estimate for CLB OWA Winter Simulation (For One OWTF) Figure hour Oil Thickness Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Figure hour Water Content in Emulsion from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Figure hour Oil Viscosity Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Figure hour Oil Evaporation Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Page 3 of 62

5 Authors This report was compiled by Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC. Lead Authors and Primary Editors Elise DeCola Sierra Fletcher Contributing Authors and Analysts Bretwood Higman, PhD Andrew Mattox Michael Popovich Tim Robertson Meteorological Data and Analysis Uwe Gramann, P. Met. Senior Meteorologist, Mountain Weather Services Page 4 of 62

6 Overview Executive Summary The Haisla Nation Council commissioned this study to analyze capabilities and limitations related to mechanical oil spill response along the vessel routes associated with the proposed Northern Gateway project. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC analyzed the response gap and the response capacity for a spill response at two areas along the shipping routes to and from Kitimat, BC. The response gap analysis estimates how often environmental conditions will be so bad as to prevent the effective deployment of mechanical spill response equipment. The response capacity analysis estimates the quantity of forces that would be required to achieve a given on- water mechanical recovery goal. Combined, these two analytical approaches illustrate what is possible and what is required to respond effectively to a spill that could result from shipping oil along the Northern Gateway tanker routes. Response Gap Analysis The response gap analysis applied an established methodology to compare historical data on wind speed, wave steepness, temperature, and daylight with established limits at which mechanical response is not possible/effective. Historical data (January February 2012) were gathered for both Dixon Entrance (open water) and Nanakwa Shoals (protected water). The analysis considered individual factors along with the interactions among environmental factors; for example, waves of a certain height are much more limiting in the presence of a strong wind or in times of low visibility. The response gap analysis resulted in estimates that the four environmental conditions measured for the study would prevent the deployment of an effective response at Dixon Entrance 45% of the time on average over the year. (During the more severe conditions from October March, a response would not be possible approximately 68% of the time, while in the milder months from April September, a response would not be possible 24% of the time.) By contrast, the environmental factors measured would prevent an effective response at Nanakwa Shoals 7% of the time on average over the year. However, data for Nanakwa Shoals indicated that response gap periods those times when no response was feasible often spanned several consecutive days, likely due to storm events. Response Capacity Analysis The response capacity analysis was performed using the Response Options Calculator (ROC) model to calculate the equipment, vessels, and personnel that would be required to contain and recover a 10,000 m 3 oil spill in a generic open water location and a generic channel location in different seasons and with different spilled product. The model also estimates total oil recovery (Genwest Systems Inc. 2012). Based on the ROC model outputs for the 16 simulations run, the number of task forces required to contain and recover a 10,000 m 3 spill under idealized conditions within 72 hours is between 8 and 20. The low estimate 8 task forces would require 8 oil spill response vessels with 8-16 work boats, 1600m of ocean boom, and more than 300 personnel to be on- scene and recovering the oil within 8 to 12 hours of the spill (depending upon location). This estimate presumes that sufficient barge capacity would be available to support offloading of recovered oil and water from the primary skimming vessel to the barge. Bulk recovery rates across the sixteen 10,000 m 3 spill simulations ranged from 503 m 3 to 2120 m 3 depending on the location, type of oil spilled, and season. In general, more forces are required for an open water spill than for a confined channel area spill, due in part to the longer transit time for resources to arrive on- scene. Likewise, winter spills require additional task forces to achieve the necessary recovery rates because they have shorter operating periods due to reduced daylight. The response capacity estimates for the 16 spill simulations look only at initial on- water recovery and do not factor in the additional response resources that would be associated with Page 5 of 62

7 concurrent response operations, such as nearshore recovery, sensitive area protection, wildlife response, shoreline cleanup and assessment, or spill surveillance. Conclusion Conservative estimates were used throughout the analysis, so that the results represent best case scenarios. For the response gap analysis, the only environmental factors measured were those for which reliable, hourly data existed to develop the hindcast. It did not incorporate currents; ice; or visibility limitations due to fog, clouds, or precipitation. For the response capacity analysis, logistical factors, mechanical failures, human error, and the impact of on- scene conditions to the overall response are not reflected in the ROC outputs. The response resource estimates developed in the RCA address only on- water recovery of floating oil. A full- fledged oil spill response system would also incorporate nearshore recovery, sensitive area protection, wildlife response, shoreline cleanup and assessment, and surveillance/reconnaissance. The results of the two analyses conducted in this study provide a necessary basis for planning for effective response for spills to water along the shipping routes to and from Kitimat, BC. These results indicate that there are significant periods of time sometimes several days in a row during which a response would be prevented by environmental conditions even in the protected waters of Nanakwa Shoals. Even in the best conditions, significant numbers of vessels, equipment, and personnel will be needed in order to mount an effective response. Deploying these resources within 72 hours of a spill is critical to ensure the most effective response possible, but also requires significant planning, adequate training, and the deliberate placement of equipment to reduce transit times to potential spill sites. Additionally, the response gap analysis can be used to inform spill prevention planning to minimize the chances of a spill occurring when that 72 hour response window will be one of high winds, steep waves, cold temperatures, and/or long hours of darkness. Page 6 of 62

8 Part 1: Introduction 1.1 Background The Haisla Nation Council commissioned this study to analyze the capabilities and limitations to mechanical oil spill response (containment, recovery and removal of oil) in two areas along the potential vessel routes associated with the Northern Gateway project. The purpose of this study was to provide additional information as part of the regulatory review of the proposed Northern Gateway project. This report overlays two related analyses. The first, a Response Gap Analysis (RGA) applies an established methodology to estimate the overall window- of- opportunity to respond to an oil spill from a Northern Gateway tanker in two representative locations. The RGA provides an estimate of how often mechanical oil spill response would be possible at the two selected locations. The second component, a Response Capacity Analysis (RCA) uses a simulation model to estimate the scale of a spill response (type and quantity of resources) that would be required to contain and recover a marine oil spill during the critical 72- hour time period when on- water spill response technologies are most effective. Taken together, these two analyses provide a basic framework for what is possible and what is required to effectively respond to an oil spill along the Northern Gateway tanker routes (Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1 Proposed Oil Tanker Routes to Kitimat Marine Terminal Page 7 of 62

9 1.1.1 Northern Gateway Project Proposal The proposed Northern Gateway project will transport diluted bitumen, synthetic crude, condensate, and other hydrocarbons via pipeline across Alberta and British Columbia. The project includes construction of a major oil terminal in Kitimat, BC to serve as the western terminus of the pipeline and serve as the hub for import and export of petroleum products, via oil tanker, to and from the Northern Gateway pipeline. An estimated 220 tankers per year will call on the Kitimat Marine Terminal, resulting in an estimated 440 transits to and from Kitimat. Inbound laden tankers will carry condensate and synthetic crude oil, and outbound laden tankers will carry diluted bitumen. Oil spill risks exist along the entire portion of the proposed primary and alternate tanker routes (DNV 2010) Representative Operating Environments Both analyses included in this study focus on operating environment as a key component of oil spill response operations. For the purpose of this study, we have applied two generalized operating environments to the proposed tanker routes. These correspond to the distinctions made by Enbridge in Northern Gateway planning documents by dividing the tanker routes into two general categories: Open Water Area (OWA) and Confined Channel Access Area (CCAA). Within each area, a representative site was chosen for both analyses. In the OWA, the Dixon Entrance weather buoy was selected for the RGA open water and the same site used for spill location and weather condition inputs for the RCA. Within the CCAA, the Nanakwa Shoals weather buoy was selected as the RGA protected water site and was also used to input into the RCA model. These two locations were chosen because they are broadly representative of the operating environment classifications applied by the American Society for Testing and Materials and commonly utilized in oil spill reference guides (ASTM 2003; Potter 2004). These sites were also chosen because there were sufficient environmental datasets available for both locations to allow for meaningful analysis, particularly for the RGA which requires a continuous set of weather observations. Figure 1.2 Map Showing Open Water Area (OWA) and Confined Channel Access Area (CCAA) Page 8 of 62

10 1.2 Mechanical Recovery of Marine Oil Spills Oil spill response methods are generally divided into three main categories: mechanical recovery, where oil is contained in an area using boom or natural containment and removed using skimmers and pumps; non- mechanical recovery where chemical countermeasures, burning, or bioremediation are used to degrade or disperse an oil slick; and manual recovery, where oil is removed using simple hand tools and techniques such as pails, shovels, or nets. Mechanical recovery had been identified as the primary oil spill cleanup method to be used for spills from Northern Gateway tankers Mechanical Recovery Methods The objective of mechanical recovery is to concentrate oil to a thickness that will permit recovery. Mechanical recovery systems involve two major components: containment barriers and recovery systems. The containment barrier is used to corral oil, and a skimming system is used to recover the oil that floats at the water s surface. On- water recovery picks up water as well as oil, both incorporated into the oil (forming what is known as an oil- water emulsion) 1 and as free water. Therefore, oil recovery systems recover a much higher volume of fluids than the actual spill volume. Sufficient storage must be available to hold the volume of recovered oil and water. Once the oil has been recovered, free water must be decanted (separated from the emulsified oil) and the remaining oil must be transferred using pumps and hoses to temporary storage until it can be properly disposed. Mechanical recovery systems require additional equipment and resources such as vessels, pumps, anchors, decanting systems, and trained personnel with the ability to safely operate these systems. Ultimately, all recovered wastes must be properly disposed of according to applicable regulations. Effective mechanical recovery operations require surveillance and spill tracking to identify the location, spreading, and condition of the spilled oil in order to select and apply the appropriate response equipment and tactics. They also require logistical support to transport equipment and trained personnel to the spill site, deploy and operate the equipment, and decontaminate the equipment when response operations are complete. Spill responders must be able to safely access the spill site in order to deploy the equipment. Accessing the spill site is often one of the biggest challenges, particularly in remote areas. Response time is critical to the success of on- water mechanical recovery. As soon as oil is spilled to water, it begins to spread, evaporate, and emulsify. As time passes, it becomes more difficult to track, contain, and recover or treat spilled oil. Therefore, the quick mobilization and deployment of response equipment and trained personnel is important to the overall response effectiveness. However, like all on- water operations, marine spill response is vulnerable to limitations posed by weather and environmental conditions. Mechanical recovery is not safe or effective above certain weather and environmental thresholds. Extended periods of adverse weather can significantly impact oil spill recovery operations Northern Gateway Oils The type of oil spilled can have a major impact on the selection of oil spill response techniques, and on their ultimate effectiveness. Planning documents for Northern Gateway tanker operations specify several different types of oils that could be transported. These include diluted bitumen, synthetic crude oil, and natural gas condensate. Each substance will behave differently when spilled to water, and the effectiveness of traditional 1 Emulsification occurs as a part of the overall weathering of oil when it is spilled to water. The oil properties change and water- in- oil emulsion ratios typically increase over time. Emulsion studies of the project oils have shown that some oils may emulsify as much as 60-70% within the first 24 hours of the spill. If a mechanical recovery system removed 100m 3 of oil that was a 60% water- in- oil emulsion, only 40 m 3 of the recovered product would actually be spilled oil. Emulsification is a significant consideration for spill planning, because the volume of storage required to hold recovered oil will be much higher than the actual volume spilled. Page 9 of 62

