GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

Transcription

1 ECONOMY 6/9/2013 Nº 169 GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' ENERGY INDEPENDENCE Pedro Mielgo, President, Nereo GreenCapital Florentino Portero, Lecturer of Contemporary History, UNED Gerardo del Caz Esteso, Mechanical Engineer. Specialist in Energy Policy FIGURE 1. U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production 35 History 2011 Projections Shale gas Trillion cubic feet Tight gas Alaska Non-associated offshore Coalbed methane Associated with oil Non-associated onshore Source: DOE U.S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Outlook 2013 Early Release

2 Energy Independence Throughout history, the development and progress of mankind have run hand in hand with increasing energy consumption. The availability of energy has been crucial to improve living conditions, increase productivity and, ultimately, to advance. Increased economic development leads to higher energy consumption and this correlation has been a constant. In the current setting, featured by a global economy that is interdependent and where competition takes place on a global scale, energy resources have acquired a strategic status due to the economic implications that their control and management entail. Interdependence is one of the most important features of modern economy and its positive effects are obvious to achieve expertise in the production of goods and, therefore, efficient markets. However, interdependence entails vulnerability when many consumers of a good or service depend on one or few suppliers. These asymmetrical relations create strategic strengths and weaknesses, the consequences of which exceed the economic field and affect the political one 1. Energy resources such as hydrocarbons, the raw material of choice for transport and industry, are not present in most industrialized countries, which are thus forced to buy them from the chosen group of producing countries. This energy dependence generates a double toll, economic and political. On the one hand, advanced economies need to shift an important part of their resources to the oil producing countries. On the other, the negative aspects arising from the need for energy resources which rest in the hands of potentially conflicting countries imply the producers power to influence and a conditionality in the supply. This strategic 1 Joseph S. Nye. The Future of Power,

3 weakness is easily exploitable in critical situations, as we have seen in recent conflicts in the European Union with Russia, or in the past with the Middle East. There are very few countries in the world that are self-sufficient in terms of energy and their common feature is, of course, that they try to capitalize that advantage by maximizing their influence and the benefits arising from the resulting imbalance 2. This state of matters has led international relations and has defined the alliances of geopolitical blocks like the Middle East or the Caucasus. The American Energy Strategy The United States is the second largest energy consumer in the world since 2009, when it was surpassed by China, accounting for approximately 20% of the annual FIGURE 2. U.S. Annual Energy Expenditures (Share of GDP) 12% Forecast 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Gal Luft, Energy SelfSufficiency: A Realistic Goal or a Pipe Dream?, ISN, October Source: DOE Short-Term Energy Outlook, April

4 world consumption of primary energy. Due to its social and economic structure, energy is vital to maintain the current American way of life, leading to a high sensitivity to price, thus any supply problem involving a rise in prices will have a direct impact on the U.S. economy and welfare. To convey an idea of what energy means for the U.S. in economic terms and regarding its strategic vulnerability, suffice it to say that the American energy invoice represents approximately 18% of its GDP (figure 2) and their energy intensity and per capita consumption are amongst the highest in the world and far exceed those of, for example, the European Union (figure 3). In nominal terms, per capita spending on energy rose from less than $500 in 1970 to over $4,000 in FIGURE 3. Energy Intensity (tep/1000 ) and Per Capita Energy Consumption in the U.S. (tep/hab) Energy Intensity (tep/1000 ) Per Capita Energy Consumption in the U.S. (tep/hab) 0,300 8,00 0,250 0,200 7,00 6,00 5,00 0,150 4,00 0,100 0,050 3,00 2,00 1,00 0,000 U.S. EU-27 Spain 0,00 U.S. EU-27 Spain Source: DOE 4

5 "The United States is the second largest energy consumer in the world since 2009, when it was surpassed by China, accounting for approximately 20% of the annual world consumption of primary energy" Despite its high production, the US has traditionally been an oil-importing country, especially since 1971, when its domestic production peaked and from then on, the aforementioned output gradually decreased while consumption progressively increased. At the end of the last decade it imported nearly 60% of its domestic consumption (figure 4). FIGURE 4. Oil Consumption and Imports in the U.S. (mpbd). Overview, Estimated Consumption Million Barrels per Day Net Imports Production Source: DOE 5

