Economic Instruments in the context of climate change

Transcription

1 LG/14/4 14 th Meeting of the London Group on Environmentl Accounting Cnerr, April 2009 Economic Instruments in the context of climte chnge Torstein Bye, Sttistics Norwy 1

2 Some economic spects of climte chnge. Instruments nd sttistics y Torstein Bye Director, Economics, Energy nd Environment Sttistics Norwy t@ss.no Astrct The Stern report (Stern, 2008) ddresses the climte chnge nd economic consequences of emission of greenhouse gses, the cost of mitigtion up to certin level, nd the cost of dpttion. In this note, we focus on the mitigtion spects nd instruments in prticulr. We do not ddress the dpttion spects. The Stern report rgues for rnge of instruments, i.e. comintion of economic instruments, technology instruments, regultory instruments etc. We show tht principlly ll instruments crete shdow prices in the mrket. Actully ll instruments my e perceived to e just comintion of the two simple tx nd susidy instruments, lthough the comintion fctor is endogenous. We then produce comprehensive numer of consistent sttisticl tles tht llows us to perform nlyses oth of driving forces ehind emissions, nd the impct of the instruments on emissions. We exemplify some interesting spects y comining ctul figures for Norwy from set of such consistent tles. Astrct Introduction Economic instruments Discrimintory txtion Discrimintory susidies Green Certifictes who is susidised nd who is txed? White Certifictes who is susidised nd who is txed? Brown Certifictes (cron mrkets) who is susidised nd who is txed? Regultion nd stndrds the shdow price nd mrket effect R&D Other spects Economic instruments nd sttistics system of tles? Some empiricl illustrtions References:

3 1. Introduction The stern report (Stern, 2008) ddresses the climte chnge nd economic consequences of emission of greenhouse gses, the cost of mitigtion up to certin level, nd the cost of dpttion. In this note, we will discuss the need for sttistics relted to mitigtion nd instruments. We do not go into detil for the other spects, only tht this implies some sort of cost enefit nlysis of the climte chnge chllenge. Some key point from the Stern report is: i) All countries will e ffected y climte chnge, ut the poorest countries will suffer erliest nd most, ii) Climte chnge is the gretest nd widest-rnging mrket filure ever seen, iii) Three elements of policy re required for n effective response: cron pricing, technology policy nd energy efficiency, iv) Cron pricing, through txtion, emissions trding or regultion, will show people the full socil costs of their ctions. The im should e glol cron price cross countries nd sectors, v) Technology policy should drive the lrge-scle development nd use of rnge of low-cron nd high-efficiency products, vi) Interntionl product stndrds could e introduced, vii) The enefits of strong, erly ction considerly outweigh the costs, viii) The cost of reducing emissions could e limited to round 1% of glol GDP if mesures introduced re cost efficient. Cost efficiency, txes, cron mrkets, technology policy (Susidies nd R&D), product stndrds (regultion), strong erly ction, nd the cost of ction these re the min formuls, i.e. we should focus on economic instruments nd cost efficiency in the mitigtion process of climte chnge. Some would rgue tht we cn not focus only on economic instruments nd tht the Stern report lso focuses on technology policy, stndrds, est prctice etc. Our view is tht these re lso economic instruments ll stndrds, regultions, R&D support will ctully y mrket effects work just s ordinry economic instruments like txes nd susidies. A rnge of new instruments re lredy implemented in severl countries, for instnce green nd white certifictes. Agin these re comintions of txes nd susidies lthough the comintion fctor is endogenous nd depends upon elsticities on the supply nd demnd side of the mrkets. Implementtion of such instruments cretes need for monitoring nd production of sttistics. In section 2 we discuss how some of the instruments introduced to try to comt climte chnge ctully work. Although the instruments pper different, there is striking resemlnce with respect to effects in the mrket. The effects reduce to the effect of comintion of only two instruments. An open question is then why introduce mny elements if only two is enough? Producing sttistics to trce the effects of severl instruments is more complex thn producing for two instruments (in ddition to the dministrtive costs). In section 3 we up consistent set of sttisticl tles tht enles us to trce oth the driving forces for environmentl consequences, the instruments introduced to comt the chnges nd the net effect of these two. These dt tles should form perfect informtion se for those who re interested in ckground sttistics nd for nlyses of the impcts of policy mesures. In section 4 we illustrte the usefulness of comintion of three of the tles tht we rgue for in chpter 3. The empiricl exmple is from Norwy. 3