11 mechanical recovery systems and equipment to a Northern Gateway spill may be significantly impacted based on the type of oil. For the purpose of this analysis, two types of oil are considered diluted bitumen and synthetic crude oil. Condensate is not included because its properties are not necessarily appropriate for on- water mechanical recovery methods. 2 Condensate spills would initially form a slick similar to a crude oil spill, however due to its chemical and physical properties, a condensate spill would quickly evaporate and dissipate into the water column, rendering on- water containment and recovery ineffective (Moffatt and Nichol, 2007). Even if a response could be mounted before the slick dispersed, on- water booming of condensate would creates a safety risk, due to the high volatility and potential for ignition or explosion. Synthetic crude oil has properties similar to some naturally occurring crude oils, and while there has been limited real- world experience with synthetic crude oil spills, it is reasonable to expect that traditional mechanical recovery methods and equipment could be applied to a synthetic crude oil spill. 3 Diluted bitumen is heavier and more viscous than most crude oils, and it is characterized as a heavy oil (IMO, 2005). The characteristics of the spilled oil are not considered at all in the Response Gap Analysis, because that analysis focuses simply on identifying whether oil spill response would be feasible to undertake. The Response Capacity Analysis does consider oil characteristics as they relate to oil recovery rates under ideal conditions. However, the subject oils used in the RCA were derived from Enbridge submission documents, and may not be fully representative of the range of oils that could be transported along the tanker routes. For example, the two diluted bitumen blends used in the RCA are considerably less dense than the diluted bitumen that spilled from another Enbridge pipeline in Michigan in 2010 (USEPA, 2011). The difference in oil properties would impact the potential effectiveness of skimming operations because the oil could more readily become submerged. Oil spill simulations for heavier diluted bitumen blends should be considered once subject oil properties have been established. 1.3 Shipping Routes Throughout this report, the Northern Gateway (NG) system is compared to Prince William Sound (PWS), because the PWS system provides a working model of how a major marine oil terminal in the North Pacific manages oil tanker spill response planning. However, the Northern Gateway shipping routes are complex and extensive, in comparison to Prince William Sound. Northern Gateway s routes: Incorporate multiple enclosed waterway routes, which are not accessible from potential staging areas for major marine or air- based access via direct vectors. Diverge in the open water area. Have a combined length of more than 800 km before clearing the OWA and all terrestrial hazards. 4 2 Condensate is derived during natural gas production. It is highly volatile and acutely toxic. In the event of a condensate spill, the majority of condensate is modeled to evaporate or dissipate within 24 hours, making on- water recovery unlikely. A condensate spill may have adverse impacts, as the product itself is toxic to many organisms. 3 A variety of syncrudes may be transported by the Northern Gateway project. Synthetic crude oil is derived from oil sands or oil shale. It is so- named because, although it is analogous to crude oil in its general behavior and commodity use, it is actually product refined from the original source. Synthetic crude oil is not a homogenous product. It is a family of hydrocarbons, much like true crude oil. Within a spill context, synthetic crude oil is assumed to behave similar to crude oil. The synthetic crude oil tested by SL Ross may or may not be representative. 4 The PWS tanker route from Valdez out of Hinchinbrook Entrance is approximately 120 km long, and consists of a single route. The Northern Gateway tanker route, until all land- hazard areas are cleared, contains roughly km of routes. Page 10 of 62

12 The proposed tanker routes are shown in Figure 1.1. While the operating environment along the proposed tanker routes is highly variable, we have selected two representative locations along the proposed route to represent two functionally different operating environments with regards to spill response. Page 11 of 62

13 2.1 Overview Part 2: Oil Spill Response Gap Analysis Despite decades of improvements to the technology and procedures used to mount a spill response on water, there are still times when environmental conditions hinder or preclude an effective response. This response gap analysis (RGA) considers the potential impact of four environmental factors (wind, sea state, temperature, and daylight/darkness) on response operations based on published literature and input from spill response experts (SL Ross, 2011; Nuka Research 2007). It also considers the potential impact of combinations of these factors on a response Scope and Approach of Analysis The analytical approach applied here originated in a 2007 analysis for Prince William Sound (Nuka Research, 2007). 5 Subsequently, SL Ross applied a similar approach, for the Canadian Beaufort Sea (2011), and the Living Oceans Society conducted a partial analysis (focusing on wave height only) for the proposed shipping route associated with the Northern Gateway project in This study therefore draws on previously established understanding of which environmental factors impact response, the metrics and data typically available for each environmental factor, the four priority factors, the typical limitations on response due to different environmental factors, and the impact of interactions among environmental factors (Nuka Research, 2007). The following steps were taken to complete this analysis: 1. Identify two weather stations representative of both protected and open- water operating areas along the proposed shipping route to and from Kitimat, BC. 2. Establish operational limits for four environmental factors based on previous studies and best professional judgment. 3. Apply the operational limits to the weather station datasets determining how each of the four would influence response for each weather observation period. 4. Establish a rule to estimate whether the interaction among all the environmental factors for a single observational period would allow or prohibit response. 5. Apply the response gap rule to the datasets determining which observational periods had weather that would prohibit response, and characterize those results with summary statistics Environmental Factors The purpose of this response gap analysis is to determine the frequency of the response gap in two areas of potential vessel operations associated with the proposed Northern Gateway project. The environmental factors of wind, sea state, visibility, and temperature all impact mechanical containment and recovery equipment differently (Nuka Research, 2007). Table 2.1 summarizes the impact of environmental factors on spill response. Wind Wind alone 6 can impede or prevent mechanical response operations in the following ways: Vessels unable to keep on station, Crew unable to work on deck, Equipment and workboat deployment and retrieval impeded, and 5 The methodology used for Nuka Research s 2007 analysis was initially proposed for review in (Nuka Research, 2006) 6 Wind is also the primary driver of ocean waves, but sea state will be considered as a separate factor. Page 12 of 62

14 Boom failure. Sea State Sea state refers to both wave height and wave period (frequency). When wave height is small, wave period has little effect on response operations. As wave height increases, waves of a short period have greater effect on response operations than waves of a longer period. Short, choppy waves have a more significant effect than long, ocean swells. Waves can impede or prevent mechanical response operations in the following ways: Boom failure, Vessels unable to keep on station, Skimmer failure, Crew unable to work on deck, Equipment and workboat deployment and retrieval impeded, Oil becoming submerged and thus not available to recovery, and Inability to track and encounter oil. Visibility Factors that may hamper visibility include darkness, fog, snow, heavy precipitation, or low clouds. Visibility can impede or prevent spill response operations in the following ways: Inability to track and encounter oil, and Vessels unable to keep on station. This study only considered the impact of daylight on visibility, though at times fog or other factors would also impair visibility. Temperature High and low temperature extremes can adversely affect oil spill response operations, but in British Columbia low temperatures are more likely to cause problems. Low temperature can impede or prevent response operations in the following ways: Crew unable to work on deck due to ice or hypothermia, Mechanical equipment failure due to icing, and Vessel instability due to icing. Currents Currents can significantly impact oil spill response operations. In rivers or narrow embayments, the entire response system is captured in the current and there is little or no relative movement between the various components of the response system. However, currents can cause problems in areas where eddies or tide rips occur and when the current sets the response system into shoal waters. Currents can impede or prevent response operations in the following ways: Boom failure, Oil becoming submerged and thus not available to recovery, and Vessels unable to keep on station. Page 13 of 62

15 Because only ocean currents are likely to be encountered by the open- water response systems considered for this study, and there is no way to measure local currents such as tide rips, currents were not considered for the purposes of this study. Both Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance are relatively protected from currents, as compared to other areas along the shipping routes. Data on currents is not included in this analysis. Ice Ice can impede or prevent response operations in the following ways: Failure of skimming systems, Vessels unable to keep on station, Boom failure, and Inability to track and encounter oil. Ice is not considered for this phase of this study, because ice is not a common phenomenon in the selected operating areas and reliable data on the presence of ice are not available Assumptions Interactions Among Environmental Factors Interactions between environmental factors have a major effect on response operating limits. For example, low temperatures and strong winds cause freezing spray that can impede or prevent response operations much sooner than either temperature or wind alone. Likewise, waves of a certain height are much more limiting in the presence of a strong wind or in times of low visibility. We accounted for these interactions by developing a simple set of rules to combine observed weather conditions and determine whether response was possible for each observational period. (Nuka Research, 2007) Response Capacity Degradation due to Environmental Factors The degradation of response does not occur at a single point, nor is it necessarily linear in nature. For instance, response efficiency does not go from 100% to 0% as wind increases from 10 to 11 m/s. Likewise, a wind of 8 m/s does not indicate that the response efficiency is half that at 16 m/s. The degradation curve is probably different for each environmental factor. This further complicated the task of setting discrete operational limits. We accounted for capability degradation by establishing categories of limitations for each environmental factor. (Nuka Research, 2007) Mechanical Response Equipment Although Enbridge has not provided specific information about the quantity and type of equipment that would be used for the Northern Gateway project, Nuka Research applied limits based on the assumption that the equipment will represent standard available technology and be comparable to the offshore oil spill response equipment maintained by major U.S. oil spill response organizations. With this basic assumption, the limits can be applied to the historical environmental factor data in the targeted areas to calculate a response gap even without knowing the exact quantity or configuration of vessels and other equipment that may end up being put in place: if the weather conditions preclude the effective deployment of one skimmer, for example, those same conditions would preclude the effective deployment of 12 skimmers. Applicability of Traditional Crude Oil Response Systems to Subject Oils The equipment operating limits applied in this study are derived from earlier work in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The Prince William Sound system was developed for spills of Alaska North Slope crude oil, which differs Page 14 of 62

16 from the subject oils (synthetic crude oil and diluted bitumen) that will be transported by Northern Gateway. Since there is no commercially available response equipment designed specifically for diluted bitumen spills, the application of conventional crude oil technologies was necessary. While this study is not meant to imply that Prince William Sound mechanical recovery technologies would necessarily be effective on the Northern Gateway oils, operating limits for on- water mechanical recovery systems are generally independent of the type of oil transported. However, if novel spill recovery technologies were developed for the subject oils, additional response gap analyses may be appropriate. For the purpose of the RGA, the key question is whether or not mechanical recovery equipment could be safely and effectively deployed under the given conditions. The effectiveness of the equipment in actually recovering the subject oils is discussed in greater detail in the RCA section of this report (Part 3). Table 2.1 Impact of Environmental Factors on Spill Response Operations FACTOR Wind Sea State Visibility Temperature CONDITIONS THAT COULD PRECLUDE A RESPONSE Winds > 15 to 20 m/s, but depending on other variables. The negative impact of winds on the effectiveness of a response is realized when winds approach a range of 15 to 20 m/s or greater. Temperature, sea state, visibility, and precipitation may vary the effect of a specific wind speed. In some circumstances, a response may be possible in 15- to 20- m/s winds, while in other circumstances a response may not be effective in winds less than 10 m/s. Seas greater than 3 m (10 feet) with strong tides and currents. A rule- of- thumb operating limit for wave height is 3 m(10 feet). This limitation may be affected by ambient temperature, visibility, and precipitation. The impact of tides and currents can only be determined on a case- by- case basis. Depending on other environmental factors, the visibility limitation may be <0.9 km for vessels tracking oil. If wind, sea state, temperature, visibility and/or precipitation cause the response to be inefficient, the additional factor of darkness may actually impede a response. Limitations for flight surveillance operations, based on visual flight rules for rotary- and fixed- wing aircraft are: foot ceiling and 3.7 km visibility if in sight of land, or foot ceiling and 35.5 km visibility if over open- water and land is not in sight. For booming and skimming vessels, the visibility limitation varies between 0.2 km (200 meters) and 1.5 km (800 meters), depending on temperature, sea state, wind, and precipitation. Visibility limits affect response vessels differently depending on whether they are already engaged in oil recovery or seeking oil to recover. For vessels actively booming and skimming in oil, the master of the vessel would set limits based on safety and operational efficiency. For vessels not in oil and which may require aircraft surveillance, the limitations would likely be determined by those of the aircraft as described above. Long- term temperatures below freezing combined with high winds could preclude a response. Sustained temperatures below freezing, in conjunction with high winds, severe sea states, poor visibility, and/or heavy precipitation, will significantly reduce the effectiveness of the response. At temperatures below - 9ºC and winds of 24 to 28 knots, wind chill becomes a factor in response operations. Page 15 of 62

