IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-38890) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 41.6 MILLION (US$ 62.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-38890) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 41.6 MILLION (US$ 62.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA FOR A SECOND URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION PROJECT June 27, 2013 Urban Development and Services Practice 2 (AFTU2) Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region Report No: ICR2266

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 2013) Currency Unit = Ghanaian Cedi Cedi 1.00 = US$ 0.52 US$ 1.00 = 1.94 Cedi FISCAL YEAR 2013 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD AMA BOD CAS CWSA DESSAP DO ECOWAS EHSD ESP GAMA GDP GHC GPRS GSGDA GWSC ICR IDA IFC IO ISR KPI LGPCU MDG MMAs MMDA MOFEP MLGRD MS MTDF MU MWRWH N/A Agence Française de Development (French Development Agency) Accra Metropolitan Assembly Biological Oxygen Demand (a measure of the organic pollution load) Country Assistance Strategy Community Water and Sanitation Agency District Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan Development Objective Economic Community of West African States Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate Environmental Sanitation Policy Greater Accra Metropolitan Area Gross Domestic Product Ghanaian Cedi Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda Ghana Water and Sewerage Company Implementation Completion Report International Development Association International Finance Corporation Intermediate Outcome Implementation Status and Results Report Key Performance Indicator Local Government Projects Coordination Unit Millennium Development Goals Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies (Local Governments) Municipal and District Assemblies Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Moderately Satisfactory Medium Term Development Framework Moderately Unsatisfactory Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing Not Applicable

3 NDF NGO NWP PCU PDO PMU PURC QAE QSA SEC SIL STMA TA TAMA ToR TMA UEMOA UESP-1 UESP-2 UNICEF WASH WHO WMD WSDB WSS XDR Norwegian Development Fund Non-government organization National Water Policy Project Coordination Unit Project Development Objective Project Management Unit Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Quality at Entry Quality of Supervision State Enterprises Commission Specific Investment Loan Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly Technical Assistance Tamale Metropolitan Assembly Terms of Reference Tema Municipal/Metropolitan Assembly West African Economic and Monetary Union Urban Environmental Sanitation Project Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project United Nations International Children s Education Fund Water, Sanitation and Hygiene World Health Organization Waste Management Department Water and Sanitation Development Boards Water Supply and Sanitation Special Drawing Rights Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Yusupha Crookes Sector Manager: Alexander Bakalian Project Team Leader: Ventura Bengoechea ICR Team Leader: Sanyu Lutalo

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5 COUNTRY: GHANA Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents MAP

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7 A. Basic Information Country: Ghana Project Name: GH Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA ICR Date: 06/27/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF GHANA Original Total Commitment: XDR 41.60M Disbursed Amount: XDR 39.98M Revised Amount: N/A Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) 1 Co-financiers and Other External Partners: The Nordic Development Fund (NDF); and the French Development Agency (AFD) B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 04/2/2003 Effectiveness: 10/27/ /27/2004 Appraisal: 01/22/2004 Restructuring(s): N/A 6/3/10; 12/5/11; 12/18/12 Approval: 04/29/2004 Mid-term Review: 07/15/ /01/2008 Closing: 06/30/ /31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Substantial Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1 The Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies (MMAs) of the participating cities were responsible for implementation of their respective components under the coordination of the PCU under MLGRD. i

8 C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Moderately Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Overall Borrower Performance 2 Moderately Satisfactory : Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Yes Yes Moderately Satisfactory Quality at Entry (QAE):Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): Rating Unsatisfactory None D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General education sector 2 2 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector Roads and highways 5 5 Sub-national government administration 8 8 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management Other human development Other urban development Pollution management and environmental health Urban services and housing for the poor Based on the ICR guidelines, the composite ratings for Bank and Borrower performance are linked to the overall outcome. ii

9 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Mats Karlsson Sector Manager: Alexander E. Bakalian Inger Andersen Project Team Leader: Ventura Bengoechea Gerhard Tschannerl ICR Team Leader: ICR Primary Author: Ventura Bengoechea Sanyu Lutalo F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective was to improve urban living conditions in regard to environmental health, sanitation, drainage, vehicular access, and solid waste management in a sustainable fashion, with special emphasis on the poor. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Reduction in number of residents of the communities in the project complaining about refuse accumulations and flooding. Value quantitative or Qualitative) % N/A 38.8%. 4 Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (incl. % The target is considered to have been fully achieved. Based on the BA findings, the number of residents complaining about refuse accumulation is estimated to 3 Baseline data was not availed at appraisal but is given as zero since the indicator definition reduction presupposes a zero baseline. 4 The BA did not explicitly include measurement of complaints with respect to the mentioned PDO as defined, but provided data on before and after project conditions which the ICR uses to infer end-ofproject conditions compared to those at appraisal in respect to the target. It estimates the reduction in number of residents not complaining about refuse accumulation based on the difference in respondents without household collection or access to skips (38.8%) before and after the project. iii

10 achievement) have reduced by 38.8%, as explained in the footnote, and those complaining about flooding are inferred as having reduced significantly given the observed reduction in frequency and severity of flooding. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Percent of people living or working near the newly lined drains who report reduced flooding. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 50% N/A (See comment). Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2 : Value (quantitative or Qualitative) The target is considered to have been fully achieved. The BA provided anecdotal evidence indicating that flooding in the project areas was significantly reduced as a result of the project, which the ICR deems to constitute no less than 50 %. Additional number of people and school children gaining access to satisfactory latrines ,000 people and 70,000 school children N/A The estimated total beneficiaries 5 were 238,883; 165,873 for households, 23,590 for public latrines, (i.e. 189,463 people) and 49,420 school beneficiaries. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) The end-of-project target for total beneficiaries was substantially achieved (80%); the combined target for household and public latrines was 82% achieved 6, while that for school beneficiaries was 71% achieved. Indicator 3 : Number of project towns in which the total MSW collected increased by at least 5% per year. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 5 N/A 5 Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments The end-of-project target was 100% achieved. 5 There is a discrepancy between the ISR numbers and the Beneficiary Assessment. Where there is a discrepancy, the latter is considered. 6 The number of public toilets was reduced in favor of additional household latrines due to higher demand for the latter, resulting in a greater number of household latrines, but fewer beneficiaries overall. iv

11 Indicator 4 : Length of access roads to communities surfaced, with roadside drains Value (quantitative or Qualitative) None 11.5 km N/A 11.6 km Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 5 : Number of WMDs in which at least 60% of serviceable waste management equipment is in operating condition. Value Baseline not provided in (quantitative PAD or Qualitative) 5 N/A 5. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (incl. % This indicator was fully achieved (100%). achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 11/12/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory /28/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory /14/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory /15/2006 Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /14/2006 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /25/2007 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /30/2007 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /30/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /26/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /21/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /01/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /10/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /26/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /14/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /11/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /04/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory v

12 H. Restructuring The project was restructured three times. The first restructuring, approved on June 3, 2010, involved an extension of the project closing date by eighteen months, from June 30, 2010 to December 31, 2011 to allow for completion of outstanding activities that had been delayed, and reallocation of funds between categories. The second restructuring, approved on December 5, 2011, involved a second extension of the closing date by five months from December 31, 2011 to May 31, 2012, to allow additional time for completion of works in Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Kumasi, and reallocation of funds between categories. The third and final restructuring approved on December 18, 2012 involved extension of the closing date by an additional seven months from May 31, 2012 to December 31, 2012, to allow additional time for the Government to process compensation payments to Project Affected People (PAPs), and introduction of a new Category Compensation Payments to Project Affected Persons. All three restructurings were Second level Restructurings. I. Disbursement Profile vi

13 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal The Republic of Ghana, West Africa s second most populous 7 country after Nigeria, has maintained steady positive urbanization trends since attaining its independence from Britain in The country s urban population almost doubled between 1960 and 2000, from about 23.1 percent to 43.8 percent; by 2010 it had risen to about 51 percent (Source: UNFPA, 2007, 2009). The five largest cities 8 : Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Tema are home to about 23 percent of Ghana s total population and about half of its urban population. The nation s capital, Accra, and the second largest city, Kumasi, together account for about 34 percent of the urban population and produce almost 20 percent of Ghana s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Ghana s cities are centers of both affluence and poverty, with huge disparities in socioeconomic and urban environmental conditions among high and lower income areas. According to Ghana s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( ), about 14.5 of the country s urban population were classified as poor at the time the project was appraised. Sectoral Background and Key Issues: The provision of basic infrastructure and services such as, housing, water supply, sanitation, urban transport, stormwater drainage, and refuse collection and disposal has unfortunately been unable to keep up with the rapid urbanization. At the time the project was appraised, deficiencies in access to basic infrastructure and services were largely skewed towards the lower income areas, including peri-urban informal settlements and slums, while services were better in the higher and middle income areas where people were willing and able to pay for them. In 2001, almost 70 percent of Ghana s urban population lived in slums 9. Conditions in many low income areas manifested a series of physical, economic, and social characteristics, including, inter-alia: (a) poor aesthetic and unsanitary living conditions due to refuse accumulations; (b) poor road and drainage conditions, leading to soil erosion, siltation of drainage channels, frequent flooding, and inadequate vehicular access, especially during heavy rains; (c) public health concerns linked to creation of breeding sites for disease vectors such as malaria and other water-borne and water-based diseases; and (d) social concerns such as crime and the spread of diseases like HIV. The urban poor, who primarily resided or worked in such areas, suffered disproportionately as a result of these conditions. 7 At appraisal (2003), Ghana had an estimated population of about 20.5 million people; by 2012 the population was estimated at 24.6 million people, about 20 percent growth. 8 The estimated population of the five cities was as follows: Accra (1.9 million, with the Greater Accra area housing 3.2 million people); Kumasi (1.5 million); Sekondi-Takoradi (400,000); Tema (200,000); and Tamale (150,000). 9 According to the 2008 Millennium Development Goals Report, published by National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)/ Government of Ghana and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ghana, April 2010, an estimated 69.6 percent of the urban population lived in slums. 1

14 In addition to, and underlying the mentioned urban infrastructure and services deficiencies, Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies (MMAs) 10, the local government authorities mandated to manage delivery of these services in the cities, faced financial and institutional challenges that further threatened the quality and sustainability of available services. Responsibility for managing environmental sanitation was delegated from central government to the local level (MMAs) in line with the Government of Ghana (GOG) s Decentralization Policy, enacted through the Local Government Service Act passed by the country s Parliament in June However, the transfer of responsibilities for these activities to the Assemblies was done without adequate transfer of resources. Further constraints in the enabling environment such as frequent turnover and inadequate qualification of staff in some areas hindered the MMA s capacity to deliver services in a sustainable manner. These concerns were linked to secondary factors such as, low remuneration in the public service, attrition to the private sector, and frequent transfers within the civil service. Financial constraints due to low revenue generation by the MMAs and inadequate cost recovery also made it difficult for them to operate and maintain the existing systems effectively, much less carry out new infrastructure investments. As a result, MMAs continued to depend on central government subsidies for some of their operations. Previous Interventions: The Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP-2), as its name suggests, was not the first project of its nature in Ghana. Concerns relating to poor urban environmental situation underpinned the conception and implementation of a series of earlier projects initiated by the GoG and partners, including the World Bank. These included: (i) the Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP-1), (Cr GH in the amount of SDR 47.8 million or US$71.0 million equivalent) which was implemented between 1996 and 2003; (ii) the Urban II Project (Cr GH), implemented between 1992 and 1999; (iii) the Priority Works Project (PWP) (Cr 1874-GH in the amount of SDR 7.8 million or US$ 10.6 million equivalent) implemented between 1988 and 1992; and (iv) the Accra District Rehabilitation Project (ADRP) (Cr GH in the amount of SDR 7.8 million or US$ 10.6 million equivalent). All the above projects addressed various elements of environmental sanitation and urban upgrading in low income areas. The UESP-1 and Urban II Projects focused on Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Tema - the same five cities as UESP-2, while the PWP focused on four of them, excluding only Tamale, and the ADRP on only Accra. While the previous projects represented important steps in addressing infrastructure, policy and institutional issues regarding environmental sanitation in the five cities, the GoG acknowledged the fact that significant problems remained, especially in the lower income areas. Policy Context: The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy ( ) (GPRS) outlined the need for additional action to ameliorate the unfavorable environmental health conditions that continued to prevail. The GPRS s priorities focused on, inter-alia, supporting provision of infrastructure, decentralization of responsibilities as a priority for good governance, and creation of an enabling environment for private sector development. The Bank s Country Assistance 10 At appraisal, Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Tamale had the status of Metropolitan Assemblies, while Tema was a Municipal Assembly. However, during implementation Tema was also upgraded to a Metropolitan Assembly. They are abbreviated AMA, KMA, STMA, TAMA, and TMA, respectively, and collectively as MMAs. 2

