Trust and Relational Capital

Transcription

1 Trust ad Relatioal Capital Cristiao Castelfrachi, Rio Falcoe, ad Fracesca Marzo Istituto di Scieze e Tecologie della Cogizioe Natioal Research Istitute of Italy (ISTC-CNR Abstract. Trust ca be viewed at the same time as a istrumet both for a aget selectig the right parters i order to achieve its ow goals, ad for a aget of beig selected from other potetial parters i order to establish with them a cooperatio/collaboratio ad to take advatage from the accumulated trust. I this paper we will aalyze trust as the agets relatioal capital. Startig from the classical depedece etwork with potetial parters, we itroduce the aalysis of what it meas for a aget to be trusted ad how this coditio could be strategically used from it for achievig its ow goals, that is, why it represets a form of power. The idea of takig aother aget s poit of view is especially importat if we cosider the amout of studies i social sciece that coect trust with social capital related issues. Although there is a big iterest i literature about social capital ad its powerful effects o the wellbeig of both societies ad idividuals, ofte it is ot clear eough what is it the object uder aalysis. Idividual trust capital (relatioal capital ad collective trust capital ot oly should be disetagled, but their relatios are quite complicated ad eve coflictig. To overcome this gap, we propose a study that first attempts to uderstad what trust is as capital of idividuals. I which sese trust is a capital. How this capital is built, maaged ad saved. I particular, how this capital is the result of the others beliefs ad goals. The we aim to aalytically study the cogitive dyamics of this object. 1 INTRODUCTION I multi-aget systems trust is a growig field of aalysis ad research ad ways to calculate it have already bee itroduced to ehace studies o commercial partership, strategic choice, ad o coalitio formatio. I particular, i almost the preset approaches the focus is o the trustier ad o the ways for evaluatig the trustworthiess of other possible trustees. I fact, there are o so may studies ad aalyses about the model of beig trusted. Also our socio-cogitive model of trust (1, 2 was about the cogitive igrediets for trustig somethig or somebody, ad how trust affects decisio, which are the sources ad the basis for trustig, ad so o; we ever modelled what does it mea to be trusted (with the exceptio of the work o trust dyamics (3 i which the focus was o the reciprocatio ad potetial iflueces o the trustworthiess ad why it is importat. I this paper we address this poit, aalyzig what it meas that trust represets a strategic resource for agets that are trusted, proposig a model of trust as a capital for idividuals ad suggestig the implicatio for strategic actio that ca be performed. Our thesis is that to be trusted: i icreases the chace to be requested or accepted as a parter for exchage or cooperatio; ii improves the price, the cotract that the aget ca obtai. The eed of this ew poit of view directly derives from the fact that i multi-aget systems it is strategically importat ot oly to kow who is trusted by whom ad how much, but also to uderstad how beig trusted ca be used by the trustee. It has bee already show that usig differet levels of trust represets a advatage i performig some task such as allocatig task or choosig betwee parters. Therefore, havig trust as a cogitive parameter i agets decisio makig ca lead to better (more efficiet, faster etc. solutios tha proceedig drive by other kid of calculatio such as probabilistic or statistical oe. This study already represeted a iovatio sice usually trust has bee studied as a effect rather tha a factor that causes the developig of social etwork ad their maiteace or structural chagig. I order to improve this approach ad to better uderstad dyamics of social etworks, ow we propose a study of what happes o the other side of the two-way trust relatioship, focusig o the trustee, i particular o a cogitive trustee. Our aim is a aalytical study of what it meas to be trusted. The idea of takig the other poit of view is particularly importat if we cosider the judge amout of studies i social sciece that coect trust with social capital related issues. Our claims are: (a to be trusted usually is a advatage for the trustee (aget Ag i ; more precisely received trust is a capital that ca be ivested, ad that requires decisio ad costs to be cumulated; (b it is possible to measure this capital, which is relatioal, that is it depeds o a positio i a etwork of relatioships; (c trust has differet sources: from persoal experiece that the other agets have with Ag i ; from circulatig reputatio of Ag i ; from Ag i belogigess to certai groups or categories; from the sigs ad the impressios that Ag i is able to produce; (d the value of this capital is cotext depedet (ad market depedet ad dyamic; (e received trust strogly affects the egotiatio power of Ag i that caot simply be derived from the depedece bilateral relatioships. Although there is a big iterest i literature about social capital ad its powerful effects o the wellbeig of both societies ad idividuals, ofte it is ot clear eough what is it the object uder aalysis. To overcome this lack, we propose a study that first attempts to uderstad what trust is as capital of idividuals. How is it possible to say that trust is a capital? How is this capital built, maaged ad saved? The we aim to aalytically study the cogitive dyamics of this object, with a particular focus o how they deped o beliefs ad goals.