17 2.2 Methodology To quantify the response gap for two locations in British Columbia, this study began by assembling historical datasets of the environmental factors known to affect open- water mechanical response systems. Each dataset contained observations related to the following environmental factors: wind speed, wave steepness, temperature, and visibility (limited to daylight and darkness). These datasets were used to evaluate how often environmental conditions exceed the maximum response operating limits for each representative environment. (The limits are established in Table 2.2). A response gap index (RGI) was calculated to incorporate the interactions between environmental factors and response efficiency losses based on the established response limits (Table 2.2). Once the RGI was computed for each observational period, the Response Gap was estimated by summing up the RGI over a set of observations. The response gap is expressed as the percentage of time that a response is not possible. Figure 2.1 shows how the RG was calculated from the RGI. Table 2.2. Limits Used for the Northern Gateway Response Gap Analysis Page 16 of 62

18 Figure 2.1 Methodology for Calculating Response Gap Selected Operating Areas This study focused on two areas along the tanker route proposed for Northern Gateway operations. Dixon Entrance was chosen to illustrate the potential response gap for open water areas, while Nanakwa Shoals was chosen as representative of protected waters along the route (see Figure 1.1). Nanakwa Shoals is the site of the only Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) buoy within the protected waters on the proposed tanker route. Though protected, this area is also subject to sudden and severe conditions due to strong winds from the arctic during high pressure in the winter. These arctic outflows can create winds of up to 60 knots. (NAV CANADA, 2001) The DFO weather buoy at Dixon Entrance had a relatively complete observation data set when compared to other open water locations Datasets Assembled for Each Operating Area The data for wind, sea state, and temperature are all from the automated buoys at Dixon Entrance (Buoy # 46145) and Nanakwa Shoals (Buoy #46181) (DFO, 2012). The datasets were culled of any buoy data flagged as doubtful, erroneous, or off- position, and any duplicate records were deleted. Observations were considered to be valid for no more than one hour; if a subsequent observation was recorded in less than one hour, the validity of the previous observation ended at the time of the new observation. In general, observations were taken hourly with occasional interruptions (Gramann, 2012, included as Appendix C to this report). For the purposes of this study, visibility has been measured strictly based on daylight/darkness using civil twilight tables based on Terrace Airport in 1975 (National Research Council Canada, 2012). While there is some data available from the airport or lighthouses describing the visibility related to cloud cover, fog, or precipitation, these are not available on an hourly basis and do not necessarily reflect the conditions along the shipping routes. This extremely conservative approach will therefore not account for times during the day when visibility is hindered due to fog or precipitation, which are particularly common from September through February (Terhune, 2011). Page 17 of 62

19 Prior to the analysis, the datasets were reviewed and any outliers removed. 7 A total of 103,364 observations were taken at Nanakwa from January February At Dixon Entrance, 125,185 observations were applied in the analysis over the same time period. There are some gaps in the datasets resulting from periods of hours, weeks, or months when the automated buoys were not functioning properly. There are a number of possible reasons for buoys to malfunction, including vandalism, heavy weather, freezing spray, maintenance, or funding limits. In the case of freezing spray or other impacts from heavy weather, this could result in a moderate bias towards under- reporting bad weather (See Appendix C for further discussion) Response Operating Limits Nuka Research established basic operating limits for mechanical response equipment used in Prince William Sound in The same limits are used in this study (converted to metric). These were based on the authors best professional judgment and a literature review, including review of both published and unpublished reports included in an annotated bibliography in 2006 (Nuka Research 2006). Reports included after- action reports from oil spill drills, exercises, trainings, and actual responses. Information about system operations in real world environments was more relevant than laboratory tests of any single component. Subsequent to the 2007 study for Prince William Sound, the Living Oceans Society conducted a preliminary response gap analysis for the proposed shipping route associated with the Northern Gateway project. This study focused only on wave height, and included the same limits used by Nuka Research in 2007 with variations only in the way that the values were converted to metric. (Terhune, 2011) Limits used by S.L. Ross for a 2011 response gap analysis for the Canadian Beaufort Sea are also consistent with the limits applied by Nuka Research in both 2007 and this analysis, with only minor variations (e.g., for wind speed, SL Ross uses any speed greater than 15 m/s as the upper limit for effective response, while Nuka Research uses any speed equal to or greater than 15 m/s for the same.) (S.L. Ross, 2011) For each of the four environmental factors considered, Nuka Research established a range at which response is not impaired (green), possibly prevented (yellow), and not possible/effective (red). These limits, shown in Table 2.2, were then applied in the analysis to estimate the amount of time that response is not impaired, possibly prevented, or not possible/effective based on historical data for wind, sea state, visibility, and temperature at two chosen locations along the proposed shipping route for the Northern Gateway project Response Gap Index A response gap index (RGI) was created to reflect the interactions among environmental factors (Table 2.3). Even if no single environmental factor is ruled red (response not possible or not effective), the challenge of dealing with yellow (response possibly prevented) conditions for two or more factors at the same time will likely make effective response impossible. Figure 2.2 shows how this rule might be applied to three different observational periods. Table 2.3. Applying the Response Gap Index If Then the RGI is any environmental factor is ruled RED Red (response not possible) all environmental factors are ruled GREEN Green (response possible) only one environmental factor is YELLOW and the rest are GREEN Green (response possible) two or more factors are ruled YELLOW Red (response not possible) 7 For example, the data for Nanakwa Shoals displayed extreme sea temperatures on a few days of - 20 C; these were removed. Page 18 of 62

20 Figure 2.2. Three Examples of Response Gap Index Application 2.3 Analysis Data for each location were analyzed for the following factors: wind, sea state (wave steepness), visibility, and temperature. For each operating area the response gap was calculated for each environmental factor separately, then the RGI. The sections below present this information for summer and winter separately, as well as the year- round average. The RGI at each location from January 1996 February 2012 is plotted and presented along with a more detailed presentation of the RGI at each location for January December This year represented one of the most complete data sets at both locations Nanakwa Shoals Year- Round In Nanakwa Shoals, the data related to wind, sea state, temperature, and visibility were compiled for a total of 103,664 observations between January 1996 and February The limits in Table 2.2 were applied to each observational period, resulting in an determination for each observational period that the response would have been unimpaired, impaired, or prevented by each of the weather conditions considered. The RGI was applied to estimate the combined impact of the environmental factors. All values are rounded, and presented in Figure 2.3. Page 19 of 62

21 Figure 2.3. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, year- round Seasonal Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the seasonal variability in the ability to mount a response at Nanakwa Shoals. For the purpose of this analysis, the dates of March 26 October 7 were used to describe spring/summer conditions, and the dates of October 8 March 25 for fall/winter conditions. Not surprisingly, an effective response is more likely to be prevented by environmental conditions between October and March than during the spring/summer. Figure 2.6 shows the frequency with which the RGI was calculated to be green and red, and also illustrates the time periods from January 1006 February 2012 for which data were not available. Page 20 of 62

22 Figure 2.4. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, spring/summer Page 21 of 62

23 Figure 2.5. Results of response gap analysis for Nanakwa Shoals, fall/winter Page 22 of 62

24 Figure 2.6. Time periods for which response was deemed possible or not possible based on applying the RGI to environmental data at Nanakwa Shoals Page 23 of 62

25 Detailed Review of Single Year Data (2005) For a more detailed look at one year (2005), 8 Figure 2.7 describes the impact of the different factors, along with red and green dots indicating the number of observational periods deemed to be red and green according to the RGI methodology. In the protected waters of Nanakwa Shoals, waves are almost always below 1 m. It does get quite cold for sustained periods of time, however, and arctic outflow winds may occur during periods of sustained cold hence, many of the red conditions result from the fact that both temperature and wind are rated yellow. Figure 2.7. Scatter plot graphic showing wind, sea state (wave height and wave steepness), temperature, and day/night with RGI at Nanakwa Shoals (2005) 8 This year was chosen because it provided one of the most complete data sets for both Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance. Page 24 of 62

26 2.3.2 Dixon Entrance Year- Round At Dixon Entrance, the data related to wind, sea state, temperature, and visibility were compiled for a total of 123,185 observations between January 1996 and February The limits in Table 2.2 were applied to each observational period, resulting in an determination for each observational period that the response would have been possible, possibly prevented, or not possible. The RGI was applied to estimate the combined impact of the environmental factors. All values are rounded, as presented in Figure 2.8. Figure 2.8. Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, year- round Seasonal Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the seasonal variability in the ability to mount a response at Dixon Entrance. For the purpose of this analysis, the months of March 26 October 7 were used to describe spring/summer conditions, and the months of October 8 March 25 for fall/winter conditions. Figure 2.11 shows the frequency with which the RGI was calculated to be green and red at Dixon Entrance, and also illustrates the time periods from January 1006 February 2012 for which data were not available. Page 25 of 62

27 Figure 2.9. Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, spring/summer Page 26 of 62

28 Figure Results of response gap analysis for Dixon Entrance, fall/winter Page 27 of 62

29 Figure Time periods for which response was deemed possible or not possible based on applying the RGI to environmental data at Dixon Entrance Page 28 of 62

30 Detailed Review of Single Year Data (2005) For a more detailed look at one year (2005), 9 Figure 2.12 describes the impact of the different factors, along with red and green dots indicating the number of observational periods deemed to be red and green according to the RGI methodology. In daytime, conditions rarely exceed response capabilities by very much. At night, response is only possible if wave heights stay low enough to fall in the green category. Thus, the combination of wave height and darkness has the most frequent impact on a potential response. Figure Scatter plot graphic showing wind, sea state (wave height and wave steepness), temperature, and visibility with RGI at Dixon Entrance (2005) was chosen because it provided one of the most complete data sets for both Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance. Page 29 of 62

31 2.4 Discussion Impact of Conservative Estimates to Response Gap Analysis Conservative estimates were applied throughout the Response Gap Analysis, so that the resulting estimate represents best case limits; therefore the response gap estimates may be low. It is possible that other factors not accounted for in this analysis, such as fog or precipitation, would preclude response for a higher percentage of the time. Similarly, conditions that do not preclude a response ( green RGA conditions) may still impair or degrade the effectiveness of response operations. An RGA estimate does not mean that an effective response will occur when conditions are amenable, only that the environmental conditions themselves should not prevent it. Careful planning, adequate resources, and the right number of personnel with the appropriate qualifications will still need to be in place Comparison with 2011 Preliminary Response Gap Study The preliminary RGA conducted by the Living Oceans Society in 2011 found response gaps based on wave height of 0.12% at Nanakwa Shoals and 18% at Dixon Entrance (Terhune, 2011). When wind, wave steepness, temperature, and visibility (in terms of daylight/darkness only) were added to the analysis and combined using the RGI methodology, the response gaps at these locations jumped to 7% at Nanakwa Shoals and 45% at Dixon Entrance. The impacts of fog and precipitation were omitted due to a lack of reliable data; if included, these additional factors related to visibility would likely increase the RGI at both locations. Since the inclusion of additional environmental factors in the RGA increased the response gaps so significantly at Dixon Entrance and Nanakwa Shoals, there is no reason why similar increases would not happen at other locations on the shipping routes to and from Kitimat, BC. In fact, based on a review of the preliminary response gap assessment for Northern Gateway (Terhune, 2011), which used wave height data only, Dixon Entrance represents a conservative example of an open- water location along the shipping routes associated with the proposed Northern Gateway project. Ships passing by Dixon Entrance (buoy #C46145, also used in this study) will also pass near West Dixon Entrance (buoy # C46205), where the response was estimated to be not possible or impaired much more frequently even based just on wave height (48.25% of the time at West Dixon Entrance, compared to 18.49% at Dixon Entrance). Additionally, vessels taking the southerly route will pass near East Dellwood (buoy #C46207), where wave height data indicates a response that is impaired or not possible 50.3% of the time. (Terhune, 2011) While it is not possible to apply a linear model to predict the extent to which the response gap estimates would increase at these other locations with the addition of wind, wave steepness, and temperature data, the increase is likely to be meaningful. For example, daylight/darkness was show to have a significant additive effect to the overall response gap calculated for the two buoys in this study. Additional consideration of just that one factor for the other response gap sites in the Living Oceans study would likely increase their estimates considerably, particularly during winter months. Figure 2.13 compares the response gap estimates based on wave height throughout the region (based on Terhune 2011) with those calculated using the RGI for Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance. Page 30 of 62

