Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture The Challenges of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa

Transcription

1 Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture The Challenges of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa Mahendra M. Shah, Günther Fischer and Harrij van Velthuizen International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria Side Event: 1.15 pm, 8 May 2008 Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) CSD-16 Review Session (5-16 May 2008) United Nations, New York CSD 16 Side Event Organizing Partners International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, Government of Austria, Vienna, Austria African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, Kenya Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy

2 Contents Executive Summary 1. Hunger and Food Security 2. Food Security and Agriculture 3. Agriculture and Climate Change 4. Food Security, Agriculture and Climate Change in the 21st Century: A Spatial Integrated Ecological and Socio-Economic Global Assessment 5. Agriculture and Climate Change Mitigation 6. Agriculture and Climate Change Adaptation 7. Concluding Remarks Annex Cover Photo credit: FreeFoto.com ZVR-Nr:

3 Executive Summary Climate change will result in irreparable ecological degradation and reduced agricultural productivity, with serious consequences for food production and food security. Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA), with the predominance of rain-fed agriculture will be severely affected by climate change. The region faces a particularly daunting situation as agriculture is the mainstay of the economies of many countries accounting for over 30% of total GDP, for over half of export earnings, and with over 90% of rural livelihoods dependent on agriculture and agriculture-based rural activities. Developed countries, accounting for about a fifth of world s current population, have contributed over 70% of the CO 2 emissions accumulated in the atmosphere over the last 50 years. Developing countries have thus far contributed relatively little to the causes of climate change and in the case of SSA the cumulative CO 2 emissions totals some 2% of the world s aggregate CO 2 emissions. This situation raises a fundamental concern of fairness and justice as the SSA region has contributed very little to the causes of climate change and yet will bear the brunt of the negative impacts of climate change. The consequences include causing widespread economic losses and further exacerbating chronic hunger and debilitating poverty that already affects over a third of the region s population. Today the developing world is on the brink of a food crisis as global food stocks reach historically low levels and international food prices have risen in the last 3 years at an unprecedented rate. The fundamental cause of this situation is the absurd biofuel policy adopted by the developed countries in response to the concerns about climate change. It took some two decades of scientific efforts to convince the world s political leaders to give recognition to the potential threats of climate change and contemplate actions. Alas, political interests in the developed countries took precedence and the solution put forward was an energy policy that emphasized biofuels as the means to reduce green house gas emissions. There was little evidence that bio-energy, especially the first generation biofuels, would help reduce carbon emissions but the political attraction was that it would keep the public-at-large happy. Governments would be seen to be acting on climate change and in the process the influential rural farm lobby, already a big beneficiary of perverse agricultural subsidies, would benefit and catch-up with urban populations that had seen their incomes and living standards rise faster during the last two decades. It politically appeared to be a win-win situation except that no consideration was given to the impact on food prices and especially on food exports to food deficit and food insecure countries. The result of this inappropriate energy-climate change policy, that spurred a biofuel stampede, has signaled a potentially devastating world-wide food crisis. In the last 2 years food prices have more then doubled for most staples. It does not cause hunger in the developed countries where on average people spend less then 15% of their consumption expenditure on food. But the situation is fundamentally different in many developing countries where well over half of a household budget is for food. The food import bill in many developing countries has increased by more then 50%. Major food exporting countries have adopted measures such as export taxes and in some cases bans on volume exports of cereals. Poor weather conditions, particularly extreme events, have resulted in lower harvests in a number of developing countries. At the same time rapidly increasing demand for cereal imports for feed in the case of China have triggered substantial import demand. Food security is a universal human right, yet today, about 920 million people in the developing world approximately 20% of the total population - are undernourished. Among developing regions, the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is particularly dire. Over 40% of the total population in SSA is undernourished, and over 70% of its undernourished population lives in rural areas. About 98% of cultivated land in Sub- 1

4 Saharan Africa, with its predominantly rain-fed agriculture, faces an exceptionally daunting situation. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economies of many SSA countries, accounting for over 30% of total GDP and over half of export earnings. The livelihood of approximately 85% of the undernourished population depends on rain-fed agriculture and agriculture-based rural activities. Agriculture is the dominant user of environment and natural resources and has the greatest impact on the sustainability of ecosystems and their services. The increasing population s need for food jeopardizes the natural resources of many countries, with land already under cultivation being exploited even further or untouched land being sacrificed for agricultural purposes. The damage inflicted on the environment is increasingly evident: arable land is lost to erosion, salinity, desertification, and urban spread; disappearing forests, loss of biodiversity and the emergence of water scarcity are additional consequences. Climate change poses the greatest threat to food security in the 21 st century, particularly in many of the poor, agriculture-based SSA countries with their low capacity to effectively cope with these challenges. There is an urgent need to integrate climate change issues in national and international agricultural development planning and policymaking to achieve food security and reduce rural poverty. Based on the IIASA-FAO spatial global agro-ecology (AEZ) and the national and regional world food economy (BLS) modeling framework, this paper presents an analysis of food security and climate change challenges in the 21 st century, highlighting the potential impacts of climate change at the national, regional and global levels, with a special focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The major findings are summarized below. Fragile ecosystems: Two-thirds of the global land surface suffers severe constraints for rain-fed crop cultivation due to unfavorable temperatures, precipitations, topography or soil quality. Climate change will have both positive and negative impacts, as some of these constraints will be alleviated while others may increase. In terms of negative impacts, arable land will suffer severe environmental constraints, preventing crop production in Central America & the Caribbean (by up to 3%) in the 2080s; in Oceania & Polynesia (by up to 5%); in Northern Africa (by up to 3.5%); Eastern Africa (by up to 2.4%); Central Africa (by up to 1.2%) and Western Africa (by up to 1.7%). Southern Africa will be the most severely affected region with approximately 11% of its total land area (265 million hectares) at risk of being lost for crop production due to environmental constraints induced by climate change. AEZ estimates that 1.1 billion hectares of arid and dry semi-arid land in Africa will develop under current climate conditions, i.e., the temperature growing period will be less than 120 days. Under the climate change scenarios considered, AEZ estimates an increase of arid and dry semi-arid areas in Africa by 5 8%, or million hectares in the 2080s. Cereal production, a clear distinction emerges between the gainers and losers of the impact climate change will have on agricultural production. Climate projections predict a considerable increase of land suitable for cereal production in the developed nations. Increases will predominantly occur in North America (a 40% area increase of the currently 360 million hectares of cultivated land), in Northern Europe (a 16% area increase of the 45 million hectares currently being cultivated), in the Russian Federation (a 64% area increase of the currently 245 million hectares), and in East Asia (a 10% area increase of the 150 million hectares presently under cultivation). According to the HadCM3 model s climate change projections, 27 countries will lose 2.2% and 52 countries will lose 5% of their cereal production potential by 2080 due to climate change. In turn, the cereal production potential of 42 and 59 countries will increase by 4% and 6%, respectively. The net balance of changes in the cereal production potential of Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to be negative, with net losses of up to 12%. Overall, approximately 40% of SSA countries will be at risk of significant declines in crop and pasture production due to climate change. 2

