IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-47030) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.2 MILLION (US$8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-47030) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.2 MILLION (US$8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR AN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT March 31, 2017 Public Disclosure Authorized Trade & Competitiveness Global Practice (GTC07) Senegal Country Management Unit (AFCF1) Africa Region

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 03/30/2017) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1 = CFAF 611 US$1 = EUR 0.93 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ARMP CEDAF CENTIF CNLCC CSPC DBR DO EU GDP GoS ICR IDA IP ISO M&E MTR OHADA Autorité de Régulation des Marchés publics (Public Procurement Agency) Cellule d Exécution Administrative et Financière (Project Implementation Unit) Cellule nationale de Traitement des Informations financières (Anti- Money Laundering Unit) Commission nationale de Lutte contre la Non-transparence, la Corruption et la concussion (Anti- Corruption Commission) Coalition du Secteur Privé Contre la Corruption (Private Sector Coalition Against Corruption) Doing Business Report Development Objective European Union Gross Domestic Product Government of Senegal Implementation Completion Report International Development Agency Implementation Progress International Organization for Standardization Monitoring & Evaluation Mid-Term Review Organisation pour l Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires OFNAC PAD PDO PGE PIPP PIU PRSC PRSP PSJ QAG QEA QMS QSA TA TRHCD TTL UNDP USAID WBG (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) Office National de Lutte contre la Fraude et la Corruption (National Office for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption) Project Appraisal Document Project Development Objective Projet de Gouvernance Économique (Economic Governance Project). Private Investment Promotion Project Project Implementation Unit Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Programme Sectoriel de Justice (Justice Sector Program) Quality Assessment Group Quality at Entry Assessment Quality Management System Quality of Supervision Assessment technical assistance Tribunal Régional Hors Classe de Dakar (Special Regional Court of Dakar) Task team leader United Nations Development Program United States Agency for International Development World Bank Group Senior Global Practice Director: Anabel Gonzalez Sector Manager: Rashmi Shankar Project Team Leaders: Jean Michel N. Marchat; Kofi-Boateng Agyen ICR Team Leader: Barbara Weber ICR Main Author: Johan Rosseel ii

3 Senegal Economic Governance Project CONTENTS Data Sheet Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Context at Appraisal Original Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators (as approved) Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification Main Beneficiaries Original Components Revised Components Other significant changes Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Assessment of Outcomes Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Achievement of Project Development Objectives Efficiency Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Bank Performance Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes 38 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 39 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 39 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 39 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 39 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 39 MAP 41 iii

4 Data Sheet A. Basic Information Country: Senegal Project Name: SN - Economic Governance Project Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA ICR Date: 03/31/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Original Total Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 5.20M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: CEDAF Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL XDR 5.20M Disbursed Amount: XDR 4.96M Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 06/30/2009 Effectiveness: 12/20/ /20/2010 Appraisal: 12/14/2009 Restructuring(s): 03/08/2014 Approval: 04/08/2010 Mid-term Review: 06/20/ /13/2013 Closing: 06/30/ /30/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Moderate Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory iv

5 C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Performance any) Potential Problem Project at No any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time Yes (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Moderately Satisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): None None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General public administration sector Law and justice Public administration- Industry and trade Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Public Sector Management Public Administration Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance Public Finance Management 1 1 Public Expenditure Management 1 1 Rule of Law Judicial and other Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Legal Institutions for a Market Economy Personal and Property Rights 1 1 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Louise J. Cord Habib M. Fetini Practice Manager/Manager: Rashmi Shankar Iradj A. Alikhani Project Team Leader: Jean Michel Noel Marchat Gilberto de Barros ICR Team Leader: ICR Primary Author: Barbara Weber Johan Rosseel v

6 F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The original Development Objective was to improve aspects of the functioning of the justice sector relevant to the investment climate. The key expected outcomes of the Project were (a) enhanced effectiveness of justice, as measured by the number of cases judged and the speed at which they are judged; (b) improved investment climate, as reflected by the number of commercial cases being enforced and the reduction in time to enforce these contracts and (c) strengthened CEDAF, as measured by its ISO 9001 quality management certification. Additionally, the PGE intended to improve the effectiveness of three key economic governance agencies 1, notably, the Anti-money Laundering Unit (Cellule nationale de Traitement des Informations financières, CENTIF); and the investigation unit of the Public Procurement Regulatory Agency, (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés publics, ARMPS); and help increase the number of firms to adopt a no-bribes integrity pact and obtain an ethical business certification. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was formally revised in March 2014, as part of a level-1 restructuring. The revised PDO was to enhance Senegal s investment climate through improvements in the economic governance and the efficiency of commercial justice. According to the Restructuring Paper (RP), for the purpose of this project, economic governance meant the policy, institutional and behavioral framework that govern the activities of the private sector, while efficiency of commercial justice referred to the speed of decisions of justice and the ease of access to justice for commercial cases 1 The PDO only lists two agencies (CENTIF and ARMPS). The third one would have been the Anti-Corruption Commission (Commission nationale de Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence, la Corruption et la Concussion or CNLCC) which is not mentioned in the PDO formulation, nor captured in the results framework of the PAD but covered by the description of Component 3 to which this additional statement to the PDO is attributable. The RP points out that support to the CNLCC never materialized because this institution never produced a work program agreeable to IDA. The CNLCC was terminated in December 2012 and replaced by the newly created OFNAC. vi

7 (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1a : Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Reduced case processing delay by 30% between 2009 and 2016 at the Tribunal Regional de Premiere Instance Value quantitative or 200 days 140 days 185 days Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /03/2012 Dropped with the March 2014 level-1 restructuring as courts of first Comments (incl. % achievement) instance were replaced by "hors classe" courts in the context of the reform of the judicial map. There has been a 15 days reduction. Indicator 1b : Reduced case processing backlog by 30% between 2009 and 2016 at the Tribunal Regional de Premiere Instance de Dakar. Value quantitative or 1054 cases 735 cases 990 cases Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /03/2012 Dropped with the March 2014 level-1 restructuring as courts of first Comments (incl. % achievement) instance were replaced by "hors classe" courts in the context of the reform of the judicial map. The number of cases backlogged was reduced by 64. Indicator 2 : The average time to enforce a commercial contract is reduced from 780 to 365 days by There has been a reduction by 64 days. Value quantitative or 780 days 365 days 529 days 500 days Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /31/2016 Target revised with March 2014 level-1 restructuring. Over-achieved Comments (incl. % achievement) (112%): The number of days for the enforcement of a commercial contract was reduction by 280 days instead of 251, as initially envisaged. Indicator 3 : The average time to close a business [resolve insolvency] reduced from 3 to 1.5 years. Value quantitative or 36 months 18 months 36 months Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /03/2012 No progress made. Dropped with March 2014 level-1 restructuring, given Comments (incl. % that progress on this indicator is dependent on OHADA insolvency reforms, achievement) and attribution to Project interventions limited. vii

8 Indicator 4 : Number of cases pursued by CENTIF doubled from 12 in 2009 to 24 in 2014 to 24 by Value quantitative or 12 cases 24 cases 24 cases 164 cases Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/ /30/ /30/ /31/2016 This indicator was lifted from an intermediary to a PDO level indicator and Comments (incl. % achievement) revised with the April 2014 level-1 restructuring. Overachieved: reaching almost 700% of target value. Indicator 5 : Increase in the number of decisions taken per year at the Tribunal Regional Hors Classe de Dakar on Commercial Cases. Value quantitative or 947 cases 1,020 cases 1,371 cases Qualitative) Date achieved 03/03/ /30/ /30/2016 This indicator was newly introduced with the March 2014 level-1 Comments (incl. % achievement) restructuring. Overachieved with 134% of target value; and reached almost 6-times its initially envisaged increase in number of cases (increase by 424 cases vs. 73 initially). (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Senegal's [Doing Business] index rating for protecting investors improves from 3.5 in 2010 to 7 in 2014 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/10/ /30/ /30/ /31/2016 Basically achieved (98%). The index rating reached 4.6 in the 2015 DBR. Comments (incl. % achievement) The 2016 DBR used a slightly different methodology, causing a drop in the rating. However, the index reached 4.2 again in the 2017 DBR. Indicator 2 : Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Decrease the average time to enforce contracts through mediation for half of the judicial actions subject to court-annexed mediation. 90 days for half of the judicial 770 days on average for actions that are N.A. all cases subject to courtannexed mediation Date achieved 03/07/ /30/ /30/2016 viii

9 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : Inconclusive. Newly introduced with 2014 restructuring. Actually, the mediation framework is operational, but not enough time passed to use it. Statistics not yet available. Annual publication on the performance of the Tribunal Régional de Première Instance de Dakar shows reduction in number of pending cases Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped with the March 2014 level-1 restructuring as courts of first instance were replaced by hors classe courts in the context of the reform of the judicial map. Indicator 4 : Number of judges and staff trained in the justice sector (of which number of female) Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /30/2016 Target achieved and largely exceeded (320%). The gender-disaggregation Comments (incl. % was dropped at restructuring. achievement) Indicator 5 : Numbers of cases properly pursued [by CENTIF] doubled from 12 to 24 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /30/2016 Comments (incl. % Lifted to level of PDO indicators with 2014 restructuring (see above) achievement) Percentage of receivable cases investigated by the Investigation Unit of the Indicator 6 : Public Procurement Office (ARMP) increased from 0% to 85% Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /30/2016 Probably achieved, although the full year 2016 number is not available. Comments (incl. % achievement) During the first 5 months of 2016, five investigations have been launched, against nine for the full year ix

10 Indicator 7 : The No-Bribe Integrity Pact is developed and adopted by 100 firms Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /30/2016 Comments (incl. % Revised target achieved and exceeded (with 154% of target value) achievement) Indicator 8 : Ethical business certification developed and adopted by 50 firms Value (quantitative 0 50 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/2015 Comments (incl. % Indicator was dropped at restructuring. achievement) Number of staff whose company adopted either a No-bribe [Integrity] Pact Indicator 9 : or obtained an Ethical Business Certification, of which percentage is female Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/2015 Comments (incl. % Indicator was dropped at restructuring. achievement) Indicator 10 : CEDAF certified ISO 9001 by 2014 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) CEDAF is ISO CEDAF not ISO certified certified Date achieved 03/12/ /30/2015 Comments (incl. % Indicator was dropped at restructuring. achievement) Number of CEDAF staff trained, of which the percentage of female Indicator 11 : Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/12/ /30/ /30/ /30/2016 Target achieved and largely exceeded (180%). CEDAF employs only 10 staff members. On average, each staff member had almost four training Comments (incl. % achievement) sessions. The gender target could not be achieved since at project closing, CEDAF employed only two female staff. x

11 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Actual Disbursements DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 06/29/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory /26/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory /27/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /10/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /01/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /28/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /27/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /10/2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /09/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /01/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory /06/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory /15/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /30/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.47 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO 03/08/2014 Y MU MS 3.76 IP Amount Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key Restructuring Changes Made in USD millions Revisions of PDO and Results Framework; closing date extension; changes to components and costs; changes in implementation schedule. If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Unsatisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory xi

12 I. Disbursement Profile xii

13 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country and Sector Background 1. In 2009, during the design of the Economic Governance Project (Projet de Gouvernance Economique, PGE), the economy of Senegal, was basically dominated by three strategic sectors: agriculture (groundnuts), fisheries, and services. The importance of the agricultural sector had declined from almost 15 percent of GDP in 1960 to 7 percent in The informal sector accounted for approximately 60 percent of the economy. Urbanization was accelerating at a rapid pace, and almost half of the population of estimated 12 million lived in cities, thereof 30 percent in the capital Dakar and surroundings. Since the mid-l990s, Senegal's macroeconomic performance had been encouraging, with an average annual real GDP growth of nearly 5 percent annually over a 10-year period, driven mainly by construction and services such as tourism and telecommunication. 2. At the same time, Senegal was stuck in a low-growth equilibrium since 2006, with decreases in the real GDP growth rate, a rise in fiscal deficit driven by strong of fiscal demand by the public sector and at the same time lackluster export performance. During , Senegal was hit by a series of shocks, including poor rains, global food and fuel price shocks, and floods, as well as governance issues of some key enterprises in the energy and mining sectors. Rationale for Bank Assistance 3. As the Government of Senegal (GoS) intended to reduce poverty by half by 2015, it needed to increase its annual growth rate to 7 percent or more. Mindful that such a growth rate could only be generated by the private sector, the GoS had adopted a strategy relying on the private sector as the engine of its economy, and recognized that in order to foster the private sector, both the investment climate and economic governance had to improve. Consequently, strategies for improving the investment climate, on the one hand, and fighting corruption and improving economic governance including specifically the commercial justice system on the other hand, were developed to which the Project intended to contribute to differing degrees. It was obvious from the beginning that in the field of investment climate improvement, the Project would need to complement, for Senegal, the work of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa 2 (Organisation pour l Harmonization en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, OHADA). 4. The World Bank was perceived as a knowledgeable partner offering excellent technical expertise and good practices to address the critical constraints to an improved effectiveness of justice and better investment climate. 2 OHADA is an exclusively business-related legal framework created in October 1993 (Mauritius) by 14 West and Central African countries, including Senegal. Since 1993, its membership has grown to 17 countries. OHADA enacts Uniform Acts that supersede contradictory national laws. The substance of the Uniform Acts relates to, among others, general commercial law, commercial companies and Economic Interest Groups (GIEs), organizing simplified recovery procedures and measures of execution and organizing collective proceedings for clearig debts. As such, the insolvency rules applicable to Senegal are established at the OHADA level. Senegal established a national Secretariat for the follow up on OHADA reforms through Decree Nr of September The Project provided targeted assistance to the staff of the Secretariat to enable them to play their advocacy role regarding both enforcing contracts and protecting investors. On January 30, 2014, OHADA adopted substantial amendments to its core corporations law, the Uniform Act relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups (a.k.a. AUSCGIE). 1