2 2 TRUST AND RELATIONAL CAPITAL Social Capital (4, 5, 6, 7 ca be see as a multidimesioal cocept ad ca be studied i its relatio both with social orms ad shared values ad with etworks of iterpersoal relatios. While i the former case studies about covetios ad collective attributio of meaigs ca be useful to study how social capital ca be a capital for the society, i the latter, oe of the basic issues that eed to be studied is how it ca happe that etworks of relatios ca be built, which ways they develop, ad how they ca both ifluece idividual behaviours ad be cosidered as a idividual capital. We also would like uderlie that social capital is a ambiguous cocept. By social a lot of scholars mea i fact collective, some richess, advatage of ay for the collective; somethig that favors cooperatio, ad so o. O the cotrary we assume here (as a first step a idividualistic perspective, cosiderig the advatages of the trusted aget, ot the advatages for the collectivity, ad distiguishig betwee relatioal capital (8 ad the more ambiguous ad exteded otio of social capital. The idividual (or orgaizatio Ag i could use its capital of trust, for ati-social purposes. I ecoomic literature the term capital refers to a commodity itself used i the productio of other goods ad services: it is, the, see as a huma-made iput created to permit icreased productio i the future. The adjective social is istead used to claim that a particular capital ot oly exists i social relatioships but also cosists i some kid of relatioships betwee ecoomical subjects. It is clear that for the capital goods metaphor to be useful, the trasformative ability of social relatioships to become a capital must be take seriously. This meas that we eed to fid out what is the competitive advatage ot simply of beig part of a etwork, but more precisely of beig trusted i that etwork. The additioal value of trustig has bee show as a crucial argumet i decisio makig ad i particular i choice of rely o somebody else for achievig specific goals icluded i the plas of the agets. I these studies trust has bee aalysed as valuatio of the other ad expectatios o it, ad has beig show how these characteristics ad mechaisms, beig part of the decisio process at the cogitive level, represet a advatage for the society i terms of realizig cooperatio amog its actors ad for the trustier i terms of efficiecy of choices of delegatio ad reliace (9. Chagig the poit of view, we ow wat to focus o the trusted aget. What does imply to be trusted for the trustee? The ituitive aswer could be that: i the probability to be chose for exchage or for partership will grow; but also that: ii the egotiatio power of that aget will icrease. However, to accout for this it is ecessary to rethik the whole theory of egotiatio power based o depedece (10,11,12,13. Try to build a theory of depedece icludig trust does ot mea to base the theory of social capital o depedece, but to admit that the existet theory of depedece etwork ad the cosequet theory of social power is ot eough without the cosideratio of trust. What we eed, the, is a comprehesive theory of trust from the poit of view of the trusted aget, i order to fid out the elemets that, oce added to the theory of depedece, ca explai the idividual social power i a etwork, o oe had, ad, o a secod phase, the social capital meat as a capital for the society. Oce a quatitative otio of the value of a give aget is formulated calculatig o how much the aget is valued by other agets i a give market for a give task, we ca say that this trust-depedet value is a real capital. It cosists of all the relatioships that are possible for the aget i a give market ad, together with the possible relatioships i other markets, it is the so-called relatioal capital of that aget. It differs from simple relatioships i give etworks, which are a bigger set, sice it oly cosists of relatioships the aget has with those who ot oly eed it but have a good attitude toward it ad, therefore, who are willig to have it as a parter. How much it is appreciated ad requested? How may potetial parters depeds o Ag i ad would search for Ag i as parter? How may parters would be at disposal for Ag i s proposals of partership, ad what egotiatio power would Ag i have with them? These