Response to VCB Action Item AI 2392 Regarding Environmental Monitoring - Atmospheric. N. Packham, Environmental Factors Office/SF2/35138 July 28, 2003

Transcription

1 Response to VCB Action Item AI 2392 Regarding Environmental Monitoring - Atmospheric N. Packham, Environmental Factors Office/SF2/35138 July 28, 2003

2 Action Item AI 2392 Action item verbiage translated by OB/SF to now read: What risks does a trace contaminant monitor manage that the Program needs managed? 1. Do research, bring the right safety and OB8 personnel, and clarify the requirements and the hazard analysis in order to see how the hazard analysis handles each requirement. Is there any place in the hazards or control of these risks that the Program depends on TOCA or VOA? 2. Provide matrix of gases/major gases and the hardware on board that can monitor them. Provide insight to the quantity requirements of the gases and their impacts including crew response and physiological response. Do we actually use the data from this hardware to control the environment? 3. What are we waiving that we are flying right now and how long have we been doing that? What was acceptance rationale? The VOA has not been validated so how that that been addressed? Waivers? 4. If we do not have VOA or TOCA, what kind of archival sample would be required in both water and air to get us through shuttle downtime before new hardware can be launched? This presentation only addresses atmospheric quality monitoring Water and radiation to follow 2

3 Response to Bullet #1 The current requirements to monitor the atmosphere do not assume that the hardware is a control to any hazard on board ISS However, the presence of real-time monitoring devices significantly reduces the risk to both crewmembers and to the systems that support them, specifically ECLS Reduction in risk to crew health Identify and quantify the accumulation of trace pollutants before they pose a threat to crew health Monitor the progress of decontamination of the atmosphere when a pollutant reaches unhealthy concentrations Reduction in risk to systems Identify to ECLS that significant sources of a new contaminant have developed that could significantly affect hardware performance (CDRA, TCCS, SRV-K) Identify that removal mechanisms (TCCS, BMP, CHX) may be functioning off-nominally even though system performance indicators show otherwise 3

4 Concentration (mg/m3) ISS Onboard Monitoring MCA CSA-CP CDM Maximum Allowable Concentration (180 days) On-orbit Detection Range Average ISS Concentration (from Grab Sample) VOA

5 Response to Bullet #2 Table 5

6 Response to Bullet #3 There are currently 10 waivers to ISS MORD requirements in work that cover different aspects of lack of environmental monitoring Waivers needed due to lack of real-time capability VOA, TOCA Waivers needed due to lack of complete archival capability (up/downmass) Waivers required for items that have never been met Total of 48 requirements addressed by these 10 waivers Process is SMCCB to FACB to MMIOCB Waiver rationale in some cases does not exist No acceptance rationale can be made for no real-time monitoring of the atmosphere and with minimal archive sample, but the requirement is not met, so waiver is required This situation should be the driver for Risk acceptance by the Program VOA actually has been validated for 75% of the compounds that it was expected to be able to monitor Two compounds have yet to be seen in grab samples, so unable to validate 6

7 What atmospheric events have occurred that posed a threat to crew health and safety and which were or could have been managed by real-time monitoring? Catastrophic Potential loss of crew (once per decade) Mir - BMP carbon monoxide release Major Crew symptoms apparent (once per year) SFOG Fire ISS - METOX Mir Larger of the ethylene glycol leaks STS Orbital refrigerator/freezer motor burn Incidents Potential to impact crew health and performance (minimum of 2-3 per year) Mir and ISS Repeated freon leaks Mir and ISS Formaldehyde issues ISS IMV problems STS Teflon/wire burns, data display unit burns, microbial action on wastes, dust from LiOH 7

8 Air Monitoring Benefit to Crew Health An Example (Contingency Response Team Activated) SM Lab Concentration (ug/m3) SMAC 10 0 Jun-01 Aug-01 Oct-01 Dec-01 Feb-02 Apr-02 Jun-02 Aug-02 Oct-02 Dec-02 Feb-03 Apr-03 Date 8

