Non-proliferation and the Reduction of Commercial Traffic in HEU. Pablo Adelfang Research Reactor Section / IAEA

Transcription

1 Non-proliferation and the Reduction of Commercial Traffic in HEU Pablo Adelfang Research Reactor Section / Symposium on Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities for Converting U.S. and Russian Research Reactors from Highly Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Russian Academy of Sciences, Presidium Presidential Hall, Moscow, Russian Federation 8-10 June 2011

2 Outline Introduction Why is HEU perceived as a threat? Civilian Uses of HEU Global Stockpiles of Civilian HEU International Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Technical Workshop and International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector (Oslo, 2006) Activities in Support of International Programmes Conclusions

3 Introduction Ten years after President Eisenhower s Atoms for Peace speech, the U.S. and Soviet Union exported research reactors (RRs) to about 40 countries Initially LEU fuel Gradually switched from LEU to HEU By the late 1970s, most RRs were using weaponuseable HEU United States was exporting about 700 kilograms of HEU a year to foreign RRs Soviet Union also exported RRs and the HEU fuel to operate them to other countries China, the U.K. and France, each provided a small amount of HEU However, Russia and the U.S have been the dominant suppliers

4 Introduction The U.S. and Soviet Union built even more HEU-fuelled research reactors domestically than they exported HEU also used in critical facilities, pulsed reactors, icebreaker propulsion reactors and naval reactors The main commercial producers use HEU in the production of the fission product 99 Mo, whose decay product 99 Tc is widely used in medical procedures As a consequence of all the above mentioned causes, significant inventories of fresh and irradiated HEU, in different types of civilian facilities, have built up worldwide In 1978 concern about nuclear proliferation Initiation of programmes to develop LEU replacement fuel to convert HEU fuelled reactors

5 Why is HEU perceived as a threat? One of the most difficult challenges for a group of nonstate actors attempting to build a nuclear weapon: obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or HEU HEU, enriched to over 20% required for the construction of a gun-type nuclear device, the simplest type of nuclear weapon The greater the enrichment the less material is needed to cause a nuclear detonation "Weapons-grade" uranium generally refers to uranium enriched to at least 90% But material of far lower enrichment levels, found in both fresh and spent nuclear fuel, can be used to create a nuclear explosive device

6 Why is HEU perceived as a threat? In 2002, the U.S. National Research Council: "crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance Creating a nuclear weapon from HEU is technically easier than building a plutonium weapon Current technology is unlikely to detect a shielded nuclear device on a truck or boat

7 Why is HEU perceived as a threat? Hiroshima: 3 m long 0.8 m diameter 3600 kg weight About 60 kilograms of weapon-grade HEU Yielded between 12 and 15 kilotons.

8 Why is HEU perceived as a threat?

9 Why is HEU perceived as a threat? Summary HEU can be used to built a gun-type weapon (simplest type of nuclear bomb). HEU is only weakly radioactive: negligible heat generation (easing weapon design and extending shelf life) minimal radiation hazards to those working with the material and handling weapons made from it high difficulty of detection from its gamma-ray and neutron emissions Weapon-grade HEU use in simple bomb designs that would not require nuclear-explosive testing

10 Why is HEU perceived as a threat? Summary A group of persons with some knowledge of physics, machining, explosives, and the chemical and physical properties of the nuclear material to be used available in the unclassified literature could potentially build a nuclear bomb from stolen nuclear material HEU is widely available at civilian facilities It is therefore plausible that non-state actors be able to make at least a simple gun-type device, with a yield perhaps as large as the Hiroshima bomb

11 Civilian Uses of HEU Currently three principal civilian uses of HEU (U %) Research reactors Medical isotope production Fuel in icebreaker propulsion reactors HEU has been used in space propulsion reactors and in nuclear power reactors The two most widespread uses of HEU are as research reactor fuel and as targets for the production of medical isotopes No new HEU-fueled civilian RR with a power level of more than 1 MW have been built in Western countries since the early 1980s, with the exception of Germany's FRM-II reactor Seventeen new research reactors worldwide were built using LEU fuels.