relatioships form a capital because (as ay other capital it is the result of ivestmets ad is costly cumulated to be spet. I a certai sese it represets a strategic tool to be competitive, ad, as well as it happes with other capitals such as the fiacial oe, it is sometimes eve more importat tha the good which is sold (beig it either a service or a material good. For example whe Ag i decides of o keepig a promise to Ag j, it kows that Ag j s trust i Ag i will decrease: is this coveiet for future relatioships with Ag j? Will Ag i eed coutig o Ag j i future? Or, is this move coveiet for reputatio ad other relatioships? For this reaso it is very importat to study how it is possible for the aget to cumulate this capital without deterioratig or waste it: sice the relatioal capital ca make the aget wi the competitio eve whe the good it offers is ot the best compared with substitutive goods offered i the market, it should be show quatitatively what this meas ad what kid of dyamical relatioships exist betwee quality of offered good ad relatioal capital. 3 COGNITIVE MODEL OF BEING TRUSTED 3.1 Objective ad Subjective Depedece The theory of trust ad the theory of depedece are ot idepedet from each other. Not oly because as we modelled (1, 2, before decidig to actively trust somebody, to rely o it (Ag i, oe (Ag j has to be depedet o Ag i : Ag j eeds a actio or a resource of Ag i (at least Ag j has to believe so. But also because objective depedece relatioships (10 that are the basis of adaptive social iteractios, are ot eough for predictig them. Subjective depedece is eeded (that is, the depedece relatioships that the agets kow or at least believe, but is ot sufficiet; it is also ecessary to add to (i the belief of beig depedet, of eedig the other, (ii the belief of the trustworthiess of the other, of the possibility of coutig upo it. If I would t ot feel depedet o, I could t rely o the other. The theory of depedece icludes i fact two types of depedeces: (1 the objective depedece, which says who eeds whom for what i a give society (although perhaps igorig this. This depedece has already the power of establishig certai asymmetric relatioships i a potetial market, ad it determies the actual success or failure of the reliace ad trasactio; (2 the subjective (believed depedece, which says who is believed to be eeded by who. This depedece is what determies relatioships i a real

3 market ad settles o the egotiatio power; but it might be illusory ad wrog, ad oe might rely upo uable agets, while eve beig autoomously able to do as eeded. More Formally, let Agt={Ag 1,..,Ag } a set of agets; we ca associate to each aget Ag i Agt: - a set of goals G i ={g i1,..,g iq }; - a set of actios Az i ={α i1,.., α iz }; these are the elemetary actios that Ag i is able to perform; - a set of plas Π ={p i1,..,p is }; the Ag i s pla library: the set of rules/prescriptios for aggregatig the actios; ad - a set of resources R i ={r i1,..,r im }. The achievemet/maiteace of each goal eeds of actios/plas/resources. The, we ca defie the depedece relatioship betwee two agets (Ag j ad Ag i with respect to a goal g jk, as: Obj-Depedece (Ag j, Ag i, g jk ad say that: A aget Ag j has a Objective Depedece Relatioship with aget Ag i with respect to a goal g jk if for achievig g jk are ecessary actios, plas ad/or resources that are owed by Ag i ad ot owed by Ag j. More i geeral, Ag j has a Objective Depedece Relatioship with Ag i if for achievig at least oe of its goals g jk G j, are ecessary actios, plas ad/or resources that are owed by Ag i ad ot owed by Ag j. As i (12 we ca itroduce the uilateral, reciprocal, mutual ad idirect depedece (see Figure1. I very short ad simplified terms, we ca say that the differece betwee reciprocal ad mutual is that the first is o differet goals while the secod is o the same goal. We defie Depedece-Network(Agt,t the set of depedece relatioships (both subjective ad objective amog the agets icluded i Agt set at the time t. Each aget Ag j Agt must have at least oe depedece relatio with aother aget i Agt. 3.2 Depedece ad Negotiatio Power Give a Depedece-Network(Agt,t, we defie Objective Potetial for Negotiatio of Ag j Agt about oe of its ow goals g jk -ad call it OPN(Ag j, g jk - the followig