14 5. The Project that was ultimately prepared for IDA-funding would be seen as part of an integrated strategy to build institutional capacity and strengthen different aspects of economic governance using complementary instruments. Its activities would be complemented by the second cluster of Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) Series 3 which would amongst other provide an additional venue for dialogue to ensure that the Project s reforms were completed effectively and in a timely manner. It would also build on previous WBG engagements in the areas of investment climate and justice, such as the Public Financial Management Reform Support Project (P112627) 4 and the Private Investment Promotion Project (PIPP, P051609) 5, and create synergies to an operation to be delivered in the following fiscal year (Public Financial Management Strengthening TA, P122476, approved in April 2011). Moreover, the PGE s design was based on a well-targeted assistance request from the Ministry of Justice, which implemented the Justice Sector Program (Programme Sectoriel de Justice, PSJ) 6. It therefore complemented and reinforced the assistance provided by the authorities and other development partners in the areas of justice and economic governance. 6. The PGE intended to expand the support provided for private-sector-led growth, consistent with Pillar 1 of the government s PRSP II - wealth creation for pro-poor growth as well as Pillar 4 on economic governance and decentralized and participatory development. The PGE was also aligned with the Accelerated Growth Strategy and was one of the IDA operations under the IDA Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for FY The CAS FY07-10 focused on strengthening economic management and public service delivery, enhancing productive capacity, and accelerating growth and competitiveness, which are fully consistent with the PGE. 3 The second cluster of PRSCs (IV-V) was implemented from PRSC IV included, under the policy area Private Sector Development a prior action aiming at improving the investment climate. Further, under the policy area Public Sector Governance, both, PRSC IV and V included prior actions intended to support critical reforms to improve economic governance in Senegal, with a focus on public financial management, procurement, debt management and statistics. A subsequent DPL-series of three Governance and Growth Support Credits (implemented from ), included a policy area to Promote Private Sector Development, and altogether two prior actions related to business climate indicators. (Covered by GGSC II, and III). 4 The Public Financial Management Reform Support Project, which closed in November 2009, was financed by a Trust Fund provided jointly the European Commission and The Netherlands for an amount of US$3.4 million. This small project was instrumental in building capacity in key departments in line Ministries and at the Ministry of Economy and Finances on Mediumterm Expenditures Framework. 5 The PIPP, implemented over the period , financed the drafting of, and consultation for, the Justice Sector Program (PSJ). PIPP also provided targeted assistance to the Ministry of Justice through the adoption of an anti-money-laundering law, provision of training for ministry staff for the budget planning and execution, and modernization and computerization of the registry of firms. The PIPP was also critical in providing the capacity building, technical assistance and Information Technology support required to set up the Senegalese Public Procurement Regulation Agency (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés publics, ARMPS). 6 In 2004, the GoS adopted the Justice Sector Program (PSJ) to: (i) rationalize the construction and rehabilitation of key infrastructure, (ii) bring the judicial system closer to those seeking justice and improve the way that users experience the justice system, (iii) reduce the delays in carrying out justice and improve the performance of the justice system, and (iv) promote the use of information and communication technologies, as well as modernize work processes. The PSJ covered While several DPs (EU, France, Spain, World Bank) supported the PSJ, only part of the funding needs for TA, initially established at CFAF billion (about US$194 million) has been secured. 2

15 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators (as approved) 7. The original Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve aspects of the functioning of the justice sector relevant to the investment climate 7. The original key expected outcomes were: (i) enhanced effectiveness of justice, as measured by the number of cases judged and the speed at which they are judged; (ii) an improved investment climate, as reflected by the number of commercial cases being enforced and the reduction in time to enforce these contracts; and (iii) a strengthened CEDAF, as measured by its ISO 9001 quality management certification. Additionally, the PGE intended to improve the effectiveness of three key economic governance agencies 8 : the Anti-money Laundering Unit (Cellule nationale de Traitement des Informations financières, CENTIF), and the Investigation Unit of the Public Procurement Regulatory Agency (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés publics) 9, and increase the number of firms to adopt a nobribes integrity pact and obtain an ethical business certification. 8. The original PDO Indicators were: (1 a-b) Delay and backlog of case processing at the Tribunal Régional de Première Instance de Dakar (reduced by 30 Percent between 2009 and 2014); (2) average time needed to enforce a contract (reduced from 780 to 365 days by 2014); and (3) average time to close a business (reduced from 3 to 1.5 years by 2014). 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 9. Following the May 2013 Mid-Term Review, the PDO was formally revised in March 2014 through a level-1 restructuring. This restructuring came after about 36 months of implementation and with 47 percent of the project s resources disbursed. 10. The revised PDO was to enhance Senegal s investment climate through improvements in the economic governance and the efficiency of commercial justice. For the purpose of this project, economic governance was defined as the policy, institutional, and behavioral framework that govern the activities of the private sector while efficiency of commercial justice referred to the speed of decisions of justice and the ease of access to justice for commercial cases. 11. Main justification for the change in the PDO formulation was the intention to better show the hierarchy of objectives, specifically the significance the GoS attributed to improved economic governance and efficiency of the commercial justice system to successful investment climate reforms in the country. The restructuring also aimed at increasing the realism of the Project Results Framework and its indicators. 12. Consequently, the restructuring had a major impact on the Project Results Framework. Specifically, two PDO indicators were dropped, notably, (1) Delay and backlog of case processing at the Tribunal Régional de Première Instance de Dakar, given that the Tribunal 7 This formulation is consistent with both PAD and original Financing Agreement. The Project ISRs contain a different formulation for the original PDO (to enhance the effectiveness of justice and improve the investment climate related to justice reform), which is incorrect. This Report is oriented towards to the correct version of the PDO. 8 The PAD only lists two agencies (CENTIF and ARMPS) in the PAD (paragraph 13) referring to beneficiary economic government agencies. The Anti-Corruption Commission (CNLCC) however, was clearly an intended project beneficiary (given that subcomponent (ii) to Component 3 was devoted to its support), and it can hence be assumed that the fact it is not included into the list of beneficiaries in the said para is an oversight. 9 The third agency, left out in the PDO formulation but included into the description of Component 3, would have been the Anticorruption Commission (Commission nationale de Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence, la Corruption et la Concussion, CNLCC). 3

16 Régional de Première Instance de Dakar seized to exist in 2014 when regional tribunals were replaced by courts of first instance in the context of a reform of the judicial map; and (3), Average time to close a business/ resolving insolvency, given that its achievement would have mainly be dependent on reforms to the regional OHADA Insolvency Law. Also, target of PDO indicator (2) was revised to make it more realistic. One intermediate indicator Number of cases investigated by CENTIF was lifted to PDO level with revised targets, and one new PDO indicator was introduced (number of decisions taken per year by the Tribunal Régional Hors Classe de Dakar (TRHCD) on commercial cases). There were also significant revisions to intermediate indicators. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The project beneficiaries, as indicated broadly in the PAD, included the judicial system in Senegal and the users of the court system and the mediation/conciliation system; national agencies, including CENTIF, ARMPS, CNLCC, and the Implementing Unit of the Ministry of Justice (Cellule d Exécution administrative et financière, CEDAF). At restructuring, the CNLCC was replaced by the National Office for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption (Office National de Lutte contre la Fraude et la Corruption, OFNAC). In addition, although not formally identified in the PAD or the Restructuring Paper (RP), the Senegalese society at large would benefit from an improvement of the investment climate in their various capacities: as investors, employers, entrepreneurs, consumers, and users of public services. 1.5 Original Components 14. At approval, the Project was a five-year Specific Investment Loan (SIL) in the total amount of US$8.0 million with three technical components, as well as an additional component to support the strengthening of CEDAF and overall project coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. Component 1 - Improving the investment climate (US$2.2 million) - aimed at supporting legal and institutional reforms and reform implementation to improve elements of the investment climate. It comprised three sub-components embedded in the Doing Business report: (i) enforcing contracts; (i) closing a business; and (iii) protecting investors. Component 2 Improving court performance and user-friendliness (US$3.1 million) - intended to enable the judicial system to more effectively play its role as warrantor of the rules regarding economic activities and transactions. This component comprised two subcomponents: (i) improving court performance in Dakar in both efficiency and quality of services; and (ii) improving the user friendliness of courts. Component 3 Strengthening the demand side for economic governance (IDA US$1.5 million) - intended to support complementary demand-side activities clustered in the following four subcomponents: (i) strengthening CENTIF; (ii) strengthening CNLCC; (iii) strengthening the new ARMPS Investigation Unit; and (iv) fostering business-led action against corruption. Component 4 Strengthening CEDAF and project implementation support (US$1 million) - focused on strengthening CEDAF to enable it to successfully implement the PSJ and become a center of excellence in public administration (US$0.6 million). Secondly, it also aimed at providing implementation support to the PGE (US$0.4 million). 4

17 1.6 Revised Components 15. While the project s number of components remained unchanged throughout implementation, components were revised as follows at the March 2014 level-1 restructuring: Revised Component 1 - Improving the investment climate (reduced to US$1.87 million). Some of the original actions foreseen under Component 1 aiming towards the improvement of several Doing Business indicators - had to be taken at the regional OHADA level and a country level project had therefore limited (or no) influence on these. Sub-component 2 ( closing a business ) was dropped and replaced by a new sub-component focusing on mediation/conciliation. Some activities of Sub-component 3 were also dropped. Revised Component 2 Improving court performance and user-friendliness (reduced to US$2.8 million). Key activities dropped included the development of an integrated management model, court user surveys and stakeholder feedback mechanisms, and the judges performance evaluation and accountability system. Revised Component 3 Strengthening the demand side for economic governance (increased to US$1.75 million). Support to CNLCC never materialized because the institution never produced a work program agreeable to IDA and was terminated in December It was replaced by the Office national de Lutte contre la Fraude et la Corruption (OFNAC). No activities were dropped, but the budget of TA components was increased to provide additional training. Revised Component 4 Strengthening CEDAF and project implementation support (increased to IDA US$1.58 million). Activities related to the ISO 9001:2008 certification process of CEDAF were dropped. The budget for implementation support was increased to provide for one additional year of implementation. 1.7 Other significant changes 16. In addition to the changes described above, the 2014 restructuring extending the project closing date by 12 months (from June 30, 2015 to June 30, 2016) and consequently applied changes to the original Implementation Schedule. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry 17. Soundness of Rationale for the Bank s Intervention. The WBG was perceived as bringing excellent technical expertise in the areas of investment climate and justice. The project was part of an integrated strategy to build institutional capacity and strengthen economic governance by using complementary instruments, such as the PRSC series and the ongoing Private Investment Promotion Project (PIPP), which had already funded capacity building activities at the Ministry of Justice and the Public Procurement Agency ARMP. The Bank s support to private sector-led development had been embedded in the country s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The Project was also aligned with the Accelerated Growth Strategy and included in the Country Assistance Strategy for FY

