Impact of Hinterland Access Conditions on Rivalry between Ports

Transcription

1 Impact of Hinterland Access Conditions on Rivalry between Ports Anming Zhang May 2008

2 De Borger, Proost & Van Dender (2008, JTEP) Private Port Pricing and Public Investment in Port and Hinterland Capacity Port A Volume: X A Capacity: K f A Hinterland A Volume: X A + Y A Capacity: K h A X=X A + X B X=X A + X B Hinterland B Port B Volume: X B Volume: X B + Y B Capacity: K h B Capacity: K f B

3 De Borger, Proost & Van Dender: Findings 1. Investment in port capacity reduces prices & congestion at both ports, but increases hinterland congestion in the region where the port investment is made 2. Investment in a port s hinterland is likely to lead to more port congestion & higher prices for port use, and to less congestion and a lower price at the competing port 3. Imposing congestion tolls on the hinterland roads raises port capacity investment

4 The present paper: Hinterland access conditions the port and port competition? Port congestion & capacity investment abstracted away Why? Bottleneck of the logistics chain shifted to the port/inland interface e.g. Hinterland connection (corridor) Inland roads

5 2 nd objective: Link port competition with corridor capacity & urban mobility Corridor capacity: Rail connection: Inland terminal (e.g. Alameda corridor) physical Rail competition: Monopoly or oligopoly? - regulatory Barge; Short-sea Border crossing: e.g. security Urban mobility: Trucking for final, local delivery Road capacity Road pricing

6 Model Like De Borger, Proost & Van Dender: Two seaports, labeled 1 & 2, share the same overseas customers and have each a downstream, congestible transport network Unlike De Borger, Proost & Van Dender: 1) Port & its hinterland belong to one region, ensuring coordination in their decisions 2) Imperfect substitutes: allow both overlapping and captive hinterlands

7 Total (generalized) cost faced by users: ρi = p i + DCi ( K Ci ) + DLi ( Vi, K Li ) + ti i = 1, 2 (1) Port competition: Competition between alternate intermodal chains (or channels ); While hinterland accessibility represented by: 1) corridor facilities, and 2) inland roads

8 Corridor delay cost falls as corridor capacity (K ci ) increases Roads used by both cargo shipments X i and local commuters Y i, we have V i = X i + Y i Road delay cost satisfies: D V Li i > 0, D K Li Li < 0, 2 D V Li 2 i 0, 2 V K i D Li Li 0 (2) That is: Increasing traffic volume (V) raises road congestion while adding capacity (K Li ) decreases road congestion, and the effects are more pronounced when there is more congestion

9 Total cost of local road traffic: ρ Y ) = t + D ( X + Y, K ) i = 1, 2 Li ( i i Li i i Li (3) (a) An increase in road toll reduces local traffic (b) An increase in cargo traffic decreases local traffic (c) An increase in road capacity increases local traffic (d) An increase in cargo traffic will, while reducing local traffic, increase overall road traffic

10 Each port s demand depends on both its total cost and the rival port s total cost: (5) X = X ρ, ) X = X ρ, ) 1 1( 1 ρ2 2 2 ( 1 ρ2 Inverting (5) yields: ρ = ρ X, ) ρ = ρ X, ) 1 1( 1 X ( 1 X 2 * Using (1) and Y (,, ), (6) can be written as, i = Yi ti X i K Li for i=1,2: p i = ρi ( X, X 2 ) DCi ( K Ci ) DLi ( Vi, K Li ) ti pi ( X 1, X 2; K, K 1 Ci Li i, t ) (6) (7) Each port s revenue as: i i π = pi ( X, X 2; K Ci, K Li, ti ) X i = π ( X 1, X 2 ; K, K 1 Ci Li i, t ) (8)

11 Main results When the ports compete in quantities, an increase in corridor capacity will: a) increase own port s output b) reduce the rival port s output c) increase own port s revenue Port competition results in higher level of corridor capacity investment than would be in the absence of competition This capacity competition between regions (countries) would improve global welfare, but the generalized costs are still too high compared to the optimal levels And it can lead to a Prisoner s Dilemma for the regions (countries)

12 Main results (cont.) An increase in road capacity may, or may not, increase own port s output and revenue, owing to various opposing effects Road pricing may, or may not, increase own port s output and revenue The above over-investment result is weakened if the mode of port competition is in prices Leading to less capacity, more congestion and lower global welfare, as compared to the absence of port competition

13 Further research 1. Empirical work a) Which model of competition is correct for ports? Cournot: Firms (here, ports) commit to quantities, and prices then adjust to clear the market implying the industry is flexible in price adjustments, even in short run Bertrand: Capacity is unlimited or easily adjusted in the short run Some industries behave like Bertrand and others Cournot; As such, which model of oligopoly is applicable to a particular industry (here, the port industry) is of an empirical question

14 b) Empirical test of the theoretical predictions: Hard given lack of data

15 c) Correlation of annual container throughput growth (market share, respectively) and changes in urban area mobility LA/Long Beach, Total delay (person-hrs) Delay per peak traveler (person-hrs) Travel time index Total congestion cost ($) Congestion cost per peak traveler ($) LA+LB container throughput growth * (0.029) * (0.024) * (0.020) * (0.029) * (0.045) LA+LB container market share (0.235) (0.318) (0.398) (0.246) (0.297)

16 Oakland Total delay (person-hrs) Delay per peak traveler (person-hrs) Travel time index Total congestion cost ($) Congestion cost per peak traveler ($) Throughput growth (0.295) (0.220) (0.193) (0.180) (0.163) Market share (0.584) (0.500) (0.398) (0.314) (0.251)

17 Portland Total delay (person-hrs) Delay per peak traveler (person-hrs) Travel time index Total congestion cost ($) Congestion cost per peak traveler ($) Throughput growth (0.650) (0.959) (0.864) (0.914) (0.718) Market share (0.692) (0.965) (0.777) (0.951) (0.671)

18 Seattle Total delay (person-hrs) Delay per peak traveler (person-hrs) Travel time index Total congestion cost ($) Congestion cost per peak traveler ($) Throughput growth (0.577) (0.498) (0.778) (0.561) (0.501) Market share (0.648) (0.571) (0.729) (0.616) (0.549)

19 2. Organizational coordination For an intermodal chain: Port, corridor & road may belong to different, separate organizations Each maximizes own interest, which may not be the same as the interest for the entire chain s Organizational coordination, or vertical integration (VI) Let r be the degree of VI: r=0: Independent r=1: Full integration 0 < r < 1: Partial integration

20 A 1 Complements B 2 3 C Complements 4 D

21 Two (potential) functional integration or alliance chains 1 2 North Chain 3 4 South Chain

22 3. Dynamic effect of captive hinterland Although the captive hinterlands do not subject to immediate competition, they play an important role in port competition How? If both the overlapping and captive markets are considered, important interactions between the two markets & their impact on port competition need to be analyzed This involves an explicit derivation of demand functions

23 Modal Structure (Basso, Yuen and Zhang, 2008b) Port A (Port of Rotterdam) Port B (Port of Antwerp) -z 0 z Users are distribute along Hinterland (e.g. Germany)