March 2010 Status Milestones Document

Transcription

1 1 er proyecto de una NPP PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO DE LA INFRAESTRUCTURA NUCLEAR March 2010 Status Milestones Document Opción nuclear de potencia incluida en la estrategia energética nacional HITO 1 Listos para tomar un compromiso informado sobre un programa nuclear de potencia HITO 2 Listos para licitar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia HITO 3 Listos para licenciar y operar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia FASE 3 Mantenimiento y mejoramiento continuo de la Infraestructura Actividades que se deben implementar para una primera NPP FASE 2 FASE 1 Trabajo preparatorio para la construcción de una NPP después de haber tomado la decisión de un programa nuclear Consideraciones previas antes de tomar la decisión de lanzar un programa nuclear de potencia Ante-proyecto Toma de decisiones del proyecto Construcción Operación/decomisionamiento Estudio de viabilidad Proceso de Licitación Licenciamiento ~ 10 a 15 años

2 The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option 2006 / 2010 Lessons Regional TC Europe Workshop WS on ZAGREB, CROATIA,SEPTEMBER 7-9, 2011 Juan José Rivas

3 Country Background No Nuclear Power Country Liberal economic model Strong democratic institutions Presidential and Parliament elections every four years New coalition in the government after 20 years (2010 / 2014) Strong environmental movements Successful anti big energy plants campaigns (coal and Hydro Plants)

4 Establishing National Statements Regarding a NPP 2006 to 2010 December 2005 A Campaign document: Chagual Agreement: 25 environmental NGOs signed an agreement with M. Bachelet, who was running for the Presidency : nuclear option will not be included in the national energy policy ". This was consistent with her personal anti-nuclear stand. January 2010 A Ministerial Report assessing The NPP, is necessary for Chile starting NPP is: convenient competitive sustainable At the same time we have important gaps to close Nuclear Infrastructure, long term public support to NPP. The next government will be responsible to decide to invest in closing gaps, even if the final decision is delayed to the following government

5 Ya sea para empezar un programa nuclear o para descartarlo, es necesario conocer lo que significa y evaluarlo rigurosamente en toda su complejidad. Either for starting a nuclear power program, or for dismissing it, it is necessary to fully understand what it means and thoroughly evaluate all its implications. President Michelle Bachelet November, 2007

6 What triggered the Government decision to start the process? 1. The Perfect Storm: Energy crisis Significant decrease of Natural Gas supply from Argentina. Severe drought had a strong impact over hydro plants generation capacity Increasing and volatile prices of fossils fuels An earthquake in the north that shut down some electrical generation plants 2. Concerns about the current electrical grid and the projection for the next decades High dependency on external providers Projected shortage of fossils fuels availability Projected increase of marginal generation cost Political and natural limits to build hydro power plants 3. Climate Change Challenge and the national and international responsibility Increasing GHG emissions: CO2 footprint taxes Environmentally irresponsible

7 What triggered the process (2) Need for a Long-Term Energy Strategy and Public Policy Secure Supply Efficiency Sustainability We must discuss about what kind of mix will ensure our policy objectives and which role could the NPP play. Nuclear Power assessment process needs to be performed within a framework, considering the main objectives of our energy policy

8 National Approach 1. In march 2007, President Bachelet established a working group (Zanelli s Comission) to assess whether nuclear energy would be a possibility for Chile. Main conclusions of the group: There are no reasons to discard the nuclear option for Chile. Before making any decision, further studies need to be performed. 2. By the end of 2007, President Bachelet put the Minister of Energy in charge of conducting the studies identified as necessary for the next stage. 3. Minister of Energy established a Work Group to deliver the presidential mandate

9 National Approach (2) Working Group for Nuclear Assessment Nuclear Consulting Group NCG Role: Advise to minister and lead the work. Include independent experts from different fields: Physics Economics Environmental Sciences CCHEN-CNE Working Group CNE Studies and Electric Departments NCG include representatives from key governmental institutions: Foreign Affairs Ministry Defense Ministry National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) National Energy Commission (CNE)

10 National Approach (3) Basic Works definitions: 1. Clear mandate: To advance in every necessary front, so in 2-3 years the country may be in conditions to make a decision on whether to proceed or not with a nuclear program. 2. Clear and specific Objectives: To produce a public government document with the assessment results. To involve public stakeholders in the assessment process. To start a public debate about the role of NPP in our future electric grid, avoiding extreme positions ( Yes, of course. No, no way ). To ensure continuity of the process during the next administration