5 The cereal production potential of 16 SSA countries, with a projected population of 780 million in 2080, will drop 7.9% due to climate change, while the cereal production potential of 14 countries with a projected population of 580 million in 2080 will increase by 5.3%. Many of the SSA countries are poor, agricultural-based economies and often lack the foreign exchange to finance food imports. Hence, domestic production losses resulting from climate change will further worsen the prevalence and depth of hunger, a burden that will undoubtedly disproportionately affect the poorest and the most vulnerable. Undernourishment: The number of undernourished in the developing world is estimated at around 820 million, equivalent to 17% of the total population of 4.1 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest incidence of undernourishment, with roughly 32% of the total population deprived of access to food. In 2080, climate change will have resulted in an additional 35 million to 170 million undernourished people in developing countries; SSA will be the region most affected, with an additional population of 17 to 50 million who are undernourished. The results of A2r future development path and the climate projections of HAdCM3 indicate that approximately 622 million people will be at risk of hunger in 2080, with the SSA region alone accounting for over 70%. In all climate change scenarios, the following countries in SSA will have lost their cereal production potential by the 2080s: Sudan, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Niger. Together, these countries currently have an undernourished population of 87 million, equivalent to 45% of the total population in Sub-Saharan Africa suffering from undernourishment. In contrast, the cereal production potential of Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, Côte d Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Guinea is projected to increase by the 2080s. These countries currently have a population of 73 million undernourished, equivalent to 38% of Sub-Saharan Africa s undernourished population. It is highly unlikely that the target of the Millennium Development Goals to reduce hunger by half will be met in SSA. In fact, between 25 to 50% of the additional population suffering from undernourishment in the 2080s due to climate change will be in SSA. Agricultural GDP: The impact of climate change is relatively small at the aggregate global level (between 1.5% and +2.6%). This applies to the total global GDP of agriculture in the reference projections, ranging from US$ trillion (at 1990 prices). Large variations are expected to occur between regions. Developing regions, with the exception of Latin America, will confront negative impacts on agricultural GDP. By 2080, climate change will reduce Asia s agricultural GDP by 4% and Sub-Saharan Africa s by up to 8%. According to scenario A2, North America will gain between 3 13% of agricultural value added; Western Europe will lose between 6-18%, and the former Soviet Union will gain between 0 23%. Cereal trade: Baseline scenarios indicate a growing dependence of developing countries on net cereal imports, ranging between 170 and 430 million tons. In several developing countries, between 10 to 40% of cereal consumption will have to be covered by imports. Many of these countries, however, lack the foreign exchange to finance food imports, thus putting them at risk of increased food insecurity. At present, the SSA region s net cereal imports amount to approximately 7 million tons, but the impact of climate change may result in a net import of roughly 143 million tons of cereal by Climate Change Fairness and Justice: Global environmental change raises the issue of fairness and equity. Climate change is global, long-term and involves complex interactions between climatic, environmental, economic, political, institutional, social and technological processes. It has significant international and intergenerational implications in the context of equity and sustainable development. Developing countries have thus far contributed relatively little to the causes of climate change. Sub-Saharan Africa s cumulative CO 2 emissions over the last 50 years total about 2% of the world s aggregate CO 2 emissions. With 9.7% of the world s population, SSA at present only 3

6 contributes 2.4% of the world s total CO 2 emissions. And yet, this region will bear the brunt of the impacts of climate change. Climate Change Mitigation: The cumulative GHGs of the past 50 years already in the atmosphere will, in all certainty, lead to climate change in the next five decades. This will substantially impact the viability and productivity of rain-fed areas. At the same time, the increase of population and income will result in rising demand for food crops and meat, especially in SSA, which is dominated by rain-fed agriculture. Sub Saharan Africa, accounting for 10% of the world population has contributed less than 2.5% of global GHGs emissions from fossil fuels and about 3.5% from agriculture and deforestation. Deforestation is the major cause of CO 2 emissions from agriculture in SSA. The total forest areas in SSA amount to some 650 mill ha and of this some 52 mill Ha were cleared for agriculture during the 1990s. With the projected population and economic growth in the 21 st century, demand for livestock products in SSA are projected to increase more then 4-fold and this will result in a proportional methane emissions from ruminants which are important in SSA. With regard to crop agriculture, SSA has the lowest level of fertilizer use in the world, about an average of 5 kg per Ha, and this is projected to increase more then five fold to meet the future food demand. It will be important to adopt precision methods of mineral fertilizer applications to mitigate GHG emissions. Adaptation to Climate Change: National Governments in SSA together with their bilateral and multilateral development partners must devise mechanisms that provide climate information and forecasting, and scientific research and policy analysis at the national and regional levels to adapt to climate change must be strengthened as well. Adaptation to climate change requires effective partnerships between the public and private sectors with operational participation of all stakeholders, including governments, farmers, the scientific and research community, NGOs and private business. Due to the long time lag between the development of adaptation strategies and technologies and their actual implementation, investments and sustained international funding will be essential to promote and strengthen comprehensive climate information systems and applied climate research for policy actions, to mobilize funding for climate adaptation, establish and prioritize agricultural research, agricultural knowledge systems, as well as agricultural extension and marketing services. National governments in SSA and their development partners must give agriculture and rural sector the highest priority in terms of resource allocation and adoption of development polices that are locally relevant and globally consistent. Only then can agricultural vulnerability to climate change be reduced and progress is made to world-wide food security and sustainable agriculture. 4