18 18. Soundness of Background Analysis. The project was grounded in a large body of literature finding that corruption has a negative effect on growth. The project identification and design had also benefited from recent analytical work, including the Senegal Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, the PSJ, the National Program for Economic Governance, the Program for the Fight against Corruption, the Senegal 2007 Investment Climate Assessment, and the World Bank Enterprise Survey Project identification also involved consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, including through the jointly (WB, Ministry of Justice) organized workshop on Economic Governance in During project preparation, the collaboration with other key development partners in the justice sector (EU, USAID, UNDP, and France) was strengthened. 19. Adequacy of Government Commitment. The project was designed to address the GoS s intention to reduce poverty by half by 2015 by increasing annual economic growth rate to 7 percent or more. During the Presidential Investment Council held in November 2008, the Senegalese authorities had reaffirmed the critical importance of addressing the main constraints to private sector-led growth, specifically to fostering private sector investment and increased productivity, through implementing investment climate reforms in three areas: enforcing contracts, closing down a business, and protecting investors. 20. Risk Assessment and Mitigation. The project s overall risk had been rated moderate to substantial, with a moderate residual risk after mitigation. During project preparation, a significant number of areas were recognized as representing a substantial risk. These areas included resistance from stakeholders in the Justice Sector, a high turnover of Ministerial positions, the need for a substantial volume of investments to generate results, and weak implementation capacity, including in procurement and financial management. In hindsight, these risks had been assessed realistically. Political, and with it, sector-specific risks related to the Ministry of Justice, rated moderate after mitigation, had been aggravated by developments in the Senegal political landscape happening in 2012 that were unforeseeable at appraisal, and led to a change in government priorities affecting government buy-in for some activities under component 2. Previously designed mitigation measures were of no significant influence under the circumstances. Some resistance originating from the court jurisdiction against the introduction of a performance evaluation and accountability system for judges, and also the risk related to lack of commitment by government agencies who did not sign the Anti-Bribery Pact at the end, had not been anticipated in the PAD risk assessment. A thorough political economy analysis carried out during preparation might have shed light on these issues to be expected, and the need to manage them accordingly. 21. Incorporation of Lessons Learned. According to the PAD, overall, project design was informed by lessons drawn from the World Development Report A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. The main specific lessons that informed the project s design were threefold and drawn from the implementation of basically three IDA-financed projects 10. On Component 1 (Improving the Investment Climate), the implementation experience showed that investment climate reforms are interactive and require strong champions and consensus building. On Component 2 (Supporting the Justice Sector Reform and Improving Access to Justice), the design team took on board the lesson learned that it is of critical importance to have the full involvement of the Ministry of Justice when implementing legal reforms. Component 3 (Strengthening Economic Governance) used an approach based on the World Bank Institute s knowledge of 10 The Private Investment Promotion Project (P051609), closed on December 31, 2011, the Private Sector Adjustment Program (P080013), closed on January 31, 2009, and the Private Sector Capacity Building Project (P002376), closed on October 31,

19 emerging good practices and international experience in economic governance. This approach emphasized a sustained joint process of collective actions that enables private firms to implement anti-corruption mechanisms, together with industry peers and key stakeholders. 22. Soundness of Project Design. The PAD clearly articulated the strategic relevance of the project, based on the IDA country engagement strategy at the time of project preparation and analytical work conducted. The PAD also provided a coherent explanation for the project s sector focus, with limited elaboration however on synergies between the various components. The team took on board guidance provided in the course of the internal review process during preparation. 23. However, project design was weakened though by a complex PDO formulation and inconsistencies in the logical results chain connecting PDO with components, activities and related indicators. (a) (b) (c) Whereas the original PDO formulation included basically one core PDO-outcome (i.e., improved aspects of the functioning of the justice sector relevant to the investment climate ), it was complemented by two subsequent PDO statement sentences: The first sentence added three additional key outcomes, notably, (i) enhanced effectiveness of justice; (ii) improved investment climate; and (ii) a strengthened CEDAF. It is not clear how these three key outcomes were related logically to the PDO or whether they were added to illustrate the aspects for the functioning of the justice sector which the PDO statement so clearly emphasized. Obviously, key outcome (ii) would not fit into this logic. For the purpose of this report, these three key outcomes will be considered intermediary outcomes to capture the expected achievements of three (out of four) components to which they match perfectly. A second extension of the original PDO formulation expressed the intention of the project to improve the effectiveness of three key economic governance agencies 11, increase the number of firms to adopt a no-bribes integrity pact and obtain an ethical business certification. This statement obviously referred to component 3, which was not covered by any of the before-mentioned three key outcomes. It added another set of four outcomes to the PDO statement, but left it unclear whether the respective agencies were considered part of the justice sector (which was at the center of the first and core PDO outcome), or external to it. 24. According to the PAD 12, promoting the efficiency of justice and economic governance requires action from two sides, reflected in the original project design: (a) the supply-side would establish conducive commercial justice services and a business environment for private sector growth, supported through reforms to improve both the business environment and the performance of courts (covered by Components 1 and 2, respectively), whereas (b) the demandside would be constituted by major economic governance agencies active in the fields of fight against money laundering, fraud and corruption, and public procurement investigations (covered by Component 3). 11 The PAD only lists two agencies (CENTIF and ARMPS) (paragraph 13) as beneficiary economic government agencies. The Anti-Corruption Commission (CNLCC) however, was clearly an intended project beneficiary (given that sub-component (ii) to Component 3 was devoted to its support), and it can hence be assumed that the fact it is not included into the list of beneficiaries in the said paragraph is an oversight. 12 Paragraph 24. 7

20 2.2 Implementation 25. The Project was implemented over about five and a half years, from effectiveness on December 20, 2010, until closing on June 30, 2016 (following a one-year extension). Reaching effectiveness took five months longer than envisaged, which is a manageable delay. Throughout implementation, five PIU Coordinators were consecutively in charge at the Implementing Agency, and three WBG Task Team Leaders (TTL) provided implementation support. The first TTL was based at HQ; the second one took over in September 2012 and was based in Senegal until September From then on, a Senegal-based co-ttl joined the Bank team. 26. At mid-term, in April 2013, project implementation progress was of concern, given uneven disbursement across components 13, and an overall disbursement rate of only 34 percent. The underlying issues were mainly related to implementation capacity: (a) the instability in some key positions related to project coordination 14 ; (b) a lack of sufficient joint understanding of the project objectives and/or activities by the beneficiaries; and (c) a lack of familiarity of the Implementing Agency and its PIU, CEDAF, with World Bank procedures. It should however be noted that increased efforts by both CEDAF and Bank team to address these weaknesses had already led to a significant increase in the disbursement pace during the six months prior to the mid-term review (MTR). 27. The MTR was carried out in the period of May 13 to 17, 2013, roughly one year later than scheduled at approval 15. The MTR rated most project performance indicators Satisfactory, with the exception of progress made towards achieving the PDO, which was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and overall implementation progress (IP), which was rated Moderately Satisfactory. 28. The MTR identified a number of structural project design issues, including the following: (a) The project could have only very limited impact on some of the project s performance indicators under Component 1 (Improving the Investment Climate), as these depended to a large extent on reforms that needed to be taken at the sub-regional level (OHADA) instead of at the country level (addressed by the PGE). (b) Some of the end-of-project targets of the performance indicators were unrealistic and assumed equally unrealistic linear improvement patterns throughout project implementation, essentially expecting Senegal to become better than many more developed countries and in a relatively short time span. (c) Given that the project was unable to provide support to the Anti-Corruption Commission (CNLCC), as the Commission never produced a work program agreeable to the Bank and was dissolved by decree in December 2012, it was replaced by a newly created Office national de Lutte contre la Fraude et la Corruption (OFNAC). 13 Whereas the (smaller) Component 3 was disbursing at a satisfactory rate (44%) and Component 4 had already disbursed 76% of its allocation, Components 1 and 2 were significantly lagging (with respectively only 13% and 18% disbursed). 14 There was instability in the position of the CEDAF coordinator. Also, the Project Steering Committee did not meet during the entire year 2012, due to the instability in the position of the Head of the Cabinet (Ministry of Justice), the de facto head of the Steering Committee. 15 In the PAD (Annex 11) the MTR was envisaged for June

21 29. The MTR s main recommendation was the need to restructure the project. In addition to the extension of the closing date, the MTR recommended to reallocate costs among components and to adjust components. 30. The restructuring - finally approved on March 13, 2014, almost one year after the MTR mission - included also a revision and simplification of both the PDO and results indicators 16. The revised PDO formulation covered three PDO-outcomes across two levels of aggregation 17 with the main focus of the revised PDO now on an enhanced investment climate to be furthered through the two secondary outcomes coming along with very clear definitions, notably (a) (b) improvements in economic governance (defined as the policy, institutional, and behavioral framework that govern the activities of the private sector ), and efficiency of commercial justice (defined as the speed of decisions of justice and the ease of access to justice for commercial cases ) 31. With the introduction of the new PDO outcomes, the restructuring deviated significantly from the original narrative, as it basically shifted the weights of the respective core outcome, from the functioning/efficiency of the justice system, to an improved investment climate. Also, the idea of interdependent supply and demand side action towards economic governance had disappeared, and the new definition of economic governance, referring mainly to a policy, institutional, and behavioral framework - which, if interpreted in the strictly literal sense would mean a concept or set of regulations 18 - rather than to the effectiveness of the institutions forming part of the economic governance system, as was the case previously. It has to be acknowledged that in the understanding of the team, according to anecdotal statements, the said framework would have included the effectiveness of economic governance institutions covered by component The restructured project retained its four components, but activities were modified, dropped, or added, and component costs changed. Also, the closing date was extended by 12 months. The long duration of the restructuring process was mostly due the extended time needed to reach consensus between stakeholders (judges, Ministry of Justice, private sector) and the Bank on details of the envisaged design changes, which, finally, were the following: (a) For Component 1 work would be abandoned on the sub-component aiming at improving closing a business, later re-formulated as resolving insolvency 19 and the respective PDO-level indicator, which had shown no progress during implementation so far 20, dropped. In addition to the realization of lack of influence by 16 Actual disbursement at restructuring stood at SDR 2.44 m (US$3.7 m equivalent). The percentage of disbursement at the time of restructuring, depending on the total amount disbursed at project completion, fluctuates around the 50% mark: Whereas the RP indicates a disbursement rate at 47% at that point in time, based on the signed project financing amount of SDR 5.2 m (US$8 m equivalent), the same percentage, at project closing, stands at 49% (based on the total disbursement in SDR on 03/30/17 of SDR 4.96 m), and 51% (based on historical total disbursement of US$7.37 m), respectively. 17 The enhanced investment climate through (i) improvements in economic governance and (ii) efficiency of commercial justice. 18 Definition of Framework in Merriam-Webster dictionary: a basic conceptual structure (as of ideas) ; and Oxford Dictionary: a basic structure underlying a system, concept, or text. 19 Activities dropped at restructuring include training of judges on bankruptcy matters, streamlining insolvency litigation, improving the regulation of insolvency administrators, and some assistance to the OHADA secretariat. 20 The DBR 2017 mentioned that, over DB2011 to DB2017, Senegal made resolving insolvency easier by introducing a new conciliation procedure for companies in financial difficulties and a simplified preventative settlement procedure for small 9

22 (b) (c) the Project, it had become obvious that there was insufficient implementation time left for the GoS demonstrate progress made on these reforms. PGE activities to support capacity building of the Executive Secretary of the Senegal National OHADA Commission continued after restructuring. Instead, a new sub-component Mediation/Conciliation was introduced, as a way of resolving commercial disputes. In 2013, the existing financial mediation framework had led to a decline in financial disputes litigated before the judicial courts. The PGE would therefore support the extension of Senegal s financial mediation framework to all classes or kinds of commercial disputes and to all types of business entities, entrepreneurs, and individuals. On Component 2, design changes at restructuring comprised the dropping of some activities to improve court performance, such as the development of a performance evaluation and accountability system for judges or the development of an integrated management model. These key activities were dropped due to a limited interest on the client side (see RP, paragraph 17), following the political changes in the aftermath of the 2012 elections. 33. The changes in PDO formulation described above while the project structure was basically maintained, led to the following picture: Before restructuring, one PDO indicator ( average time to enforce a commercial contract ) tracked progress made against an outcome ( improved investment climate ) which was not covered by the core original PDO formulation (geared toward the functioning of [a subsection of] the justice sector, i.e. the one that was relevant to investment climate). After restructuring, one previously intermediate indicator ( number of cases investigated by CENTIF ) was lifted to PDO-level and tracked results which were strictly speaking not covered by the (newly introduced) definition of the related outcome ( improved economic governance 21 ). This makes it complicated to assess project achievements, as the core of what the project was designed to achieve was not fully clear. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization 34. The M&E design of both the original and restructured project was impacted by weaknesses in PDO formulation and inconsistencies in the logical chain between PDOoutcomes, activities and components, and related indicators. However, the restructured results framework was less extensive and benefitted from greatly increased realism. Original Project 35. Design: The project s initial M&E design consisted of three PDO-level and 10 Intermediate Outcome-level indicators, 13 indicators in total. Three Intermediate Outcome indicators were gender-disaggregated. The entire set of indicators had baselines and end-of-project targets. Two PDO-level indicators and one Intermediate Outcome indicator stemmed from the Doing Business Report. There were some shortcomings with respect to the formulation of the performance indicators. First, the performance of two indicators for Component 1 was not entirely companies. However, as the PGE did not fund activities related to the new conciliation procedure or the preventative settlement procedure, this progress cannot be attributed to the project. 21 At restructuring, economic governance was defined as a framework to govern private sector activities and did not include any reference to the effectiveness of the demand side) 10