32 Figure Preliminary Response Gap at Locations along Proposed Shipping Route, and Response Gap Calculated Using RGI Methodology at Dixon Entrance and Nanakwa Shoals Combining Response Gap Data for Multiple Locations Along Proposed Shipping Routes The length of the transit route between Kitimat and the OWA creates the potential that a response gap may exist along parts of the shipping route, meaning that even if the conditions are favorable for a response at the spill location, a response gap may exist in areas where the spill may migrate. The full shipping route (or combination of available routes) must be considered in order to anticipate the potential impact of environmental conditions on a spill response associated with the Northern Gateway project. Figure 2.14 portrays the times during which wind, sea state, temperature, and visibility (day/night) would be conducive to a response in the protected waters of Nanakwa Shoals, but, at the same time, preclude a response at Dixon Page 31 of 62

33 Entrance. The times during which a response is likely to be impossible at both sites (shown in red, below) are almost entirely limited to the months of October - March. Figure Combined RGI throughout the year at both Nanakwa Shoals and Dixon Entrance Implications of Response Gap to Oil Spill Mitigation from Northern Gateway Tankers Proposing specific mitigation measures is outside the scope of this study, but the results of this analysis provide additional detail about the potential for unmitigated oil spill risks from vessel operations. It is clear that there will be times when the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline is operating, necessitating the movement of diluted bitumen and condensate onboard tankers to and from the Kitimat Marine Terminal, when the weather conditions will preclude an effective spill response should a tanker spill occur. Mitigation measures should consider the existence of a response gap along the tanker routes by enhancing tanker safety or prevention measures during times when a response gap exists. Page 32 of 62

34 3.1 Overview of the Approach Purpose and Scope of Analysis Part 3: Oil Spill Response Capacity Analysis A response capacity analysis (RCA) was performed for on- water oil spill response operations in two representative operating environments along the proposed vessel routes for Northern Gateway (NG) tankers. The purpose of this analysis is to provide a semi- quantitative assessment of the capability of oil spill response forces to mechanically contain and recover a marine oil spill from Northern Gateway tanker operations. The basic research question posed was: What is the capacity for available mechanical oil spill recovery systems to contain and recover marine oil spills in two representative operating environments (open water and protected water)? The RCA estimates generalized oil spill response capacity in the Project area, under favorable conditions, using on- water mechanical recovery systems similar to those utilized by major U.S. oil spill response organizations. The outputs of the RCA show the minimum amount of on- water mechanical recovery equipment that would be required to address a model spill (10,000 m 3 ). The results of the RCA provide a starting point for further simulation analysis, which should factor in other conditions that may impact spill response effectiveness Factors Considered in the Analysis In order to estimate response capacity, it was first necessary to define oil spill recovery systems. Since the Northern Gateway submission documents have not explicitly defined the spill response equipment that will be purchased or contracted if the project is approved, this study presumes that Northern Gateway will have best available technology available to support clean- up operations. This analysis assumed a plausible recovery force modeled on the Oil Spill Response Vessel (OSRV)- based open water recovery system utilized by the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill and other major on- water spill responses. This study applies the OSRV- based oil spill recovery systems to hypothetical spills of 10,000 m 3 (approximately 2,640,000 gallons) at two representative locations in the project area. These environments are generally representative of the types of conditions that would be encountered if cleaning up a spill in the open water area (OWA) and confined channel assessment area (CCAA) as described in Northern Gateway submissions (DNV, 2010). This study utilizes the Response Options Calculator (ROC) to calculate the response resources that would be required to contain and recover a 10,000 m 3 oil spill at each location, and provides estimates of total oil recovery (Genwest Systems Inc., 2012). This approach provides insight into the type and amount of resources that would make up a best available technology spill response system for Northern Gateway operations, while also providing a quantitative estimate of spill response efficiency under favorable conditions Assumptions Modeling is necessarily dependent upon a serious of assumptions. Wherever possible, established models and assumptions are applied. Assumptions and models inherent to ROC are described in the ROC Technical Document (Genwest Systems Inc., 2012). All assumptions applied during the RCA are duly qualified or noted in this report. Basic assumptions include: the operation of all equipment without malfunction or failure; the absence of spill- related mishaps or other accidents that could hinder the response; effective logistics, command, and communication; and effective reconnaissance and mapping of the spill. Page 33 of 62

35 When applying the RCA findings to potential real- world spills, the estimated recovery capacities should be considered the best possible cases. Assumptions in this analysis are favorable towards effective spill response, creating a systematic positive bias. 3.2 Methodology Response Options Calculator The Response Options Calculator (ROC) computer model was used to estimate bulk oil recovery capabilities. ROC is a publicly available computer model developed for the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) with industry support. The ROC was developed specifically to evaluate mechanical and non- mechanical response options to oil spills by estimating the volume of oil that could be recovered by various systems under a range of conditions. The model simulates oil weathering, spreading, and recovery by advancing skimming systems (mechanical recovery). 10 Spill behavior and weathering in ROC is based on updated versions of the algorithms of the Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills (ADIOS) model, also developed for NOAA (NOAA, 2012), which are combined with new algorithms for slick spreading (Genwest Systems Inc., 2012). Like the overlying ROC program, ADIOS was developed specifically to model oil fate and spreading to support oil spill response planning. ROC is not a trajectory model. It simulates the spread of the oil slick, but does not include influences from tides, current, land, ice, debris, or complex weather conditions. Oil spread and spill response occur without any influence from land or shallow water. ROC assumes that the mass balance of oil on the water is always available for recovery, with no oil stranding on shorelines, and utilizes the average thickness of the total calculated slick to project recovery rate. 11 This analysis used ROC standard oil weathering. ROC weathering is not a comprehensive fate model, and does not account does not account for such complex influences as water salinity, particulates, or the compositional complexity of diluted bitumen. It does not account for possible oil submergence. 12 Within the ROC, modeled response systems are applied to oil spill scenarios. Response options performance is calculated using an algorithm that applies specific response systems at one- hour time intervals to a simulated oil spill, concurrent with the spreading and weathering of the spill Oil Spill Simulation Parameters Spill Location and Dates A series of oil spill simulations were run through the ROC. All simulations presumed a 10,000 m 3 oil spills. Spill locations and dates varied as follows: Open Water Area (Open water operating environment): o Dixon Entrance weather information, winter (January 1) o Dixon Entrance weather information, summer (July 1) 10 The ROC can also be used to model non- mechanical response options such as dispersants or in- situ burning, but non- mechanical response was not included in this analysis. 11 Detailed technical specifications on ROC and its underlying algorithms and function may be found in the technical documentation produced by Genwest Systems, Inc. and available online at 12 Recovery estimates in ROC assume that all non- evaporated, non- dispersed oil will remain floating throughout the 72- hour recovery period. In reality, the density curves for the diluted bitumens (SL Ross 2010a and 2010b) show the oils approaching neutral buoyancy as early as 24 hours into a response. Oil that becomes neutrally or negatively buoyant may submerge below the sea surface, making it difficult to track and rendering traditional skimming systems ineffective. Page 34 of 62

36 Confined Channel Assessment Area (Protected water operating environment): o Nanakwa Shoals weather information, winter (January 1) o Nanakwa Shoals weather information, summer (July 1) Oil Properties Each of the 4 basic spill scenarios was run in ROC with 4 different oils, for a total of 16 basic simulations. Three of the oils were taken from Technical Data Reports (TDR) submitted by Enbridge (SL Ross, 2010a and SL Ross, 2010b) and the ROC database: Cold Lake Bitumen (CLB) diluted with condensate Mackay Heavy Bitumen (MKH) diluted with light synthetic oil 13 Syncrude, (SYN) The fourth oil, Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend (ASMB), was chosen from the ROC database of oils as a second synthetic crude oil, which might plausibly be transported be transported by the Project, but which SL Ross had not tested. Oil properties used in the ROC were: American Petroleum Institute gravity (API gravity or API): API = (141.5 / SG) where API = Degrees API Gravity SG = Specific Gravity (at 60 F / 15 C) Viscosity: Kinematic viscosity values for 1 C and 15 C were used, depending upon whichever temperature was closer to the simulation water temperature. Distillation cutoffs were used as determined by SL Ross 2010a and 2010b. Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend properties were drawn directly from the ROC database. Spill Size For this analysis, a 10,000 m 3 instantaneous release of oil is used for all simulations. This spill size is consistent with the oil spill simulations provided by Northern Gateway for 4 of 6 locations along the tanker route (Hayco, 2011). While a 10,000 m 3 spill represents a major oil spill, a catastrophic spill from a very large crude carrier (VLCC) could be in excess of 50,000 m 3, or 13.2 million gallons (Hayco, 2011) Both diluted bitumen formulas analyzed in the project documents are on the less dense end of the spectrum for diluted bitumen. Once the project oils are better defined and their properties understood, additional modeling would be useful for higher density diluted bitumen formals. 14 The three classes of oil tankers anticipated to service Kitimat Terminal are Aframax, Suezmax, and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). A VLCC carries in excess of 318,000 m 3. If a single VLCC foundered and completely voided its tanks, the resulting spill would approach 50% of the estimated size to the Deepwater Horizon spill. The worst possible spill would be a collision of a VLCC and another laden tanker, causing one or both vessels to founder. However, the probability of such a spill is very small compared to less serious spill. Applying the U.S. Coast Guard measurement that the worst probable spill is 10% of the worst possible spill, the worst probable Northern Gateway spill is considerably in excess of 31,800 m 3. The smaller 10,000 m 3 spill was selected to represent a more probable spill size, while still being large enough to illustrate the scale of response required for a major marine oil spill. Page 35 of 62

37 Environmental Conditions Table 3.1 summarizes the environmental conditions that were applied, based on the observation data compiled and described in the Response Gap Analysis portion of this report. These wind speed estimates represent averages for the warmest and coldest sea surface temperature months at weather buoys for the two representative locations (Nanakwa Shoals for CCAA/protected water and Dixon Entrance for OWA/open water). Wind variability is not accounted for in the ROC; all wind speeds are presumed to be constant. Sea surface temperatures were chosen to simulate realistic extremes for very warm and very cold sea surface temperatures. They were derived from data for peak high and low sea surface temperatures from 1991 to 2012 (Gramann, 2012 and Appendix C to this report). Table 3.1. Environmental Conditions Applied for Summer and Winter Simulations at OWA and CCAA Environmental Conditions CCAA Summer CCAA Winter OWA Summer OWA Winter Winds 8 kph (2.22 m/s) 8 kph (2.22 m/s) 11 kph (3.05 m/s) 11 kph (3.05 m/s) Sea Surface Temperature 17 C 3 C 15 C 6 C Operational Planning Parameters Deployment and Mobilization Times The simulation presumes that all oil spill response resources arrive on- scene simultaneously. Transit times of 8 hours for the CCAA and 12 hours for OWA are used. These times incorporate spill notification, dispatch, mobilization and transport equipment and personnel to staging areas (spill response hubs), transit to spill the area, and on- scene equipment set- up for recovery operations. This is an optimistic assumption. The average transit speed for OSRV is 16.7 kph (9 knots), and the maximum speed is 22.2 kph (12 knots). Transit distances from major ports where spill response resources might be located to potential spill sites may very long, approaching 500km (See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1). Our analysis assumes that a full complement of spill response equipment, vessels, and personnel would be at ready status near enough to each of the representative spill sites to facilitate rapid mobilization and deployment. Additional time would be required to recall crew and prepare equipment, for non- dedicated forces. US Coast Guard planning parameters for mobilizing response resources, used for these assumptions, are: 1 hour for owned, 15 dedicated 16 resources in ready state 17 2 hours for owned, dedicated resources in callback state hours for contracted, 19 dedicated resources in ready state 2.5 hours for contracted, dedicated resources in callback state 15 Equipment owned by and personnel employed by operator. 16 Equipment and personnel can be immediately released to spill, not employed or used in other operating capacity. 17 Equipment or personnel stored/housed onsite at spill response hub and ready for immediate deployment. 18 Equipment or personnel on notification or standby status. 19 Dedicated contractual access to equipment and personnel. Page 36 of 62

