ATTACK THE NETWORK PART 1: OIL SPOT METHODOLOGY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

Transcription

1 UNCLASSIFIED / /FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MARCH 2009 ATTACK THE NETWORK PART 1: OIL SPOT METHODOLOGY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP OVERVIEW: This dcument facilitates discussin, training and implementatin f effective targeting methds at the Battalin and Brigade level. In this paper, the Oil Spt Strategy is discussed as a mdel fr describing insurgent influence. This methdlgy can enable leaders t better understand the critical links within an insurgent cell and serve as a basis fr understanding Attack the Netwrk cncepts. BACKGROUND: Over the past several mnths, AWG persnnel met with varius peratins and intelligence prfessinals wh described the cntinuing challenge f Intelligence Surveillance Recnnaissance (ISR) asset integratin and synchrnizatin at the Brigade Cmbat Team level. Th is des nt mean there have nt been majr successes in bth training and in war. There are Brigade Cmbat Teams (BCTs) and Battalins (BNs) in Iraq that have mdified targeting and analysis functins t Find, Fix, Finish, Explit and Analyze threats and Disseminate (F3EAD) the infrmatin; they pushed intelligence t the lwest level pssible and prvided accurate, predictive analysis that resulted in the kill r capture f numerus High Value Individuals (HVls). Many times success seems t hinge n the va lidity f ne crucial piece f data-ne valuable human surce r ne Signals Intelligence analyst that is THE Subject Matter Expert. This trend indicates a need fr an adaptatin f target methdlgy and its link t cllectin platfrms. Challenges with prducing cntinuus, precise targeting data are further cmpunded in an asymmetric envirnment. Current dctrine, fcused n targeting and ISR, is mst effective in a Attacking a netwrk deliberate Military Decisin Making Prcess (M DMP), but it is mre difficult t requires leaders and achieve desired effects against an asymmetric threat withut mdifying ur analysts t understand analysis, integratin and synchrnizatin f intelligence assets. Specifically, th I k betw t h e c h a II enge b ecmes, uh w d f. d d I h... e In een an en- 0 we target spec I IC In IVI ua s w en timing IS crucial?" Find, Fix, Finish, Explit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) is an ef- emy's Critical Capabilifective methdlgy fr the Cunter Insurgency (COIN) fight. The benefit f ties, ReqUirements, and utilizing F3EAD is that it refines the targeting prcess t identify and defeat Vulnerabilities, as well specific individuals. A ptential dwn-side t this apprach is fcusing critical cllectin assets n targets that are at the lwest level and nt fcusing assets as, indicatrs reflecting against netwrks. The argument can be made that the defeat f Tier III and that an enemy actin lwer targets creates nly a mmentary vacuum that will be filled by ther re- has ccurred. cruits quickly. A BCT must develp a methd fr attacking an entire netwrk t '-- -' be successful at achieving a Brigade Cmmander's intent n a missin (e.g. neutralize Insurgent X Special Grups in zne). Attacking a netwrk requires leaders and analysts t understand the link between an enemy's Critical Capabilities, Requirements, and Vulnerabilities, as well as, indicatrs reflecting that an enemy actin has ccurred. The change required is nt drastic. In fact, much f what is taught in Intelligence Preparatin f the Battlefield (IPB) can be used; units need t fcus n nn-traditinal indicatrs at the lwest pssible level. In the COIN fight, analysts at the BN and BCT level have t understand each threat's center f gravity, idelgy and methdlgy. Units must als identify the mst vulnerable, critical ndes within a netwrk fr targeting fcus. This level f analysis is required befre ISR can be priritized and, ultimately,