23 (for investor protection) or not at all (for resolving insolvency) under control of project-financed activities and depended, at least partly, on reforms undertaken at the sub-regional level (OHADA). Second, some indicator targets, including those for PDO-indicators, turned out to be too optimistic and based on assumptions of unrealistic linear improvement patterns over the project years. The restructuring allowed to successfully address these issues. 36. Implementation and utilization: Regular data collection for project activities occurred through bi-yearly progress reports submitted by CEDAF. The regular project M&E was complemented during implementation by a detailed evaluation of the impact of justice sector reforms on the speed of delivering justice, in collaboration with the Bank s DIME team for Impact- Evaluation. Observations on challenges to project implementation progress based on M&E data led to the decision to restructure the project. Restructured Project 37. Design: At restructuring, the Results Framework was significantly revised. The PDO was re-formulated (see above). M&E design was aligned with dropped, newly added, and modified activities, and improved through the incorporation of more realistic end-of-project targets. Two of the three original PDO-level indicators were dropped and replaced. One Intermediate Outcome Indicator was upgraded to PDO level and three others were dropped. The restructured M&E design was thus less extensive, consisting of three PDO indicators and only six Intermediate Outcome indicators. The revised M&E design included less gender-disaggregated data as the original results framework, as one gender-disaggregated Intermediate Outcome indicator was dropped in the restructuring and another one lost its gender-disaggregated character, leaving only a single genderdisaggregated indicator Implementation and utilization: The M&E data gathered were effectively used to help the project team focus on identifying bottlenecks and improving project implementation. The restructuring, as described above, addressed shortcomings of the original M&E design, with substantial success (see section 3.2. below, on Achievement of PDO). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Financial Management 39. The project s financial management performance was rated Satisfactory throughout implementation. The project implementation unit CEDAF remained adequately staffed, except at the beginning when there was significant instability in the position of CEDAF coordinator. There were no overdue Interim Financial Reports, as well as audited reports. Under the project, the FM personnel acquired the required accounting and auditing capabilities. The project generally had unqualified audit reports. Procurement 40. Compliance with procurement guidelines was consistently in the satisfactory range throughout project implementation. 22 The remaining gender-disaggregated indicator was the least important one (CEDAF) of the three. 11

24 Safeguards 41. The project was classified as environmental category C under OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and did not trigger any safeguards, given that it mainly comprised institutional capacity building activities and technical assistance for subsector reforms, and there was no direct or indirect physical investment. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 42. At this stage, targeted support to commercial justice reforms is ongoing and/or planned. Given the ongoing need to address investment climate constraints in Senegal, the Tourism & Enterprise Development Project (P146469), currently under preparation, includes a component aiming at improving the business environment at the sub-national level, outside of the Dakar metropolitan area. The regional IDA-funded OHADA Improved Investment Climate Project, approved in June 2012 to strengthen OHADA s institutional capacity to support, in its member countries, selected aspects of investment climate reforms, carries forward support to the Senegal OHADA Secretariat, and, amongst others, support to commercial justice on the regional level. One component, for example, helps strengthening the capacity of the Joint Court of Justice and Arbitration and the Regional Superior School for the Magistracy. While still active, the PGE created synergies with the IFC-AS OHADA UA2 program through purchase of ICT equipment, to support the Ministry of Justice with the establishment and deployment of a new computerized company and collateral registry (e-rccm) to a number of jurisdictions. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 43. Due to changes in PDO formulation under the 2014 level-1 restructuring, a split evaluation of envisaged outcomes related to each of the two phases of project implementation is warranted. 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Rating: Substantial Relevance of Objectives (against original and revised PDO and associated indicators): High 44. Both the original PDO of the PGE - to improve aspects of the functioning of the justice sector relevant to the investment climate and the revised PDO to enhance Senegal s investment climate through improvements in economic governance and the efficiency of commercial justice - were highly relevant at appraisal and continue to remain highly relevant at project closure. 45. The project s objectives were congruent with the Government s PRSP II and the Senegal Accelerated Growth Strategy at the time of appraisal, and as such also consistent with the World Bank CAS for Senegal covering FY07-10, especially with its Governance Filter, seeking i.a. to strengthen and modernize the judicial system and mechanisms for private sector governance, and its first pillar ( Accelerated growth, wealth creation, strengthening the drivers of growth ). One of the CAS outcomes under this pillar aimed at promoting a competitive investment climate. 12

25 46. During implementation, the project s interventions were reflected in the subsequent WBG County Partnership Strategy for Senegal covering FY13-17, contributing - specifically, with the revised PDO - to its first pillar ( Accelerating Inclusive Growth and Creating Employment ) which includes the CPS outcome Improved Investment Climate for Private Sector. (However the indicators to measure progress towards this CPF outcome 23 were not covered by the restructured Project). A link can also be created to the CPS Foundation Pillar ( Improving Governance and Strengthening Resilience ). Lastly, both the original and revised PDO were in line with the GoS new National Strategy of Economic and Social Development (SNDES ) and the Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE), launched in February Hence, to conclude: Both PDOs were substantially relevant both at appraisal and completion in light of Senegal s national development strategies and the Bank s CAS and CPS. Relevance of Design (against original and revised PDO and associated indicators): Modest 47. The relevance of the original project design was affected by a complex PDO statement in the PAD, and significant logical inconsistencies between PDO (original and revised) and project design in both stages of the project, before and after restructuring. (see above, paras 23, 30, 33). In addition, in the original project, the causal chain between funding of activities at the national level and the achievement of some of the intended results was not fully convincing, specifically with respect to the activities related to closing a business/resolving insolvency, given that the critical reforms needed to be undertaken under the regional OHADA regime and were thus outside of the remit of the project. 48. Even though the reformulation of the PDO with the 2014 restructuring shifted emphasis of the Project considerably as explained above, the revised project grosso modo retained its original structure (four components) and main activities. Specifically, the restructuring did not introduce activities aiming at creating or improving a framework to govern the activities of the private sector as projected by the revised PDO formulation, and the explanation of the term economic governance coming along with it. The only existing activity contributing to such a framework in the literal interpretation, was Project support to the antibribery pact. In addition, the replacement of sub-component 1.2 (closing a business/resolving insolvency) by a new sub-component 1.4 (mediation/conciliation) was not linked to the shift in emphasis based on PDO reformulation, but due to the above-mentioned concerns related to attribution, and to the time horizon needed for success which was beyond project closing. Relevance of Implementation (against original and revised PDO and associated indicators): Substantial 49. Relevance of Implementation: The Bank s implementation assistance was responsive to the challenges emerging in the first years of implementation and remained flexible throughout project execution. The MTR effectively identified the difficulties regarding some of the project s core components of the project, including the design issues in Component 1 and the unrealistic 23 The two CPF outcome indicators are: Delay in treatment of cases at the Tribunal Régional de 1ere Instance de Dakar (which was replaced at Project restructuring), and Number of days required to obtain a construction permit (which was not measured by the Project). 13

26 end-of-project targets for certain performance indicators. The PDO was changed with the level-1 restructuring even though the MTR had in fact recommended that the project needed to be restructured while keeping the PDO, which hints to the awareness of the team preparing the restructuring of the overly complex initial PDO formulation. Following three years of mixed implementation progress characterized by a glacial disbursement progress in Component 1 and 2 and at the same time limited progress towards results, the Bank s team managed to overcome these difficulties during the second half of project implementation ensuing mainly from enhanced efforts for PIU capacity development, supplemented by project restructuring and realigning project resources to achieve its restated PDO. 50. The restructuring did however not fully resolve the weaknesses built into the logical results chain of the project but replaced a high degree of PDO complexity with a lesser one (still reaching across two levels of aggregation), and introduced some consistency issues (as discussed under relevance of design, above). One element of puzzlement - even though marginal - is that the PDO stated in all project Implementation Status Reports 24 differed from the one stated in the PAD and the Financing Agreement. It is a minor issue, but constitutes a lapse in oversight in the initial implementation phase. 51. Overall, implementation fulfilled its purpose of leading the project to a close to full disbursement and outcome achievements in the satisfactory range, which speaks to its overall substantial relevance. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Efficacy (against original PDO and associated indicators): Substantial Efficacy (against revised PDO and associated indicators): Substantial 52. The achievement of the respective PDOs was to be measured through a set of PDOlevel and intermediate indicators. (See Data Sheet Results Framework Analysis, above). Original PDO PDO Outcome: Improved aspects of the functioning of the justice sector relevant to the investment climate Rating: Substantial 53. The PGE s core original PDO outcome, supplemented by one of three key PDO outcomes related to the functioning of commercial justice, was mainly addressed through Component This component aimed at enabling the justice system to play a better role as guarantor of the rules governing economic transactions, including by exploring options for bringing judicial services closer to the people, and increasing the number of decisions taken by the commercial court per year and hence reduce the average duration of court cases. 24 In all ISRs, the PDO is stated as to enhance effectiveness of justice and improve the investment climate related to justice reform, which is different from the PDO stated in the PAD and the FA. 25 In both the original and revised project, Component 2 was the most expensive one, with an estimated cost of respectively 39% and 35% of total cost. With an estimated cost of US$2.3 million, sub-component improving court performance was the project s most expensive one (29%). 14

27 (a) The indicator supposed to measure the achievement of the core PDO-outcome under the original design referred to the reduction of case processing delay and backlog at the Tribunal Régional de Première Instance de Dakar. At the time of the restructuring, the reduction of backlog against the 2010 base line (1,054 cases in 2010) stood at 6% (990 cases in 2014) and it had become obvious that the target of a 30% reduction (from 1,054 cases in 2010 to 735 cases in 2014, and simultaneously from 200 days to 140 days in the same period) would not be reached, as it stood only at 6% then (with a reduction by 64 cases and 15 days, respectively). Also, as courts of fist instance were replaced by hors classe courts in the context of the reform of the judicial map implemented in 2014, the initial indicator lost its raison d être and was hence dropped and replaced by an indicator tracking the performance of the Tribunal Régional Hors Classe de Dakar the target of which was largely succeeded (see below, para 61). (b) An additional intermediate indicator target related to the same outcome, notably, the number of judges and staff trained in the justice sector 26 was largely exceeded (400 judges and staff trained at the end of 2015, against a target of 125 by closing date). The support by the project has allowed the gradual introduction of digital management tools at both the central and decentralized level (jurisdictions). The PGE has financed the computerization of the entire staff of the Lat Dior courthouse and the appellate court of Saint Louis. The contribution of the project has been decisive in the digitalization and archiving of the legal cases and the corresponding IT-training of the TRHCD staff. Training sessions for judges and magistrates covered HR management and appeals to the Supreme Court in criminal and civil matters. 54. Since the target related to the PDO indicator introduced with the 2014 restructuring, was largely exceeded, and the other (intermediate) indicator attributed to the same outcome was also met, the conclusion is that the original core outcome would have been achieved at project closing 27, but measured by different, more suitable indicators than were foreseen under the original design of the results framework. 55. Given that the additional statements complementing the original core PDO outcome are considered related to components (as indicated above, in para 23. (ii)), hence to be located at the intermediary level, they are not discussed at this point. The will be considered in the following sections though to the extent as they are relevant to the revised PDO outcomes. 26 The gender-disaggregated nature of the indicator was lost in restructuring. Moreover, this indicator was formulated in a too broad manner to capture the true impact of capacity building activities and could have been complemented by a process indicator, such as the number of judges trained in specific subjects, or the percentage of judges reporting that the training had increased their skillset. 27 The rating is substantial as opposed to high under the revised PDO (paras 61-63) due to the limited progress under the initial PDO indicator related to the Tribunal Régional de Première Instance de Dakar - which was then ultimately abandoned given its irrelevance. 15