15 Strategy (CAS) for Ghana for the period was fully aligned with the GPRS, and it identified the provision of urban infrastructure as one of the priority areas for increasing growth. Rationale for Bank Assistance: The UESP-2 was identified during implementation of UESP-1, and was designed as a Repeater Project 11 to scale up investments and services initiated under the latter to improve urban living conditions, as well as to provide opportunity for strengthen institutional capacity to enhance the sustainability of services. The IDA Credit of SDR 41.6 million (US$62.0 million equivalent) for UESP-2 was approved by the Bank s Board of Directors on April 29, 2004, and became effective on October 27, The project was cofinanced by the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), the French Development Agency (AFD), and the Government of Ghana. Implementing Agencies: Implementation arrangements under UESP-2 were different from those of UESP-1, giving greater decentralization of project implementation responsibility to the MMAs. The MLGRD, through the same Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) that managed implementation of the UESP-1, was responsible for overall project co-ordination, supervision, and monitoring. In addition, at the Local Government level, all components of the project, except for Institutional Strengthening, were the responsibility of the respective MMAs, who were responsible for all implementation aspects, including procurement, contract supervision, making payments, and reporting. To assist them with these tasks, MLGRD was to provide technical assistance, monitoring, and capacity building as needed during implementation. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve urban living conditions in regard to environmental health, sanitation, drainage, vehicular access, and solid waste management in a sustainable fashion, with special emphasis on the poor 12. The key development indicator was: Reduction in number of residents of the communities in the project complaining about refuse accumulations and flooding. The intermediate objectives of the project were to: (a) Reduce the frequency, severity, and duration of flooding in low-lying areas; (b) Increase the accessibility for low and middle-income residents and school children to adequate latrines; (c) Increase the amount of refuse collected and disposed of in an environmentally sustainable manner; (d) Increase vehicular access and reduce flooding, erosion, and dust in low-income communities; (e) Enable central and local government agencies to more effectively fulfill their mandate regarding the project objectives, especially the Waste Management Departments (WMDs). 11 According to Bank guidance documents, Repeater Projects are defined as projects whose basic design and effectiveness have been proven, and which a Borrower proposes to augment and scale up. 12 The PDO as stated in the PAD was basically identical to that in the legal agreements, except that the latter specified the five cities where the project was to be implemented. 3

16 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The PDO and indicators were not formally revised. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries The primary target groups of beneficiaries for each component identified in the PAD and captured in the PDO were the following. (a) The main target group for the Drainage Component primarily comprised the urban population in the five towns, living and/or working in low-lying areas, which were subject to frequent flooding. These areas were expected to experience tangible improvements in flood alleviation and control. (b) The main target groups for the Sanitation Component comprised three main groups: (i) the population living in low-income neighborhoods without household latrines; (ii) users of sanitary facilities in public places such as markets and lorry parks where public toilet facilities were constructed; and (iii) school children and teachers, who would benefit from new school sanitation facilities. Envisaged outcomes to these beneficiaries included greater convenience to users, as well as health outcomes such as reduced incidence of diarrheal diseases, including cholera as a result of improvements in hygiene behavior. (c) The main target group for the Solid Waste Management Component comprised residents of the five MMAs, who would directly experience improvements in the quality of solid waste collection and disposal services, as well as those residing or working near the existing refuse dumps who would benefit from better environmental conditions, reduced noxious odors and aesthetic inconveniences, and lower risks to public health. (d) The main target group for the Community Infrastructure Upgrading Component was the population living and/or working in select low-income communities, who were expected to benefit in terms of improved living conditions such as: reduced flooding, erosion, and dust; better access to high-density neighborhoods that had been difficult or impossible to access with a motor vehicle; better neighborhood safety at night; fewer water pipe breakages and more registered water consumers; and improved sanitation. (e) Finally, the main target group for the Institutional Strengthening Component was the administration (Assembly staff) of the five MMAs, particularly the Waste Management Departments and the Environmental Health Departments (EHD), who were to benefit from capacity building efforts to more effectively and efficiently fulfill their responsibilities in regard to environmental sanitation in the long-term with their own resources. Beneficiaries were expected to also include other units in the MMAs, such as the Finance and Planning departments and the Environmental Sanitation Sub-committee of the Assemblies; as well as MLGRD and other stakeholders such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. 4

17 1.5 Original Components (as approved) The project had five components: Component 1 - Storm Drainage (US$16.5 million base cost): This component comprised lining of primary and secondary drains, construction of small bridges, and erosion control in all five MAs. Component 2 - Sanitation (US$7.8 million base cost): This component had the following subcomponents: (a) construction of household latrines and establishment of a domestic latrine delivery program; (b) rehabilitation and construction of public latrines in public places; (c) rehabilitation and construction of school latrines combined with hygiene education and the provision of water supply where needed; (d) rehabilitation or construction of septage treatment facilities; and (e) improved sewerage management in Tema. Component 3 - Solid Waste Management (US$25.7 million base cost): This component had the following subcomponents: (a) construction of new sanitary landfills for Accra and Tema, and the completion of the one in Sekondi-Takoradi; (b) equipment for sanitary landfills; (c) closure, and rehabilitation of existing refuse dumps; (d) operation of sanitary landfills, preceded by the improved operation of some; (e) private solid waste collection; and (f) supply of household bins, skips and skip pads. Component 4 Community Infrastructure Upgrading (US$8.5 million base cost): This component comprised infrastructure upgrading in low-income communities, consisting mainly of access roads, roadside drains, street lighting, water supply, and sanitation. Component 5 - Institutional Strengthening (US$9.6 million base cost, financed by the Norwegian Development Fund (NDF)). This component had several subcomponents: (a) technical assistance and training, (b) capacity building in MLGRD and other central agencies, (c) capacity building in MAs, (d) malaria vector control and HIV/AIDS prevention, (e) project-wide monitoring, (f) reconditioning of waste management equipment, (g) house numbering, and (h) a communications strategy. The project also included Project Management (US$1.1 million base cost), the refunding of the PPF (US$0.6 million), and physical and price contingencies, which initially constituted the Performance-Based Fund 13 (US$11.1 million), adding up to a total project cost of US$ 80.9 million. The Performance-Based Fund would be used to make allocations to the MAs for additional activities within the project objectives according to their achievement of the MA Performance Criteria contained in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) and specified in the Grant Agreement. The MA s performance would be evaluated annually during the joint implementation review of the Steering Committee and IDA. Expenditures for project implementation up to a total of SDR 4.0 million incurred in the period between May 1, 2003 and the signature of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) were eligible for retroactive financing from the Credit. 13 The Performance-Based Fund was to initially be made up of physical and price contingencies, amounting to 13.7% of the total project cost. It was to be enlarged in the course of implementation through possible contributions from NDF and AFD and the transfer of funds that remained uncommitted at the time of the Mid-Term Review. Funds were later reallocated to cover overruns on specific activities. 5

18 1.6 Revised Components The project s components were not formally revised. The scope and/or scale of certain subcomponents was however revised, dropping two key activities: (i) first, the activity concerning rehabilitation and expansion of the Achimota Septage treatment facility for Accra, originally envisaged under the Sanitation Component, was dropped during implementation following a decision by then Mayor of Accra to do so, primarily because of the site s proximity to a new bus terminal for the city incidentally financed by the Bank as well; (ii) second, the activity on construction of the Kwabenya Sanitary Landfill facility for Greater Accra, originally envisaged under the Solid Waste component, which was dropped due to strong public opposition to the location of the site. 1.7 Other significant changes Project Restructuring: The project underwent several other changes, facilitated through three formal restructurings, accordingly followed by amendment of project legal documents during implementation. These are summarized below. a) Extensions of the project closing date: The project closing date was extended by a total of thirty months. The first 14 restructuring, approved on June 3, 2010, involved an extension of the project closing date by eighteen months, from June 30, 2010 to December 31, 2011 to allow for completion of outstanding activities that had been delayed. These were: construction of sanitary landfills in Tema and Sekondi; completion of the Environmental Assessment (EA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for Kwabenya landfill in Accra; provision of solid waste collection services in the five participating cities; construction of the Tema drains; and rehabilitation of dumpsites at Essipon and Kojokrom in Sekondi, and Oblogo and Mallam in Accra. The second restructuring, approved on December 5, 2011, involved a further extension of the closing date by five months from December 31, 2011 to May 31, 2012, to allow additional time for completion of works in Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Kumasi, delayed as a result of unusual rainfall in southern Ghana. Affected works involved: construction of sanitary landfills in Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi; construction of the Tema storm drains; and rehabilitation of the septage treatment plant in the same town. The third restructuring approved on December 18, 2012, involved extension of the closing date by an additional seven months from May 31, 2012 to December 31, It was requested by the GoG to allow additional time for the Government to process compensation payments to Project Affected People (PAP), mainly owners of unfinished structures that were expropriated by the GoG for the proposed Kwabenya sanitary landfill that was to have been financed through the project. Although the construction of this landfill was abandoned, there is an obligation under the DCA to compensate affected people in accordance with the Bank s Safeguards policy. 14 The official letter notifying the Borrower of the Bank s approval for the amendment was dated June 3,

19 b) Reallocation of Credit proceeds among disbursement categories: Three requests by the GoG for reallocation of funds among disbursement categories were approved by the Bank, and effected through the mentioned project restructurings. The first two requests, approved in June 2010 and December 2011 enabled reallocation of funds from activities that had funds in excess of the expected needs to cover overruns on other activities, allowing for completion of several outstanding activities, including the sanitary landfills in Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi, the Tema storm drains and septage treatment plant; procurement of solid waste management equipment in the five participating cities; and closure of waste dumpsites in Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra. The third request, approved on December 18, 2012 together with an amendment to the Credit, introduced a new Category Compensation Payments to Project Affected Persons. The amendment allowed for payment from the Credit proceeds for compensation payments to affected persons under the Kwabenya landfill Plan for compensation and the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). A table summarizing the reallocations is given at the end of Annex 2 2. Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The ICR rates the project s QAE Moderately Unsatisfactory on balance, considering the quality of design and preparation activities, which although sound in many respects, did have some major shortcomings that affected overall implementation. The project design benefitted from rigorous independent scrutiny by a Regional Review Panel, in accordance with OPCS Guidelines ( Building on Success: More Efficient Processing of Repeater Projects ), dated March 17, 2003, to assess its suitability as a Repeater Project to UESP-1. The Review Panel endorsed the overall design approach, subject to the team adequately addressing and incorporating concerns related to three main issues: (i) ensuring sustainability; (ii) risks, such as delays or lack of action by MMAs and other entities; (iii) institutional capacity (for example, of the Waste Management Departments); (iv) the need for updating the Sector Policy underlying UESP-1; and (v) compliance with fiduciary and safeguards requirements. The background analysis was sound, and project design had several strengths. The PAD assessed the fundamental urban environmental sanitation challenges prevailing in Ghana at the time of appraisal, highlighting the opportunity afforded by the project to address priority issues building upon achievements from previous projects. The PDO was clear and responsive to Ghana s development priorities defined through the National Environmental Sanitation Policy established in 1999 and the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS, ), as well as the Bank s CAS. The strategic choice to focus on the five largest cities reflected development priorities, and was designed to scale up the geographic scale and impact of the prior operations. The design considered key lessons from the UESP-1, including the comments of the Review Panel, and global experience in addressing urban environmental sanitation issues. Investment components were technically sound and selected in line with principles of cost-effectiveness. The ICR however notes significant shortcomings in several respects. The first shortcoming relates to concerns in respect to design of the project M&E framework, discussed in more detail 7