6 FIGURE 5. Gas Consumption and Imports in the U.S. Overview, Consumption Trillion Cubic Feet Production 5 0 Net Imports Source: DOE With regard to gas, the US own production peaked at around the same date, although the decline was less pronounced and the weight of imports was lower than in the case of oil (figure 5). Throughout the 20th century, American economic development forced to increase the supply of oil and gas from outside vendors, which often was in potentially unstable regions with high political conflicts. As can be seen, from the 60s on, the United States ceased to be self-sufficient in fossil fuels and became a net importer, a situation which intensified with the depletion of their deposits and the increase of demand. 6

7 In 1973, following the Arab-Israeli war of Yom Kippur, the Arab producing countries in the OPEC decided to stop supplying oil to the countries which supported Israel. The consequences for world economy were devastating as oil prices quadrupled in a matter of weeks due to the OPEC s embargo 3. The political crisis resulted in an economic crisis which had repercussions throughout the world. Given this situation and directly suffering its effects, the American administration, under President Richard Nixon, turned energy independence into a strategic objective. The United States aspired to be self-sufficient in the long run, both in power supply and in energy technology control. The end-purpose was to guarantee supply and to do so at affordable prices. This prompted a massive program of civil nuclear energy and relaunched the exploration and search for deposits on American soil. Since then, other international conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait or the emergence of new industrial countries which increased competition for energy resources (and therefore prices), have made self-sufficiency one of the priorities of all American Administrations regardless of their political color, including, besides primary energy, the development and control of any type of energy technology 4. Europe, by contrast, having a fragmented vision and different national strategies (nuclear in France, North Sea oil in the UK, coal in Germany) addressed the question with much less determination and subject to greater political fluctuations 5. 3 Roger Kubarych, How Oil Shocks Affect Markets. The International Economy, summer U.S. Energy Association, Towards a national Energy Strategy, February Paul Belkin, The European Union s Energy Security Challenges, Congressional Research Service,

8 "It is estimated that from 2025, the United States will export more fossil fuels than it will import" This energy independence seems to be today an upcoming tangible reality and it is estimated that from 2025, the United States will export more fossil fuels than it will import 6 and, moreover, it could even become a major gas exporter 7. The main reason for this revolution is, in the first place, a sustained political will that has remained steadfast under Administrations of different political orientation and which reveal that this is a State policy. In the second place, this goal would not be possible if we were not facing an unprecedented technological revolution. In fact, of all the policies pursued by successive Administrations, the most effective for the independence purpose has been the technological one. Toward Energy Independence From the 70s, numerous research programs, both public and private, have focused on developing and improving energy technologies with the aim of increasing production capacity and efficiency: electricity generation using combined cycles, supercritical coal plants, increasing oil production through advanced recovery technologies and the use of unconventional reserves, which up to now, were not viable from an economic point of view. One such technology is hydraulic fracturing or fracking which injects, at specific depths, high pressure water with chemical reagents in order to shift and extract the 6 International Energy Agency, WEO Philip K. Verleger, The Amazing Tale of U.S. Energy Independence. The International Economy, spring

9 gas stored in certain rock strata. This technology was conceived in the 1940s but its use seemed to be beyond commercial viability. It was not until the last decade that horizontal drilling began to be used and more accurate geological studies could be done for the extraction of shale gas. The results, initially unsatisfactory, began to bear fruit thanks to the continued innovation of small businesses. The criticism of this technology is based on its high water consumption and on its environmental impact. Constant technological advances are addressed to minimize this impact which, on the other hand, should be assessed in each case. This technology has been successfully used for the extraction of shale gas with significant results. Gas production in the United States peaked in 1970 and since then numerous fields were abandoned due to the depletion of resources and the impossibility to continue producing with the available technology. In recent years, the dramatic increase in gas production due to these new methods have made domestic production of shale gas in the United States rise from 1% in 2000, to 20% in 2009 and to over 30% in Today, the United States and Canada are jointly self-sufficient in terms of gas consumption. With regard to oil, the United States and Canada together produce four million barrels a day more than in 2003 (1.8 million in the past two years) totaling more than 13 million barrels a day. This has a direct impact on imports: the U.S. has reduced its dependence on outside energy from 60% to 40% in just 20 years by increasing domestic production of both conventional and unconventional reserves, and with respect to supply sources, by investing in non-opec countries. Specifically, OPEC exports to the U.S. today amount to less than 20% of annual U.S. oil consumption and the Persian Gulf countries have reduced their exports to the United States by 25% since 2003, which makes Canada their first supplier. 8 Department of Energy. 9