28 Revised PDO PDO Outcome 1 (revised): Improved investment climate Rating: Substantial 56. The revised PGE s primary PDO outcome (and one of three key outcomes associated with the original PDO) was to improve the investment climate, addressed through Component 1. The PGE s explicit aim was to make Senegal one of the 10 countries in Sub- Saharan Africa with the best business-enabling environment. Component 1 initially included three subcomponents: (a) enforcing contracts; (b) closing a business; and (c) protecting investors. As the project s outputs aimed at improving DB ratings, two PDO-level indicators and one intermediate indicator were taken from the Doing Business Report (DBR) to measure progress achieved toward improving the investment climate. Following the 2014 restructuring, and with the introduction of the revised PDO, activities in support of resolving insolvency were removed, and so was the related (intermediate) indicator. (i) The PDO-level indicator target relating to the average time for enforcing contracts (same as for original PDO) was met if not slightly exceeded against a revised target of 529 days (the end result being 500 days as reported in the 2016 Business Memo). In 2009, the 2010 DBR ranked Senegal 151th out of 183 countries on enforcing contracts. On average, enforcing a contract took 780 days and cost 26.5 percent of the claim value. A series of capacity building and technical assistance activities was undertaken during the first phase of project implementation, prior to the restructuring ( ). This included support for the economic and financial section of the at the prosecutor s office, specialization of commercial judges and rationalization of rotation schemes, establishing strict timeframes for commercial cases, fostering case management for faster enforcement of judicial decisions, improving enforcement procedures, fostering M&E of judges, and building a bridge with alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. Most of these activities continued post-restructuring. The main reform at the national level was the adoption of changes to the Civil Procedure Code (Decree of August 6, 2013), which established a fourmonth period for proceedings of readiness of legal disputes and helped to reduce the duration of cases. Tangible achievements of both the regulatory changes and continued capacity building activities for all the actors involved in the justice sector started to show results three years later, and was reflected in the GoS s 2016 Business Environment Memo 28 which reported 500 days to enforce a contract. In the 2017 DBR, Senegal had risen to rank 144 (out of 190 countries) with respect to enforcing contracts, its best ranking since the PGE was approved. (ii) The achievement of the new sub-component aiming at improved contract reinforcement through alternative dispute resolution, introduced with the 2014 restructuring, was inconclusive however. The 90-day target for the maximum duration of mediation was codified in the decree on mediation/conciliation, which was adopted on December 24, It implies that all cases that are subject to court-annexed mediation need to be resolved within the 90-day limit, and if not, they are sent back to courts 29. The 28 The 2017 DBR reported only marginal improvements for contract enforcement: days (against 655 days for SSA) and a cost of 36.4 percent of claim value (against 44.3 percent for SSA). 29 The outcome of the mediation procedure is not only to reduce the average turnaround time for disputes of commercial contracts, but also to unclog the courts. 16

29 target related to this PDO indicator would have been reached if half of the judicial actions subject to court-annexed mediation had been resolved within the 90-day mediation framework (down from 750 days in judicial court). At the time of writing of this report, statistical data on the share of judicial actions that were subjected to mediation and on the share of mediation cases that were resolved within the 90-day limit to settle a dispute through mediation, are not yet available. (iii)the intermediate result-target for improving investor protection was achieved, mainly due to the adoption in 2014 of the OHADA Uniform Act Governing Commercial Entities. The index rating for protection of minority investors reached 4.6 in the 2015 DBR, against a revised target 30 of 4.3 to be reached on June 30, 2016 and an original target of 7.0 to be reached on June 30, In the 2015 DBR, Senegal was ranked 122 nd out of 189 countries, a significant jump compared to its ranking in the previous DBR (170 th ). The DBR 2016 and 2017 used a slightly modified methodology for the protecting minority investors 31, causing a drop in Senegal s ranking (respectively 155 th and 137 th ) and in its index rating. In the 2017 DBR, the index for the strength of minority investor protection stood at 4.2, with a Distance to Frontier score of 41.76, against a regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa. PDO Outcome 2 (revised): Improved economic governance (defined as the policy, institutional, and behavioral framework that governs the activities of the private sector) Rating: Modest - referring to the definition suggested in the RP in the literal interpretation. Substantial - if considering the framework to also include the effectiveness of economic governance institutions (which was in fact the intention, according to statements of team members). For logical consistency purposes, project achievements regarding the effectiveness of economic governance institutions are discussed in section 3.5: Institutional Change/Strengthening. 57. The outcome of improved economic governance had not been included explicitly into the original PDO formulation, nor in the list of key outcomes supplementing the original PDO. It is however covered by the second addition to the original PDO statement related to the improvement of the effectiveness of key economic governance agencies, and Component 3 was exclusively dedicated to it. Achievements towards this outcome were covered by a number of intermediate indicators in the original results framework, and remained there, following the restructuring. The original idea was that strengthening three institutions (the Anti-Money Laundering Unit CENTIF; the Anti-Corruption Office OFNAC 32 ; and the Investigation Unit of the 30 At MTR, the end-target of 7.0 for the minority investor protection index was perceived as being too ambitious, given the lack of progress achieved at the MTR and the distance of the target with the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (4.5). At restructuring, the target was thus lowered to At project approval, the minority investor protection index (0-10) was defined as the simple average of (i) the extent of conflict of interest regulation and (ii) extent of shareholder governance indices. The shareholder governance index (0-10) is measured by the simple average of (i) the extent of shareholders rights, (ii) strength of governance structure, and (iii) extent of corporate transparency indices. Starting with the DBR2016, the index has been redefined by replacing the strength of governance structure by the extent of ownership and control. 32 In its original design, the project aimed at strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission CNLCC (Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence, la Corruption et la Concussion). In December 2012, that Commission was dissolved by decree and replaced by OFNAC (Office National de Lutte Contre la Fraude et la Corruption). 17

30 National Public Procurement Regulatory Agency ARMP), as well as fostering business-led actions against corruption 33, would strengthen the demand side for effective commercial justice. These activities towards the strengthening of institutions on the demand-side of economic governance in the broader (and initially intended) sense were reasonably successful. (See below, section 3.5. b: Institutional Change/Strengthening). 58. Whereas the revised PGE did not support any reforms of conceptual structures and regulations, related to policy, institutions or behavior to govern activities of the private sector in Senegal, it contributed significantly to creating a broad coalition of firms signing the Anti- Bribery pact. The revised target 34 related to fostering business-led actions against corruption can hence be considered the main contributor to a framework of economic governance in the stricter sense of interpretation. The indicator was largely exceeded (77 firms signed the Anti- Bribery Pact, against a target of 50 firms). The project worked with local business associations and the chamber of commerce in Dakar to forge a collective private sector anti-corruption initiative 35 (the Private Sector Coalition Against Corruption, or CSPC) 36. The project financed the preparation of roundtables and workshops, capacity building for the CSPC and outreach, training of private sector enterprises on corporate governance and on the Anti-Bribery Pact, and the acquisition of IT equipment and office furniture for the Coalition. This being said, there are concerns about the sustainability of the pact, specifically since the Customs Administration and the Tax Administration, i.e. the public sector counterpart of the Private Sector Coalition against Corruption (CSPC), declined to provide co-signature, hereby greatly reducing its relevance. (see below, chapter 4. on Risk to Development Outcome). PDO Outcome 3 (revised): Improved efficiency of commercial justice (defined as the speed of decisions of justice and the ease of access to justice for commercial cases) Rating: High 59. Whereas the original core PDO outcome, discussed above and addressed through Component 2, referred to the functioning of commercial justice, emphasis following the restructuring was laid more on improved efficiency of commercial justice, which can be considered an element of functioning. Component 2 remained largely unchanged by the restructuring, although three key activities were dropped due to limited interest on the client side 37, as discussed above. 33 At restructuring, the cost of Component 3, which supported complementary demand-side activities, was estimated at 22 percent of total project cost, slightly more than the original cost (19 percent). Fostering business-led actions against corruption was by far the largest sub-component (10 percent of total project cost). 34 At restructuring, the bar for this target was lowered from 100 firms signing the Pact to 50 firms. Moreover, two other intermediate outcome targets were dropped, one requiring the adoption of an Ethical Business Certification by 50 firms and the other one tracking the number of staff in companies that have adopted either the Ethical Business Certification or the No-bribery Pact. 35 At restructuring, the cost of the CSPC subcomponent was increased from US$700,000 to US$775,000 (10% of total cost), making this subcomponent the second most expensive one after improving court performance. 36 The firms signing the Anti-Bribery Pact publically committed themselves to respect a common code of conduct with respect to bribes, kickbacks, and other conflicts of interest. The intention was for the Customs Administration and the Tax Administration to co-sign the Pact, so that firms could benefit from administrative incentives, e.g. fast track import/export procedures, but this goal, which is the cornerstone of the Pact, has not been achieved to this date. 37 These dropped activities included: (i) Development of an integrated management system; (ii) Court User Surveys and Stakeholder Feedback Mechanism; and (iii) Judges Performance Evaluation and Accountability Systems. The dropping of these activities underscores the importance of conducting a thorough political economy analysis to inform the design of a project. The 18

31 60. For indicator achievements for this outcome, please also see above, para The (revised) indicator target related to the number of decisions taken per year by the Tribunal Régional Hors Classe de Dakar (TRHCD) was largely exceeded (1,517 against a target of 1,020). The Project s activities were focused on the TRHCD, which treats 80 percent of the commercial disputes in Senegal. The project financed technical assistance (studies) and training activities, as well as the acquisition of IT equipment and office furniture, targeting the two principal causes of the weak performance of the tribunals in Dakar, namely the shortcomings in judicial administration and case management. Efforts to introduce key instruments to manage and evaluate the performance of magistrates were rebuffed. As the master plan for statistics prepared by the General Inspection of the Judicial Administration was not finalized, the Bank s DIME team was put in charge of gathering statistical data to evaluate the performance of the TRHCD. The DIME study is however not finalized and does not yet make it possible to quantify the delays related to the different procedures and case management modalities. 3.3 Efficiency Rating against both original and revised PDO: Modest 62. As the PGE mainly consisted of technical assistance and capacity building activities to improve the investment climate and economic governance in Senegal, its direct benefits cannot be captured in a cost/benefit analysis. The use of a full economic and financial analysis would therefore not be appropriate to assess the efficiency of the project. The PAD did also not include a full economic and financial analysis Otherwise, efficiency of project implementation, determined by the factors of time and cost, can be considered modest: The project was implemented with an extension of one year, with a slightly reduced agenda as compared to appraisal given that some activities were dropped during restructuring. The final cost of Component 4, Support to CEDAF and Project Implementation, was 167 percent 39 higher than the estimate at appraisal (US$1.67 million compared to US$1 million). However, the cost for the same component at completion almost matched (with 105%) the updated estimate at restructuring. Still, in comparison with other projects implemented in approximately the same period, both in Senegal (across sectors) 40 and covered by T&C AFR (across countries in Africa) 41, the cost overrun is at the high end, which points to modest efficiency. Bank s DIME team has been contracted to do a client satisfaction survey, which is scheduled to be finalized by the end of March The PAD identifies three kinds of economic benefits: (i) an improved investment climate is expected to foster competitiveness and private investment, which in turn will lead to higher economic growth and job creation; (ii) supporting justice sector performance will facilitate investments and economic growth; and (iii) addressing corruption on both the demand and supply sides will help attract more private investment. 39 See Annex 1 (a). 40 See for example percentage of actual cost compared to cost at appraisal for the following projects: P (Agribusiness): 232% with extension of 3 years; P (Water & Sanitation): 98%, no extension; P (GPE Education): 73.8% with extension of 3 years. 41 See for example percentage of actual cost compared to cost at appraisal for the following projects: P (Rwanda): 160%, with 1 year extension; P (Ethiopia): 144%, with 1 year extension; P (Mozambique), 125%, with 1 year extension; P (Cape Verde): 136%, with 1 year extension. 19