20 under Section 2.3. The second relates to shortcomings in the PAD s assessment of some critical risks and subsequent identification of mitigation measures during preparation, indicating inadequate responsiveness to the Review Panel s recommendations in this regard. Mitigation measures for some risks identified as High or Substantial were inadequate, and substantial risks such as those relating to investment sustainability appear to have been under-rated. The ICR considers that the overall risk rating should have been at least Substantial. The third relates to shortcomings in the handling the consultation process in respect to the Kwabenya landfill, which faced local opposition right from the outset. Although several attempts were made by government and project staff to initiate consultations, the local communities were apparently unwilling to avail themselves to discuss the issue with project staff, much less come to a mutually agreeable conclusion. This issue should have been elevated and brought to the attention of higher authorities at the time, to identify appropriate alternatives, including the no go option. The final shortcoming was a lack of readiness in respect to implementation of some activities, due to a failure during project preparation to complete the designs for the first year of implementation in a timely manner. This issue contributed to overall implementation delays. A QAE Assessment was conducted for the project by an independent Quality Assurance Group (QAG) Panel in The Panel judged the project s QAE as Unsatisfactory overall. While the QAG report noted the project s strengths in respect to consistency of the objectives with Government development priorities, and the shift of implementation responsibilities to MMAs in line with Government Decentralization policy, it raised concerns regarding: (a) superficial treatment of sustainability issues, especially given the UESP-1 experience; (b) weaknesses in the implementation arrangements, linked to existing MMA capacity to execute the project; (c) weaknesses in assessment of risks and mitigation measures; and (d) a lack of readiness for implementation at Board approval. The QAG Assessment further observed that while the Review Panel that approved the project for processing as a Repeater made sound recommendations in respect to sustainability and safeguards, they were not adequately addressed in the project design. While the ICR concurs with the validity of the mentioned concerns, and corroborates the opinion that these aspects had shortcomings, it considers the QAG assessment as having been somewhat harsh, hence the MU rating. 2.2 Implementation There were a number of factors during implementation that ultimately affected project implementation and outcomes. Key issues are outlined below. a) Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement Safeguard Issues: Difficulties related to land acquisition were a major concern during implementation, especially for the more environmentally sensitive and potentially controversial elements such as landfills and waste treatment facilities. Land tenure in Ghana is based on a complex system governed by a combination of customary and statutory law. Nearly three quarters of all undeveloped land in Ghana is held through customary law by individuals, families, clans, or tribes, in some cases leased to other parties. Safeguards issues relating to the siting of the Kwabenya landfill in particular were a predominant concern throughout the project s lifetime, and efforts to address them, including preparation of a comprehensive Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), constituted a significant proportion of the project team s supervision activity and resulted in long implementation delays for the activity. During the project s Mid-term-Review (MTR), it became 8

21 obvious that it was unlikely that the landfill construction would be completed by the project closing date. A decision was ultimately made to cancel the landfill construction and reallocate the financing to other activities. It is worth noting that the landfill in question was one of three landfills to be constructed under the solid waste component. Incidentally, there were no major issues with the other two landfills, in Tema, and Sekondi-Takoradi. b) Weaknesses in Implementation Capacity at MA Level: Decentralization of project activities from the MLGRD to the MMA level was not immediately matched by sufficient financial management and operational capacity in some of the participating MMAs. This contributed to the slow start of certain activities, especially the Drainage Component. c) Seasonal Constraints: Prolonged rainy seasons in Southern Ghana slowed down construction progress for a number of activities, leading to requests by the GoG for additional time to complete the activities. Activities that were affected were highlighted earlier under Section 1.7. The seasonal patterns appear to have been an anomaly that could not have been reasonably anticipated and built into implementation scheduling. d) Price Escalations: Sub-project costs were affected by price escalations during implementation, leading to budget overruns for certain activities. In 2006 a decision was made to address some of the overruns by tapping into the Performance-Based Fund, and later on, as earlier discussed, some funds were reallocated among Disbursement Categories as part of restructuring to address this issue. e) Delays in Release of Counterpart Funds: Delays in release of counterpart funds at both Government and MMA levels affected staff morale and overall project implementation progress in some MAs. A case in point was in the Sekondi-Takoradi MA, where issues with release of counterpart funds affected operating costs, including the costs of running project offices. f) Slow Start of Institutional Strengthening Component: The Institutional Strengthening Component, which was co-financed by the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) experienced a slow implementation start. Identification and mobilization of suitable international consultants was delayed due to a high turnover of international consultants especially at the beginning of implementation. Because of the slow start, many of the institutional strengthening activities, including training, were delivered in a short space of time, which according to the BA findings affected the effectiveness and uptake of learning and skills by MA staff and other beneficiaries. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization M&E Design Rating: Unsatisfactory. Design of the project s Results Framework and the indicators identified for monitoring progress towards achievement of the PDO as laid out in the PAD, is rated Unsatisfactory, due to the following shortcomings; (a) the absence of baseline data in the Results Framework presented in the PAD at approval; (b) weaknesses in the definition of some indicators, in terms of ease of data collection or completeness - for example, the choice of indicator for measuring PDO results, focused on beneficiary complaints regarding only two of the four elements of environmental sanitation addressed by the project, refuse collection and 9

22 flooding. The rationale for focusing on only these two elements was unclear; and (c) the failure to disaggregate the results by project area and not just by infrastructure element, to allow for an assessment of the achievement of objectives in each city. M&E Implementation and Utilization Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. While most aspects of M&E in relation to project inputs and outputs, were routinely conducted by the PCU and MMAs in compliance with Bank requirements, allowing key issues to be identified and addressed, M&E utilization and implementation is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) due to major shortcomings in respect to results measurement, specifically in monitoring of project outcome data and ensuring timely completion of the BAs, as the key methodology for outcome measurement. Completion of the final BA, which was conducted in a resource constrained environment after the project closed, was significantly delayed. In retrospect, the project should have specifically included the BAs as deliverables in the procurement plan and allocated adequate resources for them to be conducted prior to closing. An opportunity was also missed during implementation to restructure the Results Framework. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The project triggered two Bank Safeguards Policies: (a) OP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment (EA); and (b) OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. Overall safeguards compliance under the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory on balance, considering handling of safeguards issues for all project activities during the preparation and implementation phases of the project. While there were significant shortcomings in the handling of certain activities, particularly the Kwabenya landfill, the ICR notes that safeguards for most of the other activities were managed in a satisfactory manner with minor shortcomings. Given the impact however of issues surrounding Kwabenya, the ICR discusses key elements of the case below. The Kwabenya Sanitary Landfill Case: Selection of the Kwabenya site was based on a 1993 Urban Strategy for Accra financed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which ranked the suitability of the site highest among five alternative sites. There was an earlier effort in 1999/2000 by the United Kingdom s Department for International Development (DFID) to finance construction of a landfill at the proposed site. DFID carried out an EA and financed an access road and a drainage culvert to the area as part of preliminary activities towards this effort. The Agency however eventually abandoned the construction of the landfill due to failure to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of land right claims with local owners and leaseholders, even though the area was virtually unoccupied at the time. After construction of the access road, people rapidly moved into the area and/or begun to work within proximity of the site, a situation that considerably changed the baseline conditions since the DFID EA. The Project s 2003 Environmental and Social Assessment (ESIA) for the landfill used the DFID EA as a basis, which in retrospect was somewhat misleading given the changing conditions on the ground. The project was rated as a Category A due to the landfill activities, and the Review Panel for the Repeater Project recommended that it be processed as a new project. The PAD noted that prior to appraisal, the determined opposition of a group of affected people at Kwabenya to further consultations on compensation and resettlement is jeopardizing the preparation for the 10

23 construction and poses the risk that the landfill could not be located at this site. While this statement alluded to a breakdown in the consultation process that presaged future challenges with implementing this activity, there is little evidence of any clear measures to assess the reasons for DFID s failure in order to mitigate the risk, including consideration of suitable alternatives, beyond the general statement that policy on Involuntary Resettlement would be followed, including preparation of a RAP which would be closely supervised by the Bank. The Inspection 15 : During implementation, the PAPs, organized under the so-called Agyemankata Community 16, requested an Inspection through the Accra-based Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE), on the project s handling of their concerns with the World Bank s Inspection Panel. Key concerns pertained to the landfill construction resulting in involuntary displacement of much of the Community, and not being operated and maintained in a satisfactory manner, potentially threatening the health and wellbeing of surrounding communities. The requesters further alleged that the Bank had failed to comply with its policy on Involuntary Resettlement because it had not ensured meaningful consultation with affected and displaced people, and not ensured that they were informed about their options and rights and offered choices and feasible alternatives. They contended that decisions taken by the local authority, without adequate consultation and disclosure of information demonstrated a lack of commitment to implementing a resettlement instrument that met Bank policy. The allegations seemed to be corroborated by the QAE Assessment which was critical of the submitted RPF, characterizing it as somewhat disorganized, unfocused, vague and repetitive, and insufficiently operational, and stated that the team appears to have underestimated the grounds of remaining objections in the Kwabenya area. An independent investigation on the matter was conducted by the Inspection Panel in March A recurring theme in the investigation was the difficulties encountered in designing and implementing a project when positions amongst project stakeholders have hardened, trust has been lost, and there is an impasse. The Inspection Panel observed that the project did not take all the required measures to address safeguard issues arising in the project, contrary to the Repeater Project Review Panel s advice in The Inspection Panel determined that the Bank did not comply with several provisions of Bank policies on EA, Involuntary resettlement, and Project Supervision. These included provisions related to analysis of alternative sites for a landfill, analysis of impacts in the area of influence of the project, environmental management planning, and resettlement planning. The ICR noted that project supervision reporting did not adequately flag the critical social and environmental safeguards issues pertaining to Kwabenya to prompt sufficient response in terms of intensified supervision or other measures until the MTR, after the request for inspection. 15 The Inspection Panel was created in September 1993 by the World Bank s Board of Directors to serve as an independent mechanism to ensure accountability in Bank operations with respect to its policies and procedures. The Panel is an instrument for groups of two or more private citizens who believe that they or their interests have been or could be harmed by Bank financed activities to present their concerns through a Request for Inspection. 16 The Agyemankata Community represented a community of interest, rather than a geographical community, representing the interests of the Kwabenya residents and land leasers. 11