7 1. Hunger and Food Security Food security is defined as sustained access to food at all times in socially acceptable ways and adequate in quantity and quality to maintain a healthy life. The fundamental right to food for all was at the core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in During the last five decades, about 800 million people are estimated 1 to have been chronically undernourished in spite of the fact that global food production has been sufficient to meet everyone s need. Today, some 15 million people die annually from hunger alone, and over 200 million suffer health consequences due to nutritional deficiencies, including proteins, micronutrients, and essential amino acids. While this ethically and morally unacceptable situation has been of concern for the world community, very little progress to tackle the root causes of hunger and food insecurity has been made. And this situation is expected to deteriorate in the 21st century as a result of climate change, particularly in developing countries with agricultural-based economies and with an often low capacity to cope with such challenges. In 1973, the world s political leaders set the goal of eradicating hunger within a decade. Twenty three years later, the 1996 second World Food Summit endorsed the less ambitious goal of reducing hunger by half by The same objective was repeated at the Millennium Summit 11 in 2000 and at the third World Food Summit in 2002, even though the rate of progress over the last two decades indicates that it may take more than 60 years to actually reach this target. Political goals play a role and have relevance, but the hope and trust of hundreds of millions who spend a lifetime suffering from debilitating hunger has its limits. In contrast to the severity of world hunger is the emerging problem of over consumption, resulting in obesity and related health problems such as diabetes and cardio vascular diseases. Around 1.1 billion people worldwide are estimated to be overweight, with over one-third being obese. The next world food crisis will undoubtedly be linked to human health, be it because of too little food or too much unhealthy food, which will affect people in all countries, developing and developed, to different degrees. The total number of undernourished in the developing countries declined from 815 million in 1990 to 776 million people in During this same period, the number of undernourished in SSA increased from 168 million to 194 million. This region has the highest proportion of undernourished people, about 35% of the region s total population compared to 14% of the total population of the rest of the developing world. Poverty and food insecurity are also highly interdependent. Of the world s 1.1 billion poor living on less then US$ 1 per day, over a quarter reside in SSA. Here again, the number of people living in poverty in SSA increased from 242 million in 1990 to approximately 300 million in At the same time, their number declined by around 20% in the rest of the developing world. It is highly unlikely that the time-bound Millennium Development Goals 2 to reduce world hunger and poverty by half by 2015, committed to by governments worldwide, will actually be achieved in SSA. Food insecurity and poverty cannot be tackled without first addressing the issues of sustainable agriculture and rural development in the SSA region. Converting agricultural development agendas into genuine action on the ground requires total political and resource commitment. 2. Food Security and Agriculture Agriculture is the dominant user of environment and natural resources; it has the greatest impact on the sustainability of ecosystems and their services, and accounts directly and indirectly for a major share of employment and livelihoods in rural areas in developing countries. At present, the total cultivated land area globally amounts to 5

8 roughly 1.5 billion ha of which about one-fifth is irrigated; the latter comprises about 65% of world cereal production and 40% of total crop production in developing countries. At global level, land with rain-fed production potential is estimated at 3.65 billion ha, with Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America accounting for over 50%. In these two regions, the current share of irrigated cultivable land amounts to 2.2% and 8.8%, respectively. By 2050, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase threefold to around 1.7 billion. That is, the development of rain-fed agriculture will be particularly important, since agriculture will play a leading developmental role, specifically with regard to rural employment and future livelihoods. Historically, agriculture was the foundation of economic growth and prosperity in most developed countries. Today, less than 5% of the population in many developed countries derive their livelihoods from agriculture, and yet the farmers lobby is the most powerful politically in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo, to name a few. In contrast, the livelihood of a major percentage of the population in many developing countries is dependent on agriculture and agricultural activities, and yet their political voice is not heard. The trends over the last three decades in many developing countries indicate a reduced allocation of national development budgets to agriculture, and this, together with declining multilateral lending and bilateral aid for the agricultural sector exemplifies that agriculture continues to be regarded as backward and a low priority. The reality is that no progress on reducing hunger and poverty can be achieved without political and resource commitment to rural development and environmental protection, especially with regard to rain-fed agriculture and the fact that over 60% of persons suffering from hunger and poverty 1 live in the rural areas in many developing countries. The increasing population s need for food poses a threat to natural resources 2, with people further exploiting land that is already being cultivated or encroaching upon untouched land for agricultural use. The damage inflicted on the environment is increasingly evident: arable lands lost to erosion, salinity, desertification, and urban spread; disappearing forests, loss of biodiversity and emerging water scarcity are additional negative effects. This situation will be significantly exacerbated by climate change, as well as by the increase of extreme events and climate variability. And all this will further increase the social, economic and environmental vulnerability of large proportions of the population in many SSA countries. Sub-Saharan Africa with its predominance of rain-fed agriculture faces a particularly daunting situation, as agriculture is the mainstay of the economies of many SSA countries, accounting for over 30% of total GDP and for over half of its export earnings. More than 70% of the population lives in rural areas, and the livelihoods of about 85% depend on rain-fed agriculture and agriculture-based rural activities. At present, only 2% of the arable land in SSA is irrigated. Many of the food insecure and poor countries in SSA are also socially, economically and environmentally vulnerable, and climate change will significantly exacerbate this situation. Added to this come other factors such as land degradation, water scarcity, pest and disease epidemics, and, in some cases, political instability and civil conflicts. In the short-term, policy-makers need to cope with climate variability and extreme events, which will severely affect the welfare of the most vulnerable populations. In the long run, climate change will result in irreparable damage to arable land, water, and biodiversity resources, with serious consequences for food production and food security, especially in many poor countries with a low capacity to cope and adapt to these challenges. 6

9 3. Agriculture and Climate Change Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 3 establishes the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system...stabilization should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. Climate change and variability affects thermal and hydrological regimes, and in turn, this influences the structure and functionality of ecosystems and human livelihoods. The frequency of reports on increased climate variability and extreme events has risen considerably worldwide. And, for the most part, such developments will affect the world s poorest countries. It is only in poor countries that drought turns into famine, often resulting in population displacement, suffering, and loss of life. The social and economic costs of such occurrences may undo, in just a day or a month, the achievements of years of development efforts. In 1997, the international community negotiated the Kyoto Protocol 4, in which the developed nations agreed to limit their greenhouse gas emissions, relative to the levels emitted in Fossil fuels are by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG). It is essential not only to adopt energy conservation and efficiency measures, but also to increase the share of renewable energy. The use of clean renewable energy sources would contribute substantially to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Concerted efforts are required to develop and implement clean renewable energy sources, in particular solar, wind, hydro, wave power and tides, and geothermal energy. There is also scope to use biomass energy, thus reducing pressure on fossil fuels demand. Climate change will result in irreparable damage to arable land, water, and biodiversity resources, with serious consequences for food production and food security, especially in many developing countries, which have a low capacity to cope and adapt to these challenges. While the international community has focused on climate change mitigation, the issue of adaptation to climate change is equally pressing. Scientific assessment of the causes and consequences of climate change is important, but the real need at the local and national levels, especially in developing countries, is adaptation and mitigation measures. At most, we have a 30 year window of opportunity to deal with the threats of climate change; if we wait any longer, it will be too late. At the same time, climate change is a global phenomenon and requires a global partnership. The developed countries should take the lead in view of their substantially higher energy consumption and subsequent pollution in the last few decades, which has resulted in the accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere. In contrast, most developing countries have not contributed to the causes of climate change, yet they will bear the brunt of its impacts. The world community must furthermore take stock of the differences in nation s past and future emissions, and take prevailing socio-economic conditions into account as well. Today, we have scientific knowledge on climate change, but we do not yet have a functional partnership between politicians, scientists, the business community and the consumers in order to move beyond rhetoric and expressions of concern to real actions that will bring change. While many developed countries have carried out assessments of the impact of climate change on their own economies and natural resource environments, most developing countries have not. International negotiations 5 are often constrained in an environment where one group of countries is well-informed and another is not. A concerted worldwide effort is required to carry out national analyses of climate change s potential impacts and to adopt policy regimes and measures to mitigate and adapt to the risks and consequences of climate change. 7