4 2. Economic instruments 1 Over the lst few decdes, severl instruments hve evolved to del with similr energy nd environmentl chllenges. For instnce, the economic literture prescries seprte tx or cp-ndtrde systems to internlize negtive environmentl externlities nd susidies to internlize positive externlities such s R&D. However, policy is not strightforwrd ecuse of the influence on cost nd competition nd concerns for regionl employment, economic ctivity within certin industries, nd ny distriutionl effects. Tx discrimintion, susidies nd regultions then undermine the efficiency of energy instruments. To lnce ny environmentl concerns, other instruments, including green nd white certifictes, hve een creted. While they seem innovtive economic nlysis will revel tht these work s simple comintions of txes nd susidies. Severl rticles discuss the effect of one y one instrument nd in some instnces the literture lso ddresses the comintion of two instruments. Both types of studies show tht nlyticl results my e derived, ut the conclusions with respect to sign for prices nd volumes chnges re miguous. This demnds empiricl nlyses which gin strengthen the need for relevnt sttistics. This ecomes even more importnt when introducing three nd more instruments. Then nlyticl derivtion of results ecomes impossile nd empiricl nlysis is the only wy out. Below we give some rief understnding of the complexity of even prtil instruments, one y one, to highlight simple point ll instruments reduce to comintion of tx nd susidy the composition my differ, nd in most instnces the composition is endogenous Discrimintory txtion Figure 1 depicts n energy mrket fcing n upwrd sloping supply curve (incresing mrginl cost) nd two downwrd sloping demnd curves (decresing willingness to py) for two consumers. They dd up to the mrket demnd. For the purpose of prcticl policy, consumer D fces tx while consumer D is exempted. Such discrimintion usully fvours the most price elstic consumer, i.e., the industry is exempt or fces reduced txes (whether it is cron or n energy tx), while households fce the highest tx rtes. A trined eye esily sees tht the exempted consumer lso cptures mrket enefit t the equilirium price drops, i.e. the discrimintory tx comines tx nd n implicit susidy. If we insted ssumed two producers nd one consumer, the resoning would e the sme. The txed producer reduces his production, equilirium prices increse, nd the non txed producer hrvests mrket susidy. 1 We only riefly discuss the illustrtions in this chpter. For the interesting reder we refer to Bye nd Bruvoll (2008) who thoroughly discuss oth the principles nd the illustrtions in detil. 4

5 p 1 D 1 D 0 D D 1 D 0 S t p 0 p 1 x x 1 0 x 0 x 1 x 1 x Discrimintory susidies Let us ssume two producers nd one consumer. One producer pplies cron technology the other one is renewle. The economic dvice would e to internlize the emission costs produced in the cron technology y tx or restriction (shdow price i.e. cron mrket). However, policy mkers seem to fvour positive to negtive instruments, so insted the renewle technology is susidized. The susidy shifts supply outwrds, the mrket price drops, nd the producer tht do not receive susidy is implicitly txed. S 0 g S 1 g S p 1 g S 0 S 1 rent s p 0 p 1 D x g 0 x g 1 x x 1 0 x 0 x 1 5