38 2.5 hour for owned, 20 non- dedicated 21 resources in ready state hours for owned, non- dedicated resources in callback state 23 3 hours for contracted, non- dedicated resources in ready state 4 hours for contracted, non- dedicated resources in callback state Potential Spill Site Table 3.2 Transit Times to Potential Spill Sites from Potential Oil Spill Response Hubs Approximate Distance (km) from Spill Response Hub Kitimat Prince Rupert Shear- water Transit time (hrs) at 16.7 kph Kitimat Prince Rupert Shear- water Transit time (hrs) at 22.2 kph Kitimat Prince Rupert Kitimat Terminal Wright Sound Nexus Browning Entrance Camano Entrance Learmonth Bank Forrester Island Haida Tip Far South Rocks Shear- water Figure 3.1 Map Showing Location of Potential Spill Sites and Spill Response Hubs in Northern Gateway Tanker Region 20 Equipment owned by and personnel employed by operator. 21 Equipment or personnel may be employed/used in other operational function that would need to be suspended in order to deploy to spill. 22 Equipment or personnel stored/housed onsite at spill response hub and ready for immediate deployment. 23 Equipment or personnel on notification or standby status. Page 37 of 62

39 Work Day Operational periods for each simulation were adjusted based on the duration of daylight expected in summer and winter. For winter simulations, the winter daylight period is 7:23. This is rounded to 7:30, and one hour is added to account for civil twilight periods. The total operations period is 8 hours 30 minutes. For summer simulations, the summer daylight period is 17:06. This is rounded to 17:00, and one hour is added to account for civil twilight. The total operations period is 18 hours. Spill occurrence times and work periods are adjusted so that recovery forces arrive and begin recovering oil at civil twilight (pre- dawn), giving them the entire first daytime work period to recover oil. No penalties for low visibility are applied to civil twilight recovery operations. Each simulation is run for 72 hours from the time of spill occurrence. Therefore, response forces impact the first 72 hours of the spill. This is intended to coincide with the critical 72- hour response window, during which recovery is usually highest. Functionally, this results in a series of spill simulations that contain a transit period (8 or 12 hours) followed by 2-3 daytime working periods, separated by night periods, during which no recovery occurs. Page 38 of 62

40 3.2.4 Spill Response Systems The spill response systems used in the ROC simulations is based on an open water task force 24 (OWTF) as defined in various standard oil spill response manuals. Open water task forces (OWTF) are assumed to able to operate in both spill environments (OWA and CCAA), but have limited access to near- shore shallow areas. While the OWA and CCAA spill sites represent different operating limits, the type of on- water recovery equipment commonly used for open water response can be applied in either environment, because the CCAA has sufficient water depth to support open water response vessels. Each system is comprised of equipment and vessels considered to be standard available technology based on the authors experience in oil spill planning and response and a review of standard oil spill response manuals (SERVS 2011, ADEC 2006). While four different general oil types are proposed for transport through the NG system, the open- water task force elements were developed based on the need for high viscosity oil recovery capability, to provide the ability to recover diluted bitumen. 25 Skimming resources with high- viscosity recovery capability can be easily modified to recover the less viscous oil products, which would also be transported Vessels The open water task force used for this simulation is modeled on the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) 26 Oil Spill Response Vessel (OSRV). OSRVs are purpose- built vessels capable of acting as self- contained oil recovery task forces. A typical OSRV is over 60m in length, and draws approximately 5m of water, limiting its ability to operate in shallow areas. OSRVs are equipped with high- volume internal storage (635 m 3 or 4,000 bbl) and skimming equipment, and carry an on- board workboat, which acts as a boom- handling boat. OSRVs are equipped for long- term recovery operations, have large crews (30+ people), have potential aviation support capability (helipads), and represent standard, available technology for oil spill response. MSRC OSRVs have a cruising speed of 8-9 knots (4-4.6 m/s) and top speed of 12 knots (6.1 m/s). OSRVs typically use a J- configuration with their open water boom and workboat, to collect oil (See Figure 3.2). Although the simulations in this study rely on an OSRV- based force, other task force configurations, not based on purpose- built vessels, could be substituted. Substitution of vessels of opportunity or retrofitted vessels could impact efficiency estimates Skimmers The simulated OWTFs use the FRAMO Transrec 150 skimming system. 27 The Transrec 150 system is a complete, self- contained unit that could be deployed from an OSRV, and requires a single dedicated operator to run the skimming system. This skimmer has three types of skimmers: a weir head, a high viscosity oil recovery head, and a brush recovery head intended for arctic response where sea ice is present (Figure 3.2). 24 A Task Force (TF) is a typical building block for on- water oil spill tactical response. The term task force, when used in the context of oil spill response, refers to a group of resources with common communications and a leader assembled for a specific mission. 25 There is very little field or laboratory data regarding skimmer recovery rates for diluted bitumen projects. This is an area that would benefit from further study. 26 MSRC is a major U.S. oil spill response organization with a significant on- water cleanup capacity While the typical MSRC OSRV utilizes a FRAMO TransRec 350 high capacity skimming system, The FRAMO TransRec 150 is recommend for application in this area due to the availability of the HiVisc 150 Skimmer, which is designed to recover higher viscosity oils (>10,000 cst) than the TransRec 350 is capable of recovering. An annular water injection system is also included in this system to aid in high viscosity oil flow through the system during skimming operations. Page 39 of 62

41 The weir head is designed to recover low to medium viscosity oils (up to 15,000 cst). The high viscosity (HiVisc) oil recovery head is intended for heavier oils, with a viscosity range from 10,000 cst to 1,000,000 cst. Performance can be expected to vary depending on oil properties. MKH, CLB, and other diluted bitumen blends are expected to reach very high viscosities during a spill. According to NG submission documents, one of the tested project oils (Mackay Heavy Bitumen) may reach viscosities of 15,000 cst (15,000 cp) within 24 hours of a marine spill and exceed 52,000 cst within 48 hours (SL Ross 2010a and 2010b). For at least the first 48 hours of a projected diluted bitumen spill, the HiVisc skimmer head would likely be an appropriate recovery technology. Longer timeframes or more viscious initial oils could result in oil- water emulsions with viscosities exceeding 100,000 cst, the most viscous oil the HiVisc head is rated to skim. The weir skimmer head would not be appropriate for the diluted bitumen blends, but would likely be more appropriate technology for a synthetic crude oil Oil Containment Boom Open water recovery systems typically rely on ocean boom. The MSRC OSRV system utilized Sea Sentry II boom, and the same boom was applied to this simulation. Sea Sentry II boom is approximately 170cm in total height, with approximately 58cm freeboard (boom floating above the water surface) and 112 cm skirt (boom hanging below the water surface). This type of ocean boom is inflatable, and part of the system includes a power pack and air blower to inflate the boom as it comes off the reel where it is stored. Each modeled OSRV is equipped with a total of 201m of boom onboard, stored in 6 sections of 33.5m each. Each 33.5m section weighs approximately 425kg Other Equipment Pumps and other auxiliary equipment required to support OWTF operations were assumed to be industry standard. Pumps were selected provide sufficient size and capacity to support skimmer nameplate recovery capacity and aggressive free water decanting. High capacity offloading pumps were selected to achieve a four hour target for offloading oil and water to secondary storage, including setup and breakdown. Page 40 of 62

42 Figure 3.2 Examples of Open Water Task Force Configuration and Equipment Example of OSRV recovering oil (Source: MSRC) J- booming configuration (Source: ADEC, 2007) TransRec 150 Skimmer (Source: FRAMO, 2012) MSRC OSRV towing Sea Sentry II boom (Source: MSRC, 2012) Page 41 of 62

43 3.2.5 Equipment and Recovery Specifications Numerical specifications were applied to simulated OWTFs, to establish how the task forces would operate on- water. The following assumptions were applied based on the authors best professional judgment, manufacturer specifications, and experience with actual on- water oil spill recovery operations. Speed Vessel speed over water was set to 0.33 m/s (0.75 mph) for oil recovery operations. This speed is used because once vessels advance at speeds higher than 0.44 m/s (1.0 mph), oil will begin to entrain under booms. The chosen speed (0.33 m/s) is a credible speed for a response vessel to maintain during on- water recovery operations. Decanting On- water skimming does not recovers 100% oil. In the environment, water and oil mix together to form what is known as an oil- water emulsion. 28 The proportions of oil and water which form the emulsion vary with oil type, environemental conditions, and time. The emulsion cannot be separated into oil and water components by response forces, and must be stored as- is. Additional water is unintentionally skimmed along with the oil- water emulsion. This water, known as free water, is not bound with the oil. Decanting systems selectively remove this free water from storage tanks and return it to the environment, liberating more storage capacity for oil- water emulsion. The decant system consists of a pump and a plumbing system which uptakes free water from the storage tank(s) and pours it overboard. Percentage decanted is set to 80% for the simulated OWTFs, meaning that 80% of the free water recovered by the skimmer is successfully decanted out of the vessels storage tanks and returned to the environment. 20% of the free water is not decanted, and must be transferred to secondary storage with the recovered oil and oil- water emulsion. This is to reflect that fact that in real operations, not all free water is successfully decanted from primary storage. Decant pump rate controls the speed of decanting in ROC. The decant pump rate is set to 340 m 3 /hr, which is 80% of the nameplate rate for the skimmer. This rate allows the decant pump to keep pace with the skimmer in the simulation, decanting free water as fast as it is recovered. Swath width Swath width is the width of area with the containment boom along which floating oil is swept. A standard convention for calculating oil spill recovery efficiency is to assign swath width as 1/3 of the total boom length. Therefore, for the OSRV- based OWTF, which carries 201m (660 ft) of boom, swath width would be 36.5m (120 ft). Swath width is sometimes also called boom sweep or sweep width. Based on past recovery operations, 36.5m is a reasonable swath width to maintain under favorable conditions. Onboard Storage Onboard storage refers to the quantity of recovered liquids that can be stored aboard the recovery vessel. The OWTF has 635 m 3 (4,000 bbl) onboard storage. Once this tank becomes full, recovered oil must be offloaded 28 Throughout this document, on- water recovery of oil is referred to. Technically, much of the oil encountered and recovered is in the form of an oil- water emulsion. Oil is used as a abbreviated term for both on- water oil and on- water oil- water emulsion. Page 42 of 62