11 National Approach (4) Work Strategy (2007 / 2009) 1. Work closely with IAEA: Followed Self Assessment methodology Workshop attendance Requesting specific technical support (WS in Chile) IAEA missions 2. Running energy models (MAED and MESSAGE provided and supported by IAEA), with different scenarios. 3. To hire studies calling for international bids. 4. Scientific Visits (France, USA, Argentina and Brazil)

12 Some Strategic Statemens (2007 / 2010) 1. To install Nuclear Power as an energy policy strategy discussion, not as a nuclear discussion. 2. Permanent concern about transparency, public information, and building international and national trust. 3. To keep it as simple as possible : Will not consider uranium extraction (even when we have it). Will not consider fuel elements production (even when we can do it). Will follow the turn-key approach (even when we are able to participate in several areas). 4. Not seeking agreements with any particular country, keeping our independence and avoiding commitments with a specific provider. 5. To include CHNEC in the evaluation process as support. 6. To work closely with IAEA. Using IAEA s guidelines but adapting them to our local situation.

13 March 2010 Status Adjustments we made to IAEA s suggestions: No formal NEPIO, but a working group with the same objectives and enough budget. Will not discuss possible locations and technology until decision to close our gaps has been taken. Adjust the work to be performed and the milestones to be reached in each phase according to our national situation. Working in closing gaps (Phase 2) is worthwhile even if we never decide to build a NPP.» Developing geological information is a good investment for Chile.» Having an independent regulatory body is already required for the correct operation of our nuclear facilities.

14 1 er proyecto de una NPP PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO DE LA INFRAESTRUCTURA NUCLEAR March 2010 Status Milestones Document Opción nuclear de potencia incluida en la estrategia energética nacional HITO 1 Listos para tomar un compromiso informado sobre un programa nuclear de potencia HITO 2 Listos para licitar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia HITO 3 Listos para licenciar y operar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia FASE 3 Mantenimiento y mejoramiento continuo de la Infraestructura Actividades que se deben implementar para una primera NPP FASE 2 FASE 1 Trabajo preparatorio para la construcción de una NPP después de haber tomado la decisión de un programa nuclear Consideraciones previas antes de tomar la decisión de lanzar un programa nuclear de potencia Ante-proyecto Toma de decisiones del proyecto Construcción Operación/decomisionamiento Estudio de viabilidad Proceso de Licitación Licenciamiento ~ 10 a 15 años

15 March 2010 Status (2) Where we arrived? 1. Self Assessment Process performed by Ministry of Energy / CCHEN work group (10 people with different competences) We had a special mission from IAEA on Dec to assess our process: The exercise was well prepared Good approach Recommendations Sources to be used to close the gaps Work plans to close the Gaps, 2. Self Assessment Phase 1 to be finished by mid 2010

16 SUMMARY FORM (STATUS) 1.- NATIONAL POSITION Phase 1 Condition Status 1.1. Safety, security and non-proliferation needs recognized. No Actions Needed 1.2. NEPIO established and staffed. Minor Actions Needed 1.3. National strategy defined. No action needed 2.- NUCLEAR SAFETY 2.1. Understanding of key elements of nuclear safety. Minor Actions Needed 2.2. Need of intergovernmental instruments on safety. Minor Actions Needed 2.3. Support through international cooperation. No Actions Needed 3.- MANAGEMENT 3.1. Energy strategy and nuclear power compatibility analysed. No Actions Needed 3.2. Unique Member State conditions evaluated. Minor Actions Needed 3.3. Available nuclear technologies identified. No Actions Needed 3.4. Ownership options and operational responsibilities considered. No Actions Needed 3.5. Authorities and responsibilities established. Minor Actions Needed 3.6. Appropriate expertise and experience. No Actions Needed 3.7. The management systems of all participating organizations are used to promote and support a strong safety culture Significant Actions Needed

17 March 2010 Status (3) 3. STUDIES PERFORMED through bids lead by NCE and EM We ve identified: When it would be convenient to have the first NPP operating General adjustment required for the legal and regulatory framework for nuclear activities and for the electric operation Natural risks and geological information Relevant issues about public opinion: Current knowledge on energy and nuclear Drivers to build the individual positions about nuclear (clean energy v/s radiation danger )

18 Studies 2008 Study Delivering Consultants Public & Private Role Adolfo Ibañez University / SENES,Canadien consultants Regulatory Framework STUK (Finland) Status Final report available Final report available Nuclear Fuel Cycle AMEC-CADE (UK) Final report available Impacts & Risks Nuclear-Electric Corporation (Russia) Final report available