6 2.3. Green Certifictes who is susidised nd who is txed? A green certificte is proof of n environmentlly fvourle origin of n mount of energy produced. This instrument prticulrly focuses on the supply side of the energy mrket. The government issues green certificte to the producer for ech unit of secondry energy produced y green energy crrier. Consumers re required to purchse numer of certifictes proportionl to the totl mount of their energy consumption. This cretes mrket (pper mrket) for the green certifictes. The producers of green energy hrvest certificte price in the certificte mrket dditionl to the energy price in the energy mrket. This increses the profitility of producing energy from green technologies. An dvntge over simple lump sum susidy is the incentive for cost efficient investment for cpcity expnsion tht this instrument cretes. The system is then comprle to n uction-sed susidy system. Through this pper mrket the producer tht pplies renewle (green) technologies otin susidy i.e. his supply curve shifts outwrds. The consumer tht hs to py for the pper fces initilly tx. The theoreticl literture in this field shows tht the consumer effect is miguous. Empiricl nlyses suggest tht the consumer ctully hrvest susidy while the existing dirty producers py for ll. h(p) g(p) g(p+p c ) h(p)+g(p) h(p)+g(p+p c ) p c p 0 p 1 f(p) f(p+p c ) x 0 g x 1 g x 1 x 0 x 1 x White Certifictes who is susidised nd who is txed? While green certifictes del with the supply side, white certifictes primrily concern energy svings on the demnd side. A white certificte system my impose restriction ( tx ) on totl llowle energy consumption for seprte consumer groups (the principls). In prctice, the restrictions re imposed on distriution compnies (the gent) or the energy suppliers (e.g., white certificte systems in Itly, Frnce, nd the United Kingdom). These gents invest in energy efficiency mesures on ehlf of their consumers in cost efficient wy, i.e. they trde svings potentils mong consumers, nd consumers eventully py through dditions to energy triffs. 6

7 Hence, the white certificte system is principlly comined system of tx on the consumption nd production of energy nd susidy for suppliers of energy-sving pplinces. Agin, this instrument comines the two well-known tx nd susidy instruments. p 1 D D S 2 S 0 p 2 p 1 p 0 x 1 x 2 x 0 x 2 x x 1 0 x 1 x Brown Certifictes (cron mrkets) who is susidised nd who is txed? We cn regulte externlities with either price (s with the exogenously set txes descried ove) or volume. Optiml txes should equl the (estimted) externl mrginl costs. The level of emissions will then e endogenously determined. However, it is typiclly esier to relte regultion to society s perception of the optiml emission level. An lterntive to cron txes is then cp-nd-trde system, so-clled rown certifictes. In principle, if ll emitting sources were included, cp-nd-trde system could directly regulte totl emissions s committed to in interntionl greements nd the permit price would equl the necessry tx to reduce emissions. According to the literture, this is in mny senses eqully efficient to tx system. This is then the efficiency concept of cp nd trde. This system lso comprises n income distriution spect, i.e. the distriution of permits mong producers/consumers for free. The distriution in itself does not conflict the efficiency mesure, however, it implies susidy element. The initil distriution of permits mong producers/consumers determines the distriution of the totl vlue of the permits tht occurs in mrket with free trde. Both the ssignments of free llownces (i.e., income trnsfers resulting from competitive concerns) s well s the uction of permits sed on fundmentl polluter-pys principles produce the efficient finl lloction of permits, s long s there is no restriction with respect to trde. In prctice, this policy proves hrd to chieve. Given the preceding lloction of vlue through unregulted emissions, optiml trde nd permit prices cuse cost increses, reduced ctivity, nd the closing down of firms, ll of which pper s politiclly controversil. Free llownces re then not only used s n income trnsfer lone, rther s susidy for existing ctivities to keep them running. 7

8 D D p 0 p* p* p 0 A 0 A 1 A 0 A Regultion nd stndrds the shdow price nd mrket effect In perfectly competitive mrket, consumers invest in the most cost efficient pplinces. This results in comprehensive comintions of technology choices. In some instnces, politicins introduce stndrds for energy consuming pplinces to stimulte nd increse the reltive competitiveness of green to polluting technologies. The introduction of stndrds, for instnce, est ville technology (BAT), imposes restrictions on consumption/production technology choices. Since the willingness-topy, i.e., costs relted to different technology choices, vries, stndrds imply vrying shdow prices. In line with the initil regultion exemplified in reltion to white nd green certifictes in Figures 6 nd 7, this implies differentited txes nd susidies mong consumers/producers R&D The economic resoning for supporting R&D is to cpture the effect of positive externlity, when incresed knowledge spred nd other ctors gin. R&D support is principlly discrimintory susidy, it is ment to foster development in predetermined direction, lthough the detils out this direction re uncertin. If we support development in one direction the mrket outcome works s tx on lterntives. Hence R&D is directly comprle to the susidy effects descried in chpter Other spects The exercise of mrket power in energy mrkets power keeps volumes low nd prices high. This is comprle to some of the tx effects. For instnce, the mrket power of OPEC plys n importnt 8