44 into another storage device, such as a barge or shore tank. Onboard storage is also sometimes referred to as primary storage. Nameplate Capacity The nameplate skimmer recovery rate, or nameplate capacity, describes the maximum rate at which the skimmer can theoretically skim oil. This is the maximum possible rate for the TransRec 150 weir head, identified by the manufacturer. For late- stage skimming on synthetic crude spills and all skimming on diluted bitumen spills, the TransRec 150 s high viscosity recovery head will be necessary. The HiVisc head is expected to have a substantially reduced nameplate rate, due the mechanical complexity of its viscous oil- cutting operation. However, the manufacturer does not provide a nameplate rate. For this reason, the nameplate rate of the weir head (400 m 3 /hr) is applied to the HiVisc head for the open water simulations. Discharge Pump Rate The simulated OWTF is equipped with a very high capacity discharge pump capable of moving 1000 m 3 /hr for offloading of recovered fluid to secondary storage. Offload Time Offloading time is the amount of time OWTFs must spend offloading their recovered fluids to secondary storage. During offloading, the task force cannot engage in oil recovery operations. No oil is recovered during these offloading periods. Oil spill response operations frequently have more recovery task forces than they have secondary storage vessels, and must stagger their offloading periods to minimize recovery losses which result from being serviced by a limited number of secondary storage vessels. In this simulation, unlimited secondary storage is assigned to each OWTF, so there is no staggering of offloading periods. A 4- hour offload time is achieved, which is credible based on the high- capacity pumps that are presumed to be in place for oil recovery vessels. Offload rate can be calculated as (onboard storage volume)/(pump rate) + (1 hr for protected waters) or (2 hours for open waters) (Washington State OSAC 2009). Transit Time Transit time captures the amount of time needed for a recovery vessel to rendezvous with a secondary storage vessel or facility in order to offload recovered product. A barge and tugboat are assumed to shadow each OWTF, providing dedicated on- scene storage, which results in a transit time value of zero. This is an optimistic assumption and will require a sufficient number of empty barges to be available to support each on- water task force. All barges (and associated tugboats) required to support offloading are presumed to be on- scene before OSRV primary storage fills, so that there is no delay in secondary storage availability. Throughput Efficiency Throughput efficiency indicates the amount of oil recovered, versus the amount of oil encountered. Throughput efficiency represents the fact that oil skimming equipment cannot recover 100% of the oil it encounters due to a variety of limitations, the most significant being (1) loss of oil by the containment system, and (2) variations in the thickness and concentration of the oil slick. ROC utilizes a user- set value as a baseline for throughput efficiency, but modifies it if the model indicates the recovery system is encountering more oil than it is capable of recovering. Throughput efficiency was set to 75% for all simulations, which means that of the total volume of oil encountered by the on- water recovery system (boom and skimming system), 75% is removed. Recovery Efficiency ROC de- rates the nameplate efficiency of skimmer systems according to a recovery efficiency value, to reflect the fact that most skimmers recover large volumes of free water along with oil- water emulsion. Recovery Page 43 of 62

45 efficiency for the HiVisc and wier skimmer heads is set to 20% in the simulations. This is a realistic recovery rate for weir- type skimmers. Table 3.3 summarizes all equipment and recovery specifications applied to the simulation. Table 3.3 Summary of equipment and recovery specifications used in ROC simulations Specification Vessel(s) Skimmer(s) Speed OWTF Decant Efficiency 80% Boom type and amount Swath width Onboard Storage 635 m 3 Nameplate Capacity Decanting Rate Discharge Pump Rate Offload Time Start/End Times and Work Day Length Throughput Efficiency 75% Recovery Efficiency 20% 1-63m OSRV; 1-10m support boat 1- TransRec 150 skimmer 0.33 m/s (0.75 mph) Sea Sentry II (170cm) 201 m 36.5m (120 ft) 400 m 3 /hr 340 m 3 /hr 1000 m 3 /hr 4 hours (with 0 hours for offload transits) 8 hrs 30 min (winter); 18 hrs (summer) 3.3 Outputs from Response Options Calculator Simulations The oil spill recovery task force elements described in Section were inputted into the Response Options Calculator (ROC) and the outputs that the ROC yielded described the recovery capacity for a single task force at each location for each season. The ROC output is expressed as the volume of oil recovered, evaporated, and remaining in the environment at 24- hour intervals (24, 48, and 72 hours). Appendix A summarizes the recovery capacity outputs (mass balance) for each simulation. Section 3.4 provides detailed ROC outputs for two example scenarios hour Recovery Estimates Table 3.4 summarizes recovery system performance for all 16 spill simulations, for a 72- hour period beginning at the spill occurrence. Numbers are rounded to the nearest tenth. The column labeled % of 72 hrs identifies the amount of time during the initial 72 hours of the spill response during which oil recovery operations actually take place (no recovery happens during transit to the spill, darkness, or offloading periods). Summer and winter day lengths are based on solstice periods (the longest and shortest day lengths, respectively). The Number of Fills identifies the number of times the recovery vessel must offload to a secondary storage device. Of the four subject oils modeled in the ROC, Syncrude was the most easily recovered oil, in terms of recovery rate of oil as a fraction of remaining surface oil after 72 hours. The Syncrude characterized by SL Ross (2010 a and 2010b) demonstrates a very high natural dispersion rate in the ROC simulation, substantially higher that crude oils or the other modeled synthetic crude. This creates a high rate of recovery, as a percentage of surface Page 44 of 62

46 oil, since an unusually large fraction of oil disperses naturally. SL Ross s report did not establish criteria for sample selection. Alberta SMB was selected for this study as a possible alternate light hydrocarbon to Syncrude, with different characteristics. Alberta SMB does not exhibit the very high dispersion rate of the Syncrude. Interpretation of diluted bitumen results is complicated by the potential for oil submergence, which ROC does not account for, the recovery challenges of very high viscosity oil, and the generally poor characterization of diluted bitumens both in terms of modeling properties and their real- world behavior when spilled. Cold Lake Bitumen, MacKay Heavy Bitumen, and Alberta SMB all formed stable oil- water emulsions in the ROC simulations. These three oils reached water percentages of 59% to 81% in all scenarios. These emulsion levels were frequently achieved in less than 72 hours. Syncrude did not form stable emulsions with water in ROC, which contributes to its high estimated rate of recovery. Maximum water content of the emulsions is listed in Appendix A. Bulk recovery rates across all 16 simulations vary by a factor of slightly more than 2, suggesting general agreement. Table 3.4. Summary of Recovery System Performance for All Simulations Based on ROC Outputs Simulations Time collecting % of 72hrs Oil Recovered Emulsion Recovered # of Fills MHB OWA Summer 27.1 hours 38% 714 m m 3 6 MHB OWA Winter 13.8 hours 19% 457 m m 3 3 MHB CCAA Summer 36 hours 50% 810 m m MHB CCAA Winter 19 hours 26% 570 m m CLB OWA Summer 28 hours 39% 731 m m CLB OWA Winter 14.6 hours 20% 461 m m 3 3 CLB CCAA Summer 36 hours 50% 810 m m CLB CCAA Winter 19 hours 26% 523 m m ASMB OWA Summer 29.7 hours 41% 675 m m 3 5 ASMB OWA Winter 17.2 hours 24% 492 m m 3 3 ASMB CCAA Summer 44 hours 61% 461 m m ASMB CCAA Winter 21.5 hours 30% 387 m m SYN OWA Summer 44 hours 61% 695 m m 3 2 SYN OWA Winter 21.5 hours 30% 421 m m SYN CCAA Summer 44.5 hours 62% 802 m m SYN CCAA Winter 24.4 hours 34% 537 m m Task Force Requirements to Recover 10,000 m 3 spill in 72 hours Based on the ROC model outputs for the 16 simulations, the number of task forces required to contain and recover a 10,000 m 3 spill under idealized conditions within 72 hours is between 8 and 20. This extrapolation was performed by comparing recovery performance of the modeled OWTF to the remaining surface oil after 72 hours, as calculated by ROC. Figure 3.3 summarizes the calculations used to derive these estimates. The Page 45 of 62

47 number of task forces required is dependent upon spill location, season, and type of oil. In general, more forces are required for an OWA spill than for a CCAA spill, due in part to the longer transits to the spill. Likewise, winter spills require additional task forces to achieve the necessary recovery rates because they have shorter operating periods due to reduced daylight. These scenarios all presume sufficient oil storage barges (secondary storage) will be available to offload all task forces, as needed, on demand and on- site. In reality, development and deployment of secondary storage capacity will require significant resources. Oil storage barges range in size (oil storage capacity) from 19m 3 micro barges to those that can carry more than 7,950 m 3. Common mid- range oil storage barges that can be utilized as secondary storage include 1, 590 m 3, 3,180 m 3 and 4,770 m 3. Larger storage barges require larger support tugs and will be restricted to operating in deeper water due to increased draft. In order to meet the recovery requirements for these 16 simulations, a 1:1 ratio of task force to storage barge would be required, meaning that as many as 20 storage barges (of at least 500 m 3 each) would need to be on stand- by to support the target recovery rates (to support the MHB OWA winter simulation). The minimum number of storage barges needed to support these simulations would be 8 (for the SYN CCAA summer simulation), but each barge would be required to have a capacity of at least 1250 m Table 3.5 estimates the task forces required to respond to a 10,000 m 3 spill of each of the four representative oils at the two locations, in summer and winter. This estimate describes the minimum force to achieve the projected response capacity. Figure 3.3. Calculations and conversions used to derive 72- hour task force needs from ROC outputs Estimated total OWTF required to collect spill = Mass balance for 72 hrs (Total spill size evaporated amount amount recovered by 1 task force)/(72-hour oil recovered by 1 OWTF) + 1 Example calculation: CLB OWA Winter Simulation (10,000 m m m 3 )/461 m = 7519 m 3 /461 m = = is rounded up to 18 because partial task forces do not exist. 29 Capacity calculated by dividing spill size (10,000 m 3 ) by number of barges. Page 46 of 62

48 Table 3.5. Task Force Requirements for Sixteen Simulated Oil Spills (10,000 m3) Under Ideal Conditions as Calculated using ROC Simulation MHB OWA Summer 13 MHB OWA Winter 20 MHB CCAA Summer 11 MHB CCAA Winter 16 CLB OWA Summer 11 CLB OWA Winter 18 CLB CCAA Summer 10 CLB CCAA Winter 16 ASMB OWA Summer 11 ASMB OWA Winter 15 ASMB CCAA Summer 16 ASMB CCAA Winter 19 SYN OWA Summer 9 SYN OWA Winter 14 SYN CCAA Summer 8 SYN CCAA Winter 11 Number of Open Water Task Forces (OWTF) Note: Each OWTF consists of: *1 OSRV with integrated high- capacity skimming system (400 m 3 /hr) *crew of 30+ people *635 m 3 onboard storage *1-2 support vessels; *201m of ocean boom; *discharge pump capable of 1000 m 3 /hr; *decanting pump capable of 340 m 3 /hr 3.4 Detailed Simulation Discussion Of the 16 simulations (10,000 m 3 spills) run using the ROC, we have provided a more detailed discussion and analysis of specific factors for one simulation: Cold Lake Bitumen, Dixon Entrance (OWA), winter. This spill reflects one of the more challenging sets of conditions based on product, seasonality and geographic location. Winter conditions in Dixon Entrance often preclude oil spill response operations altogether, as described in Part 2 (RGA). During times when a response would be feasible (approximately 32% of the time during fall/winter months), as few as 8.5 hours of daylight and civil twilight are available for recovery operations. If a Dixon Entrance spill were to occur at Learmonth Bank (Figure 3.1), the transit distance from Prince Rupert, the nearest large sea and airport, is 190 km (See Table 3.2). A Learmonth Bank spill scenario illustrates how the 12- hour deployment assumption applied to all simulations is extremely optimistic. Given an average OSRV transit speed of 16.7 kph and assuming that a sufficient cache of response resources was available in Prince Rupert, transit time alone for all of the required response resources would be 11.3 hours. Adding in one hour each for mobilization and on- scene set- up, which presumes that forces are owned by the operator, dedicated and in ready mode, 30 the earliest timeframe for task forces to begin 30 See Section for discussion of US Coast guard mobilization planning guidelines. Page 47 of 62

49 collecting oil is roughly 13 hours. Pushing OSRV speeds towards maximum transit speeds (22.2 kph) makes the 12- hour goal possible, but only under ideal navigational conditions. Figure 3.4 shows mass balance output from the ROC for a Cold Lake Bitumen spill at Dixon Entrance in Winter for a single Open Water Task Force assuming optimal recovery conditions (12 hour deployment time and no efficiency loss, with all other winter simulation assumptions in place). Table 3.8 summarizes recovery operations for the single OWTF. Extrapolation of the ROC output in Table 3.6 shows that 18 OWTFs, plus secondary storage and support assets, would be required to recover all surface oil for the 10,000 m 3 spill in 72 hours. Figure 3.4 Recovery Mass Balance Estimate for CLB OWA Winter Simulation (For One OWTF) Table 3.6 Recovery Performance of a single OWTF in CLB OWA Winter Simulation Time Recovering Oil, total: hours Oil Recovered: 461 m 3 Oil/Water Emulsion Recovered: 1073 m 3 Water Content (%) of the Emulsion at 24 hrs: 61% Free Water Recovered 4293 m 3 Free Water Retained 859 m 3 Offloading Cycles 3.04 Area Covered 65 ha Surface Oil Remaining 7519 m 3 Evaporation 2020 m 3 Page 48 of 62