24 After the Request for Inspection, several remedial actions were initiated by the Bank. These included the preparation of an updated EIA and RAP. The Bank also strengthened its supervision team, fielding more senior Safeguards staff to the project to help address ongoing concerns. A decision was eventually made by the GoG at the MTR in October 2010, to abandon the development and reallocate the funds intended for the landfill to ongoing activities that were experiencing budget overruns, on the understanding that additional funds would be requested by the Government at a later date if agreed. Compensation Arrangements and Current Status: Although the landfill construction was abandoned, there is a continuing obligation under the Development Credit Agreement, to conclude the process and compensate affected people in accordance with Bank policy. During the Spring Meetings in April 2012, the GoG requested Bank approval to use Credit proceeds to pay compensation for the 76 inhabited structures identified in the draft RAP, while committing to pay for the land from their own funds. Bank Management authorized the use of Credit proceeds to pay for the compensation, and granted a 7 month extension of the closing date (through December 31, 2012) in order to allow for the appropriate processing of payments. All payments were expected to be completed prior to the end of four month grace period after the Credit closing date. However, despite efforts by GoG and AMA, payment of compensation was not completed by the said date. Some reasons for this were: (a) the fact that some PAP s refuse compensation, apparently because they hope to hold onto the land; and (b) some PAP s claim that offered compensation does not reflect inflation and current market values. Although the site was eventually not used for the Bank financed project, resettlement obligations survive the closing of the project, as do Bank supervision obligations. The Bank and GoG were yet to agree on a final way forward in respect to this matter at the time the ICR was prepared. Fiduciary Compliance Financial Management Rating: Moderately Satisfactory: The ICR rates Financial Management (FM) compliance under the project Moderately Satisfactory, considering overall compliance with Bank policy and procedural requirements during project preparation and implementation as having been conducted in a satisfactory manner with moderate shortcomings. An FM Assessment was conducted for the MLGRD and the five participating MAs as part of project preparation. Responsibility for FM lay with the MLGRD s Head of Accounts and the Municipal Finance officers of the MMAs, whose capacities were assessed to be generally adequate to perform required tasks. The assessment however determined that certain actions needed to be undertaken in terms of streamlining procedures and staff training in disbursement procedures to fully meet the Bank s FM requirements. A Financial Procedure Manual for the MAs was prepared to ensure that uniform procedures were used for financial transactions, and the project included training in financial management aspects. Financial Management was generally satisfactory through the project implementation period, with moderate shortcomings. Quarterly financial reports were submitted to the Bank in a timely manner, and annual audit reports of the project accounts by independent external auditors raised no significant issues. Shortcomings primarily involved, lack of regular updating of the 12

25 Commitment Schedule, and delays in recovering advances made to the MAs. The final ISR therefore rated the project s FM rating Moderately Satisfactory. Procurement Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. Implementation of the Procurement function under the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory, based on its overall compliance with relevant Bank and country procedures during project preparation and implementation, with moderate shortcomings. A Procurement Capacity Assessment for the project was conducted as part of preparation, and the overall procurement risk in regard to the project was rated Average, which would be considered Moderate under current risk rating procedures. Procurement responsibilities for the Institutional Strengthening component and overall backstopping of the MAs lay with the PCU within MLGRD, which was experienced with implementation of Bank projects. The MAs were responsible for procurement of activities in their respective sub-components. Shortcomings in respect to procurement noted during implementation and through the BA included difficulties in selection of high quality contractors and suppliers, which led to issues such as procurement delays, procurement of poor quality equipment, and in the case of the NDF component, failure to access the fund for certain activities. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Most project financed investments and services are operational. While the project has tried to ensure that appropriate technical, institutional, and financial provisions are in place to sustainably operate most of them, ensuring the long-term sustainability of some elements will require fulfillment of certain conditions and recommendations discussed below. Operation of Drainage Facilities: Most drains dredged or constructed under the project are functional and there has been a notable reduction in flooding and associated impacts in the participating cities. However, ensuring the long-term sustainability of investments to avoid a recurrence of flooding and other impacts will call for a concerted effort and commitment by all the MMAs to provide continued support and allocate adequate resources to the DMUs established to manage the drains at the MMA level. Initial findings from the BA indicate that O&M of the drainage facilities is being better managed in some MAs, such as Kumasi, Sekondi- Takoradi, and Tamale, than in others. The new project in Accra (see below) will provide opportunity for further strengthening of the AMA to manage these facilities. Solid Waste Management Operations: There has been an overall improvement in management of solid wastes in the participating towns and services are generally being delivered effectively. Overall however, cost recovery has been skewed more towards the higher income parts of the cities where people are able to pay for services. Recovery of waste collection and disposal costs in low income areas has been much more difficult, requiring subsidies from the MMAs, which are themselves often budget constrained. The project design had allowed for provision of financial support on a declining basis during implementation, for items such as O&M of sanitary landfills and private solid waste collection, where UESP-1 experience had indicated difficulty in financing O&M from internally generated revenues. Sustaining adequate waste collection and disposal services without this financial support is difficult, and ensuring service delivery will require continued support through MMAs at least for the short- to medium-term. It is important 13

26 to note that for infrastructure investments and services targeting the poor, it is not uncommon to continue to require some form of cross-subsidy among beneficiary groups and/or continued support from MAs from revenues other than direct user fees. Operation of Sanitation Facilities: While most sanitation facilities are generally functional at the time of the ICR, emerging evidence on the likelihood for their long-term sustainability varies, with household, public, and most school toilets likely to be sustainable, while a few school facilities will require greater efforts to operate sustainably. Household latrines, which were cofinanced by, and are being operated and maintained by owners, are likely to continue to operate in a sustainable manner. Most public latrines were also strategically located in high density commercial areas such as markets and they are likely to be operated and maintained in a sustainable manner, financed through user charges, with MMA oversight and/or private sector involvement. The experience with school facilities has however been mixed. While facilities in most schools are being operated and maintained in a satisfactory manner, facilities were observed to be in a poor state of repair or otherwise non-functional in a few. Key reasons for the latter include: vandalism or improper usage, inadequate maintenance, and unreliable water supply in water based facilities. Ensuring the sustainability of school toilet facilities will require three key interventions: (a) continued awareness raising and education of students and school personnel in the proper use and maintenance of facilities; (b) allocation or collection of adequate resources for toilet O&M in each beneficiary school, including provision of reliable water supply and soap; and (c) establishment of a system of ensuring that school authorities are held accountable for facilities provided. Community Infrastructure Upgrading: Interventions in community upgrading are operational and have had a very positive social, economic, and environmental impact on the targeted low income communities. Maintenance of the infrastructure is the responsibility of the respective MMAs and the communities. In light of the identified resource constraints to some MMAs, the likelihood of sustainability of investments would be enhanced through greater direct community involvement in maintenance of facilities, as the primary beneficiaries. Follow-on Bank Operation: In response to continued need for addressing urban environmental sanitation and water supply needs in the Greater Accra Metropolitan area (GAMA), the Bank s Board recently approved a follow-on Greater Accra Sanitation and Water Project (GASWP) in the amount of SDR million (US$150 million equivalent). The objective of the GASWP is to increase access to safe water and improved sanitation to people in the GAMA, with emphasis on low income communities, and to improve planning, implementation and management of environmental sanitation in the GAMA. This project builds upon lessons learned from the UESP- 2 and will serve as an important opportunity to advance the impact on environmental sanitation, especially in the Greater Accra area, and more importantly to address the sustainability questions regarding investments and services in the city, as well as for other cities which could benefit from some of the broader institutional strengthening activities. 14

27 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: High. The PDO remains highly relevant to Ghana s development priorities and the Bank s Assistance Strategy. Ghana s Environmental Sanitation Policy (ESP), revised 17 in 2010 recognizes environmental sanitation as one of the most powerful drivers of human development. Environmental sanitation is also an important consideration in Ghana s Medium Term Development Policy Framework (MTDPF, ) and its predecessor the Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) ( ). The Development Policy Framework is informed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The PDO is also consistent with thematic pillars of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA, ), focusing on: (i) infrastructure and human settlements development; and (ii) transparent and accountable governance, both of which were addressed by the project. Finally, the project is consistent with the Bank s priorities, expressed in its CPS for , whose fourth pillar focuses on provision of strategic infrastructure, including access to improved water supply, sanitation, and urban services Design and Implementation Rating: Substantial. Relevance of project design and implementation of the project is considered Substantial, recognizing its strengths in responding to relevant development priorities and general good practice in respect to technical, institutional, and economic considerations, while noting some shortcomings in design, especially M&E, as discussed under QAE sections above. Project design in respect to the scope of activities was adjusted during implementation to reflect changes in Government priorities. Design of project implementation arrangements, involving delegation of responsibility for implementation from Central Government to the respective MAs with MLGRD oversight remains consistent with the Government s policy on decentralization and is considered best practice for enhancing local ownership and sustainability of the institutional capacity implement such programs. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives This section addresses the efficacy of achievement of the PDO by assessing the aggregate of outcomes against end-of-project targets identified in the Results Framework where available, and from analysis of the extent to which the project achieved the various elements of the PDO as confirmed through the Beneficiary Assessment. The ICR goes on to consider the element of sustainability as a key component of the PDO, by addressing the likelihood of the achieved outcomes being sustainable in the long term. Emphasis on the poor was implicitly built into the project design by specifically targeting lower income areas as the primary micro project areas in each MMA. 17 The original ESP was prepared in

28 Achievement of PDO Improved urban living conditions in regard to environmental health, sanitation, drainage, vehicular access, and solid waste management in a sustainable manner with special emphasis on the poor. Key Outcome Indicator: Reduction in the number of residents of the communities in the project areas complaining about refuse accumulations and flooding Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 18. The project achieved its overall development objective of improving urban living conditions in regard to environmental health, sanitation, drainage, vehicular access, and solid waste management in the project areas in a satisfactory manner, with moderate shortcomings on balance, mostly linked to concerns in respect to the long-term sustainability of some investments and outcomes under some components. There was a percent reduction in residents interviewed through the BA complaining about issues with refuse collection after the project, exceeding the targeted 15 percent in respect to the defined PDO indicator. Respondents also confirmed that overall the project has contributed to a significant reduction in flooding. A detailed analysis with respect to achievement of the individual IOs is presented below, and considered an integral part of assessing achievement of the PDO. Achievement of Intermediate Objective (IO) 1 - Reduced frequency, severity, and duration of flooding in low lying areas. Outcome indicator: Percent of people living or working near the newly lined drains who report reduced flooding IO Achieved: This IO is considered to have been fully achieved, with moderate shortcomings linked to sustainability of O&M of drainage investments in some MMAs. The ICR infers from anecdotal evidence provided in project documents and confirmed in the BA, that the project has resulted in improved urban living conditions in regard to improved drainage, including a reduction in the frequency, severity, and duration of floods. Additional associated outcomes include reduced risk of loss of life and property, reduced safety and public health hazards, and less disruption of communications due to improved accessibility. The reduction in flooding and improvements in the drainage network has also contributed to improved living conditions of residents by reducing the occurrence of stagnant water that acts as breeding ground for disease vectors such as mosquitoes which cause Malaria. Outputs: The project, through its Drainage component was able finance the realignment, dredging, and lining of 16.8 km of primary and secondary storm drains in Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi/Takoradi, and Tema, exceeding the 16.7 km envisaged during appraisal. It also financed erosion control measures and construction of small bridges in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and Tema, all of which contributed to the mentioned impacts. (See photographs in Annex 2). 18 Given the multi-pronged nature of the PDO, this rating is based on the aggregate of the ICR s assessment of achievement of the project development objective and intermediate objectives, as reflected through the KOI, the IOs, and other available data. 19 The explanation for assessment of this estimate is given in footnote linked to the Results Framework in the datasheet. 16