12 Civilian Uses of HEU Research Reactors RRs produce neutrons for scientific research, training, and medical isotope production Initially used LEU fuel To improve performance HEU fuel soon became the standard for RRs Enrichment level from around 90% to 36% Amount of fuel required also varies from 1 kg in MNSRs, to 10 kg per year in many pool reactors, to over 100 kg per year in the most powerful reactors

13 Civilian Uses of HEU Research Reactors Stocks of fresh and spent fuel on site, attractive target for thieves and terrorists seeking access to weapons-useable nuclear materials Development of high and very high density LEU fuel only option to convert HEU fuelled RRs without loss of performance Silicide fuel (1980s) uranium density sufficient to convert the vast majority of reactors. Very high density U-Mo fuels, currently under development, could replace HEU fuel in the remaining reactors

14 Civilian Uses of HEU

15 Civilian Uses of HEU Operational Status of HEU-fuelled Research Reactors Shut Down Before Defence Reactors and Icebreakers Operating with HEU 50 Conversion 19 Converted to LEU and Shutdown 12 Fully Converted to LEU and Operational 40 Operational Reactors Running on HEU 75 Partially Converted and Operational 6

16 Civilian Uses of HEU Pressure-Tube Test Reactors Few in number Very powerful Can consume as much as 100 kilograms of fuel per year if run continuously Ongoing efforts in developing new fuels in order to make the conversion of these reactors possible

17 Civilian Uses of HEU Critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies Much lower-powered than typical RRs Basic physics experimentation or model reactor cores They often contain very large amounts of HEU Unique proliferation challenges: Consume fuel very slowly: "lifetime cores Little economic incentive to convert to LEU they can continue to operate on their current stocks of HEU Fuel not highly irradiated thus potentially attractive to thieves

18 Civilian Uses of HEU Pulsed Reactors Used to produce short, intensive power and radiation pulses Neutron flux of much higher density than could be achieved in a reactor operating at a continuous state Use large quantities of HEU Could be difficult to convert from HEU to LEU fuel Used for defence, not civilian, purposes Same unique proliferation challenges as critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies

19 Civilian Uses of HEU Radioisotope Production Five research reactors have been producing most of the world s 99 Mo (daughter 99m Tc for medical imaging) These reactors use HEU targets, and all are over 40 years old Four major international producers use about kg of HEU each year Burnup less than 5%, large amount of HEU is left the waste Argentina has been producing 99 Mo since 2002 using LEU (1.5% of the global market) Indonesia also produces small quantities of 99 Mo for domestic use and some for export NTP, South Africa, first concrete step towards LEU target conversion by a major 99 Mo producer

20 Civilian Uses of HEU Radioisotope Production 2007 meeting in Sydney (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism): No scientific barriers to the production of 99 Mo using LEU The challenge is to move beyond the demonstration of the technical feasibility of the LEU target process to the commercial demonstration of a regular large scale production capability Similar findings, 2009 National Research Council of the U.S. National Academies report on the feasibility of procuring supplies of medical isotopes from commercial sources that do not use HEU

21 Civilian Uses of HEU Radioisotope Production First batch of South African Mo-99 produced with LEU and approved for patient use arrived in the US in December 2010 Australia new OPAL RR became the first large scale 99 Mo producer to use LEU targets from start-up Australia to supply a bit more than 8% of the global market s weekly 99 Mo requirement Australian 99 Mo from LEU is also being supplied to the US Conversion of radioisotope production to LEU is technically feasible Remaining obstacles to conversion are chiefly financial

22 Civilian Uses of HEU Space Propulsion HEU has been used by the Soviet Union and the United States for space propulsion Fission reactors (with HEU cores) have been used to power satellites in earth orbit These reactors used 90% HEU fuel, a second-generation used 96% HEU None currently in operation Interest in HEU-fuelled reactors for satellites appears to have waned Open question: will national space programs decide to use HEU reactors for deep-space propulsion in the future?