fuctio: OPN(Ag j, g jk =f( 1 Where: f is i geeral a fuctio that preserves mootoicity (we will omit this kid of fuctios i the ext formulas; represets the umber of agets i Agt set that have a depedece relatio with Ag j with respect to g jk (this depedece relatio should be either reciprocal or mutual: i other words, there should also be a actio, pla, or resource owed by Ag j that is ecessary for Ag i ; p ki is the umber of agets i Agt that are competitors with the Ag i o the same actios/plas/resources (useful for g jk i a ot compatible way (Ag i is ot able to satisfy at the same time all the agets. Figure1 If the world kowledge would be perfect for all the agets, the above described objective depedece would be a commo belief about the real state of the world. I fact, the importat relatioship is the etwork of depedece believed by each aget. I other words, we caot oly associate to each aget a set of goals, actios, plas ad resources, but we have to evaluate these sets as believed by each aget (the subjective poit of view, also cosiderig that they would be partial, differet each of others, sometime wrog, ad so o. I more practical terms, each aget will have a differet (subjective represetatio of the depedece etwork as exemplified i Figure1. So, we itroduce the Bel k G z that meas the Goal set of Ag z believed by Ag k. The same for Bel k Az z, Bel k Π z, ad Bel k R z. I practice, the depedece relatioships should be re-modulated o the basis of the aget subjective iterpretatio. We itroduce the Subj-Depedece(Ag j, Ag i, g jk that represets the Ag j s poit of view with respect to its depedece relatioships. I a first approximatio each aget should correctly believe the sets it has, while it could mismatch the sets of other agets. Figure 2 I Figure2 we show the objective depedece of Ag j : A represets the set of agets who deped from Ag j for somethig (actios, plas, resources, B represets the set of agets from which Ag j depeds for achievig a ow specific goal g jk. The itersectio betwee A ad B (part C is the set of agets with whom Ag j could potetially egotiate for achievig g jk. The greater the overlap the greater the egotiatio power of Ag j i that cotext. However, the egotiatio power of Ag j also depeds o the possible alteratives that its potetial parters have: the few alteratives to Ag j they have, the greater its egotiatio power (see below. We ca defie the Subjective Potetial for Negotiatio of Ag j Agt about oe of its ow goals g jk -ad call it SPN(Ag j, g jk - the followig fuctio: SPN(Ag j, g jk = 1 Where we have the same meaigs as for the previous formula but ow we make referece to the believed (by Ag j depedece relatios (ot ecessarily true i the world: i particular are believed both (the umber of direct depedeces ad p (the idirect, competitive depedeces. Aalogously, we ca iterpret Figure2 as the set of believed relatioships (by Ag j amog the agets. I this case we have the subjective poit of view. It is also possible to itroduce a modulatio factor that takes ito accout the special kid of depedece: reciprocal (x=r, mutual (x=m: SPN(Ag j, g jk = m x with 0<m x <1

4 Usually, we ca say that m m m r. More i geeral, we ca say that the Subjective Potetial for Negotiatio of Ag j Agt about the whole set of its ow goals (G j i the Depedece-Network(Agt,t is: s s SPN(Ag j, G j = 1 m x s k=1 Where s is the umber of goals of Ag j, ad s is the umber of other agets i the set Agt, that have a depedece relatio with Ag j with respect to the goal g jk. p ki is the umber of agets i Agt that are competitors with the Ag i o the same actios/plas/resources (useful for g jk i a ot compatible way. I words, the global subjective potetial for egotiatio of a aget i a depedece etwork with respect to all its ow goals is the sum of beliefs above showed The Trust Role i Depedece Networks Before takig ito accout the trustee s poit of view we would like to itroduce ito the depedece etwork also the trust relatioships. I fact, although it is importat to cosider depedece relatioship betwee agets i a society, there will be o exchage i the market if there is ot trust to eforce these coectios. Cosiderig the aalogy with the Figure2, we will have ow a represetatio as give i Figure3 (where D icludes the set of agets that Ag j