10 4. Food Security, Agriculture and Climate Change in the 21st Century: A Spatial Integrated Ecological and Socio- Economic Global Assessment 6 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has developed an integrated ecological and socio-economic policy analysis model and global databases for assessing the prospects of world agriculture and food security in the context of future socio-economic development path scenarios 7,8 and climate change outcomes, as predicted by five global climate models 5. The impacts of different climate change scenarios on bio-physical, soil and crop growth yield determinants are evaluated on a 5 by 5 latitude/longitude global grid. The size of potential agricultural land and related potential crop production is computed and the detailed bio-physical results are then fed into a closed economy general equilibrium model of the world food system, to assess how climate impacts may interact with alternative development pathways, and key trends expected over this century for food demand, production and trade, as well as computing composite indices, such as risk of hunger and malnutrition. This integrated modeling approach connects the relevant bio-physical and socio-economic variables within a unified and coherent framework to produce a global assessment and policy analysis of food production and security under climate change. It should be noted that the FAO-IIASA methodology and modeling framework briefly described below is unique in terms of its geographically detailed, worldwide agroecology and coverage of all crops, as well as livestock in the framework of the world food economy in terms of 14 national models, 2 regional models and 14 country group models. The space limitations in this paper do not allow for a full expose of the model and the reader is referred to two related publications 6,9 4.1 Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZ) Methodology and Models 9 The AEZ modeling framework synthesizes essential components of both the crop and ecosystem models. It uses detailed agronomic-based knowledge to simulate land resources availability and use, farm-level management options, and crop production potentials; at the same time, it employs detailed spatial bio-physical and demographic datasets to distribute its computations at fine gridded intervals over the entire globe. This land-resources inventory is used to assess the suitability of crops in relation to both rain-fed and irrigated conditions for specified management conditions and levels of inputs, and to quantify expected attainable production of cropping activities relevant to specific agro-ecological areas. Crop modeling and environmental matching procedures are used to identify crop-specific environmental limitations under various levels of inputs and management conditions. As illustrated in Figure 1, the AEZ framework contains the following basic elements: Land resources database containing geo-referenced climate, soil and terrain data; Land Utilization Types (LUT) database of agricultural production systems, describing crop-specific environmental requirements and adaptability characteristics, including input level and management; Mathematical procedures for matching crop LUT requirements with agroecological zones data, including potentially attainable crop yields estimates by land unit and grid-cell (AEZ global assessment analyzes 2.2 million grid cells, covering a 5 X5 latitude/longitude grid, based on a 1:5,000,000 scale global soil map); Assessments of crop suitability and land productivity, and Applications for agricultural development planning. 8

11 The AEZ model computes amounts of non-arable and arable land as a function of environmental constraints. Land is classified as having severe constraints (too cold, too wet, too steep, or having serious soil quality constraints); moderate, slight, or no constraints to cultivation. Classification is also made between rain-fed and irrigated land, depending on water deficits, computed internally as precipitation minus evapotranspiration. Figure 1. AEZ Methodology and Model 4.2 BLS World Agricultural Trade and Economic Modeling 6 The Basic Linked System (BLS) comprises a series of national and regional agricultural economic models. It provides a framework for analyzing the world food system, viewing national agricultural components as embedded in national economies, which in turn interact with each other at the international level. The BLS model has been calibrated and validated over past time windows. The 18 individual national models, 2 regional models and 14 country group models are linked together by means of a world market model, where international clearing prices are computed to equalize global demand with supply. The BLS is formulated as a recursively dynamic system, working in successive annual steps. Each individual model component focuses primarily on the agricultural sector, but attempts to represent the whole economy as necessary to capture essential dynamics among capital, labor and land. For the purpose of subsequent international linkage, production, consumption and trade of goods and services are aggregated into nine main agricultural sectors, though individual regional models are more detailed. The nine agricultural sectors include: wheat; rice; coarse grains; bovine and ovine meat; dairy products; other meats and fish; protein feeds; other food and non-food agriculture. The rest of the economy is coarsely aggregated into one simplified non-agricultural sector. Agricultural commodities may be used within BLS for human consumption, feed, intermediate consumption, and stock accumulation. The non-agricultural commodities may contribute as investment and for processing and transporting agricultural goods. All physical and financial accounts are balanced and mutually consistent: the production, consumption, 9

12 and financial ones at the national level, and the trade and financial flows at the global level (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Integrated AEZ-BLS Ecological-Socio-Economic Analysis 4.3 Future Climate Change Scenarios 6 General circulation models (GCMs) represent a powerful tool to generate characteristics of future climates under anthropogenic forcing, i.e., under present and projected future emissions of greenhouse gases. GCMs provide internally coherent climate dynamics by solving all climate-relevant physical equations globally to run simulations with the AEZ model under climate change. The AEZ-BLS study involved climate projections of five Global Circulation Models, namely, HadCM3, a coupled atmosphere-ocean GCM developed at the UK Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research; ECHAM, developed by the Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie in Germany; CSIRO, developed by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Australia; CGCM2, developed by the Canadian Center for Climate Modelling and Analysis; and the NCAR-PCM Parallel Climate Model implemented at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and involving several research laboratories in the United States. Climate change parameters are computed at each grid point by comparing GCM monthly-mean prediction for the given decade to those corresponding to the GCM baseline climate of Such changes (i.e., delta differences for temperature; ratios for precipitation, etc.) are then applied to the observed climate of , used in AEZ, to generate future climate data a plausible range of outcomes in terms of likely maximum future temperatures, pressures and rainfall, for the nominal years 2030, 2070 and 2100, and related to the storylines A1, A2, B1 and B2 (see Table 1) is described in the next section. 10

