Talk outline. 3) Misplaced optimism - ignoring the bean counters. 4) Global GHG pathways - impossible challenges?

Transcription

1 Global l emission i pathways A fair deal for Non-Annex 1 nations what s left for Annex 1? Kevin Anderson Tyndall Centre Universities of Manchester & East Anglia Alice Bows Sustainable Consumption Institute (SCI) University of Manchester Sept 2009 Talk outline 1) Dangerous climate change - post-copenhagen p 2) Cumulative emissions - a new chronology 3) Misplaced optimism - ignoring the bean counters 4) Global GHG pathways - impossible challenges? 5) Non-Annex 1 emissions - what s left for Annex 1 at 2 C & 4 C? 6) UK & Global response to the challenge 1

2 What is dangerous climate change? UK & EU define this as 2 C But: 2 C impacts at the worst end of the range ocean acidification devastating even at ppmv CO 2 failure to mitigate leaves 2 C stabilisation highly unlikely Put bluntly 2050 reduction targets are unrelated to avoiding dangerous climate change (2 C) cumulative emissions that matter (i.e. carbon or GHG budget) this fundamentally rewrites the chronology of climate change - from long term gradual reductions - to urgent & radical reductions 2

3 How does this scientifically-credible way of thinking alter the challenge we face? To consider: Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) 1. CO 2 emissions from landuse (deforestion) 2. Non-CO 2 GHGs (principally agriculture) What emission space remains for: 3. CO 2 emissions from energy? 3

4 Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) data from: Empirical CO 2 Non-CO 2 GHGs Land-use CDIAC EPA FAO Model AR4, Hadley Centre and Stern Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) Included very optimistic: -CO 2 from land-use & forestry emission scenarios 4

5 Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) Included very optimistic: -CO 2 from land-use & forestry emission scenarios -CO 2 from land-use & forestry emission scenarios 7 - Characterised by high uncertainty (principally driven by deforestation; 12-25% of global CO 2 e) - Two Tyndall scenarios with different carbon-stock levels remaining: i 70% & 80% issions of CO 2 (MtC CO 2 ) Em Year 5

6 Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) Included very optimistic: - land-use & forestry emission scenarios - non-co 2 greenhouse gas emissions Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) Included very optimistic: - land-use & forestry emission scenarios - non-co 2 greenhouse gas emissions 6

7 - non-co 2 greenhouse gas emissions 14 - Marked tail from food related emissions - Food emissions/capita assumed to halve by 2050 Emissions s of non-co 2 ghg (G GtCO 2 e) Year Early action Mid action Late action Tyndall s emission scenarios ( CO 2 e) Included very optimistic: - land-use & forestry emission scenarios - non-co 2 greenhouse gas emissions? Global CO 2 e emissions peaks of 2015/20/25? 7

8 factoring in the latest emissions data what is the scale of the global problem we now face? It s getting worse! Global CO 2 emission trends? ~ 2.7% p.a. last 100yrs ~ 3.3% p.a

9 appears we re denying its happening latest global CO 2 e emission trends? ~ 2.4% p.a. since 2000 ~ Stern assumed 0.95% p.a. (global peak by 2015) What does: this failure to reduce emissions & the latest science on cumulative emissions Say about a 2 C future? 9

10 What greenhouse gas emission pathways for 2 C Assumptions 2015/20/25 global peak in emissions Highly optimistic deforestation & food emission reduction 2 C global carbon budget 1400 to 2200 GtCO2e for ~10% to 60% chance of exceeding 2 C 10

11 Total greenhouse gas emission pathways 2015 peak 2020 peak 2025 peak Em missions of greenhouse gases (GtCO 2 e) Year issions of greenhouse gases (GtCO 2 e) Emi Year issions of greenhouse gases (GtCO 2 e) Emi 80 Low D L Low D H 60 Medium D L Medium D H High D L 40 High D H Year (Anderson & Bows Philosophical Transactions A of the Royal Society pp ) 10% - 60% chance of exceeding 2 C & with a 2020 peak 450ppmv cumulative emission scenarios peaking in 2020 of greenhouse gases (G GtCO 2 e) Emissions 80 Unprecedented Low A Low B reductions Medium A 60 (~10% Medium pa B from High 2020) A High B Year (Anderson & Bows Philosophical Transactions A of the Royal Society pp ) 11

12 and for energy emissions? (with 2020 peak) peak Medium D L 2015 peak High D L 2015 peak High D H 13 of 18 scenarios impossible Even then total decarbonisation by ~ necessary 2 ) Emissio ons of CO 2 alone (GtCO peak High D L 2020 peak High D H Year What annual global emission reductions from energy for 3 C and 4 C Assume 2020 global peak in emissions Highly optimistic deforestation & food emission reductions ~ 50% chance of exceeding 3 C & 4 C 12