9 environmentl role, not only in supplying oil, ut lso in keeping consumption nd emissions down. Txes on the monopoly producer s product my then, contrry to intuition, ply minor role in comting pollution s the tx my insted compete for the monopoly profit. Txtion my reduce the producer price while the consumer price my chnge less nd, consequently, consumption nd emissions my chnge less. The conclusion is tht the effect of tx is not strightforwrd in mrkets where mrket power is exercised. 3. Economic instruments nd sttistics system of tles? Aove we hve shown tht climte policies consist of portfolio of complex instruments. This highlights the need for detiled informtion out ech instrument to e le to do ny serious nlysis out the comined effect of these instruments. The informtion must e set up in systemtic wy. Below I discuss this in the context of forml tle suggestions nd lso mke some suggestions out dt sources. Tle 1 is the fundmentl tle comining the energy nd ntionl ccounts (or energy lnces comined with ntionl ccounts). This is the input mtrix from the energy ccount. The connection to the ntionl ccount is foremost for nlyticl purposes. However, some of the emission fctors re lso linked to output vriles in the ntionl ccount. Tle 3.1 A sector commodity tle (from input output tles) the point of deprture Sector Gsoline Fuel oil Coke Col Wood Wste Intermedites Agriculture Primry industries Fisheries Forestry Pulp nd pper Mchinery Mnufcturing Metls Other Construction Amount of emission crrier - physicl or economic vlues (fixed prices) Electricity etc Bnking Insurnce Privte Services Trnsport Other Pulic services Residentil To produce the emission tle (tle 3), we need mtrix of emission fctors directly linked to tle 1, this forms tle 2 A-E, i.e one tle for ech compound. 9

10 Tle 2A-E. The corresponding emission coefficient tle (one tle for ech greenhouse gs) Sector Gsoline Fuel oil Coke Col Wood Wste Intermedites Agriculture Primry industries Fisheries Forestry Pulp nd pper Mchinery Mnufcturing Metls Other Construction Emission coefficient of compound x on the cell ctivity from tle 1 Electricity etc Bnking Insurnce Privte Services Trnsport Other Pulic services Residentil The product of tle 1 nd tle 2 forms the emission tle, tle 3, i.e one tl for ech compound. In prctice there my e some djustments to this concept ut tht is not importnt in our context now. Tle 3A-E. The corresponding emission tle Sector Gsoline Fuel oil Coke Col Wood Wste Intermedites Agriculture Primry industries Fisheries Forestry Pulp nd pper Mchinery Mnufcturing Metls Other Construction Amount of emissions of compound x the product of tle 1 nd 2 Electricity etc Bnking Insurnce Privte Services Trnsport Other Pulic services Residentil The rest of the tles should e linked to these 3 tles. This will mke nlyses of the effect of instruments much esier nd complete thn present sttistics do. Some of the tles re on vector sis, i.e. one column for ech sector, some on mtrix sis, i.e. severl elements for ech sector. We do not produce forml tles, ut rther discuss the type of tle nd wht content is needed. Tle 4 The corresponding tx tle Wht is n environmentl tx? In the environmentl context the tx sis should normlly e the volumes of some kinds of proven environmentl impct or indictor for impct, for instnce emissions of cron dioxide. In theory nd for only one compound this is simple. But in prctice nd for the generl environmentl tx concept it my e complex mtter to define environmentl txes nd to seprte the environmentl spects from other spects in tx, cf. Eurostt 2001). In the Eurostt 10

