GLOBAL WAR-MING August 2015

Transcription

1 GLOBAL WAR-MING August 2015

2 1 GLOBAL WAR-MING Who 3D Prints What in 2033? While the scientific community has reached a consensus on the fundamental impacts of climate change on the world environment, there has not been as much analysis on how the ravages of climate change will impact human society, including how the conflict and violence resulting from environmental changes will affect humanity. To address this gap, Wikistrat ran an online, crowdsourced simulation in July 2015, involving more than 40 analysts who extrapolated the implications of climate change on conflicts and regional violence over the next 25 years. This report contains the insights Wikistrat s analysts generated. ABOUT US Wikistrat is the world s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent-pending Collaborative Competition methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a real-time, interactive online platform.

3 2 WHAT S MINE IS NOT YOURS Sovereignty will continue to be a driver of conflict over the next 25 years, and climate change will exacerbate existing and emerging sovereignty disputes. As population pressures combine with changing weather patterns and fluctuations in access to essential resources like water, control of strategically important territory (such as lines of communication on both land and sea) will grow in importance. The future is likely to be more, not less, driven by issues around territorial sovereignty including river basins, coastal flood plains, man-made islands adjacent to trade routes and arable lands capable of feeding the world s growing populations. There are several emerging sovereignty disputes that would emerge as a result of the progress of climate change. The primary newly emergent zone is the Arctic region. Though current treaties and organizations governing relations between states in the Arctic, such as the Arctic Council, cover much of what will occur should the ice caps continue melting, they will likely be inadequate when facing the new challenges and actors. As the polar ice cap melts, it will open two potential trade and transport routes: the North West Passage (NWP) through Canadian and U.S. territorial waters, and the North East Passage (NEP) through Russian territorial waters. The NEP will likely prove to be the prime source of conflict. The time and expense saved by taking the NEP could prove substantial to nations currently dependent on Asia-European trade routes, including much of northeast Asia as well as northwestern Canada and the U.S. It similarly bypasses the choke-points of the Suez and Panama Canals. Russia has near complete control of the NEP, and should it seek to restrict access, it could prove to be a source of conflict with NATO and/ or a coalition of western nations including Canada, the U.S. and the Nordic states. Another region likely to result in conflict is Central Asia. It is estimated that by 2025, the Aral Sea will be completely dry due to regional irrigation exacerbated by climate change. This desiccation will be compounded by the growing importance of the region as a source of energy and mineral resources. The lack of water combined with the windfall from resource exploitation is certain to fuel nationalism and competition among the ethnic groups of the region, leading to instability and fragmenting nation-states. Uzbekistan is especially susceptible, and given the proximity of both Russia and China, unrest there has international implications. Control of water resources through dams and reservoirs is another highly probable source of conflict. Currently, the states within the Nile River basin offer an example of collaboration in sharing of water resources. Egypt and Ethiopia are especially noteworthy for sharing the Nile s water. However, as water resources become scarcer and population growth increases demand, it will be more difficult to sustain collaborative relations. Competition will likely replace cooperation as Egypt demands a larger share of Nile water, while Ethiopia will be motivated to dam the river upstream to ensure it gets enough water to sustain its own rapidly growing population. The situation between China and India in the Brahmaputra river basin, while similar, has much more dire implications. The Brahmaputra River, which originates in the Tibetan Himalayas and flows through the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by China), is a source of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing. China has plans to dam the river, decreasing available water for both India and Bangladesh. There is no regional water sharing agreement, and China is reluctant to enter into one. As populations increase and climate change results in higher temperatures and less rainfall, demand for the Brahmaputra s water will become more strategically important. Conflict between India and China is likely to occur over access to the water as well as sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh.