29 Sustainability: While the Drainage component fully achieved its intended outcomes in the shortto medium-term, the sustainability of investments will depend on the MMAs ability to maintain the operations of the DMAs through adequate support and funding, and the extent to which communities are sensitized and motivated to properly maintain the drainage channels and avoid improper usage such as refuse dumping. Achievement of Intermediate Outcome 2 - Increased accessibility for low and middleincome residents and school children to adequate latrines. Outcome Indicator: Additional number of people and school children gaining access to satisfactory latrines IO Substantially Achieved: This IO is considered to have been substantially achieved, with moderate shortcomings linked to sustainability of O&M of sanitation investments in some schools. The project resulted in increased accessibility of an estimated 80 percent of low and middle income residents and school children in the beneficiary communities to adequate latrines. Access to improved sanitation is expected to bestow benefits to beneficiaries on many levels, including advantages for public health, livelihoods and dignity-advantages. The higher level public health, environmental, social and economic benefits of access to improved sanitation, though not explicitly measured as part of project monitoring, are nonetheless considered integral to the project, and the project is expected to have contributed to their achievement among the beneficiary communities. Furthermore, in the communities where project activities have taken place, the residents demonstrated knowledge of hygiene practices, and linkages between sanitation, water and disease, increasing their likelihood of attaining the full health benefits of investments. Further training and education activities are nonetheless needed to continue reinforcing the hygiene messages that were communicated to community members. Table 3.2 Access to latrines before and after the project Response Household latrines Public latrines School Latrine Before After Before After Before After % % % % % % Yes No Total Source: Beneficiary Assessment, May 2013 Outputs: Based on the end of project results indicators, 1,412 toilet seats were completed overall, representing an achievement of about 85 percent of the targeted 1,670. These included: 8501 household latrines; 36 public facilities comprising a total of 674 seats; and 157 toilet facilities constructed in schools 20 identified by the respective MAs as being in the most need in the five project cities. Interestingly, the total number of persons reduced because there was a much higher demand for household rather than public latrines than had been envisaged, ultimately leading to the project exceeding the targeted number of household latrines while reducing the 20 School facilities typically had seats. 17

30 number of public latrines constructed, but providing access to fewer people. Provision of household latrines however contributed directly to Ghana s MDGs with respect to Access to improved sanitation. The success of the household latrine component in exceeding the physical targets can be attributed in large part to the strategy adopted in marketing and administering the scheme through the use of Management Intermediaries (MIs), who basically comprised local artisans. Sustainability: While household and public latrines are likely to continue operating in a sustainable manner, some school facilities, as noted under Section 2.5 above, will require continued support in terms of education and awareness raising in proper operations and maintenance, and enforcement of a system of ensuring adequate resource allocation for operation and maintenance, including for provision of sustainable water supply and soap where necessary. Achievement of Intermediate Outcome 3 - Increased amount of refuse collected and disposed of in an environmentally sustainable manner. Outcome Indicator: Number of project towns in which the total MSW collected increased by at least 5% per year IO Fully Achieved: This IO is considered to have been fully achieved, with moderate shortcomings on balance, mostly linked to concerns in respect to the financial viability of services to low-income areas and the long-term sustainability of waste disposal in Accra. The project has contributed to improvements in the collection and disposal of refuse in an environmentally sustainable manner in all project cities. The closure and rehabilitation of existing refuse dumps in Accra, Takoradi, and Kumasi has greatly improved the environmental and aesthetic conditions in the surrounding areas, and even contributed to additional benefits such as reclamation of the land over rehabilitated dumpsites for other uses. In Kumasi for instance, the rehabilitated dumpsite is being put to use by surrounding communities as a community sports ground (see photographs in Annex 2). Sanitary landfills in Tema and Sekondi- Takoradi completed through the project are allowing for environmentally sustainable disposal of waste from those cities. Although the Kwabenya landfill was not constructed, some of the waste from Accra is now being transported to the Tema landfill. In addition, there was an overall improvement in collection of solid wastes at the household and broader community levels, largely based on private sector involvement introduced during implementation of UESP-1, with at least two thirds of respondents to the BA confirming that waste collection services were available in their communities after the project. According to project documents, all the MAs increased the volume of waste collected over the project implementation period by at least five percent annually on average. Methods of waste disposal among beneficiary communities have also improved substantially at the household and broader MA levels as a result of the project, and fewer people are using unsanitary waste disposal methods such as indiscriminate disposal in the bush or in water logged areas, disposal in unsanitary dumps, burying, or burning, which impact the environment negatively. Outputs: Most of the envisaged outputs under this component, with the exception of the Kwabenya landfill, were completed in a satisfactory manner. These included: (a) construction and provision of equipment for a new sanitary landfill in Tema; (b) completion of construction and provision of equipment for a partially complete landfill in Sekondi-Takoradi; (c) closure and 18

31 rehabilitation of existing refuse dumps in Accra, Takoradi, and Kumasi; and (d) the provision of household bins, skips, and skip pads, which are assisting waste collection and disposal and improving the overall urban environmental conditions. Sustainability: While waste collection in higher income areas where people are willing and able to pay for services are likely to remain sustainable on a direct cost-recovery basis from users, services in lower income areas will continue to require support from the MMAs in the short-tomedium term in order to maintain operations in an environmentally sustainable manner. It is also imperative that a long-term solution for disposal of the capital city s waste is identified as the use of the Tema landfill will not be sustainable in the long-term. Intermediate Outcome 4 - Increased vehicular access and reduced flooding, erosion and dust in low-income communities. Outcome Indicator: Length of access roads to communities surfaced, with roadside drains. IO Fully Achieved. The project fully achieved its intermediate objective of improving urban living conditions in regard to vehicular access, and reduced flooding, erosion, and dust in the beneficiary low-income communities through various community infrastructure upgrading The interventions have not only contributed to improved urban environmental conditions which have a direct impact on overall public health and social wellbeing, but also to increased property values and overall economic growth in the beneficiary communities. Beneficiaries confirmed that project interventions have inadvertently resulted in provision of an all-weather reliability road which will make possible smooth transportation all-year-round, as well as improved hygiene and public health conditions, appreciation of land values, promotion of urban renewal and appreciation of frontage properties, and improved access to basic services like water. Additional outcomes confirmed through the BA included improvements in community and neighborhood security through the provision of street lights and access roads to hitherto inaccessible communities. Annex 2 provides some pictures illustrating the dramatic improvement in some of the communities as a result of activities financed through this component. Key Outputs and Sustainability: Key outputs included; rehabilitation and resurfacing of 16.8 km of roads; construction of roadside drains; and provision of security lighting in twelve communities in the five MMAs. Long term sustainability of investments will require a combined effort by the MMAs and communities to maintain the facilities. Intermediate Outcome 5 Central and Local Government agencies enabled to more effectively fulfill their mandate regarding the project objectives, especially the Waste Management Departments (WMDs). Outcome Indicator: Number of WMDs in which at least 60% of the serviceable waste management equipment is in operating condition IO Substantially Achieved: This IO is considered to have been substantially achieved with moderate shortcomings. The project, through implementation of the Institutional Strengthening Component, was able to contribute to enhancement of central and local government capacity to fulfill their respective roles in terms of managing various aspects of urban environmental sanitation. Achievement of the relevant target focused on equipment provided through the 19

32 project, including office equipment, computer hardware and software, vehicles since this represented the majority of equipment available in the MAs. Most equipment supplied or reconditioned through the project was found to be in operating condition at the end of the project, and the target in respect to the number of WMDs in which at least 60 percent of serviceable waste management equipment is in operating condition was met. A summary of achieved outcomes is presented below. Outputs: Capacity within the MMAs and other departments involved in environmental sanitation management, such as the Ghana Health Service and the Ghana Education, has been strengthened through training to manage various issues including: human resources, financial management and accounting, billing and collection of revenues, legal and regulatory issues, public communications, public health, and general operations aspects such as drain maintenance. The MMA capacity has also been strengthened for management of information and monitoring through design and installation of MIS software. Institutional capacity has also been strengthened substantially through the equipment provided to the MMAs, including office equipment and vehicles. MMAs however continue to rely heavily on central government transfers to cover their operating expenses. A more detailed description of the achievements and outputs under this component is presented in Annex 2. Sustainability: While the mentioned activities represented an important step in equipping the MAs to more effectively carry out their roles, the sustainability of the outcomes is still compromised by exogenous factors such as: (a) the weak compensation and incentive structure in the MAs to attract, motivate, and maintain highly qualified staff an issue that would call for civil service reforms beyond the control of the project; and (b) the inadequate revenue flow to the MAs to fully cover operation and maintenance costs, which would call for reforms beyond the scope of the project. It is also imperative that: (a) the MAs develop and enforce sound maintenance practices for equipment; (b) training programs developed for staff on pertinent issues such as drain maintenance, communication for behavior change, etc., are sustained; and (c) Drainage Maintenance Units are maintained and/or strengthened for all MAs, with adequate facilitation provided in terms of resources. 3.3 Efficiency Cost-effectiveness rather than Cost-benefit analysis was used as a measure of efficiency at appraisal because key project outputs were considered as not having market prices that could be readily assessed, precluding measurement of benefits in monetary terms. The analysis at appraisal focused on two sub-components: (a) storm drains, and (b) latrines in residential areas. The stream of costs over the economic life of the investments was discounted to the present to determine the least-cost solution. In selecting the best option, additional information on nonquantifiable costs and benefits was considered. Based on availability of data, the ICR considered cost-effectiveness of the same components. A detailed analysis is presented in Annex 3. Storm Drains: During appraisal three alternatives were analyzed: (a) dredging to increase the channel profile without lining; (b) dredging and lining with a trapezoidal profile; and (c) dredging and lining with a rectangular profile. Common assumptions for all 3 designs were an economic life of 15 years and a drain design that would prevent floods of more than a 15-year 20

33 frequency. The evaluation was made under different scenarios of recurrent costs and discount rates. For the most realistic scenario of recurrent costs the trapezoidal channel was found to be the least-cost solution. Yet, the rectangular channel was found to be the preferred option under certain circumstances, such scarcity or high value of land, and when involuntary resettlement was needed. The implementation of the project followed these findings and applied a combination of both technologies. The expected benefits, primarily linked to flood alleviation and control were achieved. Out of 16.8 km built, 4.7 km were built with a rectangular profile, and the remaining 12.1 with a trapezoidal profile. The actual cost of the project was US$ 20.8 million, which at 2004 prices corresponds to USD 14.5 million (see details in Annex 3), which is lower than the USD 16.5 million estimated at appraisal. The actual cost per km is USD 863,000, 13% lower than the US$ 1 million estimated at appraisal. For 80 thousand beneficiaries the actual investment cost per capita was therefore USD 181 compared to US$ 205 at appraisal. These results show that the project attained the expected benefits at lower costs than foreseen at appraisal, which makes the drainage component highly efficient. Latrines: Final project costs for the Sanitation Component were compared with the appraisal estimates. For comparing actual investment costs, they were transformed to 2004 prices to eliminate price fluctuations, which were significant during the project implementation period. The costs of labor and construction materials for these facilities in Ghana are estimated to have increased by between 40 percent and 100 percent between 2004 and 2007 according to available records, coinciding with the period during which most tenders were made, leading to substantial budget overruns. By 2012 prices were 2.6 times higher than at Exchange rate fluctuation was also significant, and local currency depreciated its value by half. When actual costs at 2004 price are compared to those foreseen at appraisal (Table 3.2b), the total cost is found to be 5 percent higher. Household latrines had actual cost 55 percent higher, while public and school latrines had costs 42 percent and 26 percent lower. The cost overruns notwithstanding, the project was able to finance more household latrines than had been envisaged (8501 compared to 8200), due to the high demand for household latrines compared to public ones, which led to the latter being scaled down from 91 to 36. The increase in household latrines however represented a lower number of seats and coverage of individual beneficiaries. In the case of household latrines, the Bank Credit was envisaged to contribute 50 percent of total costs per household or US$150, whichever was lower, with the remainder to be contributed by the beneficiaries in cash and/or in kind. Due to the price escalations however, the individual households in fact had to pay the higher difference in cost. The actual per capita cost of household latrines (US$ 25) was about 50 percent higher than appraisal estimate, and 70 percent higher for public latrines and 5 percent of school latrines. Actual per capita costs for the latrines, even though higher than estimated, lie well within limits of acceptable costs, which makes them efficient and therefore the project results are acceptable in economic terms. Based on available WASH cost data 21 from Ghana and several 21 Data is based on sanitation expenditure and service levels emerging from WASHCost s research, led by IRC International Water and Sanitation Center WASHcost Programme, which collected and analyzed cost and service 21