13 Table 1. Summary of SRES Development Scenarios and GCM Outputs Scenario/Model HADCM3 ECHAM CSIRO CGCM2 NCARPCM A1 X A1T, A1B X A2 X X X X X B2 X X X X X B1 X X 4.4 Future Socio-Economic Development Path Scenarios 10 In order to assess agricultural development in this millennium, with or without climate change, it is necessary to first make some coherent assumptions about future development outcomes. To this end, we used plausible socio-economic development paths, as specified in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). The IPCC's SRES scenarios have been constructed to explore future developments in the global environment with special reference to the production of greenhouse gases and aerosol precursor emissions. All the SRES scenarios are non-mitigation scenarios with respect to climate change. Scenario A1: A future world with very rapid economic growth (world economy growing at 3.3% and SSA s economy growing at 6.2% annually in the period ), low population growth (world total population of 8.9 billion in 2080; SSA s population of 1526 million in 2080), and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are economic and cultural convergence and capacity building, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system: fossil-intensive (A1FI), nonfossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B). Scenario A2: A very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is that of strengthening regional cultural identities; with high population growth (projected world population of 14 billion in 2080), and less concern for rapid economic development (world economy growing at 2.3% annually in the period ). Scenario A2r: A very heterogeneous world. Fertility patterns across regions converge only slowly. The underlying theme is that of strengthening regional cultural identities; with high population growth (projected world population of 12 billion in 2080; SSA s projected population of 2575 million in 2080), and less concern for rapid economic development (world economy growing at 2.3% annually, and SSA s economy growing at 4.2% in the period ). Scenario B1: A convergent world (global economy grows at 2.8% annually and projected world population reaches 8.1 billion in 2080; SSA s economy grows at 5.8% annually and its projected population reaches 1476 million in 2080) with rapid change in economic structures, dematerialization and introduction of clean technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to environmental and social sustainability, including concerted efforts for rapid technological development, dematerialization of the economy, and improving equity. Scenario B2: A world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability. It is again a heterogeneous world (global economy grows at 2.5% annually until 2080 and world population reaches 9.3 billion in 2080, SSA s economy grows at 5.3% annually until 2080 and its population reaches 1790 million in 2080) with less rapid, and more diverse technological change. 11

14 Emissions of greenhouse gases connected to specific SRES scenarios are translated into projections of climate change throughout this century by using general circulation models (GCM). Climate change is clearly seen as the consequence of complex social, economic, and environmental interactions, possibly modulated by the capacity to mitigate and adapt regionally and globally. 4.5 Summary of AEZ-BLS Results 6 The main results of the AEZ analysis include climate change impacts on the prevalence of environmental constraints to crop agriculture; climate variability and the variability of rain-fed cereal production; changes in potential agricultural land; variation in crop production patterns; and the impact of climate change on cereal production potential. Results of the AEZ-BLS integrated ecological-social-economic analysis of climate change on the world food system includes quantification of scale and location of hunger, international agricultural trade, prices, production, land use, etc. The analysis assesses trends in food production, trade, and consumption, and the impact on poverty and hunger of alternative development pathways and varying levels of climate change. The integrated methodology and models provide a foundation for detailed country studies Land and Water Constraints to Rain-Fed Crop Cultivation Two-thirds of the global land surface - around 8.9 billion ha - suffer rather severe constraints for rain-fed crop cultivation: 13.2% of the surface is too cold, 26.5% is too dry, 4.6% is too steep, 2.0% is too wet, and 19.8% is constrained by unfavorable soil conditions. Climate change will have positive and negative impacts, i.e., some constraints will be alleviated while others may increase. The results indicate that these constraints will change to 5.2%, 29.0%, 1.1%, 5.7%, and 24.5%, respectively. Arable land resources will suffer severe environmental constraints preventing crop agriculture in the 2080s, for example, between 1 to 3% in Central America & the Caribbean; by up to 4 to 5% in Oceania & Polynesia; and by 2 to 3.5% in Northern Africa. In Southern Africa alone, up to 11% of the total land area of 265 million hectares is projected to be at risk of being lost for crop agriculture. By the 2080s, prime land free of constraints will have decreased in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 3), while land with severe climate, soil or terrain constraints making it unsuitable for rain-fed agriculture, may increase by million hectares HAD3 % of total land CO 2 ppm CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR HAD3 NCAR CSIRO CGCM2 Figure 3. Changes in Sub-Saharan African land with no or slight environmental constraints versus increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations 12

15 4.5.2 The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa In most of the GCM climate projections, land with no or only slight constraints will decrease. For the SRES scenario A2, a decrease of fertile land occurs in all four GCM climate projections by an average of 204,000 km 2, i.e., 6.3% of total Sub-Saharan prime land; results range from 82,000 km 2 (NCAR-PCM) to 273,000 km 2 (CSIRO). Land with severe climate, soil, or terrain constraints, which is unsuitable for rain-fed agriculture, will increase by 260, ,000 km 2. Only in the NCAR-PCM model, which differs markedly from the results of other GCM experiments and paints a somewhat benign future, does the extent of Sub-Saharan land with severe environmental constraints to crop production decline by about 150,000 km 2 for both the simulated A2 and B2 scenarios. A detailed picture of the changes in environmental constraint classification is presented in Table 2, illustrating the transition matrix from current reference climate conditions to the climate of the 2080s for projections of scenario HadCM3-A1FI for rainfed land in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are classified according to four broad groups: no constraints, slight, moderate, and severe constraints. Table 2 Transition matrix of changes in environmental constraints to crop agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa (scenario HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s) Reference Climate 1,000 km 2 1,000 km 2 Total No constraint Slight Moderate Severe No constraint Slight 2, , Moderate 6, , Severe 15, ,048 24, ,528 5,727 15,702 The current conditions are summarized in the transition matrix by the row totals shown in the first numeric column. Column totals, in the last row of the matrix, denote class extents calculated for future climate conditions. The values in each row of the transition matrix indicate the extents classified under current conditions for different classes. The table shows that only 80,000 km 2 of more than 15.1 million km 2 of land, which is currently severely constrained, is expected to improve as a result of climate change, while over 600,000 km 2 of land currently classified as moderately constrained will become severely constrained by the environmental conditions Rain-Fed Land with Cultivation Potential In Asia and Europe, rain-fed land currently being cultivated amounts to 90% of the land that is potentially suitable or very suitable for agricultural production (see Figure 4). In North America, around 75% of the potentially suitable or very suitable land is currently under cultivation. By contrast, Africa and South and Central America are estimated to have some 1 billion ha of cultivable land in addition to the currently cultivated land of approximately 350 million ha. Most of this additional cultivable land is concentrated in seven countries Angola, Congo, Sudan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. 13