50 Figure 3.5 shows the ROC slick thickness output for the CLB OWA winter simulation. The slick thickness for this simulation attenuates according a pattern that we observed to be typical for most of the simulations, though it is retarded by high viscosities. By 72 hours, the area of spill slick coverage is expected to exceed 40 square kilometers. ADIOS predicts that slick thickness, at the thickest point, will be less than a quarter- centimeter, inhibiting recovery efforts. It is possible given the very high viscosities of bitumens that the cohesion and clumpiness of the oil is underestimated by the model. Figure 3.6 shows the water content of the water- oil emulsion formed as the spill weathers. The oil rapidly emulsifies. Within 24 hours, the oil forms an emulsion with 61% water content. ROC predicts this will be the maximum water content, and the emulsion remains stable throughout the following 48 hours. Emulsions with high water content have increased volume, requiring more storage than pure oil or emulsions with lower water- to- oil ratios, and exhibit different behavioral properties than non- emulsified oil. Figure 3.7 shows the viscosity changes. Within the simulation, oil viscosities exceed 80,000 cst within a day, and approach 115,000 cst within 72 hours, exceeding the specified capabilities of the HiVisc skimmer head, and possibly halting skimming operations. This is a steeper viscosity increase, with a slightly higher (extrapolated) 120 hour viscosity, than SL Ross predicted for an October spill of MKH in their analysis (2010a and 2010b). The high viscosity of the CLB in this simulation supports earlier recommendations that on- water response systems utilize high viscosity skimmer heads. For this simulation, the spill response equipment must be sufficient to handle oil viscosities approaching or exceeding 100,000 cst. Based upon the known oil properties, adhesion will probably be high. If the spill were to impact shoreline areas, the oil would be expected to entrain sediment and may achieve densities higher than seawater. Figure 3.8 shows the evaporation curve. By 72 hours, the majority of volatiles have evaporated from the simulated oil. Further evaporative loss will not be significant. Oil that remains in the environment would likely be persistent, either stranding on shores, remaining at the water surface, or submerging. Figure hour Oil Thickness Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Page 49 of 62

51 Figure hour Water Content in Emulsion from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Figure hour Oil Viscosity Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) Page 50 of 62

52 Figure hour Oil Evaporation Output from CLB OWA Winter Simulation Spill (10,000 m 3 ) 3.5 Adjustment of Recovery Capacity Estimates based on Transit Times One of the factors that could significantly impact the estimated response capacity is the lag time required for vessels and equipment to transit from staging areas to the spill site. The 8 and 12- hour assumptions are not realistic for all potential spill sites. As shown above, in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2, some potential spills sites would require 30 hours or more transit time for an OWTF traveling at typical speeds. To gain some insight into the impact of delayed arrival times, additional simulations were run through the ROC, with task forces arriving at staggered times and often realizing only part of established work periods. To quantify this temporal adjustment, it was assumed that response forces will arrive with an equal average distribution throughout the 24- hour day. Based on day and night lengths, the probabilities of a day or night arrival are determined. Each of these probabilities is multiplied by the averaged day/night arrival time which equals half the length of the day or night. Finally, the outcomes are added to transit time (in the case of a night time arrival), or subtracted from the first work shift (in the case of day arrival). The net effect of the temporal adjustment is to reduce and redistribute the time available for recovery operations. While any given task force will arrive at a discrete time, with a discrete adjustment, the average of these is amortized over the entire force creating an approximation of the total time lost. A set of ROC runs was conducted, incorporating these temporal adjustments. The outputs showed that in the 72- hour timeframe for a CCAA spill, the quantity of oil recovered was reduced by roughly 25%. For an OWA spill, the 72- hour quantity of oil recovered was reduced by roughly 40%. The temporal adjustments emphasize the importance of quickly mobilizing response resources to the scene in order to maximize recovery during the critical early stages of a spill. One way to address these efficiency losses would be to increase the total number of task forces. Based on the same method used to calculate task force needs, we estimated that an increase of 20% to task force sizes would be required to make up for the temporal Page 51 of 62

53 adjustment for a CCAA spill, and 70% more task forces would be needed to address the 72- hour shortfall in the OWA. 31 Once the Northern Gateway on- water response system is described more completely, it will be possible to estimate response capacity using known equipment storage locations, transit times, and recovery rates. Eventually, functional exercises where equipment is deployed and tested under real- world conditions will further refine the estimated capacity for on- water spill response along the Northern Gateway tanker routes. 31 Instead of 8-20 OWTFs, OWTFs would be required to meet the recovery goal. Page 52 of 62

54 Part 4. Conclusion This study set out to analyze the capabilities and limitations of on- water mechanical oil spill response (containment, recovery and removal of oil) in two areas along the potential vessel routes associated with the Northern Gateway project. The methodology layered two related analyses in an attempt to provide additional insight into how effective existing on- water spill recovery systems might be in cleaning up an oil spill from a Northern Gateway tanker. In order for any oil spill response to be conducted, the vessels, equipment and people involved in the response must be able to safely and effectively deploy spill recovery systems. Existing oil spill cleanup equipment is subject to operating limits which are tied to various environmental and on- scene conditions. This study looked at four operating limits wind, sea state, temperature, and daylight and estimated the percentage of time that one or more of these factors (or some combination of factors) would exceed established operating limits and thus preclude on- water oil recovery. The results of this analysis estimate the response gap for a representative OWA site Dixon Entrance found that the response gap (period of time during which no response would be possible based on environmental factors) was 45% overall. The response gap for Dixon Entrance in the fall/winter was significantly higher (68%) than for the spring/summer (25%). The response gap for a representative CCAA site Nanakwa Shoals was estimated to be 7% overall, with fall/winter significantly higher (14%) than spring summer (less than 1%). A response gap analysis is only an estimate, but it helps to create realistic expectations about the opportunity to conduct on- water oil spill recovery operations. The response gap analysis confirms that oil spill recovery is more likely to be precluded during winter months, and that conditions which would preclude recovery occur more frequently in the open water area. The 68% response gap for Dixon Entrance in the winter does not reflect all environmental conditions, only those for which datasets were available. This figure is important because it begins to set the stage for a true worst case scenario. If a Northern Gateway tanker spilled oil in Dixon Entrance, during the winter months, no response would be possible for more than 2/3 of the time. While the response gap analysis considers the opportunity or possibility for oil spill response, the second analysis the response capacity analysis estimates the potential effectiveness of oil spill recovery systems in the two operating areas during times when a response is possible, and estimates the amount of resources that would be needed to recover a 10,000 m 3 spill within 72 hours of the release. During the 32% of time that response would be feasible for a winter spill at Dixon Entrance, the estimated number of open water task forces required to contain and recover 100% of the oil in 72 hours, under favorable conditions, is as much as 20 for a 10,000 m 3 diluted bitumen spill and 14 for a 10,000 m 3 synthetic crude oil spill. Each open water task force consists of a large purpose- built oil spill recovery vessel with integrated skimming capacity of 400 m 3 /hr and storage for 635 m 3 of recovered oil, as well as 1-2 workboats, 200m of ocean boom, and up to 38 crewmembers. Multiplying such a task force by 14 or 20 requires a spill response capacity that does not presently exist in Western Canada. Real- world limitations to spill recovery effectiveness would likely reduce the estimated efficiencies derived from the ROC simulations. Factors that could reduce efficiency include slick spreading and thickness, delays in arrival time for response resources, environmental limits to effectiveness, potential for submerged oil, and logistical support constraints. Throughout this report, secondary containment was frequently discussed as a limiting factor to spill response, because adequate empty tankage is rarely available immediately to support on- water recovery. Without adequate storage for recovered oil and water, response operations can quickly grind to a halt and the window of opportunity for oil recovery can be lost. Page 53 of 62

55 Once the operating parameters for Northern Gateway tankers are established and a marine oil spill response system established to support tanker operations, it will be possible to more precisely estimate the response gap and determine the on- water recovery capacity for spills from Northern Gateway tankers. Page 54 of 62

56 Part 5. References Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) Spill Tactics for Alaska Responders (STAR) Manual. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard Practice for Classifying Water Bodies for Spill Control Systems. F Department of Fisheries and Oceans Wave Height Data Search. sdmm.dfo- mpo.gc.ca/isdm- gdsi/waves- vagues/search- recherche/index- eng.asp. Accessed May June Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Marine Shipping Quantitative Risk Analysis: Enbridge Northern Gateway Project. Technical Data Report to Joint Review Panel. FrankMohn AS Environmental Products (FRAMO) FRAMO TransRec 150 Oil Recovery and Transfer System Technical Description. Revision B, dated 10/6/ Genwest Systems, Inc Response Options Calculator (ROC). Online tool and Technical Manuals. Accessed May- June Gramann, U Description of Available Meteorological Data for Evaluation of Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline Proposal. Mountain Weather Services. Hay and Company Consultants (Hayco) Hydrocarbon Mass Balance Estimates: Inputs for Spill Response Planning. Technical Data Report to Joint Review Panel. International Maritime Organization (IMO) Regulation 21: Construction Requirements for Oil Tankers. Moffatt and Nichol Methanex Corporation Kitimat Marine Terminal Modifications, TERMPOL No. 3.15, Environmental Risk Analysis. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills (ADIOS) Tool. and- chemical- spills/oil- spills/response- tools/adios.html Accessed May National Research Council Canada Sunrise/Sunset/Sun Angle Calculator. cnrc.gc.ca/eng/services/hia/sunrise- sunset/angle- calculator.html. Accessed May June NAV CANADA The Weather of British Columbia. Ottawa, ON. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC Response Gap Methods. Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council. Potter, S. (ed) World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. SL Ross Environmental Research Ltd. Eighth edition, Ship Escort/Response Vessel System (SERVS) Tactics Manual. Public review draft. Page 55 of 62

57 SL Ross Environmental Research, Ltd. 2010a. Properties and Fate of Hydrocarbons Associated with Hypothetical Spills at the Marine Terminal and in the Confined Channel Assessment Area. Technical Data Report. SL Ross Environmental Research, Ltd. 2010b. Properties and Fate of Hydrocarbons Associated with Hypothetical Spills at the Marine Terminal and in the Open Water Area. Technical Data Report. S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd Spill Response Gap Study for the Canadian Beaufort Sea and the Canadian Davis Strait. Report to the National Energy Board. Terhune, K Preliminary Mechanical Response Gap Analysis for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project. Living Oceans Society. United States Environmental Protection Agency EPA Response to Enbridge Pipeline Spill in Michigan. Accessed November- December 2011, Washington State Oil Spill Advisory Council (OSAC) Assessment of Capacity in Washington State to Respond to Large- Scale Marine Oil Spills. Page 56 of 62

58 Part 6. Appendices Appendix A: ROC Output Summaries (Mass Balance) for 16 Simulations Table A.1: Recovery capacity of a single NSTF for CCAA Summer Conditions Oil 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered (% water) 32 Evaporated Remaining MKH 487 m m m m m m m 3 (76%) CLB 472 m m m m m m m 3 (71%) ASMB 273 m m m m m m m 3 (70%) SYN 474 m m m m m m m 3 (0%) 1312 m m m m m m m m 3 Table A.2: Recovery capacity of a single NSTF for CCAA Winter Conditions Oil 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered (% water) 33 Evaporated Remaining MKH 298 m m m m m m m 3 (62%) CLB 268 m m m m m m m 3 (59%) ASMB 295 m m m m m m m 3 (67%) SYN 353 m m m m m m m 3 (0%) 1015 m m m m m m m m 3 32 Percentage of water in emulsion at hour Percentage of water in emulsion at hour 72. Page 57 of 62