cosiders trustworthy for achievig g jk. Figure3 Figure4 We have ow a ew subset (showed outlied i Figure4 cotaiig the potetial agets for egotiatio. The aalysis of the part E, F ad G will result i: part E icludes agets who deped form Ag j, who are trusted but o differet tasks; part F icludes agets ot depedig from Ag j ad trusted o differet tasks; part G icludes agets trusted for achievig the goal g jk but ot depedig from Ag j. Not oly the decisio to trust presupposes a belief of beig depedet, but otice that a depedece belief (BelDep implies o the other side a piece of Trust (as modelled i (1,2. I fact to believe to be depedet meas: 1 A iterestig problem is that a aget could be a competitor towards itself for achievig its ow goals; for example: 1 Ag j eeds actio α r both for g s ad g t ad there is oly a aget i Agt that has α r but is uable to provide two times the actio α r. 2 Ag j eeds actio α r for g r ad α s for g s ad for both the actios α r ad α s it depeds oly from Ag i that ca provide oly a actio. - (BelDep-1 to believe ot to be able to perform actio α ad to achieve goal g; ad - (BelDep-2 to believe that Ag i is able ad i coditio to achieve g, to perform α. Notice that (BelDep-2 is precisely oe compoet of Trust i our aalysis: the positive evaluatio of Ag i as competet, able, skilled, ad so o. However, the other fudametal compoet of trust as evaluatio is lackig: reliability, trustworthiess: Ag i really iteds to do, is persistet, is loyal, is beevolet, etc. Thus he will really do what Ag j eeds. Give the basic role played by believed etworks of depedece, established by a believed relatioship of depedece based o a belief of depedece, ad give that this latter is oe of the basic igrediet of trust as a metal object, we ca claim that this overlap betwee theories is the crucial issue ad our aim is amely to study it deeply. So itroducig also i the Subjective Potetial for Negotiatio (of Ag j Agt about oe of its ow goals g jk the basic beliefs about trust (1,2 we have: SPN(Ag j, g jk = Bel j (DoA i * DoW i Where: m m =m r =1; DoA i is the degree of ability (with respect to the goal g k of the aget Ag i as believed by Ag j (Bel j (DoA i ; DoW i is the degree of willigess (with respect to the goal g k of the aget Ag i as believed by Ag j (Bel j (DoW i ; DoA i ad DoW i respectively represet the Ag i s ability ad willigess of usig actios/plas/resources for the goal g k. We do ot cosider here the possible relatios betwee the values of DoA i ad DoW i with the p ki variable. 1 DoA i,dow i 0. Let us, ow, explicitly recall what are the cogitive igrediets of trust ad reformulate them from the poit of view of the trusted aget. I order to do this, it is ecessary to limit the set of trusted etities. It has i fact bee argued that trust is a metal attitude, a decisio ad a behavior that oly a cogitive aget edowed with both goals ad beliefs ca have, make ad perform. But it has bee uderlied, also, that the etities that is trusted is ot ecessarily a cogitive aget. Whe a cogitive aget trusts aother cogitive aget, we talk about social trust. We cosider that the set of actios, plas ad resources owed/available by a aget ca be useful for achievig a set of tasks (τ 1,, τ r. We take ow the poit of view of the trustee aget i the depedece etwork: so we preset a cogitive theory of trust as a capital, which is, i our view, a good startig poit to iclude this cocept i the issue of egotiatio power. That is to say that if somebody is potetially strogly eeded by other agets, but it is ot trusted, its egotiatio power does ot improve. We call the Subjective Trust Capital of Ag i Agt about a its ow task τ k the fuctio: STC(Ag i, τ k = Beli ( Bel j DoA i * Bel j DoW i j=1 Where is the umber of agets eed the task τ k. Ag j, Ag i Agt. I words, the cumulated trust capital of a aget Ag i with respect to a specific task τ k, is the sum (o all the agets eed that specific task i the etwork depedece of the correspodig abilities ad willigess believed by each depedet aget. The

