Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: Working Well Together?

Transcription

1 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: Working Well Together? A Presentation by Henry Sokolski Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Aspen Institute Conference Russia and the West Resetting the Relationship Washington, DC June 11, 2009

2 More Good News: Declining US/Russian Nuclear Deployments* Operational tactical and strategic nuclear warheads since ,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5, U.S. Russia 2

3 The Hope Ahead: 1,000 Warheads On the Road to Zero? (World with 1,000 US operationally deployed strategic warheads) 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 US Russia 1, ?

4 Bad News: Others Are Coming Up Operationally Deployed Strategic Warheads US Russia France China UK Israel India Pakistan

5 Growing Plutonium Stockpiles for States to Ramp Up or Break Out with Frank Von Hippel et al., Global Fissile Materails Report 2008

6 Plenty of Weapons Uranium for Weapons States to Ramp Up Frank Von Hippel, Global Fissile Materials Report 2008

7 How Adequate Might US Policies Be? CTBT: Do states need to test to get their first bomb and can t weapons states over engineer to avoid testing? FMCT: This leaves existing stockpiles and civilian production of weapons usable fuels untouched More START: Will others follow or be goaded on by US-Russian reductions?

8 States or Regions With Nuclear Power Plants Currently is Pretty Limited

9 Number of Power Reactors States by 2030 May Not Be

10 How the Mid-East Nexus Between Reactors and Bombs Has Been Handled Since Military Strikes against IAEA member states large reactors since against safeguarded reactors since Iran against Osirak 1981 Israel against Osirak Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr 1990 US against Osirak 2003 US against Osirak 2 against IAEA member states reactors Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Diamona 2007 Israeli strike against Syria s Reactor 10 10

11 US Policies: Again, How Effective? Strengthen the NPT: But we claim NPT protects countries right to get to the brink of making fuel (aka. bombs). Strengthen IAEA: But IAEA favors spreading nuclear technology and given the laws of physics is incapable of detecting covert plants or assuring timely warning of military diversions from declared plants Create an international fuel bank: Will this prompt more rightful nuclear fuel making or will it be irrelevant? Take back exports from nuclear violators: But how? More cooperative threat reductions: But with whom?

12 Current Proliferation Seems Manageable (With DPRK Disarming and Iran Nonnuclear)

13 Where We Are Headed The regime will not be sustainable if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice and, of course, each individual State which does this only will leave others to feel that they must do the same. This would increase all of the risks of nuclear accident, of trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by states themselves. To prevent that, you must find durable ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation. Sec. Gen. UN, NPT Review Conference, 5/2/05 13

14 Catalytic Escalation If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and even nuclear use at the very time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles WMD Commission - e.g., Mumbai attacks, Cold Start miscalculations, etc.

15 With More Nuclear-Ready States: Ramp Up to a Nuclear 1914?

16 New Nuclear Reactor Prices: Industry Estimates Are Still Rising New Power Reactor Construction Cost Projections (Overnight nominal $ /kwe installed, exclusive of financing costs) 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1, U. of C/DoE NEI Unistar Constellation Keystone 3-D Column 6 E. ON FPL Turkey Pt. 16

17 Nuclear Power As A Carbon Abater Appears More Costly than Many Alternatives Abatement cost, 2007$/mt CO2e Electronic equipment efficiency Lighting upgrades to CFL, LED Fuel economy - auto Fuel economy - light truck Building shell efficiency CHP - commercial Product and process reformulation CHP - industrial Conversion efficiency, coal plants Residential water heater efficiency Fuel economy - med. & heavy trucks Conservation tillage Capture, destroy non-co2 GHGs Industrial energy efficiency Light duty plug-in hybrids Natural gas and petroleum systems management Afforestation of pasturelands Wind energy Forest management Winter cover crops Solar PV Afforestation of cropland CCS - coal plants HVAC efficiency CCS - industrial facilities NEW NUCLEAR - subsidies CELL. ETHANOL - subsidies NEW NUCLEAR total costs BIODIESEL - subsidies CORN ETHANOL - subsidies 0-50 ECX Offset Value ($28) CCX Offset Value ($4)

18 4 Minimal Suggestions Distinguish between what can be safeguarded vice what can merely be monitored Discourage use of financial incentive in the promotion of nuclear power (e.g., loan guarantees, cheap developmental bank loans, etc.) Fortify the IAEA where it can be improved through more funding and authority (e.g., near-real time surveillance, safeguards fee, WAS unit, etc.) Constrain the stockpiles of nuclear weapons states other than US and Russia. 18

19 Two Additional Suggestions Reinterpret Article IV Require full transparency of large energy project costs and open international bidding that as is required by the Energy Charter Treaty and the Global Energy Charter for Sustainable Development; consider having the World Trade Organization assume enforcement and making this a requirement of any follow-0n to Kyoto Protocols. 19

20 Backup Slides

21 Hardly Proliferation Resistant Enough: Estimated Yields for Different Bomb Technologies Using LWR Pu (Hubbard) Trinity Shot Trinity WG and LWR Pu Trintiy x2 Trinity x3 Trinity Shot, supergrade Pu, 1% 240 content Weapons Grade, 6% 240 Pu content One-cycle LWR Pu, 14% Pu 240 content 21

22 But Can t the IAEA Safeguard Systems Prevent Fresh and Spent Nuclear Fuel Diversions? 22

23 Problem: Time It Takes to Make A Bomb Is Shorter than the Period between Inspections MATERIA L Pu, HEU, U233 in metal form Pu In fresh MOX PU in irradiated spent fuel Low enriched uranium Official IAEA Conversion Times Official IAEA Timeliness Detection Goals 7 to 10 days One month days NRDC Conversion Estimates 1 to 3 weeks 1 month 7 to 10 days 1 to 3 months 3 months 7 to 10 days if covert recycle 3 to 12 months 1 year 1 to 30 days if covert enrichment 23

24 Not Unless They Are Upgraded Of IAEA s ~1,200 remote nuclear inspection cameras, nearly 800 still have no near-real-time feedback. Virtually all of the countries of concern have no near-real-time feedback IAEA internal review of May 2005 found in that Over the past 6 years, there have been 12 occasions when facility lights were turned off for a period greater than 30 hours See web.org/frameset.asp?pagetype=single&pdffile= npec- ReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSystem&PDFFolder=Reports Of those ~ 400 IAEA cameras that have near-time feedback today, many depend on internet connections that can be interrupted US State Dept. officials requested NPEC self-censor 2 scenarios for spent fuel rod diversions that could evade IAEA detection entirely. Similar scenarios, it turns out, were described elsewhere on the web by IAEA s own Safeguards advisory group chairman. See web.org/frameset.asp?pagetype=single&pdffile= GilinskyEtAl-LWR&PDFFolder=Essays 24

25 Problem: MUF at Declared Nuclear Fuel Plants Has Exceeded Many Bombs Worth Sellafield (Euratom safeguards meeting IAEA criteria) 29.6 kgs pu MUF (Feb. 2005) 190 kgs pu in leak undetected for 8 months Tokia Mura MoX, 69 kgs pu MUF (l994) scrap kgs pu MUF (1996) Pilot reprocessing 206kgs 59 kgs pu MUF (2003) Commercial reprocessing 246 kgs/yr pu MUF (2008?) Cogema-Cadarache reprocessing plant Euratom report 2002, unacceptable amount of MUF, 2 yrs to resolve Similar MUF challenges at centrifuge enrichment plants seehttp:// nges_from_spread_enrichment_capability.pdf 25