23 Civilian Uses of HEU Icebreaker Propulsion Reactors Nuclear propulsion is employed for civilian Icebreakers At present they operate with HEU Amounts of HEU in the reactor cores are quite significant, with some ships carrying up to 200 kg of U235 Research institutes have proposed studying the use of LEU fuels in icebreaker reactors It does not appear that any in-depth studies of the issue have been carried out to date

24 Civilian Uses of HEU Fast Reactors Use of fast or high energy neutrons to produce fission and breed fuel, can be designed as breeders or fast burners to consume Pu and the other actinides such as Am and Np Some fast reactors use HEU in their core, although not all fast reactors are designed to use HEU Critical question: will the next generation of nuclear power reactors require HEU? None of the reactors under consideration by Gen IV and INPRO initiatives use HEU as fuel

25 Global Stockpiles of Civilian HEU A significant quantity (SQ) is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded Significant quantities take into account unavoidable losses due to conversion and manufacturing processes and should not be confused with critical masses 25 kg of HEU (SQ) are needed to produce a small nuclear weapon; we will assume that approximately 50 kg are needed to build a simple nuclear device (allowing for some experimentation, material loss, etc.)

26 Global Stockpiles of Civilian HEU Source: Safeguards Glossary, 2001

27 Global Stockpiles of Civilian HEU Estimated global stock of HEU (including civil and military) is around 1900 metric tons of which: Around 175 metric tons are estimated in civil stocks Around 1725 metric tons are estimated military stocks Data from: Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials. Summary Tables and Charts July 12, 2005, Revised September 7, 2005, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) So HEU in global civil stocks is enough to fabricate: 3500 nuclear weapons

28 Global Stockpiles of Civilian HEU

29 International Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Efforts to reduce the amount of HEU at civilian facilities since 1978, when the US initiated the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program Shortly after, the Soviet Union began its own program for research reactors abroad Soviet HEU export policies changed, supplying 36% HEU in lieu of 80% HEU Many countries are cooperating with these initiatives

30 International Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU In May 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) at headquarters GTRI seeks to "minimize and eventually eliminate any reliance on HEU in the civilian fuel cycle, including conversion of research and test reactors worldwide from the use of HEU to the use of LEU fuel and targets." GTRI also works on the conversion of the production of medical radioisotopes to LEU

31 International Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU

32 International Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU International efforts to return HEU fuel (fresh and spent) to the country of origin (mostly to the US and Russia) are on-going The Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return programme The Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Programme

33 RRRFR Fuel Shipments Shipment identification Fuel shipped Country Facility FF/SNF HEU/LEU U-mass [kg] Shipping Date Serbia RA, Vinca FF HEU Romania WWR-S Magurela FF HEU Bulgaria IRT-2000, Sofia FF HEU Libya IRT-1 Tajura FF HEU Uzbekistan WWR-SM Tashkent FF HEU Czech Republic LWR-15, Rez FF HEU Latvia IRT-M, Salaspils FF HEU Czech Republic Critical Assembly, CTU FF HEU Uzbekistan WWR-SM Tashkent SNF HEU Uzbekistan WWR-SM Tashkent SNF HEU Uzbekistan WWR-SM Tashkent SNF HEU Shipment identification Fuel shipped Country Facility FF/SNF HEU/LEU U-mass [kg] Shipping Date Latvia Salaspils SNF HEU Bulgaria Sofia SNF HEU Hungary BRR SNF HEU Kazakhstan Alatau SNF HEU Kazakhstan Alatau SNF HEU Kazakhstan Alatau SNF HEU Kazakhstan Alatau SNF HEU Romania Pitesti FF HEU Romania Magurele SNF HEU Hungary BRR FF HEU Poland EWA SNF HEU Libya Tripoli SNF HEU Poland EWA, MARIA SNF HEU Poland MARIA SNF HEU Poland MARIA SNF HEU Ukraine KINR SNF HEU Czech Republic Rez FF HEU Uzbekistan WWR-SM Tashkent SNF HEU Poland MARIA SNF HEU Libya IRT-1 Tajura FF HEU Poland MARIA FF HEU Czech Republic Rez FF Pu Germany RRR FF HEU Poland MARIA FF HEU Vietnam Dalat FF HEU Czech Republic Rez SNF HEU Belarus Minsk. Pamir SNF HEU Belarus Minsk. Sosny, Pamir mobile fuel FF HEU Serbia Vinca RA SNF HEU Ukraine Sevastopol FF HEU Ukraine KINR FF HEU Ukraine Kharkov 1st FF HEU TOTAL