10 "Unconventional hydrocarbon reserves are not evenly distributed and, unlike the U.S., most countries lack the technological resources, the regulatory framework or the business infrastructure to realize these projects" U.S. initiatives to reduce dependence on foreign energy have witnessed numerous attempts to replicate what the United States has managed to achieve. In some cases, shale gas reserves have already been discovered in countries like Russia, China, Canada or Argentina and geological studies continue and, if they evolve as expected, they should result in a substantial increase in reported hydrocarbon reserves. In other cases, such as Canada with its oil sands and Japan with its interest in crystallized methane deposits in deep sea, significant efforts are being made exploiting the almost unique conditions of these countries. India and Brazil (which from 2015 will have a positive net balance of oil exports), are also trying to find new unconventional hydrocarbon deposits and expand their production. What happens with unconventional hydrocarbon reserves is also true for traditional reserves: they are not evenly distributed and, unlike the U.S., most countries lack the technological resources, the regulatory framework or the business infrastructure to finance and realize these projects. As shown in figure 6, this situation is not taking place anywhere else in the world. United States has a long tradition allowing the exploration and exploitation of deposits by private companies with a very stable regulation. In this country, access to funding sources and the ability to apply knowledge to the industry and not let it only remain in college has led to an ecosystem of small, very competitive and innovative companies supported by venture capital that have enabled small-scale entrepreneurial activities in many places. For example, the first steps in shale gas extraction in the Barnett Basin, Texas, were given by small businesses which, in any other country, would not have been able to carry out their 10

11 FIGURE 6. Number of Unconventional Wells Drilled, by Country 500-plus Source: PFC Energy Global Gas & North American Onshore Group activities in competition with other traditional multinationals or large and inefficient state companies 9.These independent companies were the ones which, given the large concurrence context, had to innovate and obtained a great performance which later attracted other corporations. With regard to Europe, the situation is very different. Restrictive regulations, more complicated geological fields, high population density, lack of capital and a 9 J. Robinson West, America s Energy Renaissance. The International Economy, fall,

12 highly sensitized public opinion are the reasons companies do not attempt explorations outside specific cases. This means that Russian gas will remain an important source of supply, although the pressure on world markets produce benefits when setting prices 10. The End of Hydrocarbon Shortage? Today, and in contrast to widespread belief, the increased net production capacity of hydrocarbons (considering depleted fields) is already higher than the growth of world demand. This is even more significant in the case of oil: a sustained increase of about 2% per year until 2030 would be required, given the increasing capacity, to keep the margin unchanged, something highly unlikely given the current global economic crisis 11. Currently, natural gas production in the U.S. comes, for the most part, from unconventional gas and mainly shale gas. The Department of Energy predictions indicate that these two categories will represent more than 80% of the total gas extracted in 2040 (figure 1). Moreover, the success of the American case is having attained near self-sufficiency at costs far below world market prices. The effects already achieved are providing the United States with clear strategic advantages by reducing the marginal price of gas and, therefore, of electricity, which are now substantially cheaper than in Europe or Japan. Much of the new power generation facilities use gas and this has resulted in a reduction of coal consumption and greenhouse gas emis- 10 International Energy Agency, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, World Energy Outlook. Special Report on Unconventional Gas, BP World Energy Outlook 2030, January