5 subjectivity cosists i the fact that both the etwork depedece ad the believed abilities ad willigess are believed by (the poit of view of the aget Ag i. As showed i (2 we call Degree of Trust of the Aget Ag j o the aget Ag i about the task τ k (DoT(Ag j Ag i τ k : DoT(Ag j Ag i τ k = Bel j DoA i * Bel j DoW i At the same way we ca also call the self-trust of the aget Ag i about the task τ k we ca write: ST(Ag i, τ k = Bel i (DoA i * DoW i From the compariso betwee STC(Ag i, τ k, DoT(Ag j Ag i τ k ad ST(Ag i, τ k a set of iterestig actios ad decisio are take from the agets (we will see i the ext paragraph. Startig from the Trust Capital we would like evaluate the usable part of this trust capital. I this sese, we itroduce the Subjective Usable Trust Capital of Ag i Agt about a its ow task τ k as: SUTC(Ag i, τ k = Bel i (Bel j DoA i * Bel j DoW i j=1 1+ p kj where p kj is (followig the Ag i s belief about the beliefs of Ag j the umber of other agets i the depedece etwork that ca achieve the same task with a trust value comparable with the oe of Ag i. We have two comparable trust values whe the differece betwee them is i a rage uder a give threshold that could be cosidered meaigless with respect to the achievemet of the task. 4 DYNAMICS OF RELATIONAL CAPITAL What has ot bee cosidered eough i orgaizatio theory is the fact that the relatioal capital is peculiar i its beig crucially based o beliefs: agai, what makes relatioships become a capital is ot simply the structure of the etworks (who sees whom ad how clearly but the levels of trust which characterizes the liks i the etworks (who trusts whom ad how much. Sice trust is based o beliefs icludig, as we said, also the believed depedece (who eeds whom it should be clear that relatioal capital is a form of capital, which ca be maipulated by maipulatig beliefs. 4.1 Icreasig, decreasig ad trasferrig For what cocers the dyamic aspects of this kid of capital, it is possible to make hypotheses o how it ca icrease or how it ca be wasted, depedig o how each of basic beliefs ivolved i trust are maipulated. First, let us cosider what kid of strategies ca be performed to eforce the other s depedece beliefs ad his beliefs about aget s competece. i Ag i ca make the other aget depedet o him by makig the other lackig some resource or skill (or at least iducig the other to believe so. ii Ag i ca make the other aget depedet o him by activatig or iducig i it a give goal (eed, desire o which the other is ot autoomous (14 (or believes so. iii Sice depedece beliefs is strictly related with the possibility of the others to see the aget i the etwork ad to kow her ability i performig useful tasks, the goal of the aget who wats to improve her ow relatioal capital will be to sigalig her presece ad her skills (15,16,17. While to show her presece she might have to shift her positio (either physically or figuratively like, for istace, chagig her field, to commuicate her skills she might have to hold ad show somethig that ca be used as a sigal (such as certificate, social status etc.. This implies, i her pla of actios, several ad ecessary sub-goals to make a sigal. This sub-goals are costly to be reached ad the cost the aget has to pay to reach them ca be take has the evidece for the sigals to be credible (of course without cosiderig cheatig i buildig sigals. It is importat to uderlie that usig these sigals ofte implies the participatio of a third subject i the process of buildig trust as a capital: a third part which must be trusted (2. We would say the more the third part is trusted i the society, the more expesive will be for the aget to acquire sigals to show, ad the more this sigals will work i icreasig the aget s relatioal capital. We will see later how this is related with the process of trasferrig trust from a aget to aother (buildig reputatio. Obviously also Ag i s previous performaces are sigals of trustworthiess. Ad this iformatio is also provided by the circulatig reputatio of Ag i (18, 19. I formal terms, we ca say that Ag i has to work for icreasig: Bel j DoA i ad cosequetly Bel i Bel j DoA i. iv Alteratively, Ag i could work for reducig the believed (by Ag j value of ability of each of the possible competitors of Ag i (i umber of p kj o that specific task τ k. Let us ow cosider how willigess beliefs ca be maipulated. I order to do so, cosider the particular strategy performed to gai the other s good attitude through gifts (20. It is true that the expected reactio will be of reciprocatio, but