2 find and fix HVls. UNCLASSIFIEDj jfor OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is nt enugh t determine there are certain enemy key leaders in yur zne. Leaders and analysts, especially members f BCT and BN S2 staff sectins, must have a fundamental understanding f enemy capabilities in their area f peratin. This understa nding must be derived frm the enemy's area f influence because the threat ften perates ver lng distances and des nt cmpartmentalize peratins based n terrain; they take advantage f their capabilities and hide their vulnerabilities. INSURGENT INFLUENCE DESCRIBED THROUGH THE OILSPOT METHOD: The Oil Spt methd applied t cuntering an insurgency is nt a new cncept. Cmmanders are applying this methd t the COIN fight t successfully prtect the strategic center f gravity in Iraq: the Baghdad ppulatin. The primary intent f Part I in this series is t describe hw the Oil Spt Methd can help visualize insurgency netwrks. Part II will cntinue the discussin by describing Center f Gravity Analysis, via the Dr. Strange mdel, t understand the parts f a netwrk that shuld be targeted at the BCT level. Part III cmpletes the series by describing effective COIN templating and ISR techniques. Oil Spt Strategy - Cunter Insurgency Applicatin A. Idelgical Base B. Intermediaries C. Ppulatin An insurgency wrks cunter t the effrts f the established gvernment. Insurgent leaders mre than likely cannt directly influence r cntrl the ppulatin; their idelgy may nt appeal t mst peple they want t win ver. T ensure their wn survivability, insurgent leaders have t islate themselves frm the very thing they want t cntrl, the peple (the COIN Center f Gravity). Even if the insurgent leaders have the ppular supprt f the peple they must have gd Operatinal Security r risk cmprmise. A fledgling insurgency's first pririty is t prtect the trusted circle f hard-cre, idelgicallyfcused leaders. Insurgent leaders are usually categrized as an idelgical based insurgency and are the Tier I targets friendly frces must islate and neutralize thrugh bth lethal and nn-lethal means. As this circle f trust builds, the insurgent leaders find vetted agents that are utside the inner circle (with access t the general ppulatin, but limited access t key leaders). These middle-men are called "intermediaries". The intermediaries interact with the leaders t understand their bjectives and establish the links with valuable facilitatrs within the ppulatin. Once this linkage frm the idelgical base t the general ppulatin is established, the insurgency is ready t mve t the next level f influencing the center f gravity. Establishing the Idelgical Base and Links t Intermediaries A. Idelgical Base B. Intermediaries C. PpulatJOfl ' Intermedlaries Needed t Reach General Ppulace While Reducing Risk f Cmprmise' UNCLASSIFIEDjjFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3 Intermediaries, r Tier II targets, may adpt the idelgical beliefs f the insurgent leaders, but they may be mtivated by ther factrs including revenge, mney, pr gvernment leadership/ prpgrams and religin. Intermediaries are a part f the ppulatin, but are susceptible t recruitment by the idelgical base. They als have cnnectins within their cmmunities and knw the ptential recru its fr peratinal cells. Nt applying the F3EAD Methdlgy against T1er I r lltatgets can cause mre attentin t be paid 10 threat actin than capabilities, causing cmmanders 10 fcus n thse wh have taken direct actin against us rather than n thse wh are mre capable and dangerus. A. Idelgical Base B. Intermediaries C. Ppulat in Reaching Out t the Ppulatin/Establishing Cells "Intermediaries Translate Idelgical Mtivatins int Purpse" The targeting aspects f the F3EAD Methdlgy mdifies the D3A Methdlgy based n prven Special Operatins Frces' Tactics, Techniques and Prcedures. A practical applicatin f F3EAD is in persnality targeting, but F3EAD is much mre than that. F3EAD shuld be used as a cmmander's tl t visualize and understand the terrain, threat, friendly capabilities and intended effects. Nt applying the F3EAD Methdlgy against Tier I r II targets can cause mre attentin t be paid t threat actin than capabilities, causing cmmanders t fcus n thse wh have taken direct actin against us rather than n thse wh are mre capable and dangerus. As a result, targeting fcuses n Tier III targets: individuals nrmally a part f the center f gravity that bth Calitin Frces and the insurgent idelgical base are fighting fr cntrl ver. The cnsequence f this targeting fcus can include immediate (but shrt term) gains in security, lss f ppulace supprt fr ther initiatives, and additinal mtivatin fr disenfranchised persnnel t jin the insurgency. T cunter ur actins, all the intermediaries have t d is recruit anther disaffected persn frm the ppulatin. There is n lasting effect n the insurgency. A. B. C. FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, ANALYZE, DISSEMINATE - Targeting f LevelllllndjYiduals and Outcme "New Unks Frmed Quickly/Cell Capabititles Nt Significantly Impacted" UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL ONLY