16 Figure 4. Potential 2080s, Potential Reference and Cultivated Land , by region Rain-fed Cultivation Potential in Forest Ecosystems About one-fifth of the world s land surface some 3 billion ha are classified as forest ecosystems. Eight countries Russia, Brazil, Canada, the United States, China, Australia, Congo, and Indonesia account for 60% of the world s forestland. In the past decade, around 127 million ha of forest were cleared, while some 36 million ha were replanted. Africa lost about 53 million ha of forest in this period primarily due to the expansion of crop cultivation. The study results show that 470 million ha of land in forest ecosystems have crop cultivation potential. However, using this land for agriculture would have serious implications, as forests play a critical role in watershed management and flood control, the protection of biodiversity, and serve as carbon sinks Climate Change and Fragile Ecosystems The world s boreal and arctic ecosystems are likely to decline by 60% due to a northward shift of thermal regimes. The semi-arid and arid land areas in developing countries may increase by about 5 to 8%. Over one-fifth of Africa s population, around 180 million people, currently lives in such areas, their livelihood dependent on agriculture. In Africa, under current climate conditions, AEZ estimates that 1.1 billion hectares of arid and dry semi-arid land, i.e., with a growing period of less than 120 days, defined as the number of days in a year with temperature and soil moisture conditions favorable to crop cultivation, will develop. Under the climate change scenarios considered, and by the 14

17 2080s, AEZ estimates that arid and dry semi-arid areas in Africa will increase by about 5 8%, or million hectares Climate Change Impact on Rain-Fed Cereal Production Climate projections predict that land with high cereal production potential will increase in developed nations, mainly in North America (40% increase of the currently existing suitable land of 360 million hectares), in Northern Europe (a 16% increase of its currently 45 million hectares suitable for cereals production), in the Russian Federation (64% increase of the currently 245 million hectares), and in East Asia (10% increase of presently 150 million hectares). In all climate change scenarios, AEZ results indicate that rain-fed cereal productivity potentials will decline by more than 5% in over 40 countries worldwide by 2080, with mean losses of about 15%. The net balance of changes in cereal production potential for Sub-Saharan Africa was projected to be negative, with net losses of up to 12%. Second, there will be large variations in outcomes, with up to 40% of Sub- Saharan countries losing significant shares of their rain-fed cereal production potential. In all climate change scenarios Sudan, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Niger, will lose their cereal production potential by the 2080s. These countries currently have an undernourished population of 87 million, equivalent to 45% of the total undernourished population in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the cereal production potential of Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, Côte d Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Guinea was projected to increase by the 2080s. These eight countries currently have an undernourished population of 73 million, equivalent to 38% of the undernourished population in Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, around 40% of the Sub-Saharan countries will be at risk of significant declines in food crops and pasture production due to climate change. In the A2r scenario and HadCM3 climate change projection, the results (Annex Table A8) show that in 2080, without climate change, global cereal production is estimated at 4215 million tons, just over a two-fold increase of the level in The impact of climate change would result in a reduction in the developing world s production of approximately 35 million tons in 2080, and an increase of about 21 million tons for the developed world. The effect of climate change mitigation would result in 12 million tons of cereal production in In SSA, climate change in 2080 will result in a loss of 8 million tons of cereal production. Sub-Saharan Africa: Cereal Production and Climate Change (HadCM3 and Development Path Scenario A2r) All Currently Cultivated Rain-Fed Land Suitable for Cereal Production in SSA: The total land area currently cultivated in SSA amounts to 228 million ha, of which 205 million ha are suitable for rain-fed cereal cultivation, with a production potential of 1196 million tons under current climate conditions and high levels of input (Annex Table A1). The results of the HadCM3 climate change projections indicate that SSA will lose 10% of its potentially cultivable land in 2080 and 19% of its cereal production potential, compared to current climate conditions, assuming adaptation of the most productive local cereal varieties. Taking CO2 fertilization into account, the loss in cereal production potential would decrease to 14%. Additionally, if the best available cereal crop varieties are used, the decline in production potential would be reduced to 5%. Southern and Western Africa are the most severely affected regions, with a loss of 24% and 10% of both the potentially cultivable land and the cereal production potential. The results for the CSIRO climate change projections (Annex Table A2) are higher, with a loss of potentially cultivable land and cereal production potential of 25% and 31%, respectively. All Currently Cultivated and Irrigated Land Suitable for Cereal Production in SSA: The total irrigated land area in SSA currently amounts to approximately 7 million ha suitable for cereal cultivation and with a production potential of 56 million tons under current climate conditions and high levels of input. The results (Annex Table A3) of the 15