11 guide ll trnsport txes re ctegorized s environmentl txes, while oviously some prt of the tx is Rmsey tx nd some prt is n infrstructure tx. For discussion of the ctegoriztion of txes see Bye nd Bruvoll (2007) 2. For greenhouse gs txes such ctegoriztion should e esy? Txes on products re normlly sed on tx rtes times the mount/vlue of the product. The uthorities would e the perfect informtion source for the tx rtes even when they discriminte with respect to source. A seprte tle for tx rtes consistent with tle 3 then enles us to clculte the txes on the sis of tx rtes times the volume in tle 3A-E. This should hrmonize with the totl collected txes mesured in pulic ccounts (i.e. tx ccount mtrix). A uniform tx rte for greenhouse gs emissions is esy to implement ccording to tle 3. But in prctice discrimintory pproch is lmost lwys implemented out of some politicl reson. This enhnces the tx tle in severl dimensions; in the energy dimension energy uses for processes (P), trnsport (T) nd sttionry (S) purposes re treted differently. i.e. the tle heding should e expnded y these three ctegories for ech energy product for ech sector with different tx rtes. Exemption from tx then shows up s zero tx. Sector Gsoline Fuel Coke Col Wood Wste Intermedites P T S P T S P T S P T S P T S P T S P T S Agriculture Mnufcuturing Services Households A recent pper y Steinch et l. (2008) discusses Environmentl txes in the context of the SEEA mnul. It seems s if the focus in their pper is to ctegorize txes in n income study context (ntionl ccount) nd not the nlyticl context of environmentl efficiency. Our focus is on the dt sis for environmentl economic nlysis, which of course lso should e consistent with ntionl ccounting, cf. tle 1-3. Tle 4 The corresponding susidy tle Wht is susidy? Generlly this is mesure tht keeps prices elow their mrket vlue for consumers nd ove mrket vlue for producers. In prctice this my e direct trnsfers or tx credits (foregone income). In UNEP (2004) direct trnsfers, pulic R&D, preferentil tx tretments, price controls nd lons (with lower thn mrket interest rte) re included in susidies. In chpter we hve much roder definition of susidies. However, this roder definition is only possile to clculte indirectly, tking into ccount mrket responses. Susidies re normlly lunched to investment projects in terms of specific mount or lump sum, to producing fcilities sed on production sis (for instnce feed in triff i.e. unit susidy) or for fcilities tht wnt to sve the use of input (energy efficiency projects) on the demnd side, either lump sum or per unit. Lump sum susidies re normlly linked to some kind of volume mesures, i.e. they my e trnsformed to unit mesure. In prctice this mesure is complex nd some dt trnsformtion processes re needed to mke the mesures comprle in units. Susidies re normlly directed towrds detiled projects, i.e. these dt re on mtrix form, cfr. tle 3. The right side of this is tht the pulic sector will normlly estlish some kind of register for the udgeting nd ccounting nd the following up of such projects. Then the dt collection is reduced to hrvesting from pulic registers, while the trnsformtion process my e demnding. 2 Cfr tht tx is compulsory pyment to the government where the enefits provided y the tx pyer re not directly linked to the pyment in opposite to fees or chrges where the individul enefits re more linked to the pyment. For some reson Eurostt ctegorize the CO 2 tx s n energy tx? 11