4 A better applicatin f frce at the BCT and belw level is t fcus n the intermediaries, the Tier II targets wh are the link between the idelgical base and the center f gravity, althugh this may nt result in an immediate decrease in vilence r imprved security. This is where it can be difficult fr cmmanders and staffs, expsed t hstile actin n a daily basis, t shift their targeting pririties. Eliminating Tier III targets will prvide immediate results, but nt lasting nes. Hwever, a determined effrt t eliminate the intermediaries will eventually frce Tier III targets tward a decisin pint; they must devlve int crimina l elements t acquire resurces r recncile with the majrity f the ppulatin. Tier II targets are the vital link between the idelgical base and the cen Targeting f Level II Individuals and Outcme A...!.. >M;\.~. _..?~ri O A. Idelgical Base ~ B. Intermediaries 0 C. Ppulatin "Eliminatin f Inlennediaries Separates Ppulati frm Idelgical Base" ter f gravity. Tier II targets can include financiers, false dcument prviders, media experts, bmbmakers, weapns smugglers, trainers and recruiters. This is where BCTs can fcus their attentin and achieve lng-term success against an insurgency. This is where the reginal fusin cells enable the fight Fusin cells synchrnize Special Operatins Frces and General Purpse Frces (GPF) assets, as well as, intelligence and peratins, prviding BCT and BN cmmanders access t enablers they cannt traditinally leverage. These expanded ISR capabilities prvide the targeting infrmatin t BCT and BN cmmanders, enabling them t kill r capture Tier I and Tier /I targets. (See AWG Prduct "Reginal Fusin Cells-The Phenmenn" at ur SIPR Website) The insurgent leaders must nw risk expsing themselves mre t the ppulatin t recruit Targeting f Level l Individuals and Outcme - Once Separated replacement intermediaries. This increases ur chances f their identificatin and targeting with precisin frces. At a minimum, successful targeting f Tier II targets by BCTs will frce the idelgi B ~ cal base t cnslidate and rerganize their persnnel and resurces-significantly impacting the / ~ threat's peratinal temp. Simultaneus targeting f Tier I and Tier II targets wi ll have an even greater impact. Because Tier I targets are idelgically based, ften resurced by external state/ nn-state supprters and aware f their vulnerabilities, they are harder t identify and target. Tier I targets require dedicated ISR assets rutinely available nly C. Ppulatin A. Idelgical Base ~ "" B. Intermediaries v at the divisin and higher levels. This is where the Simultaneus Targeting Eliminates Key Individuals and Cntains Idelgical Base" Reginal Fusin Cells enable the fight. FUSin cells synchrnize Special Operatins Frces and General Purpse Frces (GPF) assets, as well as, intelligence and peratins, prviding BCT and BN cmmanders access t enablers they cannt traditinally leverage. These expanded ISR capabilities prvide the targeting infrmatin t BCT and BN cmmanders, enabling them t kill r capture Tier I and Tier II targets.

5 UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR OFFIICIAL USE ONLY CONCLUSION: Analysts, staff members and leaders need t understand the fundamentals f hw an insurgency attempts t impact the ppulatin (Center f Gravity). Recgnizing that BCTs can have mre impact by targeting Tier II, Intermediaries, is a critical first step in identifying the vulnerable parts f an Insurgency netwrk. This helps fcus and synchrnize ISR and analysis. Part II f this series wi ll cntinue the discussin by describing Center f Gravity Analysis as it applies t Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements, and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part III will describe dctrinal templating f insurgent netwrks, ISR fcus, and synchrnizatin t the cmmander's intent and scheme f maneuver. Lk fr Attack the Netwrk Methdlgy Part 2 and 3 ATTACK THE NETWORK PART 1: OIL SPOT METHODOLOGY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP SIPR: Asymmetric Warfare Grup 2282 Mrrisn Street Frt Gerge G. Meade, MD