13 "The United States has become the key to the global increase in hydrocarbon production in recent years and is helping other Western countries to rethink their energy strategy" sions. Excess coal from the U.S. is being derived to Europe, where some countries like Germany are increasing consumption of this fuel. Given that energy markets, despite their inefficiencies, are global markets and it is difficult for a country to be isolated from them, the more likely scenario is that increased capacity and supply will have a downward impact on the price of hydrocarbons. Moreover, a certain decoupling of gas prices in North America compared to other markets is already taking place 12, as it has become a relatively differentiated market with regard to international reference prices. Current domestic gas prices cannot be taken to other regions because the strength of demand prevents it and because, right now, significant exports from the U.S. are hardly foreseen and, once it happens, it will be at prices that are closer to international prices. The United States has become the key to the global increase in hydrocarbon production in recent years and is helping other Western countries to rethink their energy strategy in order to increase control over energy consumption and thus reduce their dependence from other countries. With current estimates, 2020 would witness an increase in global production capacity of 49 million barrels a day, slightly more than 50% of current capacity. 12 Paul Stevens, The Shale Gas Revolution: Developments and Changes, Chatham House, August

14 FIGURE 7. Forecast of Natural Gas Prices in the U.S., Europe and Japan Japan Europe US E 2020E 2025E 2030E 2035E Note: US prices are Henry Hub spot prices in EIA s AEO2012 Reference Scenario; Japanese and European prices are CIF prices in IEA s WEO2012 New Policies Scenario Source: Nomura, based on EIA and IEA/OECD data The means to extract unconventional reserves are often viable only after a certain threshold of oil prices that, on average, is around 70 dollars per barrel 13. Current technology prices for hydraulic fracturing of shale gas deposits in the U.S. are well below that figure, but it is not clear that it can be extrapolated to other regions, since neither the geological conditions nor the costs of exploration and production are necessarily comparable. 13 Maugeri, Leonardo, Oil: The Next Revolution, Harvard Kennedy School,

15 "The OPEC is likely to gradually lose its pole position in terms of market power, as there will be other producers" In any case, the increase in hydrocarbon extraction to meet the growing energy demand cannot lose sight of the need to act in the field of energy efficiency worldwide. Neither should it lose sight of the technologies that, though distant, have been seen for decades as the final solutions to energy shortages and that, today, are only promises, such as nuclear fusion, or even realities yet imperfect and with serious drawbacks, like solar and wind technologies. Less stress in hydrocarbon markets could be seen more like a transition stage to focus efforts toward a technological purpose yet to be clearly defined. As for the immediate future, we must emphasize two issues. The first is that the increase in energy demand in the next two decades will be covered by non-conventional sources and coal (figure 8). The second is that the U.S. advantage in shale gas production will dominate the world scene for some time (figure 9) 14. In short, market evolution in the future will have two key issues. On the demand side, the driving force of the increase will be due to China and the newly industrialized economies of other Asian countries. With regard to the supply side, the key will be the large U.S. production, to be followed by other producers who would try to replicate the model. The OPEC is likely to gradually lose its pole position in terms of market power, as there will be other producers. This loss of influence in the markets will result in a lower politi- 14 BP World Energy Outlook 2030, January

16 FIGURE 8. Primary Energy Supply and Demand Forecast for 2030 Billion toe Demand 2030 level Supply Other Renew.* Hydro Nuclear OECD Non OECD Tight Other Shale 2011 Oil Natural Gas Coal Non fossil *Includes biofuels Source: BP FIGURE 9. Tight Oil and Shale Gas Production Forecast Production in ,0 Tigh oil Shale gas 0,8 Billion toe 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 Asia Pacific N. America S. & C. America Africa Europe & Eurasia Middle East Source: BP 16

17 cal relevance in international relations and will alter the current framework of alliances in the Persian Gulf region. Geopolitical Context Every forecast entails the risk of making mistakes. In the case of energy, which depends on very volatile markets and in which so many variables come into play with economic, political, technical and environmental implications, it becomes particularly difficult. Given current trends and the American determination to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it is more than likely that, in the near future international relations will reflect the change and, in particular, relations between the United States toward the Middle East. The United States are already rapidly reducing oil consumption coming from that region. In his 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced the Advanced Energy Initiative, where he set the goal of replacing 75% of oil imports from the Middle East before 2020, and which crystalized in the Energy Independence and Security Act. In the last year, the United States has reduced oil purchases from the region by about 10% and the trend will continue. Assuming that an increase in its production with that of Canada and other countries will take place, it is quite plausible that a change in world oil flows will eventually happen, so that the bulk of Middle East hydrocarbons will go to Asia, and specifically to satisfy the insatiable demand from China and other industrializing Asian economies which lack energy resources. Europe would depend on Russia, North Africa, the North Sea and, as yet undetermined, but much less than at present, the Middle East. 17