34 other countries, the actual costs of the facilities fall within the average range of costs for similar facilities: according to the data, the per capita costs for VIP household latrines cost between US$5-51), while the per capita costs for pour flush and septic tank latrines, similar to models used for school and some public facilities cost between US$13-51). Based on the above analysis, detailed in Annex 3, the Efficiency of the project would have been assessed as Satisfactory. The ICR however additionally takes into consideration the total project implementation delay of about two and a half years, and slightly downgrades the rating for efficiency to Moderately Satisfactory. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The overall outcome rating for the project considers the PDO s high relevance, Moderately Satisfactory efficacy, and Moderate efficiency. The project was able to substantially achieve its development objective in a reasonably efficient manner, with moderate shortcomings. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty and Gender Impact: It can be reasonably concluded that in targeting the investments to improve the living conditions of people in low income areas of the five cities, the project contributed to conditions that would alleviate poverty in these areas. Moreover, the household selection criteria for specific sub-components such as the latrine sub-component did place specific emphasis on needy households in recognition of the vulnerability of these groups. The project also helped to support vulnerable groups through informal economic activities, for instance scavengers from the old waste dumps were able to organize themselves into semiformal groups which are now involved in recycling activities at the new landfills. Many of these individuals, both male and female, are poor, and the opportunity availed through the project helped to provide them with a source of income under much improved working conditions 22. While M&E during implementation did not disaggregate data by gender, the BA provided some disaggregated data by gender where appropriate. The data basically confirmed equal access by both genders to all project benefits in beneficiary communities. An additional positive impact related to gender realized through the project, was the increased school attendance of girls as a result of the provision of school toilet facilities confirmed during the ICR interviews. level information for water, sanitation and hygiene in rural and peri-urban areas, applying the life-cycle costs approach from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Andhra Pradesh (India) and Mozambique. 22 The Scavenger organizations maintain certain minimum standards during operations, including mandatory wearing of special gear for improved health and safety. 22

35 (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The project explicitly sought to strengthen the institutions responsible for operation and maintenance of urban environmental services in the five participating MMAs to ensure that these services are managed in a sustainable manner, through its Institutional Strengthening Component, financed by the NDF, and supervised by the Bank. Achievements in this regard are discussed under the relevant IO 5 above. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) There were no major unintended outcomes or impacts. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops A BA was conducted by independent consultants commissioned by the MLGRD in April and May 2013 to assess the extent to which the project achieved desired development outcomes among intended beneficiaries and to obtain critical feedback on how such interventions can be improved in the future. The respondents represented various stakeholders, including beneficiaries in communities and schools, the project officers and officers from the municipal assemblies who supervised the constructional work and were part of the conceptualization, planning, design and implementation of the project, and other stakeholders. The BA findings confirmed the substantial achievement of the PDO, with moderate shortcomings as discussed under the section on Achievement of Outcomes. A detailed summary of the main findings is presented in Annex Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial. The risk that development outcomes from the project will not be maintained is rated substantial, based on the aggregate of risks to maintaining the outcomes achieved under different project components, some of which are discussed below. Financial and Institutional Risks: Risks from a financial and institutional perspective are considered substantial. There is a risk that some MMAs may not allocate adequate resources for proper operation and maintenance of facilities. Mitigation of this risk will depend on a combination of political will and institutional factors primarily involving central and local government maintaining policies for sound management, provision of continued support, and cost-recovery in the medium- to long-term; and making adequate budgetary provisions for covering deficits for service provision in the interim. The project has helped MAs to improve their overall collection efficiency and to establish charges for local services such as solid waste collection. While a successful implementation of these measures will contribute to improving financial sustainability, the MAs will require additional reforms of their internal revenue generation mechanisms beyond the scope of the project to ensure sustained revenue flows. These issues will also require continued support from the MMAs and Government through enactment of supportive policies as part of its Decentralization agenda. Social and Attitudinal Risks: Risks from a social and attitudinal perspective are considered substantial. Maintaining the development outcomes achieved by the project will require project beneficiaries to remain motivated to continue operating and maintaining the facilities in a sustainable manner, including paying needed contributions towards cost recovery or user charges 23

36 as applicable. The provision of hygiene and sanitation education and sensitization to beneficiaries was a first step in addressing this risk by creating a greater awareness of the benefits of using improved environmental sanitation facilities and services. More should be done to maintain the engagement with beneficiary communities on these issues, including continued sensitization of school children and adults on the proper use and maintenance of drainage and toilet facilities. This will require a joint effort by relevant stakeholders, including school administration officials, parents, and students. MMAs and communities should also continue to monitor and hold accountable the stakeholders responsible for management of public facilities to assure good practices and availability of sufficient resources for their management. A mechanism for ensuring social accountability, where the citizens and communities are also able to hold local governments accountable for doing their part in managing facilities and vice versa should be established. Such initiatives could be spearheaded by civil society or other community groups. Technical Risk: Risks from a technical perspective are considered modest. The quality of construction for most investments is adequate and technologies used were appropriate and fundamentally easy to operate and maintain with adequate training of operators and availability of tools and spare parts. Risks to development outcome relate mainly to inadequate maintenance of facilities, an issue inter-linked with the financial, institutional, and social/attitudinal aspects discussed above. Technical sustainability of all facilities, like the other threads of sustainability discussed above, is closely dependent on sound management and maintenance systems remaining in place, supported by the enforcement of policies to ensure continued availability of resources. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory: Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory on balance, based on assessment of its role in overall design and preparation of the project and the implications that it had on implementation, which resulted in an MU QAE assessment. Most project design aspects are considered to have been relevant as discussed above; however there were some major shortcomings in certain respects. Most project preparation activities were consistent with the Bank s fiduciary requirements, and appraisal took into consideration pertinent technical, financial, and economic aspects of proposed activities. Implementation arrangements were designed based on lessons from UESP-1, attempting to improve sustainability of investments by strengthening WMDs capacity to operate and maintain services such as drains, and to build and mainstream implementation capacity within the MMAs. The project preparation timeframe, involving about twelve months from the Concept Review to Board Approval, was considered sufficient for a repeater project and adequate resources were allocated for key activities. As a repeater project, the project underwent a thorough review at the design stage by the Regional Review Panel, which concluded that it qualified for processing as a Repeater, subject to incorporation of specific recommendations, mainly aiming to improve its sustainability. 24

37 There were however, some major shortcomings in preparation, highlighted in the QAE section under Section 2.1 above, including: (a) the under-estimation of the critical risks relating to sustainability of investments and inadequate identification of sound mitigation measures for this risk; (b) weaknesses in design of the project s M&E results framework and arrangements; and (c) handling the consultations in respect to the Kwabenya landfill, a risk rated as high. While the preparation team had an adequate mix of technical, environmental, and fiduciary skills, it lacked a Social Development Specialist, an omission that could have contributed to the apparent inadequate handling of the this aspect. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The ICR rates Bank performance for quality of supervision as Moderately Satisfactory on balance, taking account of the extent to which the Bank managed its fiduciary and other responsibilities during project implementation to enhance the likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes in an efficient and effective manner. Adequate resources were allocated, and a total of sixteen supervision missions were conducted over the course of implementation. Sufficient attention was paid to management of both the Procurement and Financial Management aspects of the project, which were carried out in a satisfactory manner in compliance with relevant Bank policies, with minor or moderate shortcomings. It is worth pointing out that safeguards aspects for most project components, other than the noted issues related to the Kwabenya sub-component, were managed in compliance with relevant Bank policies, even though management of this issue disproportionately dominated a substantial proportion of project supervision, especially after the Inspection Investigation. One issue suggested by the Inspection report in regard to the management of safeguards prior to the investigation, was the apparent inadequate allocation of staff focusing on safeguards aspects during initial missions, potentially denying the matter sufficient attention earlier during implementation. Project supervision on these aspects however intensified after the inspection, updating safeguards tools and engaging stakeholders to address outstanding issues. The project Task Team Leader was moved to the field to enhance project supervision. Managing the response to the Inspection itself constituted a significant proportion of project supervision activities after the investigation. Implementation progress and issues were candidly described in Bank aides-memoire and ISRs throughout implementation. One shortcoming however, with respect to supervision, was the lack of sufficient attention to M&E of project outcome results during implementation. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 23. The ICR rates the overall Bank performance as Moderately Satisfactory on balance, considering the MU QAE and the MS Quality of Supervision, but also the MS outcome the project was able to ultimately achieve under fairly challenging circumstances. 23 According to the ICR Guidelines, where the rating for one dimension if in the satisfactory range while the rating for the other is in the unsatisfactory range, the rating for overall Bank performance depends on the outcome rating, which in this case was in the Satisfactory range. 25

38 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The ICR assesses Government performance as Moderately Unsatisfactory on balance, considering the performance of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as the Borrower, and the line Ministry (MLGRD) during project preparation and implementation. Government commitment to the project was considered to have been adequate at the time of entry, and part of the justification for processing the project as a Repeater was confirmation of the Borrower s interest in scaling up the existing project activities in this manner. Such commitment was confirmed through a Letter of Sector Policy dated December 30, During implementation, Government, as the Borrower, generally complied with agreed covenants in accordance with Legal Agreements with the Bank, with MLGRD maintaining close coordination and dialogue with relevant government entities and the Bank on most issues to address issues as they arose. MLGRD, through the PCU, was also able to provide sound oversight and backstopping to support the MAs to ensure technical quality of design and construction work. Government performance however had significant shortcomings, relating to three key aspects. (a) Its handling of the Kwabenya compensation and land transfer issues. Although the Bank approved Government s request to use the Credit to pay compensation costs to PAPs for this activity, together with a seven month closing date extension to allow additional time for completing the process, the Government has not been able to complete the compensation process by the end of the Grace period for the Credit. (b) Its failure to provide counterpart funds in a timely manner on several occasions. (c) Its failure to regularly convene the Steering Committee meetings, comprising representatives from relevant government agencies involved in urban service provision, including the Project Assemblies, MoFEP, MLGRD, Ministry of Works and Housing, Ministry of Health, Urban Roads Department, and the Environmental Protection Agency, to oversee the project during implementation. The Steering Committee was established with the intention to meet at least once a year with the Bank to review progress and address major issues arising. Steering Committee meetings were however not consistently convened during implementation, largely due to what appeared to be competing schedules and responsibilities by members, leaving project oversight primarily to MLGRD. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The ICR recognizes the Implementing Agencies, in this case as comprising two key groups: the PCU within MLGRD overseeing the five MMAs, and the five individual MMAs responsible for implementation of activities in their respective jurisdictions. Needless to say, the performance of these individual entities varied considerably. PCU Performance: PCU performance was Satisfactory overall. The ICR recognizes the high performance and overall commitment of the PCU during preparation and implementation, to effectively implement this relatively complex project, covering multi-sectoral activities in multiple cities, to achieve desired development outcomes, and rates their overall performance Satisfactory. The PCU was able to provide technical support to the MMAs as needed, and coordinated all project activities in a satisfactory manner. 26