4 3 THE HAVES AND THE HAVE NOTS Water and energy security will combine with issues of sovereignty to turn many local conflicts into regional conflicts, and will even further polarize the strained relations between those who have and those who have not within states themselves. There are multiple possible manifestations of conflict associated with water. The Mediterranean Basin and Middle East/ North Africa (MENA) region were a primary focus with the Nile river delta, home to more than 50 million Egyptians, a region of high risk. As sea levels rise due to melting ice caps and new rainfall patterns, the Nile delta will shrink and briny seas will invade agricultural lands in a region already facing food shortages. At present, Egypt has no strategy to stop the literal rising tide. The consequences will be infertile land in one of the world s most historically fertile areas, less clean water for a burgeoning population and a reduction in suitable housing and industry in some of Egypt s largest cities. The ramifications include increased unemployment, starvation, poverty and a mass migration south towards Central and East Africa and north towards the Middle East and especially Europe. Extremists will exploit the crisis migration and use it as a catalyst to foment conflict throughout the wider region. A similar scenario involves Southeast Asia, where hundreds of millions live in low-lying deltas, producing almost 90 percent of the world s rice supply. As sea levels rise, tens of millions will be dislocated and productive rice lands will be flooded. The mass migration, refugee and internally displaced populations, and famine resulting from rising rice prices will destabilize the region, leading to cross-border conflict. As temperatures rise and droughts intensify, cities and nations will literally run out of water Sanaa in Yemen is likely to be among the first, with other countries on the Arabian Peninsula following. The subsequent competition for increasingly scarce water resources will lead to tensions, confrontation and eventually conflict. Similarly, the Sahel is a region of water conflict as the expanding Sahara drives millions of Africans from their farms. Lacking any other means of survival, these climate refugees will inundate West African cities on their way to southern Europe. Current African migration from Morocco, Libya and Tunis will be dwarfed by the millions fleeing an Africa that can no longer offer them even survival. These millions will fuel the growth of the African and European organized crime networks that transport and exploit them, and will polarize European domestic and regional politics, leading to more popular support for anti-immigrant and pro-nationalist political entities throughout Europe. Scarcity of potable water in Brazil will lead to conflict between local street gangs and the government, weakening the rule of law and increasing corruption. Similarly, organized crime syndicates, already a significant problem in many parts of the world, are likely to become involved in the control and distribution of scarce resources such as water. While street gangs and organized crime syndicates currently contribute to conflict, corruption and violence, they have not yet moved into such essential resources as water. This is likely to change as global warming makes water scarcer and more lucrative. Lastly, current conflicts arise over energy resources. The Niger delta in Western Africa is a prime example. The Niger Delta is an oil and gas-producing region of global importance. Exploitation of the oil and gas resources in the southern and eastern regions of the delta have led to serious environmental damage and high levels of conflict between Nigerian authorities and radicalized ethnic groups. With the recent discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in the western delta province of Ondo, the associated violence and conflict is likely to spread west, threatening the nearby megalopolis of Lagos. This would raise the stakes of Niger delta violence exponentially and could threaten to further destabilize a region on which much of the world depends for current energy supplies. While Nigeria represents a case of conflict over expansion of energy production, Ukraine represents escalating conflict over energy access. Russia s natural gas deliveries to Ukraine reflect a near certain risk of conflict if not outright war in the next 25 years. Increasingly harsh winters will raise demand for Russian natural gas as Russia simultaneously restricts delivery to solidify its claims over the eastern parts of Ukraine. Conflict in the region could lead to a wider international conflict, drawing in the EU and/or NATO.