18 HadCM3 climate change projections for 2080 show that SSA would lose 1% of its potentially cultivable land and 8% of its irrigated cereal production potential, compared to current climate conditions, assuming adaptation of the most productive local cereal varieties. Taking CO2 fertilization into account, no loss in cereal production potential would occur. Additionally, if the best available cereal crop varieties are used, an increase of production potential of approximately 4% could be achieved. Western Africa with about 1 million ha suitable for irrigated cereal production would lose around 7% of its cereal production potential, while the production potential of Southern Africa, which also has about 1 million ha of land suitable for irrigated cereal production, would increase by 7%. The result for the CSIRO climate change projections (Annex Table A4) is higher, with a loss of cereal production potential of 4% in Western Africa and an increase of 12% in Southern Africa. All Currently Cultivated Rain-Fed Land Suitable for Wheat in SSA: About 34 million ha of currently cultivated land in SSA is suitable for wheat production, with a production potential of 126 million tons under current climate conditions and high levels of input (Annex Table A5). The results of the HadCM3 climate change projections for 2080 reveal that SSA would lose 81% of its potentially cultivable land and 81% of its wheat production potential, compared to current climate conditions, even under the assumption of CO2 fertilization and adaptation to the best and most productive wheat varieties. The results of the CSIRO projections show a similar loss of 79% of cultivable land and 78% of wheat production potential in 2080 due to climate change. Note that in all regions of SSA, the impact of climate change on the reduction of wheat production potential lies between 75% and 96%. The increasing consumption of wheat, especially in the urban areas in developing countries, will have to be met through imports from developed countries, and this is cause for concern in a number of developing countries whose economies are agriculture-based and which lack the foreign exchange to finance cereal imports. All Currently Cultivated Rain-Fed Land Suitable for Grain Maize in SSA: About 128 million ha of all currently cultivated land in SSA is suitable for grain maize production with a production potential of 882 million tons under current climate conditions and high levels of input (Annex Table A6). The results of the HadCM3 climate change projections for 2080 indicate that SSA would lose 11% of its potentially cultivable land and 7% of its grain maize production potential, compared to current climate conditions, and even under the assumption of CO2 fertilization and adaptation of the best and most productive grain maize varieties. The results of the CSIRO projections show a more marked loss of 23% of cultivable land and 22% of grain maize production potential in 2080 due to climate change. Southern Africa, with about 9 million ha suitable for rainfed grain maize production would lose approximately 45% of its production potential, while Western Africa, with about 50 million ha suitable for rain-fed grain maize cultivation, would lose 13% of its production potential. Eastern Africa has about 52 million ha suitable for cultivating grain maize and while the cultivable land would decline by 5%, the grain maize production potential would be 5% higher due to 11% in yield potential. The result for the CSIRO climate change projections are worse, with a loss of potentially cultivable land and a production potential loss of 23% and 20%, respectively for SSA. Western and Eastern Africa will lose 15% to 20%, and Southern Africa 63% of its rain-fed grain maize production potential. All Currently Rain-Fed Land Suitable for Pasture (grass, scrub and woodland) Production in SSA: The total land area comprising grass, scrub and woodland in SSA is estimated at 988 million ha with a production potential of 2670 million tons of biomass (Annex Table A7). According to the HadCM3 climate change projection, the impact of climate change in 2080 would result in an increase in SSA s pasture production potential of about 2%. Southern Africa with current pastures of around 162 million ha would lose approximately 14% of its cultivable land and 20% of its pasture production potential in 2080 due to climate change. Livestock is an important component of food consumption and of livelihoods in most SSA countries, and future meat and dairy demand is projected to increase by more than three-fold by the 2080s. 16

19 The results highlight the need for grain-based livestock feed and this may not be viable in some SSA countries through domestic production alone. The highest priority must be given to rain-fed agricultural research, prioritizing and developing new crop varieties that can adapt to higher temperatures and low soil moisture conditions. The AEZ-BLS analysis generates spatial information on the potential impacts of climate change and this information is invaluable to identifying particular crops. Funding for crop-specific research must be mobilized immediately, as it will take a decade or two for the new varieties and related agricultural extension services to actually be employed Climate Change and Agricultural GDP By 2080, climate change will reduce Asia s agricultural GDP by 4%, Sub-Saharan Africa s by up to 8%; whilst North America s agricultural GDP will increase by up to 13% (see Table 3). The results underline three general findings: first, the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector s GDP is relatively small at the aggregate global level, between 1.5% (in the HadCM3-A1FI scenario) to +2.6% (in the NCAR-A2 scenario); in the reference projections, this implies a total global agricultural GDP ranging from US$ trillion (at 1990 prices). Second, agriculture in developed countries will likely benefit from climate change. Among developed regions, North America will gain substantially in all simulated scenarios (3 13% for scenario A2 and different GCM projections); Western Europe will lose value added agriculture in all scenarios (loss of 6 18% in scenario A2 varying with GCM), and the former Soviet Union will mostly gain value added agriculture (some 0 23% in scenario A2) in response to climate change. Third, developing regions, with the exception of Latin America, will face negative impacts on their agricultural GDP. For Asia, the loss in annual value added agriculture will amount to around 4% in 2080 in the A1 and A2 emission scenarios of HadCM3 and CSIRO (total agricultural GDP in Asia of US$ trillion in the reference projections). Aggregate outcomes for Africa are generally negative, a loss of 2 8% in the HadCM3 and CGCM2 simulations, and decreases of 7 9% for CSIRO projections (total agricultural GDP of US$ trillion in the reference projections). Table 3. Climate change impact on agricultural GDP & cereal production, 2080s % Change Ag GDP % Change Cereal Production World Developed North America Europe Developing Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Asia World Market prices change cereals 19.5% All crops 10.5%. In scenario A2r and the HadCM3, the results of the climate change projections (Annex Table A9) show that global agricultural GDP in 2080 is projected to slightly decline by 1.9% in the developing countries and increase by 2.2% in the developed countries. In 2000, the developing countries share of global GDP accounted for 61.5% of 17

20 global agricultural GDP, and in 2080, the share will increase to about 73%. The effect of climate change mitigation in the 2080s results in the developing countries gaining US $28 billion, equivalent to 1.3% annually Impact of Climate Change on Cereal Consumption and Net Imports In the SRES worlds of the 2080s, consumers are much richer than they are today, and are generally not involved in agricultural production processes, earning incomes in nonagricultural sectors. Consumption levels depend foremost on food prices and incomes, rather than on changes in local agricultural production. A fairly consistent decline in direct human consumption of cereals (i.e., excluding feed consumption) will occur in developing countries across all climate models and emission scenarios in response to climate change (with the exception of simulations based on NCAR climate projections). For HadCM3, human cereal consumption in developing countries will decline by 2 4%, i.e., between million tons compared to total consumption in the range of 1.6 billion tons (scenario B1) to 2.1 billion tons (scenario A2) in the reference projections. Consumption changes in Asian developing countries account for two-thirds of this amount, albeit consumption will decline from relatively high levels due to rapid economic growth. Consumers in Latin America are the least affected. The simulations of the IPCC development path scenarios without climate change result in a growing dependence of developing countries (see Figure 7) on net cereal imports, between 170 million tons (scenario B1) and 430 million tons (scenario A2). Climate change will further add to this dependence, increasing net cereal imports by developing regions by 10 40% according to development path scenarios and GCM climate projections; the largest increases occur for CSIRO climate projections. Even in the case of NCAR projections, resulting in overall positive impacts on agricultural productivity, the comparative advantage for cereal production shifts to developed countries, and net imports of developing countries increase by about 25%, an additional 110 million tons in scenario A2 and around 90 million tons of additional cereal imports in scenario B2. In the A2r scenario and the HADCM3 climate change projections, the impact of climate change in South Asia is significant, with net imports increasing by 88 million tons in SSA will import 143 million tons of cereals in 2080 compared to current imports of around 7 million tons (Annex Table A10). The impact of climate change mitigation would lead to a reduction of 11 million tons of cereal imports in SSA. Overall, cereal imports by developing countries would amount to 512 million in 2080 and to about 501 million tons if climate change mitigation occurs B1 B2 A Cereal Net Imports (million tons) Figure 5. Cereal net imports of developing countries projected for different IPCC economic development paths, 2080s 18