13 For 3 C & emissions peaking by 2020: 9% annual reductions in CO 2 from energy For 4 C & emissions peaking by 2020: 3.5% annual reductions in CO 2 from energy A fair deal for non-annex 1 nations: what s left for Annex 1? 13

14 Annex 1 & Non-annex 1 Assumptions for 2 C cumulative emissions of 2200 GtCO2e for (i.e. AR4 450ppmv stabilisation top end value) very optimistic deforestation scenario (80% remains) CCC s 6Gt p.a. estimate of food emissions s ~21-60% chance of exceeding 2 C 9 billion population in 2050 (2 bill n for A1, 7 bill n for NA1) 14

15 21%-60% chance of exceeding 2 C: Non-Annex 1 & Annex 1 emission pathways tco 2 e) Green nhouse gas emissions (Mt NA1 peak Reduced growth ~3% p.a % p.a. reduction 6% p.a. reduction 10% p.a. reduction Annex 1 Non-Annex 1 Fully decarbonised energy by Year Anderson and Bows forthcoming Sept %-60% chance of exceeding 2 C: Non-Annex 1 & Annex 1 emission pathways tco 2 e) Green nhouse gas emissions (Mt A1 peak % p.a. reduction by % p.a. reduction by 2020 Annex 1 Non-Annex 1 Fully decarbonised energy by 2026/ Year Anderson and Bows forthcoming Sept

16 Assumptions for 4 C cumulative emissions of 3820 GtCO2e for (probably in excess of 50% prob of exceeding 4 C?) optimistic deforestation scenario (70% remains) 10Gt p.a. estimate of food emissions ~ 9 billion population in 2050 (2 bill n for A1, 7 bill n for NA1) ~50%chance (?) of exceeding 4 C: Non-Annex 1 & Annex 1 emission pathways Gree enhouse gas emissions (M MtCO 2 e) growth ~3.5% p.a. NA1 peak 2030 A1 peak % p.a. reduction Annex 1 Non-Annex 1 3% p.a. reduction ~80% reduction from energy by Year Anderson and Bows forthcoming Sept

17 How are the UK and International Community fairing against this challenge? UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009:5) To avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate change, average global temperatures must rise no more than 2 C, and that means global emissions must start falling before 2020 and then fall to at least 50% below 1990 levels by The UK is clearly demonstrating a strong international lead. 17

18 UK position based on CCC report CCC claim their cumulative values have 56% - 63% chance of exceeding 2 C (includes cooling aerosols, but not warming aviation uplift or other tipping points ) Can this be reconciled with must rise no more than 2 C? Impact of probabilities on UK reduction rates Prob of UK Annual Exceeding 2 C Reduction 30-78% 3% 15-50% 5% 5-30% 9% 18

19 What are current UK emission trends? Defra July 08 Ref:EV02033 Summary of best example At best 30-80% chance of exceeding 2 C Assumes very optimistic Global peak in 2016 Large buyout from poor countries (CCC 17% & 27%) Partial inclusion of Shipping & Aviation Real emissions up ~18% since

20 and what of the rest? Waxman-Markey y Bill no US reductions necessary before 2017 & 4% by 2020 Japan 25% by 2020 Russia & NZ no targets China & India demand d big reductions from Annex 1 if they re to engage LDC s suggest historical emissions be considered if they re to significantly engage ultimately.. at every level the greatest obstacle to transforming the world is that we lack the clarity and imagination to conceive that it could be different. Roberto Unger 20

21 Reframing Climate Change: End How recent emission trends & the latest science change the debate Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows What are the precedents for such reductions? Annual reductions of greater than 1% p.a. have only been associated with economic recession or upheaval Stern 2006 UK gas & French 40x nuclear ~1% p.a. reductions (ex. aviation & shipping) Collapse Soviet Union economy ~5% p.a. reductions 21

22 Need to reframe climate change drivers: For mitigation 2 C should remain the driver of policy For adaptation 4 C should become the driver of policy Urgent need for reality check If economic growth not possible with 20% p.a carbon reduction then need planned economic contraction to stabilise at 2 C and even for a reasonable probability of avoiding 4 C 22

23 Urgent need for reality check Focus on win-win opportunities is misplaced Significant pain & many losers 4 C is not business as usual - but all orthodox reduction in place & successful What does this mean for adaptation? Urgent need for reality check Both mitigation & adaptation rates are: beyond what we have been prepared to countenance without historical precedent We ve entered new and unchartered territory 23

24 ultimately.. at every level the greatest obstacle to transforming the world is that we lack the clarity and imagination to conceive that it could be different. Roberto Unger Global l emission i pathways End A fair deal for Non-Annex 1 nations what s left for Annex 1? Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows 24