this is ot eough. While givig a gift the aget kows that the other will be more iclied to reciprocate, but she also kows that her actio ca be iterpreted as a sig of the good willigess she has: sice she has give somethig without beig asked, the other is drive to believe that the aget will ot cheat o him. The, the real strategy ca be played o trust, sometimes totally ad sometimes oly partially this will basically deped o specific roles of agets ivolved. Agai i formal terms, we ca say that Ag i has to work for icreasig: Bel j DoW i ad as a cosequece Bel i Bel j DoW i. Alteratively, it could work for reducig the believed (by Ag j value of willigess of each of the possible competitors of Ag i (i umber of p kj o that specific task τ k. A importat cosideratio we have to do is that a depedece etwork is maily based o the set of actios, plas ad resources owed by the agets ad ecessary for achievig the agets goals (we cosidered a set of tasks each aget is able to achieve. The iterestig thig is that the depedece etwork is modified by the dyamics of the agets goals, from their variatios, from the emergecy of ew oes, from the disappearace of old oes, from the icreasig request of a subset of them, ad so o (21. O this basis chages the role of each aget i the depedece etwork, chages i fact the trust capital of the agets. Relatioal capital ca be also circulated iside a give society. If somebody has a good reputatio ad is trusted by somebody else, she ca be sure this reputatio will pass ad trasfer to other actors ad this is always cosidered i marketig strategies of makig voice circulate. What is ot clear yet is how these pheomea work. But whe trust o a aget circulates, it is strategically importat for the aget to kow very well how this happes ad which ways (ot oly figurate trust takes to expad. I fact, ot all the ways are the same: it is possible that

6 beig trusted by a particular aget ca mea that she just has oe more aget i her relatioal capital, but gaiig the trust of aother aget ca be very useful to her ad expoetially icrease her capital thaks to the strategic role or positio of this other aget. That said, it should be clear the importace of uderstadig if ad how much a aget is able to maage this potetiality of her capital. Basically, here also, the role of agets ivolved play a crucial part: for this reaso it is ecessary for aget to kow the multiplicative factor represeted by the recogized ad trusted evaluator i the society. It is ot ecessarily true, i fact, that whe somebody trusts somebody else ad this trusts a third oe, the first oe will trust the third oe: the crucial questio is which role the first recogize to the secod. If the secod oe is trusted as a evaluator by the first oe, tha she ca trust the third oe for specific goals. Usually how well these trasitive process works depeds o what kid of broadcastig ad how may liks the valuator has ad how much she is trusted i each of those liks, so, basically, it recursively depeds o the valuator s relatioal capital. 4.2 Strategic behavior of the trustee Util ow we did ot talk about subjective differece i the way trust is perceived by the two parts of the relatioship. We must take ito accout the fact that there is ofte a differece betwee how the others actually trust a aget ad what the aget believes about; but also betwee this ad the level of trustworthiess that aget perceive i herself. Sice beig able is ot ecessarily the cause of trust: it ca be the case of a diffuse atmosphere that makes the others trust the aget although the aget has ot all the characteristics to be trusted. These subjective aspects of trust are fudametal for maagig this capital, sice it ca be possible that the capital is there but the aget does ot kow to have it. Ca it be possible to use the relatioal capital eve if who uses it is ot aware of havig it? At the base of the possible discrepacy i subjective valuatio of trustworthiess there is the perceptio of how much a aget feels trustworthy i a give task ad the valuatio that aget does of how much the others trust her for that task. I additio, this perceptio ca chage ad become closer to the objective level while the task is performed. These factors must be take ito accout ad studied together with the differet compoets of