21 4.5.9 Climate Change and Food Insecurity At present, the total population of 94 developing countries affected by food insecurity amounts to around 4.1 billion, a figure projected to increase to over 7 billion by Currently, the livelihoods of over half of the population in most of these countries depend on agriculture. Also, in many of these countries agriculture accounts for 20% to 30% of the total gross domestic product. The current food gap for the undernourished populations of these countries is estimated at around 25 million tons. The impact of climate change on the domestic cereal production potential in these food insecure countries is illustrated in Table 4. Depending on the climate model, the cereal production of 17 to 37 countries will increase as a result of climate change. Among these countries, China, with a population of 150 million undernourished and a corresponding food gap of about 4 million tons, will increase its cereal production to 100 million as a result of climate change. In contrast, India, accounting for 212 million undernourished and with an equivalent food gap of about 6 million, will lose around 30 million tons in cereal production due to climate change. Table 4a. Food insecurity and climate change impact on food production Number of Countries Pop millions Undernourished millions Cereal Production 2000 mill. tons Cereal Gap 2000 mill. tons Climate Impact 2080s mill. tons LOSING ECHAM HadCM CGCM WINNING ECHAM hadcm CGCM The impact of climate change on cereal production (see Table 4a and Figure 6) is cause for serious concern in 25 to 45 losing developing countries. These countries have a total combined population of about 1.3 billion to 2.1 billion, of which one fifth is undernourished. Comparing the decrease of over 60 million tons of cereal production potential referred to in the Max Planck model, and the 150 million tons in the Hadley and the Canadian models, with the current food gap of 10 to 12 million tons, the substantial loss in domestic production in the 2080s due to climate change implies that the number of undernourished may drastically increase. Table 4b shows that the cereal production potential in four of the IPCC future development paths and the HadCM3 climate change projections will increase between 4.4% to 5.1% in 13 to 17 countries in SSA, with a total projected population of 560 million to 650 million. On the other hand, 13 to 16 countries with a total projected population of 460 to 780 million will lose 7.1 to 8.6% of their cereal production potential in Table 4c shows the results of four climate projection models; the HadCM3 climate change impacts indicate that the cereal production potential of 14 SSA countries will increase 5.3% in 2080, while 16 countries will lose 7.9% of their production potential. The results of the CSIRO climate change projections are worse, with around 17 SSA countries losing as much as 15.1 % of their cereal production potential in The 19

22 NCAR climate change projections are markedly different, with only three SSA countries losing just 0.8% of their total cereal production potential in Figure 6. Country-level climate change impacts on rain-fed cereal production potential (HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s) Table 4b. AEZ s estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal production potential in the 2080s and HadCM3 climate projections for currently cultivated land in Sub-Saharan African countries Scenario Number of countries Projected population (billions) Change in cereal production potential (%) G N L G N L G N L Total A1FI A B B G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of 5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or more. Table 4c. AEZ s estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal production potential in the 2080s, SRES A2 for currently cultivated land in Sub-Saharan African countries Climate model Number of countries Projected population (billions) Change in cereal production potential (%) G N L G N L G N L Total HadCM CSIRO CGCM NCAR G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of 5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or more. 20

23 The balance of SSA countries gaining and losing illustrates two important factors. First, the balance of changes in cereal production potential will very likely be negative for Sub-Saharan Africa, with net losses of up to 12% of the region s cereal production potential. Second, there will be large variations in outcomes, with up to 40% of Sub- Saharan countries losing a rather substantial share of their agricultural resources. Many SSA countries are poor, agriculture-based economies. They often lack the foreign exchange to finance food imports. Hence, any domestic production losses resulting from climate change will further worsen the prevalence and depth of hunger, and this burden will undoubtedly fall disproportionately on the poorest and the most vulnerable Climate Change: Number of People at Risk of Hunger The number of undernourished in the developing world is estimated at 820 million, equivalent to 17% of the total population of 4.1 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest prevalence of undernourishment, with some 32% of the total population deprived of access to food. Central Africa with a total population of 84 million has the highest prevalence of hunger, affecting 56% of the population. In Eastern and Southern Africa, with a population of 168 million and 71 million, respectively, undernourishment affects around 39% of the population. There has been progress in reducing the prevalence of hunger in Western Africa from 21% to 15% in the last 10 years. Some fairly unambiguous conclusions emerge from the analysis of climate change impacts on the number of people at risk of hunger. First, climate change will most likely increase the number of people at risk of hunger. Second, the importance and significance of climate change impact on the level of undernourishment depends entirely on the level of economic development assumed in the SRES scenarios. Figure 7. Additional number of undernourished people due to climate change (in millions) Figure 7 demonstrates that the additional number of undernourished persons by region will increase between 35 million and 170 million in the 2080s, depending on the IPPC future development paths and the results of the climate change in the 2080s, as projected by the HadCM3 and CSIRO General Circulation Models. The results for SSA in Figure 8 show that until the 2020s, despite high economic growth assumptions in the IPCC future development scenarios for SSA, very little progress is made in reducing hunger and the Millennium Development Goals will unlikely be achieved in SSA. 21

24 Figure 8. SSA: Risk of hunger projected for four IPCC economic development paths The Millennium Development Goals set a target for reducing hunger by half in The results of the A2r future development path and the climate projections of HadCM3 demonstrate that in 2080, approximately 622 million people will be at risk of hunger, with the SSA region alone accounting for over 70% (Annex Table A11). In South Asia, the decline from 312 million people at risk of hunger to 45 million in 2080 represents the highest rate of progress, similar to Southeast Asia and East Asia, where those at risk of hunger decline from 42 million to just 5 million people. If climate change mitigation reducing emissions from 1100 ppm to 550 ppm in were to occur, the number of people at risk of hunger would decrease by 44 million Fairness and Equity Global environmental change raises the issue of fairness and equity. Developing countries have thus far contributed relatively little to the causes of climate change. Sub- Saharan Africa accounted for just 2.0% of the world s total cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels over the period 1951 to 2004, and at present, SSA with 9.7% of the world s total population only contributes 2.4% of the world s total CO2 emissions (see Figures 9a 9b). 17.2% 28.2% 4.6% 4.6% 2.0% 5.9% North America Europe & FSU Oceania & Japan Sub-saharian Africa Latin America Middle East & North Africa South & East Asia 37.3% Figure 9a. CO2 Emissions Cumulative share