32 64. When it comes to individual components, it is worth highlighting that, overall at the end of the project, costs for Component 1, (Investment climate) were higher than projected both at appraisal (112%) and at restructuring (132%), whereas costs for Component 2 Court Performance) were significantly lower with 67% of estimate at appraisal and 75% of the already reduced amount at restructuring in the same extended time period. This points, on the one hand, to the shift in emphasis of the project from commercial justice to investment climate over time and particularly following the restructuring. It might however also point to differences in efficiency of implementation of these two components. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 65. The overall outcome rating of the project is assessed as Moderately Satisfactory. In principle, a split rating would have needed to be calculated for the project based on the fact that the PDO had been revised and that there were substantial changes to the original key associated targets. However, given that the efficacy rating for both phases rests at substantial a split rating is obsolete, as it would not make a difference. The Moderately Satisfactory rating against both the original and revised PDO is justified by a Substantial rating for relevance, Substantial for efficacy, and Modest for efficiency. The Project made a remarkable recovery after restructuring and had, within a relatively short time span, a significant impact on protecting minority investors, contract enforcement, and mediation. In addition, leaning to a rating in the satisfactory range overall is justified by the substantial results achieved by the Project when it comes to institutional change/strengthening of institutions of economic governance. (See below, section 3.5. (b)). 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 66. The project interventions contributed to improving the investment climate and are therefore likely to have contributed to broad-based economic growth and, assuming the existence of effective trickle down mechanisms in Senegal, to poverty reduction. 67. Overall, the project had no specific gender objectives. The original M&E framework included three gender-disaggregated intermediate indicators, but two of them got lost in restructuring, leaving the number of women trained at the implementation agency CEDAF as the sole indicator tracking gender aspects. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 68. The strengthening of institutions forming the demand-side of economic governance (Component 3) and implementing the PJS (Component 4) was a strong focus of the PGE, and it was an area of intervention where it achieved substantial results. The project sought to strengthen the capacities of national institutions fighting corruption and money laundering and increasing transparency in public order. 20

33 Strengthening the demand-side of economic governance 69. The PDO-level indicator target 42 to double the number of cases pursued by the Anti- Money Laundering Unit CENTIF was largely exceeded (the number for 2015 is 164 declarations, of which 87 have been analyzed, against a target of 24; data for 2016 are not yet available). CENTIF has been established in August 2004 and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. It has the mandate to monitor, investigate and report money-laundering activities to judicial system. Over the years, it faced an increasing demand for its services, which created an increased demand for adequate technical assistance and resources to carry out its mandate. The PGE financed studies, direct technical assistance, capacity building, training (including study trips) and the purchase of IT equipment, software, and vehicles. The key activity was the recruitment of an international cabinet to prepare guidelines to manage the implementation of measures to fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Overall, the activities funded by the PGE have significantly benefitted CENTIF and contributed to an increase in its performance. CENTIF has become a key player in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Senegal. CENTIF has also played a key role in the definition of a national strategy on fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 70. The revised target 43 related to the intermediate outcome to strengthen the Investigation Unit of the Public Procurement Agency (ARMP) was not fully reached (64 percent of receivable cases investigated, against a target of 80 percent). The project provided on-the-job technical assistance to the investigation unit on investigation techniques, public procurement, and regulatory matters. The project also financed two study tours at the European Investment Bank for each three staff members 44 of the investigation unit, as well as one vehicle, IT equipment and audio-visual equipment. The PGE has allowed ARMP s Investigation Unit to enhance its investigation capabilities, which is reflected in the significant improvement of the percentage of investigated cases, although the target was not fully reached. 71. The project did not define an intermediary-level target to track the performance of OFNAC, the new institution that replaced the defunct CNLCC. OFNAC has self-referral, referral, and investigation powers that allows it to advise administrative authorities. After investigation, OFNAC can trigger public action, but it has no legal power of its own. The project supported OFNAC through capacity building and communication activities, as was planned from the beginning for the CNLCC, and through the acquisition of IT equipment and office firniture. The support of the PGE had a positive impact on OFNAC s institutional capacity and on its IT environment. Strengthening CEDAF 72. In the original project, the strengthening of CEDAF (10 staff members) was one of the three key expected outcomes 45. Under Component 4, the project would strengthen CEDAF 42 At restructuring, the indicator tracking the performance of CENTIF had been upgraded from intermediate outcome level to PDOlevel. No PDO-level indicator for economic governance was included in the original M&E framework. 43 At restructuring, the bar for the target was lowered from 85% on June 30, 2015, to 80% on June 30, The ICR fact-finding mission found that staff trained under the project are no longer working in the investigation unit and that none of the staff currently working in the investigation unit members have received any training financed by the project. 45 The PAD explicitly listed three key expected outcomes : enhanced effectiveness of justice, improved investment climate, and strengthened CEDAF (see PAD, par.13). The PAD portrayed improved effectiveness of three economic governance agencies as a subordinated additional outcome. 21

34 to enable it: (a) to successfully implement the PSJ 46 ; and (b) become a center of excellence in the public administration. Despite the strengthening of CEDAF being a key expected outcome, the M&E framework did not track its achievement at the PDO-level, but rather at the intermediate level, through verifying whether CEDAF had obtained an ISO 9001 quality management certification While the June 2013 MTR had recommended 48 continuing the activities related to the ISO 9001 certification, that certification was - without any explanation - dropped at the March 2014 restructuring and removed from the M&E framework. After the restructuring, the project continued supporting the strengthening of CEDAF by providing a digital law library and some office equipment. The project also financed a vehicle, IT-equipment, as well as accounting and evaluation software for CEDAF. The project also supported the elaboration and implementation of PGE s communication strategy and financed the development of the Ministry of Justice s new web site. 74. The intermediate result-target for strengthening CEDAF was achieved, as the number of staff trained reached 20 49, against a target of 10. At project closing, only two staff members were female and both had benefitted from training. The project financed several training sessions abroad for CEDAF s interim coordinator and work planning engineer. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 75. There is nothing to report at the time of writing of this Report. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey 76. A beneficiary survey was not carried out, although it had been part of the initial activity plan. At restructuring, it was decided to drop court user surveys and stakeholder feedback mechanisms, due to limited interest on the client side. Nevertheless, a client satisfaction survey of firms that have had issues with the courts is being undertaken as part of an impact evaluation study by the Bank s DIME team. Results are scheduled to be available by the end of March Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 77. There is a low risk that economic or political factors might reverse or weaken the development outcome of the legal reforms, regulatory changes, and capacity building activities undertaken through Components 1 and 2. The policies of the GoS that provided the context for the design of the project and the reforms of the legal framework (Civil Procedure Code, Mediation 46 No information was made available however on the outcomes of the Justice Sector Program or on CEDAF s performance in implementing the PSJ. 47 The ISO 9000 family of quality management systems standard is designed to help organizations ensure they meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders, while meeting statutory and regulatory requirements related to a product or program. ISO 9001 deals with the requirements that organizations must fulfill to meet the standard. Third-party bodies provide ISO 9001 certification. ISO 9001 is one of the most widely used management tools in the world. 48 The MTR had also recommended increasing the budget of Component 4 by US$300,000. At restructuring, the increase in the budget allocation stood at US$580,000, despite the dropping of the ISO 9001 certification. 49 Some CEDAF staff members benefitted from more than one training activity. No information is available on staff turnover during the project. 22

35 Decree) remain highly relevant. Moreover, they have enjoyed the support of the public, the private sector, and the current administration. 78. The beneficiary institutions of the Project are well-established institutions with a clear mandate. They have received substantial capacity building support to enhance skills that will certainly erode over time, but are difficult to remove over the short and medium term (at least in case of the Ministry of Justice; in the case of the ARMP and CENTIF, staffing changes might cause a quicker erosion of skills acquired under the project). There is also a risk of failure to keep up the newly acquired IT and communication equipment, as well as the vehicles. 79. However, there is a risk to the sustainability of the Private Sector Coalition against Corruption, a small institution, which received significant support from the project. The outlook for the future of the Coalition is dim, as the various stakeholders that have been contacted (private sector, donors, chamber of commerce) did not provide any commitment as to the continued existence of the institution, which may close before the delivery of this ICR. There is also limited visibility on the future participation of key entities of the Ministry of Finance (Customs Administration, Tax Administration) in the No-bribery Pact. Without the participation of these entities, the relevance and development outcome of the No-bribery Pact would be substantially reduced. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 80. The Bank s team involved in the design of the project consisted of qualified experts, including IBRD/IFC private sector development specialists, a legal reform specialist, a governance specialist, and a procurement expert. The team analyzed the key constraints related to the investment climate, governance, and the justice sector. They also took into account lessons from an ongoing project (Senegal Private Investment Promotion Project P051609) that provided similar capacity building activities, technical assistance, and IT support to the Ministry of Justice and the Procurement Regulatory Agency (ARMP). The project s objectives were consistent with the Bank s CAS and the government s PRSP II. During preparation, extensive consultations took place with the relevant partners. 81. One question that comes to mind is whether a political economy analysis (PEA), undertaken during project preparation, would have been a suitable tool to better inform the upstream project design, especially in view of the fact that the Bank had very little experience in working with Ministry of Justice as the project s counterpart. It remains open, in hindsight, whether a POE might have been able to help respond to challenges that occurred during implementation (and were identified as project risks), such as resistance to change from stakeholders, for example strong resistance from magistrates against the development of a performance evaluation tool for magistrates, also the unwillingness of the DGs Customs and Tax in the MoF to sign the No-bribery Pact. 82. The weaknesses in design of the original project have been discussed above, including the complex PDO formulation, overambitious and unrealistic targets given the limited duration of the project, the attribution issue when it comes to the OHADA-related activities, and the reliance 23

36 on Doing Business reporting, which seldom captures improvements to the business climate in real time. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 83. The project implementation took about six years, instead of the initially planned five years. The Bank undertook regular implementation support missions (six in total) and, overall, project supervision was adequate, with an adequate skills mix. Continuity in project supervision was assured, as, throughout implementation, only a limited number of three Task Team Leaders (TTLs) were in charge of the project - which is usually a recipe for better project perfomance. As of December 2012, the TTL was based in Dakar to ensure close supervision and as of January 2016, a locally based co-ttl was assigned to the project, as the TTL was assigned to Headquarters. 84. The MTR mission took place in June 2013, about one year after the planned date at appraisal. The MTR and ensuing March 2014 restructuring (level 1) managed to turnaround the operation by adjusting various aspects of project implementation. However, it also created new complications with respect to the causal chain as discussed above, shortcomings which might perhaps explained by the absence of an M&E Specialist in the Bank team at the time of restructuring. The faster implementation and accelerated disbursement rates of Components 1 and 2, post-restructuring, can clearly be attributed to strong team efforts to boost the implementation capacity of CEDAF, starting in the year before the restructuring. 85. The supervision of fiduciary aspects during implementation was strong. Procurement and financial reviews were routinely carried out and their findings reflected in the implementation supervision reports. Mission Aide-Memoires were pro-active in identifying implementation weaknesses. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 86. Overall, Bank performance is assessed to be Moderately Satisfactory, based on the ratings for quality-at-entry and quality of supervision, and an overall moderately satisfactory outcome rating. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 87. At first, the project was implemented during a political challenging time 50, which corresponded with a period of significant instability at the head of CEDAF s coordination unit 51. Moreover, the Steering Committee, which was responsible for overseeing the project and the follow up of the entire Justice Sector Program, did not meet at all in 2012, which is explained by 50 Presidential elections took place on February 2012, amidst controversy over the constitutional validity of a third term for the incumbent president. In the runoff, the incumbent lost. 51 In August 2012, the government appointed an interim coordinator after a period of three months without a coordinator. This was already the fourth coordinator since project preparation. 24