39 MMA performance: MMA performance was on balance Moderately Satisfactory. While some MMAs such as Kumasi and Tamale, were able to implement their components in a satisfactory manner, with minor shortcomings, and Sekondi-Takoradi also demonstrated satisfactory performance, with moderate shortcomings, the other MMAs faced some capacity constraints and needed more support, especially in the beginning. By the end of the project, overall capacity had been enhanced and the implementing agencies were able to effectively manage required fiduciary, as well as safeguards and other implementation aspects for most activities with minor or moderate shortcomings. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The ICR rates the overall Borrower performance as Moderately Satisfactory overall considering the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for the Government performance, the Moderately Satisfactory rating for the Implementing agencies, in respect to ensuring quality at entry and supervision, and the Moderately Satisfactory project Outcome. Based on the ICR guidelines, the composite rating is linked to the outcome. 6. Lessons Learned Key lessons learned from the project are outlined below. a) Due diligence in respect to Safeguards should involve close monitoring of changing conditions on the ground, especially where there has been a considerable time lag between initial collection of baseline data and final preparation of Safeguards documents. Safeguards analyses during project identification and preparation should also take legacy issues from prior operations, including those that were not approved or were abandoned by other financiers, very seriously. b) The Bank and Borrowers should ensure careful cross-sectoral coordination, internally and externally, as early as possible during project design to avoid potentially conflicting designs and/or siting of investments. Two cases under the project illustrated the importance of this issue. First, the proposed location of the septage treatment facility for Accra that was to be financed through the project had to be abandoned on the instructions of the city s Mayor, due to its proximity to a new bus terminal also financed by the Bank. Second, the Bank financed an Energy project, involving a power transmission line whose route crossed the proposed Kwabenya landfill site. This issue could have raised concerns had the landfill been constructed. c) There are trade-offs between strengthening the institutional capacity of implementing agencies through learning by doing approaches while at the same time holding them accountable for implementing critical project activities, and associated risks to implementation progress and quality should be duly recognized and adequately mitigated. d) While the construction of infrastructure (hardware) can be implemented with relative speed, realization of benefits requiring software aspects such as changes in behavior including hygiene and sanitation habits, institutional culture, and community management practices, 27

40 takes much longer. Design of project implementation schedules should ensure that sufficient time is given to the implementation of software activities in order to reap the full benefits. e) For infrastructure investments and services targeting the poor, it is not uncommon to continue to require in the short-to medium-term some form of cross-subsidy among beneficiary groups and/or continued support from central or local governments from revenues other than direct user fees to ensure service delivery on a sustainable basis. f) Adequate resources should be allocated for critical M&E activities such as BAs, and these activities included as deliverables in Procurement Plans to allow for completion of data collection and analysis of project outcomes before the closing date. M&E support should also be provided to teams early during preparation and implementation to ensure strong results frameworks. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies Borrower s input provided in form of Borrower s ICR in Annex 6. (b) Cofinanciers Comments were not provided. (c) Other partners and stakeholders Comments were not provided. 28

41 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) 24 Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Component 1 - Storm Drainage Component 2 Sanitation Component 3 - Solid Waste Management Component 4 - Community Infrastructure Upgrading Component 5 - Institutional Strengthening Component 6 - Project Management PPF Refund Compensation Total Baseline Cost Physical Contingencies Price Contingencies Total Project Costs Front-end fee PPF Front-end fee IBRD Total Financing Required The project earned exchange gains amounting to US$1.936 million. 25 This activity was not part of appraisal and was added through project restructuring. 26 The discrepancy in amounts is explained by the fact that most of the beneficiary and the MMA contributions were in kind rather than in cash, making it difficult for the project accounts to fully capture the actual amounts. 29

42 (b) Financing Borrower Local Communities Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate 27 Estimate (USD millions) (USD millions) Counterpart funds Beneficiary contributions International Development Association (IDA) Credit Municipalities of Borrowing Country Counterpart contributions Nordic Development Fund (NDF) Grant Total AFD Credit Percentage of Appraisal 27 Data is taken from the PAD. Where there is a discrepancy with the Borrower s data, the value in the PAD prevails. The PAD did not include data on the AFD Credit. 28 Beneficiary contributions in cash or in kind. 29 The amount at appraisal was estimated at 62.0 million, but is currently million due to exchange rate fluctuations. 30 MMA contributions in cash or in kind. 31 NDF provided Euro 9 million. 32 The AFD funding was not included in the PAD as it was parallel funding. 33 AFD Credit was Euro 25 million. 30

43 (c) Original Budget* Allocation of IDA Credit by Implementing Agencies No. Implementing Agency Original October 2004 Revised June 2010 US$m % US$m % 1 Accra Metropolitan % % 2 Kumasi Metropolitan % % 3 Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan % % 4 Tamale Metropolitan % % 5 Tema Metropolitan % % 6 MLGRD % % Total base cost % % Contingencies (Performance-Based Fund) % 0 TOTAL COST % % d) Summary of Reallocations During Implementation Category of Expenditure Allocation % of Financing Current Original Revised (I) 34 Revised (II) Civil Works a)works other than Household Latrines 29,000,000 30,989,000 30,635, % foreign; 90% local b)household latrines 1,800, , ,000 50% 2.Vehicles, Equipment, and Spare Parts a)project Cities 1,300, ,000 1,863, % foreign; 90% local b)mlgrd 150, , , % foreign; 90% local 3.Consultancy, Studies, and Training: a)project Cities 2,750,000 4,523,000 3,986,000 90% b)mlgrd 250, , ,000 90% 4.Operating Cost: a)solid Waste 1,150,000 3,025,000 0 b)others 350, , ,000 90% 5.Refinancing of PPF 400, ,000 49,000 N/A Advance 6.Unallocated/Performance 4,450, ,639,000 Fund TOTAL 41,600,000 41,600,000 41,600, First reallocation, done through Second Level Project Restructuring of June 3, Second reallocation, done through Second Level Project Restructuring of December 5,

44 Annex 2. Outputs by Component The project comprised five components, each one addressing one of four infrastructure elements of urban environmental management services, as well as their institutional and financial capacity building aspects in the five largest towns in Ghana: Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Tema. The components were as follows: A) Component 1 - Storm Drainage (US$16.5 million base cost) This component was intended to finance the realignment, dredging, and lining of about 16.7 km of primary and secondary drains; erosion control measures; and construction of small bridges in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, and Tema. Design of this Component was based on a comprehensive drainage study carried out in Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi in the early 90 s, which prioritized masterplans for the dredging and lining of drains prepared. Sporadic attempts to preserve natural flood basins and to build retention basins upstream were made at different times, but largely failed due to uncontrolled land development. According to residents and government officials, the dredging and lining of major primary and secondary storm drains carried out under the UESP-1 significantly reduced the frequency, severity, and duration of flooding in these areas but were unable to cover the entire project areas. Activities under the Drainage Component of the UESP-2 were designed to scale up the achievements of UESP-1 in this regard in order to further reduce the problems with flooding. The expected outcome with respect to this component was a reduced frequency, severity, and duration of flooding in low-lying areas. A summary of achievements against targets is presented in Table A2.1 below. Outputs and Achievements: A summary of key outputs of this component is presented in Table A2.1 below. Table A2.1 Summary of Outputs from Drainage Component Project Component Project Targets Project Achievements Storm Drainage Reconstruction of 16.7 km of storm drains in 4 towns: Accra (3.5km), Kumasi (5.5km), Sekondi/ Takoradi (3.5km) and Tema (4.2km) to reduce flooding Accra 1.1 km buried concrete conduit and 1.3 km concrete lined channel Kumasi 6.0 km concrete lined channel Sekondi/Tak 1.1 km lined channel and 3.8 km channel improvement Tema 3.5 km concrete lined channel 32

45 Picture A1 - Accra Storm Drainage (Before and After Project) Mataheko Drain and Road Picture A2 - Accra Storm Drainage (Before and After Project) Onyasia Drain B) Component 2 - Sanitation (US$7.8 million base cost) This component had several subcomponents: (a) construction of household latrines and establishment of a domestic latrine delivery program; (b) rehabilitation and construction of public latrines in public places; (c) rehabilitation and construction of school latrines combined with hygiene education and the provision of water supply where needed; (d) rehabilitation or construction of septage treatment facilities; and (e) improved sewerage management in Tema. The expected outcome with respect to this component was an increased coverage with conveniently located and hygienic latrines. Design of this Component was based on Strategic Sanitation Plans (SSPs) prepared under UESP-1 by all MAs except for Accra 36. The SSPs set out the MA strategies for providing comprehensive sanitation services by the year The SSPs included a priority listing of the mix of household, public and school facilities needed to serve the cities low-income households and a description of the management and financing arrangements needed to implement each component. The key SSP objectives were: (i) Elimination of pan latrines and a move from public facilities to household sanitation facilities; (ii) Improved public facilities in neighborhoods and commercial centers; (iii) Improved school facilities; and (iv) Provision of new septage treatment facilities. The SSPs contained recommendations about technology 36 The project was to assist AMA to prepare an SSP and the other project MAs to revise their SSPs through the Institutional Strengthening component. 33

46 options, depending on housing densities and household income. Subsidies were targeted to low-income households. Household latrines: The project was to deliver 8,200 household latrines, to serve about 160,000 people. The project MAs adopted an integrated approach involving education, enforcement of bylaws, and engineering and to continue to carry out this program after the project end. The project was to assist the MAs in revising and enforcing the applicable bylaws, supplemented by an awareness campaign and hygiene education. It concentrated mainly on the low-income communities where infrastructure upgrading was carried out, to allow a more comprehensive approach to environmental sanitation in the selected low-income neighborhoods through combining improvements in solid waste collection, drainage, paved access roads, and water supply, where needed, with an intensive household latrine construction program and hygiene education. The IDA subsidy for latrine construction was 50 %, the same level as for UESP-1, with the remainder contributed by the beneficiaries in cash and/or in kind. The program set a subsidy ceiling of $150 per latrine. Public latrines: The project was to include the rehabilitation or construction of 91 twenty 37 -seater units of public latrines, to benefit about 70,000 people. They were to be located in public areas such as markets, lorry parks and light industrial areas in accordance with the Environmental Sanitation Policy of Operation and maintenance was to be contracted to private contractors through competition, as was the case with UESP-1. School latrines: School latrines consisting of 167 ten or twelve-seater blocks were to be renovated or constructed in primary and junior secondary schools, hygiene education given in the classroom, and water supply connections made to those schools that did not have them. This was to benefit about 70,000 school children and teachers. The enrolment in schools averaged about 400, divided into morning and afternoon sessions. Each will typically be served by a 12-seater block, consisting of a unit of 5 seats for girls and 1 for women teachers, and an identical unit for boys and men teachers. The technology was a KVIP latrine with alternating pits or a Water Closet or Pour Flush with a septic tank and a drain field. Operation and maintenance arrangements were determined by school officials, in consultation with the PTA, and were described in individual Facilities and Management Plans. Private sludge haulers would periodically be hired to empty the latrine pits or septic tanks. Hygiene Education: Existing hygiene education materials, including those that were developed under UESP-1, were to be reviewed and disseminated to participating schools, and the project was to provide support to hygiene education, including the ongoing national hand washing campaign targeted at school children. Each MA will discuss and finalize an annual hygiene and sanitation Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign with the School Health Education Program with emphasis on hand washing with soap and will allocate resources for implementing the campaign on a city-wide basis. Liquid Waste Management in Accra and Tema: This activity involved: (a) the construction of an access road for the Tema Septage treatment facilities constructed under UESP-1; and (b) rehabilitation and expansion of the existing septage treatment facility at Achimota, Accra. Outputs and Achievements: Table A2.2 summarizes the key outputs from the toilet facilities subcomponents. Both Septage treatment facilities were however not rehabilitated or expanded. 37 Normally, a latrine block will consist of 20 seats, half for men and half for women, but an occasional 10-seater may also be constructed. 34