9 Air Monitoring Benefit to Systems An Example Freon Concentration (mg/m3) Feb-01 Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02 Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02 Date 9

10 Response to Bullet #4 No amount of archival sampling can fully compensate for total loss of onorbit atmospheric monitoring At a minimum, samples should be taken monthly in the SM, FGB and Lab and returned to the ground 10

11 So where do we go from here? Identify short, mid and long-term approaches to atmospheric monitoring Short = Now to RTF Mid = RTF Long = What really makes sense to replace existing hardware capability OB, EB and SF to agree on implementation of plans Keep a clear visibility on project progress to ensure that we are reducing risk 11

12 Option Description Dependencies Cost (L/M/H) Schedule (Months) Issues 1 Fly the solid sorbent air sampler (SASS). Already US flight-certified. Provides better capability than grab sample containers due to concentration effects. 2 Obtain Russian AK-1 tubes, repair and fly. Use US resources to analyze post-flight. 3 Certify and fly new (COTS) passive sampling system (replacing GSC's) that is small enough to increase likelihood of Soyuz return 4 Use Russian air pump to obtain concentrated samples on COTS absorption tubes. 5 Find COTS hardware for limited realtime compound determination Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz (SASS is ~4 lbs). Engineering to develop P-103 certification. Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz. Russian agreement to provide tubes and our modification to preclude leaks. Also need details of Russian desorb procedures (may already have this info). Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz. Rapid Engineering certification to EA-WI-016. P-103 certification. Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz. Agreement to use Russian pump with US hardware. Rapid Engineering certification to EA-WI-016. P-103 certification. Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz. Rapid Engineering certification to EA-WI-016. P-103 certification. Short-Term Low. Paperwork Could potentially make 12P delivery requirements. If not, 7S or 13P Still not real-time but the best we have to mitigate the risk. Medium 3-6. Negotiations with Russians to modify their hardware to support US sampling could prove difficult. Still not real-time. Medium 4-6. Still not real-time. Medium 4-6. Difficult verification of interface compliance. Still not real-time. Medium 4-6. Most COTS devices dedicated to one or two analytes. Need multiple devices for broad range of potential 12 contaminants.

13 Mid-Term Option Description Dependencies Cost (L/M/H) Schedule (Months) Issues 1 Fly VOA S/N 1002 Engineering to complete preflight acceptance testing. Acceptance of risk by the Program that same failure might occur. Manifest on ULF-1. Medium-High To support bench review for ULF-1 Same failure as S/N 1001 (1002 has not received the same punishment as the on-orbit unit - RPCM recycles/nitrogen shut-downs). However, has more operating hours. 2 Build VOA S/N 1003 Very rapid fabrication and 3 Find COTS hardware for limited realtime compound determination pre-flight testing required by Engineering. Program would have to give ATP very soon (funding issue) Russian agreement to launch on Progress and return on Soyuz. Rapid Engineering certification to EA-WI-016. P-103 certification. High To support bench review for ULF-1 Redesign of heaters/fuses to avoid existing failure scenario. Very aggressive schedule. Medium 4-6. Most COTS devices dedicated to one or two analytes. Need multiple devices for broad range of potential contaminants. 13

14 Long-Term Option Description Dependencies Cost (L/M/H) Schedule (Months) Issues 1 Evaluate currently available technologies and develop into flight hardware. Provision of funds by the Program. Identification of potential technologies resulting from the OB RFI. Potentially very high months depending upon complexity of technologies selected Funding throughout the development phase and the ability to sustain the hardware. Criticality determination could drive exorbitant costs. Getting "left behind" in technology development (vis-à-vis "state of the art") SA, EA and OB are currently pursuing this approach RFI to be released shortly Code U-funded panels to meet Sept 29, 2003 to evaluate promising technologies Blind testing to determine technology performance Flight hardware design, development and testing 14