18 "China may replace the U.S. as the main destination of Middle East oil and this will force China to step up its interest in the region to maintain that supply" China may replace the U.S. as the main destination of Middle East oil and this will force China to step up its interest in the region to maintain that supply. This is already a reality in countries like Iraq and Kazakhstan, where Chinese state-owned energy companies have already closed supply contracts in competition with Western companies. In addition, Beijing, anxious to ensure its long-term supply, is taking diplomatic and economic positions in several African countries with resources of all kinds, including energy, where considerations are not only economic but also include aspects of cooperation and political support. The United States could return to a situation of energy self-sufficiency similar to the one before World War II. In Europe, self-sufficiency is something that cannot be considered in any case, but the situation could improve with certain conditions in the context of the transatlantic free trade agreement currently under discussion, assuming that the United States would facilitate energy exports. Having access to American energy products and thus diversify supply sources would be positive for Europe. Specifically, it would be able to reduce its dependence on the Middle East and Russia which, through their pipeline networks, have control over the supply of gas to central and Eastern Europe. Europe will need a supranational policy that encourages interconnection infrastructures and that seeks to diversify sources of supply before competition from new consumers in Asia such as India and China Corey Johnson, Thinking Outside the Box: Energy Security in Europe and Beyond, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Policy Brief, June

19 While the region comprising Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East will continue to produce about 50% of world oil, the real revolution will occur in the Western hemisphere with American self-sufficiency and what the diversification of sources of production will mean for Europe. One positive consequence of the increase and diversification of supply will be the stability of hydrocarbon prices, which will not suffer such significant and immediate changes like those that used to occur when there was a conflict affecting some producer country or supply route. Indeed, this has already been demonstrated over recent months: although there is no clear downward pressure on prices, oversupply has already resulted in a greater margin to soften occasional market tensions like, for example, the sanctions against Iran by the United States and Europe which were joined by other countries. Without the existence of a greater diversification of supply sources, probably the restriction on Iranian oil due to their nuclear program would have caused a rise in prices that would have been detrimental to the economies of the countries that issued the penalties 16. American Withdrawal Faced with a difficult economic situation, significant budget constraints and modest results in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has chosen to avoid participating in distant conflicts and favors temporary alliances with regional leaders that do not involve significant deployments to minimize the risk of being drawn into persistent and costly conflicts. This is the so-called withdrawal strategy to minimize influence in distant geopolitical areas and which focuses instead on addressing internal problems, especially economic ones. Particularly, on not 16 Rising Oil Output U.S. Gives More Policy Options, WSJ, July 4,

20 increasing a massive debt that leaves no budget margin to invest more in security or defense. The claim on self-sufficiency perfectly fits the current strategy of the Obama Administration. Scenarios such as the Caucasus, Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf will not be as decisive for power supply as they are now. For example, the Strait of Hormuz, through which 35% of global supplies of oil and 20% of liquefied gas flows, and the conflicts that arise there, will not become in the future a direct danger to Western economy. The United States and Europe will be able to carry out their relations with the countries of the Middle East area according to political affinity criteria and values such as freedom and democracy, thus altering existing partnerships in the region. The U.S. energy independence is one of the most important changes, economically speaking, of the century and could have a profound global impact. As happens with many countries now exporting gas and oil, the economy will internationalize further but, as has happened with other oil exporting countries, it could turn, politically speaking, into an element to isolate itself and relinquish their presence in international forums or work in trade agreements 17. The United States would have a new engine of economic growth in the energy sector that would bring significant benefits but also the risks carried by economies with energy resources 18. However, as is clearly shown by history, forgoing a capacity to influence implies losing it at the expense of another power that, hypothetically, would be China. The 17 Voeten, Erik and Ross, Michael, Oil and Unbalanced Globalization, UCLA, Ross, Michael, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