34 US Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Programme Country HEU (Kg) Shipment Dates Country HEU (Kg) Shipment Dates Argentina 40 12/ / /2007 Australia / /2009 Austria 6 12/ /2001 Brazil 5 11/1999 Canada 11 06/ /1996 Chile 8 01/ /1996 Colombia 3 09/1996 Japan / / / / / / / / /1997 Netherlands / /2001 Philippines 3 04/1999 Portugal 7 08/ /2008 Denmark 6 Germany / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2008 Greece 11 12/ /1998 Italy 23 01/ / / /1997 Romania 20 8/1999 8/2008 Slovenia 5 South Korea 22 Spain 4 Sweden 52 08/ / / / / / / / / / / / / /2008 Switzerland 34 04/ /1996 Taiwan 4 Thailand 5 Total / /1999

35 Technical Workshop and International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector TW held on June 2006 followed by the IS on June 2006 in Oslo, Norway Organized by the Government of Norway in cooperation with the More than 100 experts from 41 countries in the TW and around 130 from 45 countries in the IS TW: review and discuss technical issues related to HEU minimization and achieve consensus on the technical feasibility of eliminating HEU IS: formulate concrete policy options for advancing the goal of HEU minimization

36 Technical Workshop and International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector Technical Workshop: Virtually all RRs can use LEU fuel without a significant penalty to their applications Penalties from conversion can be managed and compensated by other measures Most of the high-power RRs will be able to be converted as soon as very high-density LEU fuel is qualified and commercially available Broad consensus that the production of Mo-99 from LEU is technically feasible and that obstacles to conversion are economic, financial, and political Progress made by RERTR and the "take-back" programmes recognized Called for these efforts to be enhanced and expanded on the basis of voluntary decisions Positive role of the in these efforts highlighted Broad consensus that the should expand its relevant activities, including the promotion of cooperation between and international sharing of RR facilities

37 Technical Workshop and International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector International Symposium: Marked by broad political discussions placing this subject within the context of the global nuclear disarmament debate, especially regarding the differing obligations of Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons States under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Several countries stated that the large stocks of HEU in military programmes of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), which are outside of international safeguards, pose a greater threat to international security than do the much smaller stocks of HEU in civilian nuclear applications in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), which are subject to international safeguards A number of representatives also stressed that actions to minimize HEU should not impinge upon the rights to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT However, there was consensus that activities related to the minimization of HEU in the civil sector should proceed on the basis of voluntary requests by national authorities, in the context of available donor funding and international technical assistance

38 Activities in Support of International Programmes Objectives Address non-proliferation and nuclear security concerns related to dispersed HEU Reduce risk by eliminating vulnerable HEU inventories Coordinate with GTRI Help resolve nuclear waste, safety, and environmental problems

39 Activities in Support of International Programmes Almost 30 years of support to international efforts to reduce HEU in international commerce projects and activities have directly supported RERTR and fuel take back programmes efforts have included: Dissemination of information Transfer of pertinent technology Management of contracts related to RR conversions and shipments of spent and fresh HEU fuel Publication of guidance documents 39

40 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion Fostering the Use of LEU in Mo-99 Production Qualification of High Density LEU RR Fuels Conversion of MNSRs Use of LEU in ADS Systems Assessing Facilities Utilizing HEU Building Consensus on HEU Minimization 40

41 Activities in Support of International Programmes 41

42 Activities in Support of International Programmes 42

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46 Activities in Support of International Programmes Major expansion and strengthening of activities in 2004 after: Announcement of GTRI Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham on May 2004 at the headquarters GTRI Partners Conference on September 2004 findings supportive of accelerating and expanding RERTR and take back programmes RERTR meeting,, Vienna November

47 Activities in Support of International Programmes 47

48 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion tailors each project to address the relevant constraints: design of reactor and fuel technical needs of the member state local nuclear infrastructure available resources 48