37 the instability at the head of the Cabinet of the Minister of Justice. Starting from 2013, government commitment became stronger, although, at restructuring, some critical activities were dropped due to a limited interest on the client side. The GoS could also have provided more effective leadership with respect to the co-signing of the Anti-bribery Pact by two entities of the Finance Ministry (Customs Administration and Tax Administration). (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory 88. No separate Project Implementation Unit was set up. The day-to-day implementation of the project was the responsibility of CEDAF, the technical unit of the Ministry of Justice in charge of the implementation of the Senegal PSJ. The PIU was professional and performed its role with dedication after the instability at the head of the coordination unit stopped. CEDAF benefitted from an important capacity building program aimed at strengthening the unit. At restructuring, in March 2014, the allocation for implementing the project had to be increased to 17 percent of total project cost, as the actual implementation cost had already exceeded the initial budget allocation by 161 percent. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 89. This rating is justified on the basis of the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating of the government performance and the Satisfactory rating of the PIU. 6. Lessons Learned 90. Logical results chain and M&E. Project design teams need to think through more thoroughly how different elements are connected and designed towards contributing to a joint PDO. They also need to think harder about what is achievable within the limited timeframe of a project and about the optimal pathways to achieve the desired outcome within the country context. It might help to clearly disclose the theory of change for project interventions in view of intended outcomes, rather than trying to cover all sorts of results in one very complex PDO statement. 91. Political Economy Assessment (PEA). Robust risk assessment plays an important role in designing projects and achieving satisfactory outcomes. Political Economy Analysis is an essential tool to appreciate the risks involved when fostering regulatory reforms in politically sensitive areas, such as justice sector, governance, and corruption, involving multiple stakeholders. Moreover, the Bank had little or no experience with the Ministry of Justice as counterpart, which would have been another reason for undertaking a PEA to inform project design. 92. Doing Business Report. The use of numerical indicators from the Doing Business Report for data collection and results monitoring can entail risks, as the Doing Business report regularly updates its methodology. Moreover, regulatory reforms can take considerable time before their implementation is fully reflected in the indicator, which might be an obstacle for providing the evidence that results have been achieved within the timeframe of project implementation. One stakeholder of the project felt that using DB indicators in the PGE had been a big mistake. 93. Choice of Lending Instrument. In retrospect, the choice of the Specific Investment Loan (SIL) as the lending instrument to foster the investment climate and improve the justice sector in 25

38 Senegal was not optimal. Future operations of this nature delivery of technical assistance and capacity building in the justice sector to improve governance and the investment climate would be better structured as a stand-alone IFC Advisory Services project. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Co-financiers (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) 26

39 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Components Appraisal Estimate (USD m) Revised Estimate (USD m) Actual (XOF m) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD m) 52 Percentage of Appraisal Percentage of Revised 1. Improving the Investment Climate , Improving Court Performance and User-friendliness Strengthening the Demandside of economic governance Strengthening CEDAF and project implementation support Total Baseline Cost , Contingencies /Undisbursed (0.322) Total Project Costs , Front-end fee PPF Front-end fee IBRD Total Financing Required 8.0 3, (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate Estimate (USD millions) (USD millions) Borrower International Development Association (IDA) ` Percentage of Appraisal , The figures presented have been provided by the PCU. The number provided on total amount in actual expenses are not consistent with the historical disbursed amount indicated in Client Connection (US$7,372 m). 53 The signed amount at the end of implementation, according to Client Connection, is actually US$ (03/22/17), hence almost US$1 million less than the originally approved amount based on exchange rate fluctuations. 54 Historically disbursed according to Client Connection. 27

40 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1 Improving the Investment Climate Sub-component (i) Enforcing contracts Activities for this subcomponent focused on implementing the training plan in the area of commercial contract enforcement and supporting the delivery and enforcement of judicial decisions. Key Activities Review of the rules of civil procedure Assessing the demand for specialization of judges and rationalization of their rotations Training in the area of commercial contract enforcement Review of the rules of civil procedure Improvement of enforcement procedures Improvement of enforcement procedures Fostering of case management for faster enforcement of judicial decisions Building a bridge with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) Outputs No corresponding outputs in the List of activities provided by CEDAF No corresponding outputs in the List of activities provided by CEDAF The project supported training sessions for magistrates on competition law, cyber criminality, fiscal litigation, banking litigation and warranty rights, financial markets and economic surveys The project organized a workshop on the methodology of Doing Business (magistrates, auxiliaries of justice) Support for APIX on reforms linked to the business climate Training of magistrates and clerks in the jurisdictions of the Dakar Court of Appeal on securities and loan repayment incidents Study trip of three magistrates of the Commercial Chambers of the TRHCD to France The project supported the adoption of the decree on the modification of the Civil Procedure Code Extension workshop on the Civil Procedure Code (three regional sessions were organized: St. Louis, Kaolack, and Dakar) Three sessions of workshops on the enforcement of judicial decisions for bailiffs, auctioneers, police forces, lawyers, magistrates; (St. Louis, Kaolack, and Dakar) DIME support: recruitment of a firm to collect data for the impact evaluation on the speed of justice Workshop on justice reforms to improve the investment climate, in collaboration with APIX, WB, EU and the private sector Capacity building on reducing delays in the pre-trial common lawprocedures in commercial cases Training on the organization and management of fast procedures at Tambacounda No corresponding outputs in the List of activities provided by CEDAF 28

41 Sub-component (ii) Closing a Business Activities for this sub-component focused on ensuring training of magistrates on bankruptcy related economic and commercial issues. The sub-component was dropped at restructuring and replaced by the mediation sub-component. Key Activities Mapping out of all the processes at registry level in order to simplify procedures Training on tracking software Training on bankruptcy related economic and commercial issues Outputs No corresponding outputs in the List of activities provided by CEDAF No corresponding outputs in the List of activities provided by CEDAF The project financed a training session for magistrates and prosecutors at St. Louis on enterprises in difficulty and the notion of state of insolvency The PGE supported a workshop on corporate turnaround and negotiations of a preventive composition agreement or by composition with creditors. Sub-component (iii) Protecting Investors Activities for this sub-component focused on supporting the extension and information on the Uniform OHADA Acts Key Activities Development of a performance evaluation and career development system for bankruptcy judges Capacity building for legal professionals and private sector Awareness campaign Capacity Development support for the National Secretariat for the follow up on OHADA reforms Outputs - Dropped with March 2014 restructuring - Two study trips (France, Mauritius) were organized to review the experience of other countries in the area of investor protection. The participants were the National OHADA Commission, the Civil Affairs and Seals Directorate (ministry of Justice), the private sector coalition against corruption, the National Employers Council, and CEDAF On the modification of the Uniform OHADA Acts regarding general commercial law and securities, the project organized a workshop on the draft bill in Koalack and Dakar, in collaboration with the National OHADA Commission. There were also four regional dissemination and information seminaries on the OHADA Uniform Act regarding cooperative company law. In the context of the study of bankruptcy procedures for companies, a consultancy firm was hired and a benchmark mission was undertaken to the Commerce Tribunal of Abidjan (Executive Secretary of the National OHADA Commission). The outcomes of the study were discussed in a workshop. Technical assistance provided by the PGE allowed the OHADA National Commission to fully understand the nature and scope of the changes in both the OHADA Uniform Act on Company Law and the one on Insolvency. At the end, the Senegal OHADA National Commission, the Ministry of Justice and other key stakeholders not only bought into the 29

42 Key Activities Outputs proposed reforms, but also effectively carry out a critical advocacy role for the adoption of the Uniforms acts. In consequence, Senegal s OHADA National Commission is meanwhile recognized within the 17 OHADA member countries has one of the best National Commission. Building on effective support by the PGE, the OHADA National Commission is now funded from the Government budget and the National Commission continues to play an important advocacy role at the regional level in OHADA meetings, including for the Uniform Act on Accounting Standards approved in January Capacity building for legal professionals and awareness campaign Training of firms on corporate governance Awareness campaign Capacity building for legal professionals Provision of equipment Training of journalists and key members of the civil society. Training of firms on corporate governance With respect to the amendments to the Uniform Act on Trading Companies and the Economic Interest Grouping, the project supported the General Assembly of the National OHADA Commission to examine these amendments, a workshop to review the bill and make recommendations, and an extension workshop (three sessions) for Appeal Courts (Dakar, St Louis, and Ziguinchor). Another extension workshop was held on the same subject in Mbour to inform lawyers about the changes. The three Appeal Courts also benefitted from an extension workshop on simplified debt recovery procedures and measures of execution. Regarding simplified stock companies and shareholder agreements, the project supported extension workshops for magistrates, lawyers, clerks, and bailiffs, notaries, accounting experts, and certified appraisers, as well as a benchmark mission to France. The PGE also supported a reflection day with employers on the investment code. The project played a supporting role in the adoption of the law on the lowering of the minimum capital to create a limited liability company (LLC) and in the adoption of the decree on the lowering of notary fees for the creation of LLCs. The project financed a workshop on securities law for lawyers, notaries, bankers, accounting experts, and certified appraisers. The PGE also supported training on mode of nullities and the termination of commercial leases for magistrates according to the OHADA Law for magistrates and clerks of the Court of Appeal in Dakar. Funds provided by the PGE were used to purchase ICT equipment needed (later) to deploy the new computerized company and collateral registry (e-rccm) to a number of jurisdictions supported following legal and operational advice by IFC-AS under the OHADA UA2 program, implemented in collaboration with the MoJ. The project also financed the purchase of 400 copies of the OHADA Code Vert for the jurisdictions. - Dropped with March 2014 restructuring - No corresponding outputs found in the List of activities provided by CEDAF 30

43 (New) Sub-component (iv) Promoting mediation and conciliation Activities for this sub-component focused on supporting the settlement of commercial disputes through the adoption of a decree on mediation and conciliation and supporting the extension of the legal texts on mediation and conciliation Key Activities Preparatory work for drafting the legal texts Country-wide awareness campaign Outreach events for legal professionals and the financial sector Capacity building for legal professionals Outreach events for legal professionals and the financial sector Country-wide awareness campaign Capacity building for legal professionals Outputs The project supported the establishment of a technical committee that together with experts from the World Bank - drafted the decree on mediation and conciliation, which was adopted on December 24, 2014 (Decree No ). The project also supported the establishment of a National Steering Committee for Mediation in application of the mediation decree. An Executive Secretary was appointed and a consultant was recruited to elaborate and implement a communication plan regarding the new mediation system A number of workshops were organized to inform all stakeholders on the new mediation tool: Appeals Court in Dakar, Chamber of Notaries, expert accountants, qualified investigators and experts, coordinators within the Ministry of Justice, mediators of the Houses of Justice, help desk officers of the Ministry of Justice, financial experts of the Observatory of the Quality and Financial Services, banks and financial institutions, and insurance companies. The pool of magistrates and clerks of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Dakar benefited from capacity building on the identification and typology of mediation cases. Capacity building activities were also organized for the Dakar Arbitration and Mediation Center and a mediation office was installed in Ziguinchor. Three workshops on mediation were organized at the level of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Dakar between magistrates and respectively lawyers (modus operandi of mediation cases), bankers (banking litigation), and maritime experts (maritime litigation) The PGE financed the participation of a large Senegalese delegation, consisting of the Executive Secretary of the National Mediation Committee, the Executive Secretary of the National OHADA Commission, the President of the TGIHCD, the Director of the Judicial Training Center, the technical advisor of Justice de Proximité, at the Summer School of the French speaking justice in Montreal, Canada (June 27-Juky 6, 2016). The theme of the two-week session was OHADA normativity and mediation toward a new paradigm in dispute management in French speaking African countries. The Dakar Arbitration and Mediation Center organized two workshops for economic agents in Dakar and Ziguinchor. The PGE organized regional information tours and public meetings on mediation at the level of Chambers of Commerce and Town Halls in four regions (Thies, Mbour, Fatick, Kaolack) The PGE organized two training sessions on mediation and conciliation for magistrates, lawyers, notaries, bailiffs, clerks, accounting experts, assessors, and financial experts. The training was provided by experts 31

44 Key Activities Provision of equipment Outputs from the Institut de formation en mediation et negotiation in Paris (IFOMENE) and by the Arbitration and Mediation Center in Quebec. Respectively 50 and 54 participants attended these sessions. The project financed the purchase of office furniture for local offices of the Arbitration and Mediation Center in St. Louis and Ziguinchor, for the Mediation Chamber of the Justice Houses, and the Executive Secretary for mediation. The project also acquired IT equipment for those involved in mediation (Local Justice (a.k.a. Justice de Proximité), the Observatory of the Quality and Financial Services, the Liberal Inter-professional Committee, the TGIHCD, National OHADA Commission) for the management of mediation files. At the TGIHCD, a central server and local servers was purchased to better manage the mediation cases and for the structures of the National Mediation Committee. Component 2 - Improving court performance and user-friendliness Sub-component (i) Improving court performance in Dakar in both efficiency and quality of services Key activities dropped at restructuring include the development of an integrated management model, court user surveys and stakeholder feedback mechanisms, and the judges performance evaluation and accountability system. Key activities Development of an integrated management model Assessment of the court HR systems Management training Capacity building of a cadre of court administrators Development of management tools to enable the generation of relevant statistics Outputs - Dropped with March 2014 restructuring - No corresponding outputs found in the List of activities provided by CEDAF The PGE recruitment a consultancy firm to study the management of jurisdictions and financed in this context a mission of the General Inspection of the Judicial Administration to Thies, Kaolock, Diourbel, Louga, and St Louis. Magistrates received training on several aspects of managing jurisdictions, including on the methodology of research, policies of harmonization of jurisprudence and how to motivate a team. Magistrates were also trained on means of cassation and proceedings before the supreme court, appeals in higher court in criminal and civil affairs The PGE organized two workshops on the theme justice and the media No corresponding outputs found in the List of activities provided by CEDAF 32