12 A recent pper y Steinch et l. (2008) discusses Environmentl txes in the context of the SEEA mnul. Tle 5A-B. The corresponding greenhouse gs llownces nd permit trde An lterntive to tx environmentl stress, to internlize the externl cost in mrket opertions, is to set n upper trget of llownces nd llow trding of these llownces, i.e. shdow price of the restriction shows up in the mrket. Generlly, shdow price equl to the tx will produce the sme cost efficient environmentl output. This suject demnd two sets of sttisticl tles one for the initil ssignment of free llownces in volumes (implies lso vlue trnsfer volume times the mrket price) nd second for following up of the economic nd volume exchnge through the trding of emission permits in the mrket (see elow), oth specified t the firm level (ggregted to sector level see tle 3). This re ggregtes over the columns in tle 3, not specific for ech column, i.e. they re normlly directed towrds sectors nd not ctivities within sector. The ssigned mount of llownces my e collected from pulic registers, this could e divided into grndfthered, i.e. sed on historic emissions, nd other free emissions (for instnce for new fcilities). A supplement could e surrendered emission, if the firm out of some reson used less thn wht ws ssigned nd ws not llowed to sell undnt llownces in the mrket. The verified emissions follow from tle 3. The second prt of this tle covers the trde of permits oth volumes nd vlues. This comprises domestic trde nd interntionl trde. The interntionl trde involves trde on mrket nd trde through CDM nd JI. Principlly, it should e possile to gther dt from the permit exchnge on firm sis. However since this mrket is suprntionl, this is proly not possile. The question is then whether we need gross or net trde. It my e possile to clculte net trde of permits s ssigned mount less the surrendered mount nd the verified emissions. All CDM nd JI projects must e formlly ccepted on firm sis, i.e. such registers exist. From the ccounting mtrix nd the register informtion of CDM nd JI we my deduct the net trde on the exchnge on firm sis. A discussion of the permit mrket in the context of the SEEA mnul nd the SNA is given in Olsen (2008). Tle 7. The corresponding green certificte tle or electricity certificte or ---- A sying is tht der child hs mny nmes, this lso yield for green certifictes. Some cll it electricity certificte. The instrument s such my evolve to other mrkets s for instnce the gsoline mrket nd then my e nmed io fuel mrket, etc. The nme nd mrket does not relly mtter for the principls. The clue is tht someody hs to pprove the chosen technology s green nd deliver the certifictes, i.e. pulic register. The mrket is lso unitry, i.e. the vlue of the certificte forms directly the price. The register contins informtion out the technology choice, the firm, nd the volume. Since there is common mrket for these certifictes the price my e collected directly from the exchnge. When firm prticiptes in different certificte mrkets we should collect different prices nd prices my look different if we se the ggregtion on the energy lnce (residentil) or the energy ccount (territoril) frmework. Tle 8. The corresponding white certificte tle As for the green certificte tle, the white certificte tle my e sed on pulic register of how much ech firm/sector is supposed to sve. Since it is not resonle to imgine tht ll ctors ctully prticipte in the trde of energy svings, cf. the principl gent ssumption, this eses the dt 12

13 collection. Ech gent (for instnce distriution compny for electricity) hs to verify the svings nd the cost for ech principl (consumer), i.e. the exct informtion wee need in our sttistics. Tle 9. The corresponding regultion tle A regultion regime should e esy to cover in the sttistics, since the regultions normlly re set up y pulic firms on firm specific regime. Since the pulic sector should follow up on their own regultion oth the regulted nd the verified outcome is registered. The informtion needed then should e sed on these registers. 4. Some empiricl illustrtions To our knowledge noody hs ever developed complete set of tles like the ones discussed ove, lthough Eurostt produces comprehensive tx dt. However, we should struggle in this direction to e informtive out the development of instruments pplied to ddress the climte chnge prolem, nd help reserchers to get proper informtion to e le to nlyse the effects of ll these instruments. Below we hve dded n illustrtion of some of the points mde including informtion from pilot study of elements in tle 3, 4 nd 5 for Norwy, see Bruvoll nd Dlen (2008). On the x-xis we find ccumulted emissions of greenhouse gses over commodities nd sector on the y-xis we find the ctul tx pid. We clerly see tht some sectors re exempted, some fce low txes nd some fce high txes. Typiclly, mnufcturing industries re exempted or py low tx while households nd the petroleum sector py high tx. This is perfect illustrtion of the urden shring within Norwy. It lso illustrtes n importnt cost inefficient pproch to the prolem, oth compred to domestic pproch nd compred to n interntionl pproch with permit trde (see the green shded re for the vrince of the Europen permit price (ETS). The figure lso comprises strt of n emission llownce regime. This is interesting since the erlier exempted or low tx emitters now typiclly re included in n emission permit trde system while the erlier hevily txed pyers re not. This will oviously move the tx system in more efficient direction. NOK/tonne CO2 350,00 Extrction of oil nd gs 300,00 Households 250,00 Lnd trnsport ex/cs, rilw y nd us trnsport 200,00 Domestic se trnsport oct 2008: 25 /tonne CO2 150,00 Averge CO 2 -tx in Norw y: 184 NOK/tonne CO 2 100,00 50,00 0,00 Gs terminls Production of refined oil products Aluminum Fishing Cement, lime nd gypsum Iron nd steel Plstic, ruer production dec 2008: 15 /tonne CO mill. tonnes CO2 From these figures we now my clculte the mount of the urden shring mong emitters in Norwy, se figure 2. The figure illustrte tht out of the totl tx of 1.1 illion Euro in 2006, 13