19 Studies 2009 Study Public Opinion (First poll) Legal Framework adjustment Natural Risks Electric Regulatory Framework adjustment Delivering Consultants Tironi & Asociados (Chile) Universidad de Chile & Barros y Errázuriz (Chile) Departamento de Geofísica (U. de Chile) SYSTEP (Chile) Status Finalized. To be published in March Final report in process To be published in March Final report in process To be published in March Final report available

20 March 2010 Status(4) There was enough time for closing the gaps until the first reactor would be dispatched

21 Next Steps (Since March 2010) 1. A New Government was elected in March 2010: The Government should: Make it clear about the cost of stopping the evaluation of the nuclear option. Help keeping the momentum. The new Government should: invest in closing the gaps.

22 Next Steps (2010 / 2014) 2. Main gaps to be closed during next Government: Regulatory body: needs to be independent from CCHEN. Regulatory and legal framework: changes regarding environmental impact assessment and licensing. Seismic studies: map of geological faults. Human Resources for regulatory body, intelligent customer, etc. Public opinion: education programs about energy options (not only nuclear). Strengthen the Nuclear Consulting Group Working in closing the gaps does not mean we are in a non-return journey ; is just the responsible approach to follow.

23 Actual Government Position (2010 / 2012) What is happening now in Chile with NPP The decision is on stand by since 2010 Ministry of Energy officers have been saying the same what we had written before. They are showing formal continuity with our approach about a NPP strategy. (sharing) NPP is convenient, competitive, sustainable We are not ready to take a decision yet Chile has to continue with some studies and close important Gaps. Nevertheless they are not working on new studies and Gaps

24 Actual Government Position (2010 / 2012) Why is this happening? Short term reasons The new coalition will avoid any big public problem. They want to win again (they were for 20 years out of power) Recent earthquake and Tsunami in Chile and Japan: high risks are very present Weakness in national strategy to deal with an emergency Weakness in our national regulatory bodies (mining accidents, etc.) Rising opposition to big energy approved projects (Hidro power plants; Coal Plants) engaged with anti nuclear stand (polls)

25 Former Government Responsibility (2010 / 2012) Mistakes evaluating the Nuclear Option 1. Non existent previous policy and strategy framework to assess the Nuclear Option. (Nevertheless our initial statement) Energy Policy objectives stated only beginning 2009 (report) No public debate about Energy Policy Objectives neither about desired Energy Matrix 2. Ignorance about how to develop a complex public policy in a new political scenario (new government coalition) Short terms cost v/s long terms benefits Governmental and Private role developing a public policy Unclear relation between politics and public opinion (who is following who?)

26 Former Government Responsibility (2010 / 2012) Mistakes evaluating the Nuclear Option 3. Ignorance about how the people built their positions about energy Late start Public Opinion Studies Qualitative Studies in February Naive Approach about public opinion drivers Energy is not an every day concern. Energy doesn t exist without crisis ( is transparent). In normal situation only exist the light, the switch. (no plants, no transmission lines, no energy cost) Environmental macro arguments v/s private environmental practices 5. Weak stakeholders involvement process Late Low profile debate The government was not able to create conditions for stopping the process had a high political cost

27 The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option 2006 / 2010 Lessons Regional TC Europe Workshop WS on ZAGREB, CROATIA,SEPTEMBER 7-9, 2011 Juan José Rivas

28 Current Electric Generation Grid: 14 GW (2008) OIL: 9% COAL: 16% Renewable 39% Hydro: 37% Gas: 36% Fossil 61% NCRs: 2% Chile imports: 95% of coal 80% of natural gas 98% of oil

29 Installed Capacity by 2035 Without NPP: 38 GW Capacidad instalada al 2035 sin opción nuclear Eólica 12,25% Geotermia 5,14% Biomasa 1,90% Solar 0,03% Carbón 27,91% Mini Hidro 2,34% Hidro 32,74% Petróleo 6,85% GNL 10,84%

30 Good Practices and Lessons Learned (2006 / 2010) 1. Avoid rush decisions. 2. NPP should be a public policy discussion.. 3. Simplify the discussion. Why make it more complicated that it already is? 4. Cooperation with IAEA is a key point: Ask for their feedback. Self-assessment exercises: Be rigorous in distinguishing assessment (interpretation) from evidences (facts, not opinions) Evidences should be something always verifiable and eventually measurable. Consider the local situation when using IAEA s guidelines and be prepared to adapt them to the particular reality. 5. Set milestones: technical visits, documents, seminars.