21 "The U.S. energy independence is one of the most important changes, economically speaking, of the century and could have a profound global impact" turbulent situation in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation risks, the permanent threat of Islamist terrorism and the conflict with Israel, will be a constant reminder to the United States that with great power comes great responsibility and will require it to stay in the region, but without the mortgage entailed by being energy-dependent on certain countries as is happening today. Without taking it as an excuse to give up current global involvement and presence, the increase in hydrocarbon production will provide greater flexibility and maneuverability in policies that the United States and Europe may assume with regard to producing countries. It will be a dividend in terms of safety since, in order for hydrocarbon supply shocks to have an impact on markets, these disturbances would have to be increased and would therefore become less likely 19. With respect to energy and its supply, America will have in the future an advantage over any other country. Apart from its undoubted political ability to influence, it will become the first gas producer in the world, one of the largest oil producers and will have more economic resources than other countries to supply itself from international markets. It is located next to Canada, with its vast unconventional reserves yet untapped. It will have the most advanced and innovative extraction industry with regard to hydrocarbons with competitive companies and almost exclusive technology. It also has huge coal reserves and is still committed to tap 19 A National Strategy for Energy Security. Harnessing American Resources and Innovation, Securing America s Future Energy (SAFE),

22 other generation sources such as nuclear or renewable energy and to develop programs to improve the efficiency of energy consumption, particularly for transport and domestic use. Given all the political and economic uncertainties that may exist, the U.S. ability to respond to potential energy shortage crises worldwide is unquestionable. Conclusions For several decades, in sight of geopolitical instability in oil-producing countries, energy independence and control of supply have been a strategic objective for the US. Today, thanks to unconventional hydrocarbon reserves and technological advances that have enabled their exploitation, the goal seems attainable and their exploitation will increase U.S. production and make it less oil-dependent on the Middle East or countries such as Venezuela or Russia. Given the technological advances and a higher return in terms of energy and economy by the exploitation of such deposits, it is expected that other countries will follow suit. Even considering the increased demand, mainly from Asian countries, it is possible to anticipate that oil supply capacity will grow faster than global demand, therefore the current system of cartelized oil producing countries will lose relevance and the first to be damaged will be those that now have an economic dependence on their energy exports. These countries will witness the disappearance of what, in practice, is an almost exclusive supply of hydrocarbons: the OPEC and particularly producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria. An increased oil production will have its effect on international markets, which will witness a downward pressure on oil and gas prices. Prices will not only decrease but will also become less sensitive to political instability in certain geo- 22

23 "Oil supply capacity will grow faster than global demand, therefore the current system of cartelized oil producing countries will lose relevance" graphic areas allowing for a greater certainty of supply, a particularly positive thing for very energy-intensive countries in the developing world. At a political level, a consequence will be that U.S. strategic interests will give less importance to energy resources. Scenarios like the Strait of Hormuz and the Caucasus are not vital to the global supply of oil and this will allow the West to distance itself from the affairs of the region. All this would be convergent with the U.S. strategy and would fit the strategy of the current Administration of President Obama, who has chosen to reduce U.S. involvement in distant conflicts. With regard to the Middle East, although its reserves and production do not have today such a degree of criticality regarding the many geopolitical risks, the constant threat on Israel, the risk of nuclear proliferation and potential existing religious conflicts, the American presence as a deterrent seems necessary. In any case, the United States will have more freedom to choose its allies, as the criterion of energy supply will lose weight under other factors of political affinity. American energy independence will be good news for consumer countries in general and Europe in particular due to the economic benefits to be gained from greater diversification of supply. Some producing countries will lose influence and the relationship with them will not be conditioned by strategic weakness, which creates an imbalance in favor of the producer, but it could be based instead on mutual interest agreements. However, it is not very convenient to take overly optimistic views regarding the future of global energy. The growing energy needs of large emerging economies 23

24 "American energy independence will be good news for consumer countries in general and Europe in particular due to the economic benefits to be gained from greater diversification of supply" and regions will require an economic and technological effort unparalleled in history and international relations will not be without tension and conflict for these reasons. However, in the energy field, technological advances in the field of hydrocarbons and their consequences can provide the world with a period of lower stress that should be used to join forces and define a horizon of new technologies yet to be specified. papeles@fundacionfaes.org FAES, the Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis, does not necessarily identify with the opinions expressed in the texts it publishes. FAES, Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales and the authors. 24