49 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion Chile Conversion of RECH-1, fully converted in May 2006 Development of domestic LEU fuel fabrication capability Objective: qualify the irradiation performance of fuel fabricated in Chile; to ensure quality control and assurance of silicide fuel, and to improve fuel fabrication technology 49

50 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Conversion efforts of 2 cores in Tajoura were completed as part of direct gov t to gov t agreements between Libya and the USA At the request of the Libyan gov t provided assistance to: assess the quality of the proposed LEU replacement fuel and implement poolside fuel inspection capabilities 50

51 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion Portugal Support for the conversion of the Portuguese RPI research reactor issued an international call for tenders for LEU fuel convened an independent international expert consultancy meeting to evaluate the offers and selected the preferred tender Fuel supplied in early 2007 per a tripartite contract RPI full conversion completed in September

52 Activities in Support of International Programmes Research Reactor Conversion Romania 14 MW TRIGAreactor in Pitesti, Romania, fully converted in May 2006 Managed through a tripartite contract Challenged as the fuel fabrication operations were transitioning from USA to France Well managed with no adverse impact on the project 52

53 Activities in Support of International Programmes Conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors Chinese MNSR (4 in China, 5 abroad) Conversion appears to be feasible for MNSRs Additional analysis necessary to confirm feasibility Positive response from Chinese government to is operating a CRP to address technical issues is preparing a publication on a generic MNSR conversion case Conversion of individual MNSRs to commence soon

54 Activities in Support of International Programmes Conversion of Mexican TRIGA MARK III Consultancy meeting (July 2010), to preview and discuss the projected work process for converting the RR is assisting in addressing technical and administrative issues involved in the conversion A Project and Supply Agreement (PSA) for assistance in the conversion to LEU and return of HEU to the U.S. has been submitted to Board of Governors on 6 June 2011 for approval Full commitment to further assist Mexico and the U.S. until successful completion of the project

55 Activities in Support of International Programmes Conversion of Jamaican Slowpoke reactor Assistance is being delivered to Jamaica and the US on planning for the technical and administrative actions for Conversion of the SLOWPOKE at ICENS, Jamaica to LEU is exploring options for fabrication of the LEU fuel is facilitating discussions between stakeholders

56 Activities in Support of International Programmes Use of LEU in Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems HEU or LEU can be used for the sub-critical assembly fuel. More than twenty MS with ADS activities In some MS plans for building ADS systems Importance that these facilities only utilize suitable LEU fuel for the sub-critical assembly is operating an international initiative covering: Performance analyses of LEU and HEU subcritical assemblies Experimental ADS systems safety issues Benchmark studies

57 Activities in Support of International Programmes 99 Mo production using LEU CRP Small-scale Mo-99 production via LEU fission or neutron activation ( ). Most recent event was 2010 Workshop on waste and quality (Santiago, CHI) INT-TC project: sequel to above CRP with objective to deploy demonstrated production technologies (from 2012) OECD HLG-MR participated as observer and assisted with effort to establish new reactor irradiation capacity (POL, CZR)

58 Activities in Support of International Programmes 99 Mo production using LEU Developing NE Series Report on non-heu based Mo-99 production technology. Objective is to report the demonstrated status of development using technology readiness levels CRP on homogeneous reactors based on 2007 meeting and a TECDOC. 1 st RCM in 2010, second to be organized in 2011 [EB Norway] 2010 GC side event on Mo-99 supply 2010 Meeting to kick-off international Expert Group on HEU to LEU conversion planning of major Mo-99 production. Group being formed / launched in 2011

59 Conclusions HEU is perceived as a threat because: It is widely available at civilian facilities; and It is possible that a group of non-state actors might be able to steal enough HEU to make a simple gun-type nuclear weapon. Civilian HEU is used mainly in RRs either as fuel or to produce medical radioisotopes HEU can be substituted by LEU in most applications without degradation of performance or yield

60 Conclusions Civil stocks of HEU worldwide are estimated in around 175 metric tons, enough to fabricate 3500 simple nuclear weapons World distribution of civil HEU asymmetrical, with the largest inventories concentrated in a few number of countries There is a strong need for an internationally agreed approach aiming at the minimization and eventual elimination of the use of HEU in civil applications

61 Thank You for your attention!