trust, i order to build hypotheses o strategic actios the aget will perform to cope with her relatioal capital. The, we must cosider what ca be implied by these discrepacies i terms of strategic actios: how they ca be idividuated ad valued? How the trusted aget will react whe aware of them? She ca either try to acquire competeces i order to reduce the gap betwee others valuatio ad her ow oe, or exploitig the existece of this discrepacy, takig advatage ecoomically of the reputatio over her capability ad coutig o the others scarce ability of moitorig ad testig her real skills. (everybody trusts everybody, but whe he ejoys some form of cocetratio of trust (a oligopoly positio i the trust etwork; while the collective social capital could do better with a geeralized trust amog the members of the collectivity. REFERENCES [1] Castelfrachi C., Falcoe R., Priciples of trust for MAS: cogitive aatomy, social importace, ad quatificatio, Proceedigs of the Iteratioal Coferece of Multi-Aget Systems (ICMAS'98, pp , Paris, July, [2] Falcoe R., Castelfrachi C., (2001. Social Trust: A Cogitive Approach, i Trust ad Deceptio i Virtual Societies by Castelfrachi C. ad Yao-Hua Ta (eds, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp [3] Falcoe R., Castelfrachi C. (2001, The socio-cogitive dyamics of trust: does trust create trust? I Trust i Cyber-societies: Itegratig the Huma ad Artificial Perspectives R. Falcoe, M. Sigh, ad Y. Ta (Eds., LNAI 2246 Spriger. pp [4] Bourdieu, P. 1983: Forms of capital. I: Richards, J. C. ed. Hadbook of theory ad research for the sociology of educatio, New York, Greewood Press. [5] Colema, J. C. 1988: Social capital i the creatio of huma capital. America Joural of Sociology 94: S95-S120. [6] Putam, R. D. 1993: Makig democracy work. Civic traditios i moder Italy. Priceto NJ, Priceto Uiversity Press. [7] Putam, R. D. 2000: Bowlig aloe. The collapse ad revival of America commuity. New York, Simo ad Schuster. [8] Graovetter, M. (1973. The stregth of weak ties. America Joural of Sociology, 78, [9] Castelfrachi, C., Falcoe, R., (1998 Towards a Theory of Delegatio for Aget-based Systems, Robotics ad Autoomous Systems, Special issue o Multi-Aget Ratioality, Elsevier Editor, Vol 24, Nos 3-4,, pp [10] Castelfrachi C., ad Cote R., The Dyamics of Depedece Networks ad Power Relatios i Ope Multi-Aget Systems. I Proc. COOP 96 Secod Iteratioal Coferece o the Desig of Cooperative Systems, Jua-les-Pis, Frace, Jue, INRIA Sophia-Atipolis, P [11] Sichma, J, R. Cote, C. Castelfrachi, Y. Demazeau. A social reasoig mechaism based o depedece etworks. I Proceedigs of the 11th ECAI, [12] Castelfrachi, C., Miceli, M. e Cesta, A., Depedece relatios amog autoomous agets. I E. Werer, Y. Demazeau (Eds, Decetralized A. I. - 3, pp , North Hollad, Amsterdam, [13] Cote, R. e Castelfrachi, C. (1996 Simulatig multi-aget iterdepedecies. A two-way approach to the micro-macro lik. I U. Mueller & K. Troitzsch (eds Microsimulatio ad the social sciece. Berli, Spriger Verlag, Lecture Notes i Ecoomics. [14] Castelfrachi, C. Falcoe R. (2003, From Automaticity to Autoomy: The Frotier of Artificial Agets, i Hexmoor H, Castelfrachi, C., ad Falcoe R. (Eds, Aget Autoomy, Kluwer Publisher, pp [15] Schellig, T., The Strategy of Coflict. Cambridge, Harvard Uiversity Press, [16] Spece, M Job market sigalig. Quarterly Joural of Ecoomics, 87, [17] R. Bliege Bird & E. Alde Smith Sigalig Theory, Strategic Iteractio, ad Symbolic Capital, Curret Atropology, vol. 46,.2. April [18] R. Cote ad M. Paolucci, Reputatio i Artificial Societies. Social Beliefs for Social Order. Kluwer [19] A. Jøsag ad R. Ismail. The Beta Reputatio System. I the proceedigs of the 15th Bled Coferece o Electroic Commerce, Bled, Sloveia, Jue [20] Cialdii, R. B. 1990: Ifluece et maipulatio, Paris, First. [21] Pollack, M., Plas as complex metal attitudes i Cohe, P.R., Morga, J. ad Pollack, M.E. (eds, Itetios i Commuicatio, MIT press, USA, pp , CONCLUSIONS As we said, idividual trust capital (relatioal capital ad collective trust capital ot oly should be disetagled, but their relatios are quite complicated ad eve coflictig. I fact, sice the idividual is i competitio with the other idividuals, he has a better positio whe trust is ot uiformly distributed