59 Table A.3: Recovery capacity of a single OWTF for OWA Summer Conditions Oil 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered (% water) 34 Evaporated Remaining MKH 311 m m m m m m m 3 (74%) CLB 298 m m m m m m m 3 (70%) ASMB 356 m m m m m m m 3 (81%) SYN 353 m m m m m m m 3 (0%) 1165 m m m m m m m m 3 Table A.4: Recovery capacity of a single OWTF for OWA Winter Conditions Oil 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered Evaporated Remaining Recovered (% water) 35 Evaporated Remaining MKH 206 m m m m m m m 3 (64%) CLB 188 m m m m m m m 3 (61%) ASMB 292 m m m m m m m 3 (80%) SYN 286 m m m m m m m 3 (0%) 1069 m m m m m m m m 3 34 Percentage of water in emulsion at hour Percentage of water in emulsion at hour 72. Page 58 of 62

60 Appendix B. Acronyms and Abbreviations ADEC Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation ADIOS Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills API American Petroleum Institute ASMB Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend (synthetic crude oil) ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials bbl Barrel BC British Columbia c Celsius CCAA Confined Channel Assessment Area CLB Cold Lake Bitumen cm Centimeters cp Centipoise (viscosity unit of measure) cst Centistoke (viscosity unit of measure) DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans DNV Det Norske Veritas FRAMO FrankMohn AS Environmental Products FRV Fast Response Vessel ft Feet F/V Fishing Vessel GIS Geographic Information System GOSRP General Oil Spill Response Plan GRP Geographic Response Plan ha hectare HiVisc High Viscosity HQ Headquarters hr Hour HRO Highly Reliable Organization ICS Incident Command System IMO International Maritime Organization JRP Joint Review Panel kg Kilograms km Kilometers kph Kilometers per hour kts Knots LTF Lightering Task Force Page 59 of 62

61 m m 3 m³/hr MHB mph m/s MSRC nm NG NOAA NSTF OSAC OSRV OWA OWTF PWS RCA RGA RGI ROC SCAT SERVS SG SYN Syncrude TDR TF TOO US USCG USEPA VLCC WA Meter Cubic meters Cubic meters per hour MacKay Heavy Bitumen Miles per hour Meters per second Marine Spill Response Corporation Nautical Mile Northern Gateway National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (United States) Nearshore Task Force Washington State Oil Spill Advisory Council Oil Spill Response Vessel Open Water Area Open Water Task Force Prince William Sound Response Capacity Analysis Response Gap Analysis Response Gap Index Response Option Calculator Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team Ship Escort/Response Vessel System Specific gravity Syncrude Synthetic crude oil Technical Data Report Task force Tanker of Opportunity United States United States Coast Guard United States Environmental Protection Agency Very large crude carrier Washington Page 60 of 62

62 Appendix C: Meteorological Data Summary Page 61 of 62

63 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: Description of Available Meteorological Data for Evaluation of Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline Proposal Uwe Gramann, P.Met. Mountain Weather Services Smithers, BC July 2012

64 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: PURPOSE Publicly available meteorological and oceanographic observations were collected from land based stations and buoys along the B.C. north and central coast. The collected data was used to establish a frequency analysis of wind and visibility occurrences along the proposed tanker routes as well as Terrace and Prince Rupert Airports. The data further aided in establishing a response gap analysis conducted by Nuka Research Planning Group. DISCUSSION The data obtained by EC and DFO vary immensely from station to station with respect to start of observation period, end of observation period, observation interval and missing data. The reliability of the data is difficult to assess without a detailed analysis of each station set. The most apparent issue with the dataset are irregularly missing periods of data. In general, land observations have more complete datasets compared to buoy observations. One of the more problematic stations in this regard is the Nanakwa shoals buoy, where as much as 15% of hourly data is missing (possibly more). A very cursory first look could not detect any bias in this missing data. It is however suspected that a large number of missing observations are due to equipment failure that is triggered by inclement weather. It is therefore conceivable that the dataset is underreporting such conditions. Nanakwa shoals, however, observes the only reliable and representative wind speed along the inland route (CCAA), since it is located in the middle of Douglas Channel, and is as such well exposed to along channel winds (e.g. arctic outflows). It is also not located on an Island or land that would slow winds through divergence and friction. However, since its location is not coinciding with the narrowest section of Douglas Channel it is conceivable that higher wind speeds along the CCAA will remain undetected. Another problem is the lack of visibility data along the proposed routes. The only stations reporting visibility are lighthouses and airports, none of which are located along the confined channel assessment area (CCAA). As a result there is no record of visibility observations along the inland route. It is noted, that the proponent commissioned a maneuvering study that did not test maneuvers at visibilities below 3 nautical miles. Visibilities of less than 3 nautical miles are quite common at Terrace airport, which is expected to have generally better visibility than Douglas Channel along the CCAA, due to its location further inland. Visibilities observed at marine lighthouses have two distinct problems: Lighthouses report at irregular hours (most commonly in 3 hour intervals) and most of them do not report between 10PM and 4AM; in many cases not even between 4PM and 4AM. Additionally, lighthouses are located on land experiencing better daytime visibilities than open water due to the adjacent warmer land mass and slightly drier conditions. Considering that the timing of most lighthouse observations are biased towards daytime conditions, they should be considered a best case scenario when evaluating restrictions along the proposed tanker routes caused by visibilities. The most reliable data within the set are (manual) airport observations from Terrace and Prince Rupert Airports. Their strength is the long period (over 50 years), a very consistent data set (only few missing Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 2

65 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: observations) as well as 24-7 observations. Unfortunately, these airports are located at somewhat protected locations (especially Terrace) and wind and visibility conditions can be considered too benign compared to conditions along the proposed routes. Wind observation stations that represent conditions at the proposed LNG terminal in Bish Cove are unrepresentative for winds along the proposed route as well as for the proposed Enbridge tanker terminal. The Bish Cove LNG Terminal is naturally protected from winds blowing along Douglas Channel by its location in a cove hidden behind a land barrier. The proposed Enbridge tanker route as well as the proposed Enbridge Terminal are exposed to dominant winds blowing along Douglas Channel. As a result, Bish Cove wind data is not recommended to be used for the planning process or operations of the Enbridge project. Wind observations installed by the proponent are not part of this data set and the locations of the associated observations stations subject to boundary layer effects from nearby objects and/or divergent flows underestimating wind speeds compared to what tankers would encounter along the route. It is understood that these stations are only used to verify the proponents wind models. It is not recommended to use them for tanker operations and decision making that depend on wind observations fully representative along the proposed route. Wind speeds measured at Terrace Airport are also not recommended to be used for operational decisions due to its location within a multi-valley confluence zone that is unrepresentative for conditions along the CCAA. Triple Island lighthouse observations have a special significance in that this location is one of the pilot boarding stations. The length and good consistency of the dataset (Jan-1953 until Dec-2001) adds to its importance. Wind speed and visibility is considered representative for the region since it is well exposed in all directions. Particular importance should be given to the units of visibility if this data is to be compared to third party datasets. Data provided here presents visibility in kilometer as provided by Environment Canada. Visibility in marine environments, however, including Environment Canada s marine forecasts, most commonly refer to nautical miles (1nm=1.852km). Furthermore, aviation visibility observations and restrictions, such as visual flight rules most commonly refer to visibility in statute miles (1sm=1.609km). Uwe Gramann, P.Met., Senior Meteorologist Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 3

66 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: APPENDIX DATA HANDLING AND CONVERSIONS All available buoy and land data was retrieved from web servers of Environment Canada (EC) and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) by a Linux shell script routine and then imported into MS Access for further handling. The dataset was assembled under the general assumption that DFO source data is accurate unless flagged. Since EC data does not contain flags all land based data was assumed to be accurate unless a cursory review found errors in any parameter, in which case the entire observation was deleted. No detailed error or bias analysis was conducted. The strengths and limitations listed here were discovered while conducting routine and basic data checks and analyzing the data (for some of the results see also Station and Data Notes). The resulting database was subjected to the following steps: All DFO buoy data flagged with the numbers 3 (doubtful), 4 (erroneous) or 7 (off position) were deleted. (see also ) Data from the following stations were deleted due to redundancy and the fact that nearby data existed with longer records: Prince Rupert, Prince Rupert 2, Prince Rupert Auto, Sandspit, Sandspit AWOS, Terrace Skeena Bridge. All duplicate records within each station s data set were deleted. If necessary, data was converted to common units according to the following formulae: 1 m/s = knots 1 m = feet 1 km/h = knots 1 km = nautical mile 1 km/h = m/s 1 m/s = 3.6 km/h The column labeled date was renamed to Datum (German for date ) to avoid naming conflict with date functions intrinsic to MS Access. This parameter was considered to be the start of observation validity. All observations were limited to a maximum validity duration of 1 hour. Validity of less than 1 hour was determined chronologically by the start time of the next available observation of the same station. (End of validity of observation is listed in column ValidUntil ). Daylight hours were used from Terrace in the year It was confirmed that daylight data from the years 2012 and 1950 do not vary by more than 1 minute. Daylight timing was adjusted to match DFO buoy data in Greenwich Mean Time. Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 4

67 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: DATA SOURCES DFO B UO Y DATA: DFO Buoy data was downloaded from DFB Buoy Column and Flag descriptions can be found at EC CLI MAT E/LAND DATA: EC online climate data was downloaded from EC online climate data descriptions can be found at DAYLI GHT DATA: Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 5

68 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: DATA COLUMNS DFO B UO Y DATA: Location Location Name StationID Location DFO Identifier Datum Date and time observed (UTC) ValidUntil Time of next obs or 1 hour after "Datum", whichever comes first Q_Flag Quality control flag Latitude Latitude of Buoy Locatoin Longitude Longitude of Buoy Locatoin WaterDepth The depth values are presented in metres VCAR m Characteristic significant wave height (m) WvPkPd s Wave spectrum peak period (s) VWH m Characteristic significant wave height (reported by the buoy) (m) VCMX m Maximum zero crossing wave height (reported by the buoy) (m) VTP s Wave spectrum peak period (reported by the buoy) (s) WDIR deg Direction from which the wind is blowing ( ) WSPD mpers Horizontal wind speed (m/s) WSS mpers Horizontal scalar wind speed (m/s) Gust mpers Gust wind speed (m/s) WDIR 2 deg Direction from which the wind is blowing ( ) WSPD 2 mpers Horizontal wind speed (m/s) Gust 2 mpers Gust wind speed (m/s) Pressure hpa Sea level atmospheric pressure (mb) Pressure 2 hpa Sea level atmospheric pressure (mb) Temp deg C Dry bulb air temperature ( C) SeaSurfcTemp deg C Sea surface temperature ( C) Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 6

69 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: EC CLI MAT E/LAND DATA Location Datum ValidUntil Data Quality Temperature degc Temperature Flag Dew Point degc Dew Point Flag RH percent RH Flag Wind Dir 10deg wind Dir Flag Wind Speed kmh Wind Speed Flag Visibility km Visibility Flag Station Pressure kpa Station Pressure Flag Hmdx Hmdx Flag Wind Chill Wind Chill Flag Weather Location Name Date and time observed (PST) Time of next obs or 1 hour after "Datum", whichever comes first The temperature of the air in degrees Celsius (C). The dew point temperature in degrees C Relative humidity in percent The direction (true or geographic, not magnetic) from which the wind blows. Expressed in ten's of degrees, The speed of motion of air in km/hr, usually observed at 10 m above the ground Visibility in kilometers (km) is the distance at which objects of suitable size can be seen and identified. Atmospheric pressure in kilopascal (kpa) humidex Wind chill Weather Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; weather@uniserve.com; T: P a g e 7

70 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: STATION MAP NORTH Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; T: P a g e 8

71 Mountain Weather Services PO Broadway Ave Smithers BC V0J 2N0 T: STATION MAP SOUTH Mountain Weather Services; PO 4341; 3967 Broadway; Smithers; BC; V0J 2N0; T: P a g e 9