45 Key activities Support to the computerization of the Ministry of Justice Capacity building in IT Provision of material Outputs The PGE recruited a consultancy firm to digitalize the HR files of the judicial staff The project financed the training of the IT specialist of the Ministry of Justice and of the agents of the Direction of judicial services The project also financed training of the IT Director in France on Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL): management of IT systems Training of all computer specialists of the IT Department of the Ministry of Justice on computer security systems, software development, maintenance and help function Purchase of printer, scanner, server, router for the DSJ (digitalization of HR files) Purchase of equipment and office furniture for newly created jurisdictions (Tivaouane, Rufisque. Kedegou, Sedhiou, Mbqcke, Mbour, Pikine-Guediaway, Bakel, Velingara, Kaffrine) Purchase of office furniture for the District and County Courts Purchase of IT equipment for all the jurisdictions of the Palais Lat Dior, the Clerk s office of the TRHCD, the public prosecutor, Purchase of IT equipment for certain regional jurisdictions Purchase of IT equipment for certain services of the Chancellery (cabinet of the Minister, Computer Director, OHADA Commission) Production and printing of a lexicon on legal terminology Sub-component (ii) Improving user-friendliness of courts Key activities Assisting the Help Desks Improving the quality of reception for litigants Improving the quality of reception for litigants Improving the quality of reception for litigants Improving the quality of reception for litigants Purchasing material Outputs Training sessions (two per year over three years) of help desk agents on telephone reception service and customer service Training of heads of jurisdictions on the accessibility of justice Open Door days on how jurisdictions function (Dakar, Mbour, Kedougou, Kaolack) Support to the commission in charge of studying legal assistance User guide for litigants Purchase and installation of security cameras and direction signs in the Lat Dior law court Planning and equipment of the archives rooms in the Lat Dior law court Purchase of documentation for the library TRHCS, THCD, Appeals Court Office equipment for the reception desks of Lat Dior and departmental tribunals Recruitment of an expert firm for the rehabilitation of the website of the Ministry of Justice Purchase of the digital legal library integrated in the website of the Ministry of Justice. Component 3 Strengthening the demand for economic governance 33

46 Sub-component (i) - Strengthening CENTIF Activities for this sub-component were focused on the organization of awareness campaigns and the provision of critical IT material Key activities Organization of awareness and information campaigns Capacity building Awareness campaign In-house training to CENTIF on the adoption of international standards and practices and the acquisition of specialized analytical software Purchasing of critical IT equipment to enable investigations Outputs The project supported Forums for NGOs and lawyers on the fight against money- laundering and the financing of terrorism in Senegal The PGE supported training sessions for trainers on money laundering and the financing of terrorism Seminar on the role of auditors, experts and accounting auditors in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism Training session for judicial police officers on financial investigation techniques and the organization of investigation files Training session for magistrates and judicial police officers on investigation methods and best practices in the fight against the financing of terrorism Seminar for art dealers on the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Senegal Seminar on the pre-validation of the national strategy to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism Awareness seminar for taxable persons and other actors of the Mbour department Recruitment of an international expert to provide technical support to CENTIF Training sessions for the staff of CENTIF by the international expert on various subjects (criminal analysis theory, information search in specialized data bases, data security, use of Excel for data base management, financial investigation techniques, review of accounts and the detection of fraudulent flows, money laundering techniques and investigations) Getting Started workshop of Analyst Notebook program Workshop on the elaboration of the national strategy to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism Study trip to Paris (three CENTIF agents) on bank fundamentals (2014) Presentation workshop of three CENTIF studies on the risks of money laundering in real estate, electronic payments and cell phone payments Study trip to Paris (two CENTIF agents) on cyber criminality (2015) Study trip of two CENTIF agents on corruption (prevention, detection, repression) (2015) Recruitment of an international firm to conduct a study on the elaboration of guidelines for monitoring the implementation of measures to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism Purchase of IT equipment (desktop PCs, printer, scanners, portables), software licenses (Analyst s Notebook, Steganos Privacy Suite 15, encryption software, Maltego, Systran, Copernic Desktop Search), and vehicles Sub-component (ii) - Strengthening OFNAC 34

47 Key activities Support capacity building and communication activities Outputs Seminar to strengthen the capacities of the investigators of the Investigation Department of OFNAC Workshop OFNAC/judicial actors on the problem of fraud and corruption investigations Celebration of the UN International Anti-Corruption Day (December 9) to raise public awareness of corruption and ways to fight it (in collaboration with the Private Sector Coalition Against Corruption Purchasing of material Purchase of IT and reprography material in 2015 Purchase of office furniture Purchase of an information network Sub-component (iii) - Strengthening ARMP Key activities Technical assistance to ARMP on investigation techniques and regulatory matters Purchasing of material Outputs Workshop on fraudulent practices, collusion and corruption in public procurement Workshop on public procurement, delegation of public service and partnership contract Recruitment of an international expert for the training of the agents of the ARMP Investigation and Intelligence Unit Training sessions on the money laundering of the gains of corruption, economic regulation, and public procurement investigations Internship of respectively three and two staff of the Investigation Unit at the General Inspection of the EIB (2014 and 2015) Workshop on money laundering for banks, insurance companies, economic operators Workshops in collaboration with the magistrates of the Dakar Appeals Court on the rules and regulations of public procurement, public finance law, public procurement litigation law, public private sector partnership law Purchase of IT equipment (desktops, portables, servers, scanner), audiovisual equipment (analogue and digital cameras, voice recorders), standard works on public procurement and public-private sector partnerships, one vehicle 35

48 Sub-component (iv) Strengthening the private sector coalition against corruption (CSPC) Activities under this sub-component focused on increasing the awareness of the private sector and employer organizations, on preparing and conceiving a no-bribery pact, and on consulting public administrations regarding the adoption of incentives for the certified firms. Key activities Raising awareness of business organizations and the private sector Implementing a series of roundtables and workshops to agree on the design and rollout of the no-bribery pact Financing and training for the implementation of the pact. Purchasing of material Outputs Recruitment of a consultant to coordinate the activities of the CSPC (15 months) First workshop on the activities of the CSPC Recruitment of a consultant to elaborate a code of good conduct ; renewal of the contract for 8 months Workshop on the validation of he code of good conduct Financing of the editing and printing of the Code of good conduct Election of the president of the PSPC workgroup Roundtable on tools developed in Senegal for the implementation of corporate governance: what are the incentives for corporations? in collaboration with Corporate Social Responsibility Senegal (CSR) (4 th Edition of the International Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR) Elaboration of the draft convention between the CSPC and CSR Senegal Establishment of the CSPC headquarters and inauguration by the Minister of Justice and the World Bank Support for the operation of the headquarters, including the payment of monthly indemnities of the CSPC president and of the salary of the permanent secretary Recruitment of three experts to accompany the CSPC in its efforts to promote the internalization of the code by private sector companies Recruitment of an expert cabinet to elaborate an integrity pact for the private sector Workshop with 80 private sector participants to validate the Integrity pact in collaboration with the Directorate General of Customs and the Directorate of Taxes and Domains Organization of the official signing ceremony of the Integrity Pact Training of deontologist-certifiers Elaboration and implementation of the communication plan of the CSPC Meetings with business organizations and the structures in charge of the promotion of good governance Purchasing of basic IT material at the General Directorate of Customs for the management of the petroleum products stocks of the private sector Financing of the installation of a cable network of the General Directorate of Customs Purchase of IT equipment and office furniture for the CSPC headquarters 36

49 Component 4 - CEDAF Sub-component (i) Strengthening CEDAF The activities under this sub-component focused on strengthening the coordination capacities of CEDAF. Key activities Outputs Reinforcing the coordination Organizing capacity building sessions on procurement procedures and capacities of CEDAF the changes made to the World Bank procurement framework and regulations The project financed the participation of two CEDAF interim coordinators in a seminar to prepare for certification as International Development Project Manager (Montreal, Canada). One interim coordinator participated in a seminar on macro-economic frameworks, programmatic approach and results budgeting The project also financed the participation of the CEDAF planning engineer in a seminar on the setting up of M&E systems (Morocco) and a study trip to the USA on operational planning and project control The project financed the participation of the CEDAF administrator in procurement seminars in Morocco. The project also contributed to the computerization of the judicial system by financing the training of the CEDAF IT-specialist in the development of network applications and administration. Purchase of material The PGE financed the purchasing of IT-equipment, office furniture, cell phones, and one vehicle Sub-component (ii) Project implementation support Activities under this sub-component focused on ensuring the implementation of the project and tracking its progress. Key activities Project implementation Capacity building Communications plan Purchasing of material Outputs Recruitment of the project team (M&E specialist, procurement specialist, administrative and financial manager). The three experts drafted the project implementation manual and the manual of administrative and financial procedures The programming and M&E expert participated in training sessions on M&E systems and performance indicators (in Morocco) and the optimization of project tools (in France). The financial manager participated in training sessions on contract managing and disbursement monitoring (SETYM International, Canada), management of projects funded by donors, accounting software Tompro (CIFOPE, France), computer-assisted drafting of financial statements, preparation of accounting and financial management audits. The procurement expert participated in trainings on procurement, the modernization and performance of procurement contracts for public bodies, management of the public procurement cycle, public private partnership contracts. The project recruited a consultant to elaborate and implement a communication plan for the PGE The project also purchased IT-equipment for the entire PGE team, accounting and M&E software, and one vehicle 37

50 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Gilberto de Barros Sr. Private Sector Spec GTC07 Task Team Leader Aissatou Dicko Team member Dileep Wagle Consultant IEGSD Team member Haroun Ould Sidatt Consultant GTC07 Team member Jacqueline B. Veloz Lockward Paralegal LEGLE Team member Jean-Christophe Ngo Consultant AFTFW Team member Julien A. M. Levis Consultant GFM01 Team member Klaus Decker Sr. Public Sector Spec GGO15 Team member Korotoumou Ouattara Sr. Financial Sector Spec GFM06 Team member Kouame Kouadio Statistician DECDG Team member Lissandra Ellyne Team member Lucy Fye Sr. Private Sector Spec GTC01 Team member Porfiria P. B. Basco Program Assistant WFALO Team member Sidonie Joctane Executive Assistant AFMGA Team member Supervision/ICR Gilberto de Barros Sr. Private Sector Spec GTC07 Task Team Leader Jean Michel Marchat Lead Private Sector Spec GTC07 Task Team Leader Kofi-Boateng Agyen Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTC07 Task Team Leader Alicia Hetzner Consultant GED05 Team member Alvaro Gonzales Principal Economist GPSJB Team member Aminata Ndiaye Young professional GFM06 Team member Astou Diaw-Ba Sr. Program Assistant AFCF1 Team member Barbara Weber Sr. Operations Officer GTC07 ICR-TTL, Ops support Craig Raymond Giesze Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTCA1 Team member Eric Jean Yoboue Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE - HIS Procurement Spec Fallou Dieye Consultant AFTFW Team member Haroune Ould Sidatt Consultant GTC07 Team member Hillary C. Johnston Economist EAPCE Team member Irene F. Chacon Operations Analyst AFTFW - HIS Team member Irene M. Nnomo Ayinda-Mah Program Assistant GTC07 Team member Jacqueline B. Veloz Lockward Paralegal LEGLE Team member Jean-Christophe Ngo Consultant AFTFW Team member Johan Rosseel Consultant GTC07 ICR author Kamal Siblini Sr. M&E Spec GTCOS Team member Korotoumou Ouattara Sr. Financial Sector Spec GFM06 Team member 38

51 Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Ma Soukha Ba Consultant GTC07 Team member Magueye Dia Senior Private Sector Spec GTC07 Team member Maimouna Mbow Fam Sr. Financial Management Spec GGO26 Financial Mgt Spec Mehdi Benyagoub Private Sector Spec GTC07 Team member Samuel Taffesse Sr. Economist GFA01 Team member Seydou Mouh Bassirou Kane Consultant GTCA1 Team member Tanangachi Ngwira Operations Analyst GTC07 Operations support Waleed Haider Malik Sr. Public Sector Specialist GGO19 Team member (b) Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle Lending Supervision/ICR Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) , , Total: , , , , , , , , (ICR) 10 40,000 (estimated) Total: , Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 39

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53 MAP 41