14 households, petroleum extrction nd lndfills py 0.3 illion Euro to much nd process industries py pproximtely 0.4 illion Euros to little. Compred to cron price in the ETS mrket the verge domestic price lmost right (0.1 Euro to much) while the distriution of the urden is not cost efficient. NOK/tonne CO EU/ETS oct 2008: 25 /tonne CO Se- nd lnd trnsport ~0.4 ill Processing emissions 0 Lndfills Extrction of oil nd gs Households ~0.3 ill. ~0.8 ill mill. tonnes CO2 References: Bruvoll, A. og H. M. Dlen (2008): Lyer on lyer in Norwegin climte policy. (Unfortuntely only in Norwegin). Lg på lg i norsk klim- og energipolitikk, Økonomiske nlyser 5, 29-37, Sttistics Norwy. Bye, T., nd A. Bruvoll: (2008): Multiple instruments to chnge energy ehviour: The emperor s new clothes? Energy Efficiency 1(4), Bye, T. nd A. Bruvoll (2008): Txing energy why nd how? The present policies cross western countries. RAPP 2008/28, Sttistics Norwy, Bye, T. (2008): The energy mrket nd climte chnge or vice vers. Pper sumitted to the Energy Economics Journl, Decemer 2008, Sttistics Norwy Eurostt (2001): Environmentl txes A sttisticl guide. Methods nd Nomencltures. Luxemourg, Office for Officil Pulictions of the Europen Communities, Olsen, T. (2008): Emission permits, Issue pper prepred for the 13 th meeting of the London Group of Environmentl Accounting, Brussels, Belgium 30. Septemer - 3. Octoer

15 Steinch, N., V. Plm, nd U. Roewer (2008): Revision of SEEA 2003: Issue Pper: Environmentl txes, Sttistics Sweden, Stockholm Document to London Group Meeting in utumn 2008 Steinch, N., V. Plm, nd U. Roewer (2008): Revision of SEEA 2003: Issue Pper: SEEA susidies relted to the environment, Sttistics Sweden, Stockholm Document to London Group Meeting in utumn 2008 Stern, N. (2007): The Economics of Climte Chnge: The Stern Review. Cmridge, UK: Cmridge University Press, online t m. 15

16 Some questions rised: 1. The pper dvoctes tht ll instruments in climte policy reduce to comintion of txes nd susidies. Does the London Group gree? 2. The pper dvoctes tht it is importnt tht sttistics gther informtion on instruments in climte policy in detiled mnner, which mkes it possile to study the mrket nd technology effects of instruments. Does the LG gree? 3. To follow the impct of climte policy it is importnt tht s mny instruments s possile re included in the sttistics. For some instruments it seem esy, for others it is more complex. However, reserch on how to include complex instruments should e emphsised? 4. The pper dvoctes tht the sttisticl detiled setup for instruments should follow the sttisticl setup for emissions (i.e. the ntionl nd energy ccount setup). Does the LG gree? For sttisticl purposes this eses the dt gthering s vlues my e sed on tx rtes nd emission ccounts. Consistency my e checked y ggregtion of these tx rtes emission ccounts clcultions nd totl pulic tx ccounts. 5. Emission permits should e included in the sttisticl system? This includes trdle permits in the mrkets, which my e clculted indirectly, see elow This includes JI which my e found in ntionl registers This includes CDM which my e found in ntionl registers This includes free llownces which my e found in ntionl registers 6. Sttistics for regultions should e gthered how to include them in should e studied further? 16