5 4 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS While climate change may not fit the zero-sum paradigm, not all actors impacting the situation share that view. Many see themselves winning by the consequences of climate change, or see the benefits outweighing the costs. Russia may be willing to trade rising temperatures for greater access to the Arctic and a larger agricultural zone in Siberia. China may be willing to sacrifice the polar ice caps for rapid economic development. This is one of the challenges of crafting global policy it focuses on the overall public good, but individual states are often willing to sacrifice the public good for national gain. Having identified some of the drivers of conflict resulting from climate change, powerful security and economic alliances should pursue long-term development agendas that mitigate or eliminate those drivers. Examples would be development of water purification and desalination in at-risk regions like the Nile Delta and the Ganges basin. Western nations and alliances (e.g., NATO/EU) could see a large return on this investment in a significantly decreased likelihood of conflict around access to water and the associated migration and disruption of valuable trade. Western nations, alliances and international organizations should financially support engineering and development projects that decrease competition and conflict, providing incentive for those in at-risk regions to opt for conflictdeflating solutions to scarce resources. In many regions prone to resource-driven conflict, there are multiple options to resolve adequate supply and access, but those that decrease conflict often lose out to more conflict-prone solutions due to financial and national considerations. Financial and diplomatic support from Western and international actors could steer regional players toward conflict-neutral solutions, saving lives and resources in the process. The Nile Basin is one such region, where drought resulting from global climate change and increasing demographic and agricultural demand is likely to make access to the already scarce Nile water even more critical. Damming of the upper Nile by Ethiopia can proceed in several ways, which make conflict more or less likely. Western and international assistance and influence could make conflict-decreasing options more palatable to Ethiopia, while tying Egypt and the other Nile states to an integrated regional water-sharing protocol. International, national, and regional development assistance will be essential in funding construction of sea walls and other barriers to rising sea levels. In the Niger delta, this would safeguard population centers and agricultural lands in Egypt, decreasing the strategic importance of increased access to water from the upper Nile valley. The same is true in the Brahmaputra River Valley in India and China/Tibet, another at-risk region. Construction of dams and levees could well diminish the chance for conflict between these two regional powers. Construction of sea walls and dikes would protect the population and rice fields of downstream Bangladesh. Emerging conflict zones should consider creation of multi-national conferences modeled on the Arctic Council to facilitate dialogue and mitigate conflict. The Arctic Council has proven beneficial in negotiating past tensions in the region because it provides a forum for all parties, including Russia, to engage in discussion and debate. In some areas, regional bodies already exist (e.g., ASEAN in Southeast Asia) that include all relevant players, which could evolve to include mechanisms to manage emerging conflict around climate change. In other areas (China/India, the Nile Delta and the Central Asia region of the Aral Sea), mechanisms modeled on the Arctic Council do not yet exist. However, their creation could provide an ideal forum for regional states to discuss critical issues and explore solutions to impending conflict. The challenge for these regions is that such mechanisms are difficult to create when conflict already exists. Therefore, it would be advisable for global partners to encourage the formation of such mechanisms soon, before the emergence of conflict drastically reduces their chances of success. As conflict surrounding climate change emerges over the next 25 years, nations will find themselves on all sides of the conflict continuum. Russia in the Arctic and the southern European states in the Mediterranean littoral will find themselves on the defensive as outside pressures emerge posing threats to their national security interests. Egypt and Nigeria will experience similar pressures over rising sea levels and threats to vulnerable populations. Other actors Russia in Ukraine and Central Asia, China in the Southeast Asian sea lines of communication, and India in the disputed mountain regions of Tibet are likely to become more aggressive and assertive. India and China are also likely to expand

6 their involvement in food and resource production in Africa, leading to instability on that continent. Countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Ukraine are likely to experience significant instability over the next 25 years as a result of climate change and the actions of neighboring powers reacting to climate change. Finally, the impacts of climate change could reduce conflict in some areas. Opening up northern passage trade routes from Asia to Europe could re-route commerce away from southern Asian routes contested by China and Southeast Asian competitors. The subsequently decreased strategic importance of these southern sea lines of communication could result in less competition for control, which is now fueling China s territorial expansion in the region through island building. ATTRIBUTIONS [Cover photo] is a derivative of photos purchased from dollar photo club.

7 GLOBAL WAR-MING Who 3D Prints What in 2033? Author: Prof. Randy Cheek Editor: Eva Dubinsky Written by: Dr. Amanda Skuldt & James McGirk in consultation with Dr. Thomas PM Barnett, Wikistratís Chief Analyst Edited by: Steve Keller There were more than 60 analysts participating. This report is based on the collaborative effort of more than 40 Wikistrat analysts. Request access to Wikistrat Simulations: Competing Scenarios and Policy Options generated by hundreds of analysts Real time access; Analysis is consumed in an interactive wiki format Additional features; Shock Injection; Strategy Formulation Contact: June 2013 August 2015