47 Table A2.2 Sanitation Component: Summary of Toilet Outputs Town Household Latrines (No of drop holes) Target Actual Public Latrines School Latrines PAD Target Completed PAD Target Completed Facilities Seats Facilities Seats Facilities Seats Facilities Seats Accra 1, Kumasi 2,000 2, Sekondi- Takoradi 1,700 1, Tamale 1,500 1, Tema 1, TOTAL 8,200 8, , , ,260 Picture A3. Rehabilitation of Public sanitation Facility Tamale (Before and After Project) 35

48

49 C) Component 3 - Solid Waste Management (US$25.7 million base cost) This component had several sub-components: (a) construction of new sanitary landfills for Accra and Tema, and the completion of the one in Sekondi-Takoradi; (b) equipment for sanitary landfills; (c) closure, and rehabilitation of existing refuse dumps; (d) operation of sanitary landfills, preceded by the improved operation of some; (e) private solid waste collection; and (f) supply of household bins, skips and skip pads. The expected outcome from this component was an increase in the amount and regularity of refuse collected and disposed of in a technically, institutionally, financially and environmentally sustainable manner. The solid waste component under UESP-2 was designed to build upon similar activities implemented under UESP-1. It consisted of the following key activities: (i) the construction of sanitary landfills in Accra and Tema, supply of equipment for their operation, and the completion of the sanitary landfill in Sekondi-Takoradi; (ii) support for effective operation of the three landfills in Kumasi, Tamale, and Sekondi-Takoradi that were constructed under UESP-1, including monitoring for environmental compliance and the involvement of local private operators in their operation; (iii) improved use of the refuse dumps that still had to be exploited until the new facilities were ready, followed by their closure and rehabilitation; (iv) rehabilitation of discontinued refuse dumps, and (iv) scaling up private solid waste collection on the basis of lessons learned from the pilots. A summary of the key targets and achievements is presented in Table A2.3 below. Project Component Solid Waste Management Table A2.3 Solid Waste Component: Summary of Outputs Project Targets Construction of new sanitary landfills for Accra and Tema Completion of partially complete landfill in Sekondi-Takoradi; Provision of equipment for sanitary landfills; Closure, and rehabilitation of existing refuse dumps; Operation of sanitary landfills, preceded by the improved operation of some; Private solid waste collection; and Supply of household bins, skips and skip pads Project Achievements Sanitary landfill for Tema completed Sanitary landfill in Sekondi- Takoradi completed Equipment provided for landfills Refuse dumps in Accra, Takoradi and Kumasi rehabilitated and closed. Household bins and Solid Waste containers procured for 4 cities. Construction and Provision of Equipment for Sanitary Landfills: Two sanitary landfills were to be financed through the project, one at Kwabenya for Accra, and one for Tema. The works were to include weighbridges, a site office, water supply and a surrounding buffer zone. Access roads already existed, on which traffic flow and safety improvements were to be made. Only the Tema landfill was constructed 38. It will receive refuse from Tema as well as parts of Accra and 38 In September 2010, the Mayor of Accra informed the MLGRD that AMA would not continue with the development of the Kwabenya landfill. 37

50 Ga District, estimated at 100,000 tons/year. In addition, the Sekondi-Takoradi sanitary landfill initiated under UESP-1was completed under UESP-2. Equipment for operation of the new sanitary landfills was financed through the project, and included: a front loader, a compactor, a tipper truck, a water tanker, motorcycles, and communications equipment. Training and technical assistance for their efficient operation and maintenance was part of the Institutional Strengthening component. Improved Use, Closure, and Rehabilitation of Refuse Dumps: This subcomponent involved implementation of measures to ensure optimal use of the existing refuse dumps in Accra, Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi to allow their continued use in the interim while sanitary landfills were being constructed, and to take remedial measures for safeguarding the environment. Once the new landfills were completed, the existing dumps would be rehabilitated to minimize their negative environmental and social impact. Refuse damps in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, and Tema were rehabilitated and closed. Closure and rehabilitation included relocation of scavengers, leachate captivation and treatment, methane ventilation, contour stabilization, soil cover, and fencing. Household bins, skips and skip pads, and other equipment: The project financed the supply of waste containers, including bins for households, skips, and skip pads in areas where door-to door collection is not feasible. Additional equipment provided included Information vans, motorcycles, and mini tractors. Outputs and Achievements: A summary of this equipment is provided below. Table A2.4 Solid Waste Collection Summary of Containers and Equipment Procured Through Project ITEM AMA KMA TMA TaMA STMA Waste Containers Information Van Motor Cycles Mini Tractors Operation of Sanitary Landfills: This sub-component financed part of the operational costs for sanitary landfills constructed through the UESP-1 and UESP-2. The landfills that were completed in Kumasi and Tamale under UESP-1 and the one at Sekondi-Takoradi that was to be completed under UESP-2, were designed for efficient use and to meet environmentally sound standards, but the respective MAs were unable to finance their operation costs under existing revenue generating arrangements. The project was to provide limited financial support for the normal O&M costs associated with the operation of the sanitary landfills through operational subsidies applied on a declining basis. Operating subsidies would be at the rate of 50% for the first two years, 35% for the next two years, and 25% for the remainder of the project. 39 Technical 39 Identical to the IDA financing of the waste management contracts 38

51 assistance would be provided through the NDF financed capacity-building component. To help the MAs with better plans for bridging the funding gap by the end of the project, each MA was to prepare an annual operating plan for the landfill with evidence of adequate budgetary provision for meeting the funding shortfall. Some of the landfills, such as Team, had not prepared such plans at the time of the ICR mission. Private Solid Waste Collection: This sub-component was intended to directly build upon the experience and lessons learned from UESP-1 in respect to private sector involvement in solid waste collection. Contracting out solid waste collection following a competitive process was introduced in the MAs on a pilot basis under UESP-1. The MAs were zoned into collection areas suitable for competitive collection contracts, and model contracts were developed for engaging private collection firms on a competitive basis. Each city selected a pilot collection zone for generating lessons for wider replication and IDA financed part of the cost of the collection contracts/ in the pilot zones on a declining basis. The pilots were implemented in Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Tema. No program was carried out in Accra because one company was given a monopoly for solid waste collection by the previous government. The experience showed that high-income users were willing to pay in full for the service while middle-income users for part of it. Collecting fees directly from low-income users has been difficult partly because waste collection is not door-to-door. The pilot also showed that all the key aspects of the mutual obligations should be specified in the contract. UESP-2 Outputs and Achievements: The program was continued under UESP-2 to apply the experiences learned and to extend this kind of service to other middle and low-income areas. Two such contracts in addition to the old pilots are planned in each of the 5 MAs. IDA financed the new contracts at the rate of 50% for the first two years, 35% for the next two years, and 25% for the remainder of the project. Picture A4. Rehabilitation of Oblogo Waste Dumpsite in Accra (Before and After the Project) D) Component 4 Community Infrastructure Upgrading (US$8.5 million base cost) This component comprised infrastructure upgrading in low-income communities, consisting mainly of access roads, roadside drains, street lighting, water supply, and sanitation. The expected outcome was better access to high-density neighborhoods that had been difficult or impossible to 39

52 access with a motor vehicle, less flooding, erosion and dust, better neighborhood safety at night, fewer water pipe breakages, more registered water consumers, and improved sanitation. Under the project, 13 communities in the five project towns were to be upgraded, which would benefit an estimated 80,800 residents. Table A2.5 Communities to be Upgraded City Communities Estimated number of beneficiaries Accra Alajo, James Town, and Kpehe 15,800 Kumasi Old Tafo and Ayigya 24,800 Sekondi- Takoradi Tamale Effia-Kuma, New Takoradi, and Kojokrom/Anoe 13,400 Tishegu-Moyahibili-Nyanshegu, Buillpala Kakpalylli Nalonfon, and PoliyafanAboabo Ward I 13,400 Tema East Ashaiman and Kpone 13,400 TOTAL POPULATION 80,800 The same list of infrastructure improvements as in UESP-1 featured prominently in the communities list of priorities. The communities in Accra and Tema were chosen from a long list of 32 low-income communities in Greater Accra (which includes the urban part of Ga District adjacent to Accra) with severe infrastructure deficiencies, following the results of a study and community consultations that were completed in August A menu of roads, drains, water supply, toilets, refuse collection, and street lighting was offered to the communities, and their priority choices were used to prepare preliminary plans. The communities to be upgraded in Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi had been identified in 1996 during the preparation for UESP-1, but could not be included in UESP-1 due to budget constraints. Outputs and Achievements: A summary of outputs for this Component against targets is presented in Table A2.4 below. Table A2.4 Community Upgrading Component: Summary of Outputs Project Component Project Targets Project Achievements Community Infrastructure Upgrading Provision of roads, drains, sanitation facilities, security lighting and water supply in 14 communities to benefit about 100,000 people Three in Accra: Alajo, Abeka Wuoyeman, Kpehe, Two in Kumasi: Old Tafo and Ayigya Three in Sekondi/Takoradi: New Takoradi, Effia-Zongo, Kwesimintsim, and Kojokrom/Anoe Community upgrading works in the following communities completed: Three in Accra: Alajo and Abeka Wuoyeman Two in Kumasi: Old Tafo and Ayigya Sekondi/Takoradi: New Takoradi, Kwesimintsim, and Kojokrom/Anoe Four in Tamale: Tishegu- Mayabihi-Nyanshegu, Bulepela 40

53 Four in Tamale: Tishegu- Mayabihi-Nyanshegu, Bulepela Kakpayili Nalonfon, and Poliyafon Aboabo Ward I and Two in Tema : East Ashaiman and Kpone and Poliyafon Aboabo Ward I Two in Tema: East Ashaiman and Kpone Picture A5. Kumasi Infrastructure Upgrading (Before and After the project) COMPONENT 5 - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING (US$9.6 million base cost, financed by the Norwegian Development Fund (NDF)) This component had several subcomponents: (a) technical assistance and training, (b) capacity building in MLGRD and other central agencies, (c) capacity building in MAs, (d) malaria vector control and HIV/AIDS prevention, (e) project-wide monitoring, (f) reconditioning of waste management equipment, (g) house numbering, and (h) a communications strategy. The contract for the Institutional Strengthening consultants commenced in August 2006 for completion in March The contract was extended under an addendum which commenced in July 2010 for completion in June A further extension was granted bringing the consultancy contract to a close in October Outputs and Achievements: Support was provided to at least ten departments in the MAs in form of Technical Assistance and training (both formal and on the job training) and provision of vehicles and equipment to address two broad aspects: (i) capacity building to improve aimed at institutional and financial improvements in environmental sanitation; and (ii) support for provision of necessary skills and facilities for every MA to implement its share of the project. Specific support focused on: development of guidelines and action plans to strengthen the MA s human resources and financial management capacity; training in legal, regulatory, and communications aspects; design and installation of MIS software; support for Drain Maintenance Units; public health, and equipment management. It also included renovation of offices and staff training. Achievement of the relevant target focused on equipment provided through the project, including office equipment, computer hardware and software, vehicles since this represented the majority of equipment available in the MAs. Most equipment supplied was found to be in operating condition at the end of the project and the target in respect to the number of WMDs in which at least 60 percent of serviceable waste management equipment is in 41